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ABSTRACT 
Strategic group research originated in the 1970s and a number of notable studies 
centered on the US pharmaceutical industry. Results were however, conflicting. This 
thesis explores the nature of strategic groups and the related concept of competitive 
groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry during the period 1993 to 2002. The research 
follows three related themes. The first research theme identifies two stable strategic 
time periods each of five years duration across the period studied. Within each of these 
time periods strategic groups were identified using a combination of Ward's method 
and aK means clustering algorithm and the presence of a relatively stable strategic 
group structure was confirmed. A statistically significant relationship between these 
strategic groups and performance is demonstrated using three performance measures. 
The second research theme then explores the movement of firms between strategic 
groups and finds some support for the proposition that firms moving between strategic 
groups move to more advantageous positions. The relationship between strategic groups 
and mergers is also investigated and this research finds that mergers between firms 
occur preferentially across strategic groups rather than within strategic groups. This 
relationship is confirmed as highly statistically significant. Finally in the third research 
theme the relationship between strategic groups, how firms compete and competitive 
groups, where firms compete, are investigated. Six different competitive groups are 
identified, all but one of which is concentrated around a dominant therapeutic area. This 
finding suggests that direct competition between firms is reduced by market 
segmentation. A weak relationship was found between competitive groups and 
performance but when competitive groups (where firms compete) and strategic groups 
how firms compete) are examined in combination a strong statistically significant 
relationship with performance was found. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The research 
The aim of this research is to explore the relationship between strategic choice and 
performance in the UK pharmaceutical industry. The UK pharmaceutical industry was 
chosen as the setting for this research for two reasons. First, the UK pharmaceutical 
market is the sixth largest in the world but, with the exception of inclusion within a 
study of five E. C. countries (Martens, 1988), the UK market has been largely ignored. 
Second, the UK market is unusual in that the National Health Service (NHS), 
represented by the government, is virtually the sole purchaser of ethical 
pharmaceuticals. Ethical pharmaceuticals are those available only via prescription and 
not available for purchase by the general public. 
This research covers strategic choice in the UK pharmaceutical industry during the ten 
years from 1993 to 2002, a time period which is interesting because it encompasses 
perhaps the greatest changes to affect the National Health Service since its inception in 
1948. The research reported in this thesis explores the dynamics between firms that 
occurred during this turbulent period. In this study the strategic group concept is used as 
a vehicle to compare and contrast the strategies of firms. 
1.2 What are strategic groups and why are they important? 
Classification has always been an important part of scientific enquiry because in order 
to make sense of diversity and to compare and contrast objects, be they firms, animals 
or plants etc it is useful to separate each into like and dissimilar forms. The term 
strategic groups was introduced by Hunt (1972), who, in his industrial organization 
study of the US "White Goods" industry, first discovered, contrary to existing opinion, 
that different groups of firms, each pursuing alternative strategies, were present in that 
industry. However, despite the fact that Hunt first identified strategic groups the most 
popular definition of a strategic group is that provided by Porter (1980): 
"A strategic group is the group of firms in an industry following the same or a 
similar strategy along the strategic dimensions"(Porter, 1980 p 129). 
Within this definition strategic dimensions reflect the critical choices that firms make in 
choosing to compete. The strategic group idea was an important contribution to the 
industrial organization (10) literature because it offered the opportunity to accurately 
classify firm's strategies and compare and contrast the implications of a given set of 
strategic choices. Prior to this discovery, it was assumed that firms within a given 
industry each followed the same optimal strategy, where performance differences were 
solely attributable to the relative application of scale. 
From its origin in 10 research, the strategic groups concept was rapidly disseminated 
into strategic management theory, where it provided the opportunity to compare firms in 
terms of "how they compete". It offered a finer grained analysis of Porter's generic 
strategy continuum from low cost to differentiation. This opportunity sparked a large 
number of studies during the 1980s which produced rather equivocal results when it 
came to the link between strategic group membership and performance. 
This lack of a consistent link to performance can be traced to three main criticisms of 
strategic group research. Firstly, much of the theory base which underpins the strategic 
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group concept stems from 10 research that was supported by little in the way of 
empirical results. The strategic management stream of strategic group research followed 
on from this but, until relatively recently, contributed little to theory development. The 
result was a large number of separate research studies but little, if any, consistency 
between the 10 and strategic management streams. 
Secondly, these strategic management studies, even when conducted in the same 
industry, tended to operationalize strategy differently and there was little, if any, 
agreement on what constituted the main strategic choice variables within a given 
industry. This problem was compounded by a similar lack of consistency between the 
performance measures deployed. Thus the ability to draw valid comparisons between 
studies remained severely limited. 
Thirdly, the widespread use of exploratory techniques such as cluster analysis, often 
without a strong and consistent research design, gave support to the criticism that 
strategic groups were an artefact of method rather than a valid grouping of firms. 
Despite these early problems, however, arguably strategic group theory has emerged as 
a valuable research approach within strategic management and the modem researcher 
has the advantage of some excellent guidance as to how to conduct valid and consistent 
strategic group research. The ability to classify firms accurately according to the 
strategies which they deploy, allows the researcher to both compare and contrast the 
performance consequences of firms' strategy choices and to explore in detail the 
competitive dynamics of the industry in question. 
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1.3 The structure of this research 
Chapter two presents a review of the literature pertaining to strategic group research. By 
necessity this is a selective review but it presents an overview of strategic group 
research to date, its theory base and main themes. The chapter concentrates mainly upon 
discussing the key theories that underpin the strategic group concept and research 
within industries most relevant to pharmaceuticals. The chapter concludes by stating the 
research questions addressed in this thesis. 
Strategy does not occur in isolation but represents the firms' investments in building a 
strong market position. The environment surrounding the firm is therefore important 
because the opportunities and threats which each firm senses in its surroundings may be 
expected to impact upon the choice of strategy. As mentioned above the UK 
pharmaceutical market is unusual in being dominated by one main purchaser, the NHS, 
whose actions directly impinge upon the pharmaceutical firms that operate in the UK. 
Chapter three presents an overview of the key changes that occurred to the 
pharmaceutical industry's environment in the UK during the years encompassed by the 
research, namely 1993 - 2002. 
The key to any classification system is to understand the criteria by which objects, such 
as firms, are grouped. Chapter four examines strategic choice in the pharmaceutical 
industry and exposes the drivers which impact upon firms' strategies. An important 
objective of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the reasons why firms' strategies 
differ within the UK pharmaceutical industry and to present a list of variables which 
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may accurately reflect firms' strategies and which may be used to distinguish between 
them. 
The importance of method within strategic group research cannot be overestimated. 
Given the often voiced criticism that cluster analysis will produce clusters regardless of 
the true structure inherent in the data, it is important to deal effectively and confidently 
with this challenge. Fortunately, the modem researcher has the benefit of a number of 
excellent books and articles that provide precise advice on how to ensure that the 
analysis conducted is both valid, reproducible and accurate. In addition, the capabilities 
of the modem PC have moved on since the early empirical studies of strategic groups, 
and available clustering methods have similarly advanced. Chapter five presents the 
methodology and methods employed in this research and places particular emphasis 
upon addressing the earlier criticisms of method. 
A common weakness of strategic group research is the lack of comparability between 
studies. The research in this thesis aims in part to address this. The research presented in 
chapter six was conducted as far as possible, adopting the methods and variables, 
according to earlier strategic group research. That is to say that the period studied was 
first divided into stable strategic time periods and variables chosen wherever possible 
were equivalent to those employed in previous research. 
Chapter seven presents research upon the competitive dynamics within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry, during the ten years from 1993 to 2002. During this period 
there were several successive waves of consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry and 
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eighteen mergers. Previous research, as discussed in chapter six, specifically excluded 
merged firms, an omission which the research in this chapter seeks in part to redress. 
Chapter eight builds upon the research presented in chapter six and introduces the idea 
of competitive groups as representing where firms compete, as distinct from strategic 
groups which describe firms in terms of how they compete. The relationships between 
these two classifications are then explored and their performance implications tested. 
This chapter, therefore, brings together the two dimensions of Porter's generic 
strategies. The first continuum, from low cost to differentiation, is represented by 
strategic groups and the second, from broad to niche market, is represented by 
competitive groups. 
Chapter nine then presents an overview of the research reported in this thesis. These 
results are then discussed in the light of previous strategic group research. Then in the 
final chapter conclusions are drawn and suggestions for further avenues of enquiry 
emanating from the findings are proposed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The attraction of strategic group theory is the ability to compare and contrast strategic 
choices between groups of firms within a given industry. Despite concerns expressed as 
to the validity of the strategic group concept (Barney et al., 1990), to date no widely 
accepted equivalent alternative has emerged. This chapter presents the origins of 
strategic group research, exposes the theoretical foundations which underpin the idea 
and contrasts the different perspectives through which strategic group research has been 
pursued. A complementary classification but not widely accepted, is the concept of 
competitive groups, this classification is also presented and the similarities and 
differences to strategic groups are discussed. The principal difference between these two 
classifications is that strategic group membership describes how firms compete i. e. 
strategy adopted, as compared to competitive groups which describe where firms 
compete, i. e. choice of markets served. In effect these two classifications approximate to 
the two dimensions described by Porter's generic strategies. Strategic groups offer a 
finer grained alternative to Porter's low cost- differentiation strategy dimension. In 
contrast competitive groups provide a more precise classification of Porter's scope 
dimension which differentiates between broad and niche market choices (Porter, 
1980). The chapter concludes with a review of the gaps exposed in the current research 
before presenting the questions that the research reported in this thesis seeks to address. 
In contrast to previous research (Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987; Martens, 1988), it is 
not the aim here to address the broader strategy literature. This is a well trodden path 
and the breadth and diversity of strategic group research both warrants and merits more 
7 
focused attention. The focus here is firmly upon the origins, contribution and 
opportunities of the strategic group literature, particularly that research directly relevant 
to and situated upon the pharmaceutical industry. The aim of this chapter is to endorse 
the value of strategic group research as a means effectively to classify strategy and to 
position the current study within the wider context of strategic group research. 
Wherever possible direct links to previous pharmaceutical-based strategic group studies 
will be made clear, but one of the enduring problems of attempting to review strategic 
group literature is the diversity of studies in numerous empirical settings. 
2.1 Origin and Definitions: The Early Industrial Organisation (10) Studies 
The term "strategic group" was first coined by Hunt in 1972 in his thesis on 
"Competition in the Major Home Appliance Industry". Here, contrary to expectation, 
Hunt discovered a number of different groups of firms within an industry pursuing 
asymmetric strategies. This observation was of interest because it ran contrary to 
existing theory drawing from economics. At this time it was thought that all firms 
within a given industry would follow the optimal strategy for "wealth maximisation" 
within that industry. Differences between firms were not thought to arise through 
implementation of different strategies but mainly through the effect of the application of 
relative scale. Hunt named the groups of firms he identified "strategic groups" and 
defined a strategic group as: 
"a group of firms within the industry that are highly symmetric with respect to 
cost structure, the degree of vertical integration, and the degree of product 
differentiation, formal organisation, control systems, management 
rewards/punishments, and the personal views and preferences for various 
possible outcomes. "(Hunt, 1972, p 8) 
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Hunt's observation gave rise to a plethora of strategic group studies, but the strategic 
group idea was disseminated more widely with the publication of the book 
"Competitive Strategy" by Michael Porter in 1980. This introduced the idea of strategic 
groups to a wider readership including practitioners and provided a since widely 
employed definition of strategic groups as: 
"the group of firms in an industry following the same or a similar strategy along 
the strategic dimensions". (Porter, 1980, p129) 
This definition stems from two earlier statements by Porter, who had suggested; "that 
the strategy of the firm is the vector representing its choice for each of the major 
decision variables" (Porter, 1976). This statement was then developed in a later paper 
into: 
"An industry can thus be viewed as composed of clusters or groups of 
firms, where each group consists of firms following similar strategies in 
terms of the key decision variables ... I define such groups as strategic 
groups. Firms within a strategic group resemble one another closely. 
Between strategic groups however, the situation is different" (Porter, 
1979, p 215). 
Porter then proposed a number of "strategic dimensions" that should capture the 
possible differences among the strategic options of companies in a given industry. Note 
the reference to a specific industry. These dimensions are composed of various 
competitive methods that are listed as (Porter, 1980, p127-128): 
1. Specialisation 
2. Brand identification 
3. Push versus pull. Here, push refers to where the firm seeks to build an identified 
brand with the consumer where the consumer is motivated to ask for or actively 
seek the product. In contrast a pull strategy relies upon the support of 
distribution channels in selling the product. 
4. Channel selection 
5. Product quality 
6. Technological leadership 
7. Vertical integration 
8. Cost position 
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9. Service 
10. Price policy 
11. Leverage which refers to the ratio of debt to capital employed. A dimension that 
may also provide some indication as to the management's attitude to risk. 
12. Relationship with the parent company 
13. Relationship to home and host government 
It is important to note here that while some assistance was provided by Porter in 
defining which of these 13 strategic dimensions may be utilised, a general feature of 
strategic group research is a lack of consistency as to how the idea should be employed 
in practice. A reason for this, stems in many ways from the origins of strategic group 
research, which arises from not one but two potentially conflicting sources. In the first 
instance, strategic group research is a product of the Industrial Organisation (10) branch 
of economic theory. A number of, if not the majority of, the early "strategic group 
studies" (Hergert, 1983; Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1973; Porter, 1973; Porter, 1976) 
followed this perspective, which centred on research conducted at Harvard University. 
The theory that underpinned the 10 perspective was the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm (Bain, 1968; Mason, 1949), which proposed that industries were 
protected by entry barriers that prevented the free movement of firms into a given 
industry and hence allowed differential returns to persist. The assumptions that underlie 
the SCP paradigm were summarised in a recent review of strategic group theory 
(McGee, 2003): 
1. Technology is common to all firms and the only differential refers to relative 
scale. 
2. Production differs solely on scale and each firm owns one plant. 
3. Price is set by larger firms. 
4. No differences exist between firms except according to relative size. 
5. Uncertainty and knowledge asymmetries do not exist. 
6. Firms do not act opportunistically but rationally. 
7. No asset specificity exists. 
8. All firms in an industry are in direct competition. 
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Within industries all firms seek to maximise their profits and will attempt to follow the 
optimal strategy towards that end. All firms are not equal however, but differ in terms of 
relative size, where factors such as innovation or technological endowment are deemed 
to be a function of scale. 
In other words, in 10 theory the structure of the industry in terms of the relative size of 
its incumbents was what ultimately determined firm success, and firm conduct was in 
effect determined by relative industry position. Later revisions of the SCP concept 
(Porter, 1979; Scherer, 1980) suggested that collusion between competing firms could 
affect profits, thus there was a shift in opinion from S>c>P i. e. with structure driving 
performance where firm conduct was assumed to express a relatively minor role 
towards S>C>P with conduct becoming perceived equally as important as a determinant 
of industry profits. Previously it was thought that conduct was constrained by industry 
structure and that structure acted as the primary driver of industry performance. The 
ability of firm decisions to affect industry structure was therefore now acknowledged. 
The apparent paradox between the prevailing SCP theory and Hunt's subsequent 
observation prompted a number of studies aimed primarily at confirming the presence 
of intra-industry groups within a variety of industries. These intra-industry groups, or 
strategic groups, were interesting not only because they provided an opportunity to 
study the link between industry structure and performance, but because they provided 
the means to deconstruct industries into their salient parts and to compare and contrast 
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structural configurations between and across industries. These 10 studies generally 
followed a common prescription. 
1. A number of industries would be included in the study, frequently in excess of 
10. 
2. In direct support of the SCP paradigm, strategic choices would be reduced to no 
more than two or three variables (Hergert, 1983; Newman, 1973; Oster, 1982). 
Frequently one variable, namely FIRM SIZE, was taken as a proxy to represent 
strategic choice (Porter, 1973). 
3. Studies were of short duration and presented a quick "snapshot" view across a 
variety of often largely unrelated industries. The assumption was made that 
industries were in essence undifferentiated, regardless of customer group served 
or technology platform applied. 
4. The approach taken was invariably quantitative in nature. The selected variables 
were measured across a number of industries and groups were identified using 
either a strategic mapping technique (Harrigan, 1979) or through some form of 
clustering analysis. Availability of data appears to have been a principal driver 
of research activity, with the COMPUSTAT' database providing data on basic 
company statistics such as size, for a number of studies,, across a number of 
industries. 
5. The perspective taken was top down using strategic groups as a unit to break 
industries down into smaller groupings of firms and to compare and contrast the 
result for competition. 
1 For more than 35 years Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT data has been recognized as one of the 
financial information industry's leading resources for in-depth financial information on publicly traded 
companies in the US. and around the world. This database was widely used in some of the earlier 10- 
based strategic group studies. 
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The legacy of this early 10 research remains today through providing the enduring 
definition of what is meant by the term "strategic group" (see Porter's definition above) 
and more importantly because the assumptions that underpinned the SCP paradigm are 
not dead but persist in the theories that underpin the strategic group concept today. 
2.2 The Origins of Strategic Groups in Strategic Management Research 
Concomitant with the work at Harvard, researchers at Purdue University in the USA 
were also pursuing the idea of grouping firms and exploring the relationship between 
market structure, conduct and performance. The SCP paradigm forms a starting point in 
common with the early Harvard studies but each set of researchers adopted markedly 
different perspectives. 
The Purdue studies stem from two research theses. First, Hatten explored (via a simple 
equation) the idea of profitability as a function of strategic choice or conduct variables, 
which were under management control, and environmental or market structure 
variables, which were not (Hatten, 1974). This equation is simply presented as: 
PROFITABILITY =f (Strategic choice variables, Environmental variables) 
The context for Hatten's study was the US brewing industry during the period 1952 to 
1971. This was an industry chosen firstly because its firms engaged in only one 
business, brewing, hence business strategy was being measured without cross-industry 
or cross- product contamination (Hatten, 1974; Schendel et al., 1978, p1615). Secondly 
because the firms were each represented on the stock market and the required data sets 
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were readily available. A combination of cluster analysis and regression analysis was 
used to identify groups of firms and seven distinct groups were identified. These 
differed significantly in terms of profitability relationships from the industry average. A 
sub-industry structure of heterogeneous groups pursuing different strategies with 
different sets of performance relationships was therefore confirmed. 
It is worth noting here that despite encompassing 20 years of data, no attempt was 
made in this study to pursue industry dynamics and especially to investigate the firms 
that were eliminated from the industry during the period studied. Given that the 
objective was to investigate the effect of strategic choice upon performance within a 
changing industry context, this would appear to be a significant omission. 
A further study, by Patton, focused on same time period in the US brewing industry, but 
extended Hatten's work, moving beyond single equations to the use of a simultaneous 
equation model to investigate strategic choice and performance. Patton used size and 
geographical scope to split the industry into three groups, national, large regional and 
small regional brewers (Patton, 1976). The key differences between this approach and 
Hatten's was that Patton extended the left side of the equation from profitability, as 
measured by return on equity (ROE), to performance, which in addition included both 
market share, as a proxy for growth, and production efficiency. 
Patton demonstrated that the strategy construct could be mathematically modelled and 
identified key relationships between multiple dimensions of performance, managerially 
controlled variables, and non-controllable variables describing the external 
environment. 
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The Purdue studies were aimed at assisting senior management to quantify the value of, 
strategic choice on market performance by building a bridge between the 
qualitative approaches of corporate strategy and the model building techniques of IO. 
The early work at Purdue by Hatten and Patton established a pattern that was to become 
the norm for the majority of strategic group studies within strategic management. These 
traits included that of taking an industry specific context, using a number of different 
variables as proxies for strategy, considering the industry over a time period, and 
identifying strategic groups on the basis of an inductive "mathematical" approach rather 
than by prior theory. A common problem, which is repeated many times in subsequent 
strategic group studies is also exhibited. That is, despite a common industry and time 
period, the variables chosen to identify groups differ between studies and even between 
papers by the same researchers, which calls into question the researchers' ability 
objectively to select those variables that best describe strategic choice within a given 
industry. This latter point is illustrated in Table 2.1 that compares the Hatten and Patton 
published studies on strategic groups within the US brewing industry (Hatten et al., 
1978a; Hatten et al., 1978b; Schendel et al., 1978). The table shows that despite a 
similar sample size within the same industry, there is considerable variation in both the 
number of variables chosen to represent conduct and the nature of those variables. 
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Table 2.1 Strategic group studies in the US brewing industry 
Hatton & Schendel Hatten, Schendel & Schendel & Patton 
(1977) Cooper (1978) (1978) 
Sample 13 Firms 13 Firms 12 Firms 
Conduct Variables 3 Manufacturing 5 Manufacturing 16 Strategic & 
3 Marketing 5 Marketing Operational 
2 Environmental 2 Financial 7 Environmental 
4 Environmental 
Total Number of 8 16 23 
Conduct Variables 
Dependent Return on Equity Return on Equity Return on Equity 
Variables Production Efficiency 
Market Share 
In conclusion, despite differences in approach within the 10 and strategic management 
studies into strategic groups it is possible to discern a number of links to the SCP 
paradigm in both the early Harvard and Purdue studies. The principal Harvard studies 
adopted a theory of the heterogeneity of industries and through their cross-industry 
studies sought to deconstruct industries into a series of heterogeneous groups, each of 
which was homogeneous in character. In effect the SCP paradigm was shifted from 
industry to sub-industry level with entry barriers becoming intra-industry mobility 
barriers. But the same ideas of relative size, collusion, and performance being mainly a 
result of structural configuration, remained largely in place. In contrast, the Purdue 
studies gave greater importance to the firm's strategic decisions, but adopted originally 
a simplistic view. In these studies strategic choice was assumed to drive performance 
and between structure and performance the firm was seen as little more than a "black 
box". The general idea of strategy was over-simplified and ignored the process of 
strategy implementation or the ways in which tacit activities contribute to the building 
of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney, 1997). 
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The legacy of these early studies is, however still present and important in modem 
strategic group research. The Purdue strategic management approach has emerged as the 
dominant model in strategic group inquiry, which marks the shift from a multi-industry 
"snapshot, " static, approach, based on mapping one or two variables, towards the single 
industry multivariate, often longitudinal, study based upon cluster analysis. This has 
become the norm in strategic group research today. The early Purdue approach, 
however, has contributed little to theory building (McGee, 2003). In contrast, while the 
methods employed by the IO researchers have declined, the theories provided by the 
Harvard School still provide the theoretical base that underpins the concept of strategic 
groups today. 
2.3 The Twin Pillars of Modern Strategic Group Theory: Mobility barriers and the 
scope for collusion. 
Post Hunt's observation, two key theories were proposed to explain persistent intra- 
industry performance differences. Both these theories emanated from 10 research. 
Together they provide the complementary twin pillars upon which strategic group 
theory is still based. The first is the theory of mobility barriers. Caves and Porter 
suggested that firms cannot move at will within industries due to the presence of intra- 
industry barriers (Caves et al., 1977). These barriers result from the collective actions of 
groups of firms within an industry, which protect each strategic grouping from outside 
competition. Firms within a strategic group are assumed to be sensitive to their 
interdependency and are therefore likely to react similarly to competitive changes. 
Activities like advertising or R&D research expenditure can create an effective barrier 
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to entry, which is difficult to vault without the expenditure of considerable time and 
money (Cool et al., 1994; McGee et al., 1986). In the pharmaceutical industry, for 
example, patents may provide a number of years of "market exclusivity". Mobility 
barriers are classified in the literature into those that are market related, such as 
advertising, sales force size and breadth of product line, and those that are asset related, 
such as product patents (McGee, 2003). There is a clear link between mobility barriers 
in strategic group research and the earlier work of Bain (1968) and Mason (1949) on 
industry entry barriers in 10 research. 
Intra-industry mobility barriers can arise as the result of "collective activities" by group 
members. But it appears equally plausible that firms may mimic the actions of a 
reference firm, recognised in some sense as the group "leader" (Fiegenbaum et al., 
1995), producing a similar result. In a study of the UK grocery retailing industry Curto 
observed that "companies have important reference points in the industry and what 
other firms do plays a part in the decision taken (Curto, 1998, p 352, )" The height of the 
mobility barrier is expected to determine the profit potential of a given strategic group, 
in accord with entry barrier theory (Bain, 1959; Mason, 1939). The distance between 
groups may be used as a proxy for the height of the mobility barriers separating them 
(Caves et al., 1992; Caves et al., 1977). It has also been suggested that companies may 
enter an industry via the least protected strategic group. Once inside the industry, they 
may then penetrate more profitable strategic groups through the acquisition of 
knowledge, relevant assets and experience (Caves et a!., 1977). Thus, a "stepping stone" 
theory has been advanced to explain intra-industry competition (Caves et al., 1977; 
McGee et al., 1986). 
18 
The second pillar of strategic group theory, alongside mobility barriers, proposes that 
intra-industry rivalry will be most severe when two conditions are present (Porter, 1976; 
Porter, 1979). First, when there is a marked difference in size between strategic groups 
there will be an in-balance in bargaining power. This may result in strong rivalry. If, 
however, the strategic groups are equally powerful then collusion is more likely to 
occur and an agreement may be reached on how to compete without costly and 
destructive competition. Secondly, if strategic groups serve the same markets, via 
common customers, and pursue similar strategies, then a common view of the market 
may emerge. With reputations intertwined, companies are more likely to co-operate in 
order to maximise returns and minimise marketing costs. In contrast if firms pursue 
common markets but employ different strategies they are less likely to co-operate and 
are more likely to compete away profits or engage in destructive price competition. 
The height of the mobility barrier acts as some insulation from rivalry as does operation 
in non-related markets, but all things being equal firms that offer substitute products by 
different means are more likely to engage in destructive rivalry than those which apply 
closely similar strategies to common markets. The latter will be more likely to 
understand each other's motives and reach some "understanding" on how to compete. 
However, the concept of mobility barriers and intra-group structure is not seen as totally 
explanatory of performance differences. Moderator variables, such as firm specific 
attitudes to risk, different asset stocks or the ability to execute a given strategy, may all 
play a part in determining performance (Porter, 1979; Porter, 1980). 
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2.4 Two Further Decades of Strategic Group Research: Much Exploration but 
More Heat than Light? 
From these origins, research on strategic groups then went into a phase during the 1980s 
where various researchers looked to verify the findings of the earlier research, in 
different industrial settings, and employing different performance variables. For 
example, Hergert (Hergert, 1983) explored the incidence of strategic groups within fifty 
US manufacturing industries; risk was independently used as a definitive variable by 
Ryans and Baird (Baird et al., 1983; Ryans et al., 1985), generic strategies by Dess and 
Davis (Dess et al., 1984) and the industry life cycle by Primeaux (Primeaux, 1985). The 
research results were mixed. Contemporary reviews (McGee, 1985; McGee et al., 1986) 
pointed to the sensitivity of strategic group analysis to the choice of variables adopted 
and to the difficulties of comparing strategies across different industries. The conclusion 
was that detailed knowledge and understanding of an industry and its context were 
necessary in order to specify adequately the variables to be included in any useful 
strategic group analysis. This was a clear criticism of earlier 10 studies with their 
application of general concepts and tools of analysis across industries. This critique was 
later picked up and adapted by Barney and Hoskisson (Barney et al., 1990), who argued 
that strategic groups are an artefact of the research methodology employed. In 
particular, the statistical technique of cluster analysis, commonly used in studies to 
identify strategic groupings, could be problematic. 
Cluster analysis chooses the best fit for the data between, for example, a three group or 
four group solution, but it does not clarify whether clustering the data is appropriate in 
the first place (Ketchen et al., 1996). This is because clustering analysis acts to combine 
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groups on the basis of a given similarity matrix. Groups are formed on the basis of 
relative distance, but cluster analysis relies strongly on the intuition of the researcher 
and provides no hard test as to whether clustering the data into groups is appropriate or 
not. 
These criticisms of strategic group theory, as it had developed especially in the 10 
literature from 1972 to the mid-1980s, led to a further phase of research. This phase 
focused especially on a number of key themes, namely: (1) the further exploration of the 
concept of mobility barriers (Mascarenhas, 1989; Mascarenhas et al., 1989); (2) how 
strategic groups form; (3) the stability of strategic groups over time (Cool, 1985; Cool et 
al., 1994; Cool et al., 1987a; Cool et al., 1987b; Fiegenbaum, 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 
1985; Fiegenbaum et al., 1987; Martens, 1988; Oster, 1982); (4) the application of 
generic strategies; (5) the idea of cognitive groups (Porac et al., 1994; Reger, 1988); (6) 
intra-group dynamics; and (7) the idea of natural selection and population ecology 
(Boeker, 1991; Carroll et al., 1992; Hannan et al., 1977). Each of these developments is 
now briefly reviewed. 
2.5 Further Exploration of Mobility barriers 
Research into mobility barriers and strategic groupings in the 1980s built on the ideas of 
Caves and Porter (Caves et al., 1980; Caves et al., 1977). McGee concluded that 
mobility barriers are a counterpart of group structures and arise from strategic decisions 
(McGee et al., 1986). Decisions which affect the height of the mobility barrier are 
critical and may be expected to arise as the result of judgments that, 
"cannot be readily imitated by firms outside the group without substantial costs, 
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substantial elapsed time or uncertainty about the outcome of the decisions"(McGee et 
al., 1986, p 150). 
McGee also proposed a useful taxonomy of mobility barriers; distinguishing between 
market-related strategies, industry-supply characteristics and firm characteristics. It is 
noteworthy that the mobility barriers included were endogenous to the firm and 
therefore were strategic decisions under management control (McGee, 2003; McGee et 
al., 1986). All mobility barriers are not equal, however. Some, like pharmaceutical 
patents, are the result not just of heavy continued expenditure but require long periods 
of elapsed time to garner the experience and build the team necessary to produce 
productive, leading-edge, research. In contrast, mobility barriers like sales force size can 
be overcome by application of sufficient money, through for example a parent company 
with "deep pockets" financing the hire of appropriate numbers of salespeople from an 
outsourcing agency. Although not all companies can employ such tactics to equal 
effect, for example in a study of the grocery industry, it was found that "larger retailers 
were more able to take advantage of superstore development... than other companies 
because of their relative size" (Curto, 1998, p 345, ). 
Mascarenhas and Aaker (Mascarenhas et al., 1989) studying the performance 
implications of strategic groups within the oil industry considered that the concept of 
mobility barriers was pivotal to the strategic group concept they, therefore, proposed a 
further definition of a strategic group, namely: 
"A grouping of businesses within an industry that is separated from other 
groupings of businesses by mobility barriers, barriers to entry and exit" 
(Mascarenhas et al., 1989, p 475). 
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They concluded that mobility barriers are much more about "who you are" and are 
resource dependent than "what you do" or the actions taken. This position was 
supported by Mehra and Floyd (1998) who argued that industries are not equal, as 
originally assumed within 10 research, but differ significantly in terms of product 
market heterogeneity, the available space for different strategic groups to occupy, and in 
terms of resource inimitability. These, they argue, are the building blocks of mobility 
barriers. Their theory proposes that strategic groups can only exist and persist over time 
if there is sufficient heterogeneity of market positions within the industry and firms 
possess the basis to build sustainable mobility barriers. A four cell model was then 
suggested by Mehra and Floyd based on two axes, the degree of product/market 
heterogeneity and the degree of resource inimitability. This theory seeks to explain why 
some industry studies have failed to find significant performance differences between 
groups. It proposes that the stability of groups and the number of expected groupings 
should be predictable in advance based on these two parameters (Mehra et al., 1998). 
Exploring the conditions under which sustainable performance differences may persist, 
(Dranove et al., 1998) reiterate that an effective mobility barrier must be in place to 
prevent entry or imitation by outside competition and, in addition, a group-level effect 
must occur as the result of intra-group strategic interactions. These group interactions 
change the way firms compete. They may take the form of market power effects, such 
as the price fixing by some pharmaceutical companies that was recently alleged to have 
occurred within the UK (Burleigh, 2003 p. 480). Group interactions may lead to 
efficiency gains, for example through common co-promotion agreements. Alternatively, 
the group members may benefit from consumer preference. This may be due to an 
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enhanced group reputation or more effective promotion of products, for example 
through fielding a large sales force. 
The findings of Dranove et al (1998) were confirmed in an empirical study of the 
Japanese Steel industry (Nair & Filler, 2003, ). This study used cointegration analysis to 
examine the relationship between firm behaviour and strategic group membership. The 
authors concluded that strategies may take a long time to adjust and suggested that 
group membership determined interaction between members. These adjustments 
support the proposition that firm moves are often made in alignment with reference 
firms, but that when environmental shocks occur firms' responses vary and they may 
either converge towards a common strategy or diverge away from it. 
In the studies by Mascarenhas and Aaker, mobility is higher between less protected 
similar groups because market entry requires overcoming relatively fewer mobility 
barriers. This finding is consistent with the argument in Caves and Porter (Caves et al., 
1977) and the "stepping stone" idea advanced by McGee and Thomas (McGee et al., 
1986). Therefore, Mascarenhas and Aaker provided a research focus based on a 
common strategy conceptualisation of strategic groups. The tacit element of strategic 
decisions was brought more squarely into the argument. They concluded from their 
research that: 
"The results suggest credibility for the strategic group concept motivated by 
mobility barriers ........ A high degree of group stability was observed, ... indicating that mobility barriers did exist... " (Mascarenhas et al., 1989, p 484). 
Mobility barriers have continued to be a key concept that underpins the idea of strategic 
groups, providing the means by which sustained performance differences between 
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groups can exist (Porter, 1980). However, mobility barriers, as originally described 
(Caves et al., 1977), included a policy of collusion in which firms could act in concert 
to promote their common interest by building high entry barriers in order to protect 
group profits. This idea, analogous to groups of residents building the walls of a 
medieval city to repel invaders, was not, however, born out by subsequent research. It 
seemed more probable that a number of firms made similar investments due to the 
similarity of strategies pursued by firms within a particular strategic group rather than 
because of collusion. For example, through focusing upon similar research and 
development targets, or by the deployment of similarly sized sales forces. This could be 
prompted by following the lead of an individual firm, perceived as a reference point by 
other group members (Bogner, 1991; Fiegenbaum et aL, 1995). 
The question of which variables to select in order to define strategic groups therefore 
became a matter of which mobility barriers best describe the structural components of 
an industry that prevent the free movement of firms between groups. Arguably, only a 
handful of key decisions may prove to be of significance. For example, employing 
Porter's generic "differentiation" strategy (Porter, 1980), firms might invest heavily or 
selectively in research and development where patents provide an important mobility 
barrier. Recent research suggests that R&D presents a structural barrier based more 
upon the stochastic probability of finding a viable and attractive new product than being 
the result of similar or collusive actions by group members (Lee et al., 2002): 
"we focus on the entry limiting effect due to the inherent difficulty of 
developing a high end product. Thus, it is more appropriate to consider this 
difficulty as a structural barrier than a barrier erected by incumbents" (Lee et al., 
2002, p 731. ). 
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In conclusion, the use of mobility barriers to define strategic groups remains central to 
the theory. Strategic groups cannot persist without mobility barriers, therefore 
identification of meaningful strategic groups becomes, in part, a process of identifying 
the key strategic decisions that build and sustain market position within a given 
industry. 
2.6 How strategic groups form? 
Allied to the idea of mobility barriers as bulwarks that sustain intra-industry structure 
and allow group structure to persist over time, is the question as to how the differences 
that give rise to group positions develop in the first place. In their 1977 article, Caves 
and Porter infer that random differences result in different starting points for firms that 
make individual choices dependant, for example, upon their attitude to risk: 
"Assume an industry with firms virtually identical in all aspects except for 
random differences in scale. One firm undertakes an investment and alters its 
strategy to place entrants to the industry at a disadvantage. The investment in 
higher barriers also affects the firm's competitive posture vis-a-vis its actual 
rivals, who react either by matching the initiating strategy or by adopting 
different ones more suitable to their initial sizes. If the rivals opt for 
systematically different strategies, we have the basis for a group structure" 
(Caves et al., 1977, p 253). 
Tang and Thomas propose that strategic groups form because firms in an industry need 
to interpret similar sets of competitive cues and problems over time. Through imitative 
behaviour firms create group level beliefs about the competitive space and the authors 
suggest a model of spatial location competition, which posits that relocation costs 
determine the group structure of industries with differentiable products (Tang et al., 
1992). A firm's strategy is described as a location point in space surrounded by the 
variables that describe the firm's strategy. The height of mobility barriers is represented 
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by the costs of relocation inherent in these strategy variables. Some variables, for 
example research costs, represent more permanent investments that are difficult to alter, 
while others such as price or advertising are more easily adjusted. In industries with 
moderate to high relocation costs, a group structure is predicted. This model is similar 
to that proposed by Mehra et al, who suggested that a stable strategic group structure 
was an industry specific phenomenon, more likely to occur in industries with a 
combination of high product/market heterogeneity and strong differentiation based on 
inimitable factors, such as R&D (Mehra et al., 1998). 
The importance of market heterogeneity was also discussed by Duyster, who stated that: 
"as many companies compete in different markets, strategic group formation 
should not be identified in terms of the companies' main economic activities but 
in particular be related to their multi market competitive positioning" (Duyster et 
al., 1995, p 361. ). 
Work on modelling the evolution of strategic group structures led the authors to 
conclude that four factors were important in determining whether stable strategic group 
structures will arise in a given industry, namely mobility barriers, the degree of 
interaction between high performers, the extent to which rivalry extends across firms 
pursuing dissimilar strategies, and the presence of dynamic capabilities. In particular, 
the authors demonstrate numerically that strategic groups are not likely to emerge and 
persist where dynamic capabilities, or the ability to refresh market positions, are absent 
(Lee et al., 2002). 
More recently these ideas have been extended by empirical work that proposes a 
mechanism where by innovators invested more consistently in antibiotic research than 
imitators in the US Pharmaceutical industry and that this difference over time gave rise 
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to a group structure: 
"We estimate that, on average, innovators introduced eight times as many new 
chemical entities as did imitators between 1940 and 1960. In contrast, imitators 
did not commit resources to R&D and remained peripheral to innovation. In 
sum, our results support a main theme in the strategic group literature: Strategic 
divergence can emerge and persist in an industry" (Lee, 2003). 
Clearly the higher the relocation costs between different groups, the greater the group 
stability and visa-versa, a theme explored in the next section. 
2.7 Strategic group stability 
Oster's work on the stability of strategic group intra-industry structures over time 
(Oster, 1982) followed the methodology of Porter and defined strategic groups on the 
basis of high and low advertisers. She then explored the dynamics of strategic group 
membership within 19 US consumer goods industries, between 1971 and 1977. Her 
principal findings were that strategic groups were stable structures with a low degree of 
movement between groups. Oster's study deserves attention because it was the first 
attempt to assess empirically the extent of inter-group mobility. However, the method 
adopted can be criticised for the use of an overly-simple identification of group 
membership, i. e. low vs. high advertisers. Also, by measuring annual changes there is 
possibly an assumption that firms change group membership on an annual basis. 
The work of several other researchers (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987; 
Martens, 1988) on strategic group stability shared a common methodology. Firstly, an 
extensive industry analysis was conducted in order to identify industry specific 
variables. These were then operationalised to identify strategic groups. Secondly, stable 
strategic time periods (SSTPs) were identified between which changes in strategic 
group membership could be observed. Thirdly, an extensive industry analysis was 
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conducted in order to identify industry specific variables, which were then 
operationalised to identify strategic groups. 
The three studies by Cool, Fiegenbaum and Martens explored the dynamics of strategic 
groups over a considerable time period and attempted to illustrate consistent 
performance differences between groups. The work of Cool (1985) focused on the US 
pharmaceutical industry between 1963 and 1982 and that of Fiegenbaum (1987) on the 
US insurance industry over a 15 year period. Fiegenbaum identified five to seven 
strategic groups within the period of his study, and found significant performance 
differences between the three main strategic groups that he identified for all SSTPs 
(with the exception of his risk adjusted performance measure, which was only 
significant for one stable strategic time period). An interesting element of the study was 
the attempt to measure firm movement towards industry benchmarks, where 
Fiegenbaum found some support for the idea of the strategic group as a reference point. 
Also, in contrast to Cool, who identified four SSTPs over a 20 year time span, 
Fiegenbaum identified nine, with the majority lasting for only one year. Fiegenbaum 
attributed this primarily to the degree of turbulence within the US insurance industry, 
driven by price and regulatory changes. However, it is worth noting that the US 
pharmaceutical industry also faced considerable turbulence during the 20 year period 
studied by Cool, so this explanation for the larger number of SSTP's found by 
Fiegenbaum may not be valid. 
In another study, this time of railroad firm strategies before and after regulation, five 
strategic groups were identified and it was found that most firms changed their 
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strategies in response to environmental variation. Strategic changes involving 
innovation or contingency strategies proved the most profitable and the authors 
concluded that firms that changed their strategies out-performed those that did not 
(Smith et al., 1987). 
These studies illustrate some of the idiosyncrasy between different industries, which 
underlines the difficulty of making valid comparisons between very different industries. 
For example, despite the similarity in methodology and the performance measures 
chosen by both Cool and Fiegenbaum, the US insurance and pharmaceutical industries 
each operate to their own industry norms and rules of engagement. The drivers in one 
industry may be very different to those of another and caution should perhaps be taken 
when drawing conclusions on similarity across different industries. 
The study by Martens (Martens, 1988) built on Cool's study and addressed the same 
industry, pharmaceuticals, although in Martens' case across five EC member countries. 
A longitudinal study was adopted, measuring strategic group dynamics encompassing 
41 pharmaceutical companies over an eight year period, between 1978 and 1985. 
Martens observed that the strategic group structure is not a very stable phenomenon in 
the EC pharmaceutical industry and that firms in groups that had a relatively low 
strategic distance experienced many strategic group shifts. He concluded that: 
".. the pharmaceutical industry is not always structured into clear distinct 
strategic groups. the concept of strategic distance or strategic asymmetry can be 
relevant in this respect and certainly deserves further attention in the strategic 
group theory and research. Comparing pairs of strategic groups on several 
strategy dimensions may reveal the closeness of strategic groups and may also 
give an indication of the strategic groups from which most strategic group shifts 
maybe expected" (Martens, 1988, p 344). 
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In a similar type of study, Bogner (1991) looked at the US pharmaceutical market for a 
period of 20 years between 1969 and 1988. Bogner studied strategic group dynamics 
and examined various hypotheses as to why firms change their grouping and under what 
circumstances. Using a methodology similar to that in previous strategic group research 
(Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987; Martens, 1988) and two distinct sets of analysis, 
Bogner showed that patterns of strategic group dynamics certainly exist. But he also 
found that the underlying nature of these patterns is not consistent with what had been 
assumed to underlie strategic group structures and their dynamics in earlier research. 
Using paired questions, he first explored the extent to which strategic groups reflected 
past performance and whether strategic groups could be used accurately to predict 
future market positions. He then considered the effect of the environment using a 
similar set of paired questions, one reflecting past responses and the other future 
actions. He concluded that strategic groups are not simply cognitive creations but are 
derived from artefacts of strategic intent, resource allocations and product introductions. 
Strategic groups are based upon managers' decisions based on individual firm 
performance and objectives and not on some group homogeneity. 
In a second set of questions Bogner explored whether firms change groups at times of 
environmental turbulence, something predicted by mobility barrier theory because 
barriers are likely to be lowered at a time of environmental flux. Contrary to 
expectation, firms were found to move at all times and the changes were not driven by a 
single environmental opportunity. This result is consistent with a less deterministic view 
of strategic group theory and stands in stark contrast especially to the conclusions from 
traditional IO. In particular it challenges the widely held belief that strategic groups are 
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differentially impacted by changes within the operating environment. Bogner concluded 
that the factors that led managers to move their firms out of a grouping are unrelated in 
time or focus to the occasional disruptions in the pattern of competition within the 
industry at large. He also concluded that a firm's ability to move is not wholly 
constrained by environmental or mobility barriers, whether during a stable strategic 
time period or at a break between SSTPs. Mobility barriers are discussed in terms of the 
result of internal choices within firms not in terms of uncontrollable external events. 
Bogner argued that firms adjust their competitive position based on benchmarking 
within their strategic group. Economically profitable firms are ones that have the 
flexibility to act on changes in perception, manage to acquire appropriate assets, and 
change their competitive postures accordingly. If a firm is not performing to group 
standards, the reference position, then proactive choices can be made to improve 
competitiveness. His notion of the competitive group adds to the idea of strategic 
choice. Bogner's study supports the proposition that mobility barriers are not something 
in the environment imposed upon the firm but result from the firm's own actions. 
2.8 The Application of Generic Strategies 
The discussion so far has highlighted the richness of strategic group theory, as well as 
its weaknesses and some inconsistencies. One of the most enduring of these weaknesses 
is that without prior theory as to the number and broad differences between groups, it is 
difficult to defend against the charge that strategic groups are an artefact of the 
application of cluster analysis to a data set (Tang et al., 1992; Thomas et al., 1988). 
Moreover, a discussion of the development of strategic group theory alone cannot 
provide a conclusive comment on its value for future management research. To go 
further we need to establish the desirable characteristics of a strategy classification 
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scheme for research and assess obvious alternatives to that offered by strategic group 
theory (Leask et al., 2003a). 
Previous research has argued that the world of organizations is too complex to permit 
the development of any comprehensive typology capable of encompassing every form 
of organizational behaviour (Miles et al., 1978). This is a sentiment supported by 
Hawes and Crittenden, who conclude: "Therefore it may be more appropriate to focus 
on a limited domain of competitive strategy that appears particularly amenable to 
understanding" (Hawes et al., 1984, p 277). 
When reviewing the use of generic strategy templates, for the study of competitive 
strategy, it is perhaps useful to reflect on what characteristics a strategy classification 
system should comprise of to provide a useful basis for management research and 
practice. The following suggestions are provided here to aid the comparison between 
generic strategy classifications and their use within strategic group research (Leask et 
al., 2003b). 
1. Provide a meaningful classification of strategies employed within an industry 
recognized by managers within that industry as valid. 
2. Allow competitive dynamics over time to be effectively measured and 
evolutionary pathways traced. 
3. Permit flexibility in the use of a wide range of different strategies utilizing both 
quantitative data and qualitative and "perceptual" information. 
4. Enable a fine grained analysis of strategies within an industry, allowing a 
detailed and meaningful classification based on multiple possible groupings 
rather than a highly restricted set. 
5. Be readily accessible to and useable by managers. 
Two obvious alternative strategy classifications to strategic groups for research in 
strategic management are Porter's "generic strategies" and the Miles and Snow's 
"typologies". 
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Porter's approach to generic strategies plots companies along two simple dimensions, 
the breadth of their product/market offering against the choice of selling on price as 
"lowest cost producer" or differentiating on product benefits or other added value 
(Porter, 1980). Porter thus offers four broad positioning alternatives, namely broad 
market vs. focus and low cost vs. differentiation. The advantage of the generic strategies 
approach lies in its simplicity and comparative ease of application. All of the data 
necessary to populate the model are usually readily available. The principal weakness of 
generic strategy theory is that it represents a blunt and crude measure to identify and 
portray subtle patterns of strategic choice. It does not allow the sophisticated separation 
of different but broadly similar strategic choices nor does it recognize the importance of 
the relative position of firms in their ability to capitalize upon a given opportunity. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, a primary driver is the supply of new 
products. But Porter's classification does not allow for the separation of companies 
employing an extensive licensing programme within a differentiation strategy, for 
instance as pursued by the company Wyeth, as against a strategy based primarily upon 
researching own compounds, as adopted by Merck. It must also be recognized that 
research costs are likely to be a significant mobility barrier in the industry. 
Pharmaceutical companies are forced by the economics of the research process to 
employ a differentiated marketing approach, targeted at the broadest market possible, to 
recoup their research costs before patent expiry. Therefore, while the product/market 
dimension has some value within this industry, the differentiated vs. low cost dimension 
is too blunt to provide significant explanatory power. 
Porter's generic strategies may, however, be perceived as supra groupings into which 
different sets of strategic groups may fit; a conclusion hinted at by Porter: 
"The three generic strategies represent three broad and consistent approaches to 
successful strategic positioning .... They are different broad types of strategic 
groups that can be successful depending on the economics of the particular 
industry"(Porter, 1980, p 152). 
In other words, strategic group theory provides the potentially fine grained analysis that 
can be nested in the concept of generic strategy. In a study of 22 independent firms 
within the paint and allied products industry Dess and Davis tested Porter's assertion 
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that 
"Firms oriented towards specific strategies should outperform firms 
characterized by Porter as "stuck in the middle". Porter maintains that this latter 
class of firms by failing to develop its strategy along at least one of these three 
categories is almost guaranteed low profitability(Porter, 1980, p 41)" 
In a carefully designed study involving interviews of top management and the use of an 
expert panel, together with factor and cluster analyses, four separate patterns of strategy 
were uncovered analogous to focus, differentiation, low cost and "stuck in the middle". 
The three "generic strategies" consistently out performed firms that had failed to align 
to a specific generic strategy (Dess et al., 1984). These results are consistent with 
similar research conducted on 54 firms within the Korean electronics industry, where 
once again four strategic groups were identified and firms without a clear cut generic 
strategy performed less well that those using generic strategies (Kim et a1., 1988). A 
simpler technique was employed to identify strategic groups following generic 
strategies in the airlines industry (Kling et al., 1995). Using a competitive mapping 
technique (Porter, 1980, p152), cost per seat mile was mapped against airline quality 
rating, revealing strategic groups largely consistent with the prescriptions of the Porter 
model. Martens (1988) compared the strategic groups that he identified within the 
pharmaceutical industry in terms of generic strategies and found that "although some 
strategic groups resembled some of the generic strategy types.. . some groups 
had 
characteristics common to several generic strategy types" (Martens, 1988, p 344). He 
concluded that generic strategy types may be more valuable in comparing groups of 
firms stemming from several industries, in which a higher level of generalization is 
unavoidable. 
The Miles and Snow typology (Miles et al., 1978) differentiates firms into four 
groupings - defender, prospector, analyzer and reactor. Again two key dimensions are 
used to separate firms, namely breadth of product/market domain, a dimension also 
chosen by Porter, and the degree of environmental uncertainty. The nub of Miles and 
Snow's argument hinges on three points. Firstly, that managerial or strategic choice 
represents the primary link between an organization and its environment. Secondly, that 
management's ability to understand and manage the organization's interaction with its 
environment is the key to success. Thirdly, that a primary distinguishing factor between 
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organization types is the multiple ways that management responds to environmental 
cues. In essence, the Miles and Snow typology broadly classifies firms into three 
discernable strategic types and "reactors", which arguably represents a catch all 
category representing no clear strategy. This might be seen as similar to Porter's "stuck 
in the middle". The primary variables used to classify firms and position them along the 
two dimensions are product/market domain, growth engine, technology, planning, 
structure, control, performance appraisal and co-ordination. Clearly, the last five of 
these variables are all "internal" to the firm and effectively invisible to the external 
observer. Therefore, to apply Miles and Snow's typology in research requires the 
gathering of perceptual information. This brings with it the attendant problems of 
distinguishing between realized and intended strategy, while the mapping of 
evolutionary changes is also rendered problematic. Thus, while Miles and Snow's 
classification allows the consideration of a number of variables, the taxonomy presents 
problems with regard to data gathering, ease of application and interpretation. 
Despite these limitations, the Miles and Snow typology has been successfully used to 
identify strategic groups in a number of industries. A study of 478 US supermarket 
chain stores used an 18 variable Likert scale questionnaire to elicit strategy responses 
from senior executives. The data were analysed using cluster analysis and multivariate 
analysis of variance. The results revealed four distinct strategy types within the generic 
branded grocery market. The four strategic groups identified were aggressive initiators, 
conservative reactors, submissive defenders and non-participants. These were broadly 
similar to the classifications suggested by Miles and Snow. A significant difference was 
found between the strategic groups, with aggressive initiators consistently 
outperforming the other strategic groups (Hawes et al., 1984). 
In another study, of this time 47 US electronic manufacturing firms, a questionnaire 
was used to classify firms into four strategic groups. The authors found consistent 
differences between the analyzer and prospector groups, but a number of inconsistencies 
were found between the defender group and Miles and Snow's defender categorization. 
On balance, the findings offered modest support for the Miles and Snow typology 
(Smith et al., 1989). 
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The combination of generic strategies with strategic group theory provides the ability to 
build a more solid and useful framework. A criticism of some strategic group research is 
that it lacks a sound theoretical base a priori. This charge stems from the suggestion 
that strategic groups are an artefact of method (Barney et al., 1990). Use of generic 
strategies as a template provides a theoretical framework into which strategic group 
theory can be nested. Strategic group theory in exchange provides the means to classify 
firms' strategies with more precision than the differentiation low cost dichotomy that 
was suggested by Porter(Porter, 1980). 
2.9 Cognitive groups 
Another approach that developed in the 1980s to define strategic groups is referred to as 
"cognitive research". Cognitive research is based on the notion that perception is reality 
and that an understanding of decision processes can help to separate strategic groups. 
Cognitive groupings may be expected to capture both participant perceptions and 
indications of future action. The cognitive research theme encompasses the idea that 
managers construct market models based on their personal perceptions of competition, 
which may differ from objective reality. It is assumed that "through processes involving 
induction, problem solving and reasoning decision makers construct a mental model of 
the competitive environment" (Porac et al., 1994, p. 119). These models are used both 
to determine who are the competition and where the corporate focus should be applied 
when competing. The outcome of realised strategy then rests, ultimately, upon the 
institutional and cognitive constructions of decision makers. Porac et al. introduce the 
idea of primary competitive groups, defined as 
"the collection of firms that define each other as rivals" (Porac et al., 1989, p. 414). 
This is an approach similar to that of Bogner who introduced the idea of the 
"competitive group", which he defined as: 
"an intra-industry combination of firms which are following similar strategies. 
Where firms follow similar strategies because they have different historical 
backgrounds, that have provided them with different stocks or competencies or 
assets and because different managers have identified different ways in which 
they can compete in the industry" (Bogner, 1991, p. 496). 
The cognitive approach to strategic groups comprises a minimum of two beliefs. Firstly, 
that the perceptions of managers about a firm's identity, its competitors, customers and 
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suppliers, determines the set of transactions that link the firm with its environment. 
Secondly, that perceptions determine industry recipes or generic strategies, which in 
turn delineate the actions necessary to compete in the firm's operating environment. An 
important assumption for groupings based on common perceptions is a common 
interpretation of external events, with future resource decisions based on these 
interpretations. In a study of strategic group perceptions among Chicago bankers, Reger 
(Reger, 1988) found strong evidence of consistent cognitive maps across respondents. 
While Porac et al. (Porac et al., 1994) studying Scottish knitwear manufacturers, 
described the creation of cognitive communities, where industry "group think" results 
from managers in similarly placed firms interpreting the same environmental cues and 
attempting to solve similar problems. 
A notable advantage of the cognitive research stream in strategic group theory is the 
recognition of the importance of management perceptions in defining the competition. 
The major weaknesses of the research relate to the relatively small samples used in the 
empirical analyses and the very discrete markets chosen. In the case of the Scottish 
knitwear market, for example, Porac et al. (Porac et al., 1994) note the absence of sound 
and validated market data available to managers. This may have prompted a more active 
exchange of views between managers in participating companies than would be the case 
in larger, more data rich industries. It is also important to note that drawing up strategic 
groups based on cognitive factors provides an insight into intended strategy, while 
studies that include performance measures e. g. (Dess et al., 1984) are comparing the 
outputs of realized strategy. This management perspective does, however, provide the 
opportunity to explore the mechanism behind the observed change in strategy and thus 
to add an additional dimesion to strategic group research (Curto, 1998, ). An enduring 
problem in this type of research is that people do not always do what they say they will 
do - nor are they necessarily always truthful when revealing their intended strategy to 
researchers! 
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2.10 Intra-Group Performance 
This empirical work draws heavily on the earlier research of Porter (Porter, 1976; 
Porter, 1979) that provides the primary theory base for intra-industry performance as 
discussed above. A number of studies have reported greater performance differences 
within strategic groups than between strategic groups (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; 
Martens, 1988). This result Porter explains in terms of the different abilities of firms 
within the same strategic group to implement their chosen strategy effectively: 
"The final factor entering into the analysis of a firm's position in its strategic 
group is its implementation ability. Not all firms pursuing the same strategy 
(thus in the same strategic group) will necessarily be equally profitable ... Some 
firms are superior in their ability to organize and manage operations, develop 
creative advertising themes with equal budgets, make technological 
breakthroughs with the same expenditures on R&D, and so on. These sorts of 
skills are not structural advantages of the sort created by mobility barriers ... 
but 
may well be relatively stable advantages. The firms that have superior 
implementation ability will be more profitable than other firms in the strategic 
group" (Porter, 1980, p 144). 
"Strengths and weaknesses in implementation, based on differences in a firm's 
ability to execute strategies, rest on people and managerial abilities. As such, 
they may be more ephemeral, though not necessarily"(Porter, 1980, p 150). 
Recently this phenomenon, predicted to occur in industries with low product market 
heterogeneity and strong resource inimitability (Mehra et A, 1998), has become the 
focus of a separate line of research (McNamara et al., 2003). For example, a study of 54 
US banking firms revealed significant performance difference within strategic groups 
for return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as performance measures. The 
authors classified firms within groups into core and secondary firms. Finding that 
secondary firms outperformed core firms, the authors concluded that firm positioning 
within a group has performance implications (McNamara et al., 2003). Faced with 
similar intra-group performance differences, in his study of the US pharmaceutical 
industry, Cool explains this finding in terms of different attitudes to risk by resident 
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firms (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). This explanation links strongly to the comments 
of Porter, described earlier, regarding people and managerial attitudes (Porter, 1980). 
2.11 Population Ecology 
The final theme that blossomed briefly in the 1990s was an approach to strategic groups 
based on the pioneering work of Hannan and Freeman (Hannan et al., 1977), on the 
population ecology of organizations. This evolutionary view of strategy led to strategic 
groups being considered as equivalent to species. In 1991 Boeker studied the dynamics 
of three populations of US brewing firms over an 18 year period, applying a population 
ecology perspective to derive strategic groups. The approach adopted was to apply 
ecological models measuring primarily the effect of competition between populations 
and how environmental change impacted the size of each population (Boeker, 
1991). This was followed in 1992 by a study from Carroll and Swaminathan, also on US 
brewing (Carroll et al., 1992). These studies argued that strategic groups should be 
identified in terms of organizational form rather than perceived strategies, which can be 
highly normative in nature. In this analysis, organizational form encompasses not only 
the formal organizational structure but also "all factors that define a population's niche, 
including especially environmental factors" (Carroll et al., 1992, p. 68). 
In other words, the environment, very broadly defined, determines the performance of 
firms. The result is a deterministic approach to strategic groups under which the scope 
for independent managerial decision making is severely constrained. This line of 
research has not been widely adopted, perhaps because some strategy researchers find 
such a strictly exogenous view of the formation and continuation of strategic groups 
unattractive. This exogenous view assumes that firm survival is a function of external 
forces such as the degree of competition and the relative availability of environmental 
resources an approach which differs markedly from this research which assumes that 
strategy is driven by strategic choice as measured by a largely endogenous set of 
decisions measured through such factors as market scope and resource deployment. The 
population ecology line of research is therefore not directly germane to the subject of 
this research and it need not be discussed further here. 
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In conclusion, from its origins in IO economics strategic group research has developed 
to encompass a variety of different themes within a large number of industry settings. 
This variety is driven primarily through strategic management research that represents 
the bulk of the more recent studies. Here, strategic group theory has frequently been 
used to apply a different lens to an established field of study, for example generic 
strategies, or population ecology. This diversity both in the central purpose of research 
and in the chosen industry setting perhaps contributes to confusion over what is meant 
by strategic groups and to the practical use of the strategic group concept. If strategic 
groups offer the means accurately to classify strategic choice then research must 
concentrate on industry specific studies sharing a common approach to the identification 
of strategic groups. To date, however, a common approach even within industries has 
not emerged. The next section of the chapter explores in more detail the previous 
strategic group research pertaining to pharmaceuticals. 
2.12 The Pharmaceutical industry as a context for Strategic Group Research 
A number of studies have already measured certain aspects of strategic groups and 
performance within the pharmaceutical industry (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 
1994; Cool et al., 1988; Cool et al., 1987b; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 1988; Osbourne, 
1996; Voyer., 1993). 
The study by Cool was the first devoted exclusively to the pharmaceutical industry and 
sought to confirm the presence of strategic groups within US pharmaceuticals over a 
twenty year period, from 1963 to 1982. Secondary archival data was used and fifteen 
variables, based upon scale, scope and resource commitments, were adopted to identify 
strategic groups across stable strategic time periods (SSTPs). Cool confirmed the 
presence of strategic groups, but the intra-industry group structure was found to change 
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significantly over the twenty years (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). Also, strategic 
groups were found to differ significantly in terms of performance, as measured by 
market share and weighted market share, though no significant difference was found 
with regard to profitability or risk adjusted performance (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1988). 
A further interesting finding was that strategic group members in US pharmaceuticals 
displayed differences in performance whilst pursuing similar strategies. This was 
explained by differences in risk taking among strategic group members. 
Cool's study was limited in it contained only 22 firms, all of which were resident in the 
US and had not engaged in merger activity. Arguably a modem strategic group study 
centered on pharmaceuticals would find this approach rather restrictive given the 
number of large multinational firms and the role that mergers have played in shaping 
the industry over the last twenty years (Pursche, 1996). 
Corroboration for the strategic group structure as reported by Cool was provided by 
Osborne's research, also on the US pharmaceutical industry. Through analyzing letters 
to shareholders during the period 1963 to 1982 and using linguistic themes, "a topical 
schema which categorises words into related groups" (Osborne, 1996, p 15), the aim 
was to classify intended strategy into "thematic groups, " in a direct parallel to the 
process of labeling strategic groups based on realized strategy. A statistically significant 
relationship was found between the strategic groups identified in Cool's study and the 
thematic groups identified by Osborne. 
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Employing a similar study design to that of Cool, Martens investigated the 
pharmaceutical industry in five European Community (EC) countries (Martens, 1988). 
This study is unusual in the inclusion of several countries and it is also notable because 
it appears to be the only strategic group research carried out on the UK pharmaceutical 
industry, prior to the research reported in this thesis. Forty one firms were selected for 
the study, which identified two stable strategic time periods within an eight year period, 
1978-1985. The research employed six variables to identify the strategic groups, 
revealing a group structure of nine strategic groups in 1981 and ten in 1985. Martens, 
however, failed to find an unequivocal cluster solution for 1981. This led him to 
conclude that "the pharmaceutical industry is not always structured into clear distinct 
strategic groups" (Martens, 1988, p 344). Also, no consistent performance difference 
was found between the strategic groups he identified (Martens, 1988). 
In his study of the US pharmaceutical industry Bogner primarily investigated the 
dynamics of inter-group movement over a twenty year period (Bogner, 1991). Thirty six 
firms were included in the study, which used four marketing variables and three R&D 
measures to identify strategic groups. Although the primary questions addressed by this 
research related to group stability over time, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Bogner 
did investigate whether the return on sales (ROS), return on net income (RONI) and 
return on assets (ROA) differed significantly between strategic groups. In accord with 
previous research (Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987), a distinction was made between 
mean returns, the variation (or risk) associated with those returns, and the risk adjusted 
returns of the firms studied. No consistent significant performance difference was 
recorded between strategic groups for any of nine performance measures, although 
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Bogner does note (Bogner, 1991, p 467. ) that the analysis was weakened by the 
elimination of many of the non-US firms from this part of the research due to a lack of 
data. 
A later study involving Bogner et al explored the entry paths of European firms into the 
US pharmaceutical industry over a twenty year period (Bogner et al., 1996). Seven 
strategic variables were selected through a combination of survey, product and patent 
data. The authors sought to test a number of the earlier assumptions with regard to 
mobility barriers (Caves et al., 1977) and discovered that firms, as expected, followed 
an incremental path in trying to improve their competitive position. Contrary to 
expectation, however, firms did not enter the industry via the lowest mobility barrier. 
Entry appeared to be related more to the parent company's resource base, which was 
also found to exert a marked effect upon the final competitive position gained. No 
difference was found between the responses of immigrant and resident firms to 
environmental shocks (Bogner et al., 1996). 
In a more recent study Guedri examined the relationship between strategic groups, 
growth capability and performance in the global pharmaceutical industry (Guedri, 
1998). Nine scope and three resource variables were used to identify strategic groups 
during the period 1995 to 1997 from a selection of 42 pharmaceutical firms. Four 
strategic groups were identified where member firms differed in both growth capability 
and performance, but no statistical performance difference was found between these 
groups. The strong intra-group differences are congruent with the earlier findings 
reported by Cool and Martens (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988). 
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A limitation of the Guedri study is the exclusion of Japanese firms, although both Cool 
and Martens also excluded them. Points of note include the global perspective of the 
study, and the sophisticated use of clustering methods to determine groups. The method 
adopted involved the reduction of variables by the use of principle component analysis 
followed by the application of two clustering algorithms namely Wards method 
followed by a divisive clustering method. 
From these earlier studies of pharmaceuticals a number of common elements appear. 
Firstly, in all cases a number of relatively stable strategic groups were found to exist, 
although significant changes to group membership were observed to take place over 
time. Secondly, several of the studies employed a largely common methodology, based 
upon identifying stable strategic time periods (SSTPs) within a more lengthy research 
period (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; 
Martens, 1988). Thirdly, a common clustering algorithm was generally chosen, with 
Ward's method the most popular choice. Fourthly, the sample of firms selected 
generally excluded a number of possibly significant firms. For example, Cool excluded 
non US companies, while Guedri and Martens both excluded Japanese firms from their 
analyses (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 1988). Finally, the 
number of variables chosen to separate strategic groups varied between six and 
seventeen, with the variables chosen generally reflecting scale, scope and resource 
commitments (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; Guedri, 1998; 
Martens, 1988). A summary of the method, data and findings from these studies is 
provided in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2 Summary of Previous Strategic Group Studies Within the Pharmaceutical 
Industry' 
Cool 1985 Martens Fiegenbaum Bogner Guedri 
1988 et al 1990 1991 1998 
Industry US 5 E. C. Global US Global 
Focus Countries 
Time Period 1963-1982 1978- 1974-1981 1969-1988 1995-1997 
1985 
Number of 22 42 22 41 42 
Firms 
Major Non-US Some None Some non- Japanese 
Exclusions Companies. private Listed. US Companies. 
Merged companies. excluded 
Companies. from the 
Generic performance 
Companies. analysis. 
Number of 4 to 6 9 to 10 3 or 4 4 to 6 4 
Strategic 
Groups 
Identified 
Performance Market Percentage Not Return on Return on 
Variable share increase in Measured investment assets 
Measured Weighted Weighted Return on 
market market net 
share share over investment 
Return on a4 year Return on 
sales period assets 
Risk 
Adjusted 
Sets of 
Each of the 
Above 
Data Source IMS IMS Compustat IMS Company 
Company Company Company Annual 
Annual Annual Annual Reports 
Reports Reports Reports 
Z It should be noted that some of these studies notably the study by of Cool (1985) provided the basis for a 
number of follow on studies and publications e. g. (Cool & Schendel, 1987b; Cool & Schendel, 1988; 
Cool & Dierickx, 1993, ). 
3 IMS is an abbreviation for Intercontinental Medical Statistics. IMS provides the standard audits of 
market data for the pharmaceutical industry measuring sales and promotion. 
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There is much disagreement in the studies on the impact of strategic groups on 
performance. Cool concluded that market share differed significantly between groups 
within US pharmaceuticals for all time periods and weighted market share for all but 
one time period (Cool, 1985). No differences, however, were found between groups in 
terms of risk or risk-adjusted performance (Cool, 1985; Cool & Schendel, 1988, ). It 
was, however, found that "over the 20-year period studied, different risk reward 
relationships characterize strategic investments of firms in the US pharmaceutical 
industry"(Cool & Schendel, 1988 p 219, ). These relationships followed a pattern over 
the period studied and the authors concluded that "risk stems primarily from a 
discontinuity between past and current strategy, and not per se from the type of strategy 
currently employed" (Cool & Schendel, 1988 p 220, ). Martens failed to find any 
performance difference between groups in terms of growth in weighted market share. 
This led him to postulate that within group performance differences may outweigh 
between group differences (Martens, 1988). Bogner and Guedri also reported no 
significant performance differences between strategic groups (Bogner, 1991; Guedri, 
1998); but Voyer in his study of "cognitive groups" within the US pharmaceutical 
industry found significant differences in terms of profit, earning per share and return on 
equity (Voyer., 1993, p11). 
A further study explored the impact of rivalry on firm's profits (Cool & Dierickx, 
1993, ). This study was prompted by the observation that although firm profits fell by 
40% during the period 1963-1982, in the US pharmaceutical industry, factors such as 
industry concentration, segment interdependence and strategic distance between firms 
remained largely unchanged. An interesting observation was that the relative position of 
key strategic groups changed over time and that these configuration changes "were 
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linked to the effects of within and between group rivalry on performance" (Cool & 
Dierickx, 1993 p 57, ) The authors concluded that as innovation declined and product 
differentiation waned imitation became more prevalent leading to an increase in rivalry 
between firms. It was found that the most profitable firms were those that dominated 
their segment. 
The general conclusion from a review of the published research is that there is strong 
evidence for the existence of strategic groups within the US pharmaceutical industry, 
though not for the link to performance differences. However, there has been much more 
limited investigation of other countries' pharmaceutical sectors. Also, while there is no 
strong evidence of performance differences between strategic groups, drawing 
conclusions is complicated by differences across studies in the way performance is 
defined and measured. 
2.13 Key Research Questions Arising From This Literature Review 
When the value of strategic groups in researching the link between strategy and 
performance was originally called into question (Barney et al., 1990), a key issue was 
whether strategic groups represent a valid and useful concept or were strategic groups 
merely an artefact of the mathematical algorithms used inductively to discover strategic 
groups? In answer to whether strategic groups are a mathematical myth or a potentially 
useful concept, arguably on balance the research to date supports the value of the 
strategic group concept. This is because support for strategic groups, does not simply 
derive from a number of strong theories, or from inductive empirical support, but from a 
large number of different and unrelated sources drawn from a variety of industries. 
Cognitive research, for example (Porac et al., 1989; Reger, 1988; Thomas. et al., 1994), 
confirms that practicing managers make sense of the complexity of their competitive 
environment through shared mental models that identify who they are in competition 
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with and the available means to compete in their industry. This research provides face 
validity from practicing managers and indicates that grouping of industry participants 
into close and direct competitors, for example, is used by managers seeking to make 
sense of their firm's environment. Descriptions of these competitive groups (Bogner, 
1991; Porac et al., 1989) and cognitive groups (Porac et al., 1989; Porac et al., 1994; 
Thomas. et al., 1994; Voyer., 1993) bears a strong resemblance to strategic groups, as 
described in various industries (Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum, 1987; Ramsler, 1982). 
Similarities also occur in the work on thematic groups, where through identifying 
particular language phrases from annual reports and shareholders letters (Osbourne, 
1996), intended strategies were classified into thematic groups. These the author claims 
correlate strongly with the strategic groups identified in previous research (Cool, 1985; 
Cool et al., 1987b). 
But, if strategic groups are valid, why has strategic group research not developed the 
deep underlying theory more clearly and why, in particular, have performance 
differences, the nub of much research, not been empirically proven between strategic 
groups. If strategy matters and strategic groups provide an accurate classification of 
different strategies within an industry, then surely it must be possible to explain at least 
some part of performance differences between firms in terms of their strategic group 
membership. One possible explanation for this apparent anomaly is suggested by Lee: 
"we believe such inconsistencies and disagreements stem partly from the nature 
of the verbal theory tradition in the field where untested assertions and hidden 
assumptions tend to confuse researchers" (Lee et al., 2002, p 728). 
Porter also suggests another valid explanation, by suggesting that differences within 
groups can be explained to some extent by firms' differing abilities to implement their 
chosen strategy effectively (Porter, 1980). 
Possibly, therefore, the very diversity of strategic group research has clouded the issue. 
In particular, a number of the key theories that stemmed from IO economics (Caves et 
al., 1977; Porter, 1979) were offered without much empirical support. Alternatively, 
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even when two studies tackle the same context there is little or no agreement between 
the analytical methods that should be adopted. For example, both Cool and Bogner 
investigated the US pharmaceutical industry over an overlapping period, but there is 
little agreement between the studies on the choice of companies included or the 
variables selected to delineate strategic groups (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985). 
Strategic group theory potentially provides a theoretical framework to test whether one 
set of strategies is more effective than another and to analyse and chart competitive 
dynamics. This was the premise which gave rise to the large number of frequently 
conflicting studies since the 1970s. The results may be summarised as confirming that 
strategic groups exist in different industries, but that as yet no clear unambiguous link 
between strategic group membership and performance has been conclusively 
demonstrated. A number of the studies have focused upon the US pharmaceutical 
industry. These have yielded conflicting results with regard to any link between 
performance and strategic group membership (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1996; Cool, 
1985; Cool et al., 1999; Cool et al., 1988; Cool et al., 1987b; Guedri, 1998; Osborne, 
1996). This result in itself is perhaps perplexing given that: 
1. The pharmaceutical industry is consistently cited as one of the world's most 
profitable industries (The Boston Consulting Group, 2000). 
2. That the industry spends on average US$700m on each new chemical entity 
[NCE] that it produces and a further US$400m on marketing (Bastianelli et al., 
2001). 
3. Analyst valuations of pharmaceutical companies differ widely based on current 
performance and future expectations (Lehman Brothers, 2003) 
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4. The long lead times of the industry and the observation that the performance 
outcome for a given NCE will vary widely dependent upon which company 
markets the product (Lehman Brothers, 2003). 
These facts point to a conclusion that in order to remain highly profitable, 
pharmaceutical companies must be effective in executing their strategies or they will 
fail to cover the high costs of research, development and global marketing. Different 
strategies may be expected to result in markedly different company valuations, which 
are not simply the result of serendipity. It also appears that the company which is 
fortunate enough to uncover a blockbuster in the research process does not always win. 
Thus, the observation that to date strategic group research has not uncovered an 
unequivocal link to performance in the pharmaceutical industry does not match with 
expectation. To the contrary, the expectation is that strategy will matter in the 
pharmaceutical industry and that if strategic groups provide an accurate means of 
classifying pharmaceutical companies' strategies, then there should be performance 
differences between different strategic groups. 
Therefore, the first question that we seek to address in the research reported in this 
thesis is therefore: 
1. Do strategic groups that differ significantly in terms of performance exist within 
the UK pharmaceutical industry? 
As we have seen, the presence of mobility barriers is generally well established in the 
strategic group literature, but two areas remain open to question. Firstly, do external 
environmental shocks lead to changes in strategy and hence a change in group 
membership, as originally predicted by Caves et al (1977)? Research here has been 
equivocal. On the one hand, the environmental shock of regulation has been shown to 
lead to a shift in strategy within the US railroad industry (Smith et al., 1987); on the 
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other hand Bogner found no link between strategic group membership changes and 
environmental factors in US pharmaceuticals (Bogner, 1991). Secondly, do firms that 
change from one strategic group to another move to a more advantageous position as 
also suggested by Caves (1977). 
The second question that we seek to answer in the research is therefore; 
2. Do firms that move from one strategic group to another consistently move into a 
higher performing group and are such moves concomitant with environmental 
change? 
A third question that arises from the idea of industry change and the observation that a 
number of mergers occurred during the period encompassed by this research is: 
3. Do mergers occur more frequently between strategic groups or within strategic 
groups? 
The final question relates to the predicted relationship between market heterogeneity 
and strategic groups. Much received theory suggests that the pharmaceutical industry 
will consist of unstable strategic groups that will differ more in intra-group performance 
than between groups (Mehra et al., 1998). Porter suggests that interrelated markets and 
dissimilar strategies will lead to lower performance (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979), a point 
recently reiterated (Lee et al., 2002). Here, it is suggested that firms which address the 
same customer groups and who offer similar products are more likely to co-operate or 
collude if each approaches the market in essentially the same way. This is because 
market signals will be readily understood and acted upon and the companies will each 
recognize their mutual interdependence. If however one firm adopts a markedly 
different strategy then the firms are less likely to co-operate and damaging price 
competition is more likely to occur (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979). Similarly, Porac 
emphasizes primary competitive groups, where companies compete through offering 
direct substitutes (Porac et al., 1989). Therefore, if companies compete in the same 
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markets and direct their activities to common customers, they represent direct rivals, as 
distinct from companies that address the same customers but do not offer direct 
substitutes but instead offer either entirely unrelated or complementary products. 
Competitive groups, therefore, delineate where companies compete as distinct from 
strategic groups that classify firms in terms of how they compete. Here Porter suggests 
that companies in the same strategic group will compete less vigorously than rivals in 
different strategic groups because they will understand each others motives and achieve 
some competitive accommodation with each other. Two key dimensions will affect 
intra-industry performance, therefore first, how the companies compete in terms of 
strategy as identified by the strategic group to which they belong and, second, the 
relationship between companies in terms of the markets that they contest, as classified 
by the competitive group to which they belong (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979). The fourth 
question we seek to address in this research is therefore; 
4. What is the relationship between primary competitive groups and strategic 
groups within the UK pharmaceutical industry? 
The next chapter turns to a description of the UK pharmaceutical industry and how it 
has evolved over the period 1993 to 2002. This alongside the literature review in this 
chapter provides the context for the research reported in later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UK OPERATING ENVIRONMENT FOR PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is threefold. Firstly to describe the UK operating environment in 
pharmaceuticals that existed during the period 1993 to 2002. It is important to gain this 
understanding because the strategy of pharmaceutical companies can be expected to be 
linked to the opportunities and threats that exist within the environment at that time 
(Andrews, 1987). Secondly, to chart the changes that occurred within the National 
Health Service (NHS) during the study period that will have directly impacted upon 
pharmaceutical companies because the NHS is virtually the sole purchaser of 
prescription medicines in this country (IMS, 2003). Thirdly, to illustrate the link 
between the UK Government, the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry, which sets the 
UK operating environment apart from the operating environments covered in the 
majority of previous strategic groups studies centred on the pharmaceutical industry 
(Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1996; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Voyer., 1993). 
In order to put these elements into context, however, it is necessary to explain how the 
UK pharmaceutical industry's operating environment in the 1990s changed relative to 
the 1980's and how the UK differs from other world health care systems. We also need 
to establish the overall pattern of the changes and to identify those variables that may 
reliably be used to represent environmental change. 
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It should be noted here that the health service organisation and provision between 
England and Wales is similar, while Scotland or Northern Ireland are managed 
differently. The primary aim of this chapter is, to isolate the key changes that occurred 
to the operating environment which may impact on pharmaceutical company strategy 
and not to discuss the merits of health care provision. Therefore, the remarks made in 
this chapter will address only the system of health care administration present within 
England and Wales, where the vast majority of the UK population resides. For example, 
in 1990 the resident population of the UK was 57.56 million with 50.87 million resident 
in England and Wales. By 2000 the population figures were 59.76 and 52.94 million 
respectively (Yuen, 2002, section 1 p13). 
3.2 Pharmaceuticals and the UK Health Care System 
A summary of the environmental changes that impacted upon the UK pharmaceutical 
industry are presented in Table 1. The UK Health Care System and particular changes 
introduced, summarized in Table 1, are addressed in detail below. 
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The UK National Health Service was established on the 5th July 1948, post the Second 
World War, with the founding principle that it was "free at the point of need, not 
according to ability to pay" (IMS, 2003, p 7; Yuen, 2002). This health service was 
funded out of taxation where the patient paid nothing, although later governments 
introduced a prescription charge per item, which currently stands at £6.20 (IMS, 2003, p 
12). 
This guiding principle of "free at the point of need funded out of taxation" sets the UK 
healthcare system apart from a number of other health care systems, where the model is 
for health service costs to be met through some combination of health insurance and 
personal contribution. In the US, for example, the employer provides health insurance 
as an increasingly important part of the employment package. For those who are elderly, 
unemployed or poor, they have to rely on Medicaid or Medicare, a state funded "safety 
net" that provides limited health treatment. In 1993, for example, 18% of the non- 
elderly US population were uninsured, 13% were covered by Medicaid or other public 
coverage, 8% had some form of private insurance, but 61%, (the vast majority) were 
covered through employment based insurance (Brown et al., 1996, p 42. ). 
It is important to refer to the US market for two reasons. Firstly, the majority of 
pharmaceutical based strategic group studies are situated within the US pharmaceutical 
industry (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1996; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). Secondly, 
the US is the world's largest and most important pharmaceutical market, which 
therefore may be assumed to be the prime focus of most pharmaceutical companies' 
strategic activity (Lehman Brothers, 2003). Within Europe an insurance based model 
exists within Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Switzerland; while some form of tax funded health care system exists in Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK (Rosleff 
et al., 1995). The insurance model is generally similar to that provided in Germany, 
where the state provides a basic health service for the poor and unemployed, but once a 
threshold income is reached, mandatory contributions must be made for health 
insurance. In contrast, within the UK: 
"About 11% of the UK population is estimated to be covered by PMI (Private 
Medical Insurance) but penetration varies widely across the country - from 
about 20% in the South of England to 6% in the North East" (IMS, 2003, p 18). 
Prior to the Thatcher reforms encapsulated in the White Paper "Working for Patients", 
published in 1989 and implemented with effect from April 1991, the UK 
pharmaceutical operating environment was comparatively benign. Each patient was 
registered with a general practitioner (GP), who diagnosed their condition and 
prescribed treatment. In the case of more persistent or serious conditions that required 
further investigation or a second opinion, the GP referred the patient to a hospital 
specialist. "Provision of hospital services accounts for 52% of NHS expenditure, a 
percentage that has remained about the same since the start of the NHS" (IMS, 2003p 
16). Thus, under the UK system the GP acts as a "gatekeeper" dealing with all first 
consultations with the patient, except those cases where the patient arrives directly into 
hospital via the Accident and Emergency (A&E) Department. The effect of this is that 
the patient is usually treated within the primary care setting without recourse to more 
expensive secondary care (hospital) treatment. For example, a comparison in referral 
rates between the UK and Germany reported that: 
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"For every 100 direct referrals recorded in the UK there were two indirect 
referrals whereas in Germany - there are as many indirect as direct referrals. 
These differences can probably be attributed to the traditionally strong GP-gate 
keeping role in the UK compared to the absence of such a role in Germany 
(Rosleff et al., 1995, p 9). 
Figure 3.1 illustrates that the UK spends less on health care provision as a proportion of 
GDP than most other developed countries. In terms of cost efficiency, for delivering a 
comprehensive health care system equably available to the entire resident population, 
the NHS seems to deliver good value compared to most other developed countries. 
Figure 3.1 Total Health Expenditure as Percentage of GDP 
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On average, each person in the UK saw their GP five times in 1993, although the figure 
is skewed by the elderly who visited their GP six to seven times (Yuen, 2002). The 
number of GP visits differs from country to country according to local custom with the 
French patient visiting a GP as much as 12 times per year, while the Japanese 
preference is strongly in favour of the hospital specialist. A key difference between the 
UK and a number of other countries is that UK patients must be referred by their GP to 
gain access to hospital treatment, with the exception of admissions via A&E. In many 
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other countries the patient is free to visit any number of general practitioners or to go 
direct to a specialist, should they wish. 
In summary, therefore, the UK National Health Service differs from the health services 
of the United States and a number of other countries in that it is funded solely through 
taxation. The UK also differs in the use of the GP as a gatekeeper who controls access 
to more expensive secondary care services. In spite of these differences, all health 
services strive to promote the health of their resident population, to meet the needs of 
the sick and to cope with demand that is neither predictable nor uniform in nature. The 
essential differences between the various health services across the globe are largely 
related to funding, access to treatment and the degree to which prices of medicines are 
controlled (Rosleff et al., 1995). All health services, however, face the common 
problem, that demand for service from an increasingly educated and health aware 
society is increasing, as is the cost of treatment. In the UK this problem is reflected in 
the funding gap that exists between the demand for services and the ability to meet 
those demands through acceptable levels of taxation. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the changing demographics of the UK population. Although the 
population over 65 represented only 10.2% of the population in 1948, by 2001 the 
proportion of the population over 65 had increased to 16.4% (Yuen, 2002). 
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Figure 3.2 The Growing Elderly Population 
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Expenditure on medicines for patients who are over 65 averages three times that of 
patients under 65 (Ball, 1992, p 30. ). Expenditure on medicines is strongly driven by 
demographics. 
In the UK this presents a problem for a health care system funded out of taxation. There 
is a rapidly growing gap between the cost of providing a comprehensive health service 
free to all at point of need and the funding available derived from taxation. Factors that 
may have contributed to the Thatcher government's desire to act and reform the NHS in 
the late 1980s were: 
I. Changing demographics and in particular the demands that an increasingly large 
and growing elderly population was placing upon the health service (Rosleff et 
al., 1995). 
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2. The perception of waste within the health service, illustrated by marked 
variation between health care providers in terms of resources consumed and 
outputs achieved (Ham, 1997). 
3. The rising cost of technology with new treatments costing more than ever 
before. This point is illustrated by pharmaceuticals where the cost of each new 
chemical entity (NCE) had risen to US $700m by 2001 (Bastianelli et al., 2001). 
New treatments therefore cost more than previously, which contributes to rising 
health costs (Rosleff et al., 1995). 
4. An increasingly educated consumer, who is informed about treatments options 
and who demands marked improvements in health care services. Here the 
growing availability of the internet certainly allowed some patients to research 
their condition more easily and thus to go "armed" for their visit to the doctor 
(Rosleff et al., 1995). 
5. The perceived importance of the health service as an issue for voters, as 
illustrated by the debate devoted to health care at election time (Ham, 1997). 
6. The growing gap through the 1980s between government funding and the 
increasing demands upon the health service driven primarily by an ageing 
population and the cost of advances in medical technology. By 1987 this had 
reached a point where hospitals were forced to cancel non-urgent operations, 
close beds and leave staff vacancies unfilled in order to keep within budget 
(Ham, 1994, p 2. ). 
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The net result was that in the late 1980s the Thatcher government decided to reform the 
NHS and to drive down costs and improve value for money by introducing competition 
via the creation of an "internal market"(HMSO, 1989). Ham points out, it is more 
accurate to use the term managed market; firstly, because competition amongst 
providers was not confined to the NHS, it also included providers from outside the 
NHS, (for example some minor surgical procedures like cataract operations could be 
performed more swiftly in France. (Ham, 1994, p 10). ) Secondly, it was not the 
government's reported intention to introduce a "free market" but to graft some of the 
incentives present in commercial markets onto the NHS (Ham, 1994, p 10. ). 
In 1989 the government White Paper, "Working for Patients", was published which 
presented plans to radically reform the NHS with changes due to be implemented with 
effect from April 1991. Due to the availability of data, this research explores the UK 
operating environment not from the inception of this change in 1991, but with effect 
from 1993. The next section briefly describes the pharmaceutical companies' operating 
environment within the UK prior to the Thatcher reforms to highlight the differences 
that pharmaceutical strategy had to address after April 1991. 
3.3 The NHS prior to the Thatcher Reforms 
The general structure of the health service in England and Wales prior to April 1991 
included a Health Service Supervisory Board that reported to the Department of Health. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure of the Health Service in England and Wales prior to 
the Thatcher reforms of 1991. 
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Figure 3.3 NHS Structure Circa 1989 
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The health service was managed by the Department of Health, which was organised into 
two groups. The first of these was responsible for secondary care administered through 
14 Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), each of which in turn managed a series of 
District Health Authorities (DHAs). Each DHA was responsible for its resident 
hospitals and community health services. This side of the health service was fiscally 
controlled within the Hospital and Community Health Services Budget (HCHS) and 
was strongly cash limited. In contrast, the second group consisted of the Family 
Practitioner Committees (FPCs), which like their secondary care equivalents were 
geographically organised and funded via a formula related to their resident population. 
Unlike the Regional Health Authorities, however, the primary care side of the health 
service was not cash limited. This was because the General Medical Services budget, 
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which funded the activities of general practitioners, dentists, opticians and pharmacists, 
was not cash limited. It had open ended access to additional top ups from the Treasury 
department in order to provide the facility to cope with flu epidemics and other serious 
sporadic events. This difference in the availability and management of funding could in 
some ways be responsible for the different policies that operated across the National 
Health Service with regard to the purchase and use of medicines. These two primary 
organs of the health service, aside from funding differences, were also unlikely to 
actively co-operate because the boundaries of the FPCs were not co-terminus with either 
the regional or district health service boundaries. 
Thus, from a pharmaceutical company's perspective the two areas of the health service, 
although joined in a common purpose, behaved differently when it came to the use and 
purchase of pharmaceuticals. Within secondary care each hospital ran a formulary 
which is a limited list of approved drugs. The principle aims of the formulary were to 
achieve consistency in medical treatments and to avoid purchase and stocking of too 
many product lines due to space and budget considerations. Within the hospital 
environment generally only consultants could prescribe off formulary. For significant 
sales to be achieved, therefore, new products had to gain entry to the formulary, which 
for a new medicine attempting to enter a crowded product category meant displacing an 
existing product. 
Hospital formularies were administered by the pharmacy department with new 
pharmaceutical products formally proposed and discussed at a drug and therapeutics 
committee meeting. For a new medicine to be approved, it generally required the 
support of the relevant consultant together with the principal and information 
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pharmacists being convinced that the product offered a good balance between efficacy, 
safety and cost. In key teaching hospitals, gaining entry on the formulary presented a 
significant hurdle with some hospitals restricting their drug and therapeutic committee 
meetings to two or three a year. Teaching hospitals were also the principal source for 
quality clinical drug trials, which were a necessary step in gaining the data necessary for 
a successful product licence submission to the Medicines Control Agency (MCA). 
Once a product had been listed on the formulary, the product would still not be widely 
used unless it was actively promoted to the resident physicians. Here, a second hurdle to 
widespread use was the difficulty within hospitals of getting the product routinely 
stocked on the ward trolley, and ensuring its access to junior medical staff. Here 
contract price was an issue as hospital pharmacies sought to manage their drug bill and 
hospitals purchased pharmaceuticals on annual or biannual contracts via a competitive 
tendering process. Therefore, in order to gain widespread hospital acceptance, the 
contract price had to be acceptable. A marked difference occurred between hospital only 
products and products that would be more widely used by general practitioners in 
primary care. This was because the latter products were often sold at a fraction of their 
price in the community (GP sector) in order to encourage widespread hospital referral. 
In conclusion, within the secondary care or hospital setting, a formal hierarchy of 
doctors and pharmacists controlled which drugs would be used within the hospital and a 
strongly argued clinical case was necessary to gain access to the formulary which 
allowed junior doctors to use the product. Cost of treatment was an important metric 
within the "cash constrained" hospital environment and products that competed in 
widely used categories had to offer competitive contract prices to be seriously 
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considered. Despite this, there was considerable variation in the use and cost of 
medicines and other aspects of medical treatment between hospitals, districts and 
regions. 
Within primary care a different set of circumstances pertained. General practitioners 
operated either as sole contractors to the Family Practitioner Committees or 
alternatively in general practice groups, consisting of two, three or more GPs. Each GP 
operated independently and generally made his or her own independent choices about 
which medicines should be used and whether to see representatives from 
pharmaceutical companies or not. Cash was not limited in the primary care setting and 
as gatekeepers, GPs did not consume the products which they prescribed, nor did they 
actively monitor their personal or practice's medical expenditure. The primary care 
(GP) market at this time was therefore relatively insensitive to price, unlike the 
secondary care (hospital) market. 
Two different types of GP practices existed. The traditional GP practice that generated 
prescriptions, which were filled by the local chemist or the alternative dispensing 
channel prevalent in rural areas. Dispensing doctors represented approximately 16% of 
GPs and differed in several key respects. Firstly, because a significant proportion of 
their patients lived at least one mile from a chemist, a dispensing doctor could both 
prescribe and dispense for eligible patients. Nationally, approximately 41% of patients 
were eligible "dispensing patients", the remaining 59% collected their prescriptions 
from a retail chemist, although clearly the balance between dispensing and prescribing 
patients varied by location. GP practices in a rural setting could have 100% dispensing 
patients (Leask, 2002). 
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Secondly, dispensing practices were run along business lines with a limited selection of 
drugs prescribed by the resident partners that constituted a practice formulary. Thirdly, 
drug selection criteria included efficacy and safety but also the discount offered by the 
pharmaceutical supplier, which was an important source of practice revenue. The sum 
involved could be equivalent to an extra practice partner (Leask, 2002). 
In conclusion, prior to the Thatcher reforms of 1991 the market for pharmaceuticals was 
largely price insensitive. The key decision makers important to the pharmaceutical 
companies consisted of GPs and hospital doctors. Pharmacists performed a largely 
passive role of dispensing prescriptions in primary care, although some pharmacists, for 
example those who served on the drugs and therapeutics committee, were important 
influencers within the hospital setting. The key figure in the UK pharmaceutical market 
was the GP: 
"... who accounts for about 80% of pharmaceutical expenditure. The average GP 
sees 140 patients a week during surgery and visits another 25 at home. Seventy 
per cent of these consultations result in a prescription, with the average person 
receiving between seven and eight scripts a year" (Davis, 1997, p 25). 
This result was skewed still further by the introduction of the new GP contract in 1990. 
This introduced incentives for running health promotion clinics, health checks for the 
elderly and for meeting vaccination, immunisation and cervical cancer screening targets 
(Ham, 1994, p 65). The net result of this was to encourage GPs to see more patients and 
write more prescriptions. 
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3.4 The Thatcher Reforms 
"In 1991 Britain's government forced through one of the most sweeping 
transformations ever of a health care system, from an administered 
governmental service to an internal market of contracts between purchasers and 
providers" (Light, 1998, p 217). 
The Thatcher reforms were not intended to revolutionise the NHS, because in 
comparison to other European health care systems the NHS appeared to deliver a 
comprehensive health care system at a lower proportion of GDP than most of our 
neighbours. Instead, the aim was to encourage emulation of the success achieved by the 
most efficient providers within the NHS. The aim was to shift from an internally 
focused "provider driven" service to a customer focused health service, where money 
followed the patient, and to reward good practice with additional resources. Thus the 
introduction of competition aimed to stimulate providers to improve efficiency without 
sacrificing quality. 
"This principle was designed to overcome the efficiency trap which existed 
before the reforms in which providers were in effect penalized for treating more 
patients because their income did not increase in line with productivity" (Ham, 
1994, p 12). 
The NHS structure circa 1993 is shown in figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 NHS Structure Circa 1993 
NHS Structure Circa 1993 
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The Thatcher reforms focused upon the following key changes. 
1. The role of the Regional Health Authority (RHA) was expanded to encompass 
the management of both primary and secondary care. This had the effect of 
bringing control of both sides of the NHS under one authority. This was 
considered essential for the development of an integrated service and to increase 
fiscal control. 
"Unifying the family health authorities and district health authorities was an 
important step in eliminating a split budget around which there was 
considerable cost shunting" (Light, 1998, p 218). 
The Primary Care prescribing role of the RHA can be summarised as follows 
(Hepburn, 1992, p 91): 
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a. Allocation of firm budgets to FHSA. 
b. Allocation of prescribing budgets to fund holding general practitioners. 
c. Monitoring the indicative prescribing scheme (IPS) utilizing expenditure 
statements from the Prescription Pricing Authority4 for firm budgets, 
indicative prescribing amounts (IPAs) and fund holding prescribing 
budgets. 
d. Communication with the Department of Health and the FHSAs within 
the region both on quantity and quality of prescribing. 
e. Addressing the problems which arise at the primary/secondary care 
interface and the production of prescribing protocols to aid in this 
process. 
2. To create a market of buyers and sellers, the purchaser provider role carried out 
by the District Health Authorities was split. Under this arrangement, DHAs were 
now become solely responsible for the purchase of health care and were no 
longer held responsibility for the management of the hospitals, community 
service and ambulance units within their boundaries. In theory, this allowed the 
DHA to purchase health care from any reliable source either within or outside of 
the NHS. In reality, because the units that did not acquire NHS trust status 
remained the responsibility of the DHA, the purchaser provider split was 
muddied and there was a tendency for purchasers to rely on past relationships 
and to purchase little beyond their boundaries. 
3. The mechanism to link purchaser with provider was via a service contract for 
which providers would compete. Individual health authority budgets were based 
on a capitation formula that applied significant factors such as age and sex to the 
4 The Prescription Princing Authority is responsible for the pricing of prescriptions and for the 
reimbursement of pharmacists. 
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resident population. Initially, contracts were "blunt instruments" or block 
contracts, where the broadly specified health needs of a given number of patients 
were contracted to a chosen health care provider, such as the local hospital, at a 
set price. In contrast, rarer conditions that required specialist treatment were 
contracted on a cost per case basis. Between these two extremes, a cost per 
volume contract became the norm as purchasers and providers gained experience 
and confidence in the contracting process. 
4. Initially, acute hospitals with over 250 beds, were expected to apply for NHS 
Trust status (HMSO, 1989). This allowed a hospital the opportunity to take out 
commercial loans to develop its services and to opt out of national "Whitley" 
pay scales. This in turn provided more flexibility to attract good employees by 
paying market rates and build centres of excellence. In reality the "trust model" 
attracted all types of health care providers. The initial wave of 57 trusts that 
"went live" on the 1St of April 1991 consisted of acute hospitals, community 
health units and ambulance services. By 1994, over 90% of such units were 
working as NHS Trusts (Ham, 1994, p 14. ). 
5. General practitioners that belonged to practices with more than 11,500 patients 
were allowed to become Fund holders, which allowed the practice to manage its 
own budget. The budget covered three elements: practice staff costs, prescribing 
costs and a defined range of surgical procedures, which included diagnostic tests 
and investigations (Ham, 1994, p 20.; HMSO, 1989). This allowed GP Fund 
holders to shift patients to where waiting lists were shorter. This shift in power 
in favour of the Fund holding GP over the hospital consultant gave rise to the 
criticism that the Thatcher reforms were creating a "two tier" service (Ham, 
1994, p. 21). In reality, fund holding became a driver for change within the 
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health service with practices engaging in active shared care protocols with their 
selected hospital providers to treat conditions such as diabetes and asthma. (Ham, 
1994, p 47). A major incentive for change was provided by the carrot that fund 
holders could keep the savings made from their budget to invest in practice 
facilities. This allowed those GPs who owned their practice to fund building 
schemes that would benefit them personally when they retired and sold their 
share of the practice to an incoming partner. Clearly, this incentive did not 
apply equally, to those largely inner city GPs who rented or leased their 
premises. 
The restriction on practice list size for prospective fund holders was 
progressively reduced, first to 9000, then 7000, and finally practices that could 
join together and field a list in excess of 3000 patients could become 
"community fund holders". The net result was that fund holding took off swiftly 
from 306 practices in 1991. By 1994,2000 practices and 8,800 GPs were 
enrolled covering 36% of the population (Ham, 1994, p. 19). By 1996, the year 
before fund holding was abolished, the scheme covered more than 50% of the 
patient population in England. 
6. Incentives were also extended to GPs under the "indicative prescribing scheme, " 
which later became known as "prescribing budgets". 
"From 1 April 1991, each practice received an indicative amount for its 
drug spending from its FHSA. This is simply the best estimate that can 
be made of the practice's likely needs, given its historic pattern of 
spending, the special characteristics and interests of the practice and 
anticipated changes in legitimate demand for drugs" (Podger, 1992, p 9). 
GPs that opted to spend less than their indicative amount and achieved their 
target could spend 50% locally on primary care projects jointly agreed with their 
Health Authority (Podger, 1992, p. 10). Under later schemes introduced, GPs 
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could earn up to £ 3000 per annum by keeping within their pre set prescribing 
budgets. The function of these prescribing budgets, which assumed in 
subsequent years that the incidence of spending would follow the same pattern 
as the previous year, was to provide "financial benchmarks against which 
practices' spending could be monitored and justification sought by the FHSA for 
marked divergence"(Podger, 1992, p. 9). The sting in the tail of the prescribing 
budget was that practices could be called to account for profligate or 
inappropriate prescribing. 
7. To assist in measurement, new quarterly Prescribing Analysis and Cost (PACT) 
figures were developed by the Prescription Pricing Authority (PPA). 
"... effective purchasing cannot happen without good comparative data 
on price, product, quality and service.... Effective American purchasing 
groups start by deciding what outcomes they want and then develop good 
data systems for all providers in the market area" (Light, 1998, p. 219). 
These reports were sent routinely to practices and described at three levels of 
increasing detail how the practice measured up on prescribing. 
a. Level 1 PACT reports compared practice prescribing costs, number of 
items and average cost per item against the FHSA average and the 
English national average. These reports were sent automatically to every 
GP (Ball, 1992, p. 28). 
b. Level 2 PACT broke the level 1 information down into seven categories, 
namely the six major therapeutic groups that account for most 
prescribing cost and an `all other' category. The six therapeutic areas 
were Cardiovascular, Gastrointestinal, Respiratory, Musculoskeletal, 
Central Nervous System and Infections. Level 2 was sent automatically 
to practices whose overall prescribing costs were 25% above their health 
authority average or 75% above in any one category (Ball, 1992, p. 28). 
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Later PACT reports combined levels 1 and 2 into one report which was 
sent automatically to all GPs. 
c. Level 3 PACT, which detailed a full catalogue of all prescriptions issued 
during the quarter, was available on request but sent automatically to all 
training practices (Ball, 1992, p 29. ). 
8. Information technology was seen as an important driver. A pre requisite of fund 
holding was that practices must have, or install an "approved practice computer 
system" (HMSO, 1989). Later initiatives included the development of 
PRODIGY, a prescribing support system that incorporated the latest prescribing 
guidelines. 
Concomitant with these changes, the Thatcher reforms introduced new roles within 
health authority management. A Medical Adviser and Pharmaceutical Adviser were 
introduced to call on GP practices and provide advice on medical management and 
prescribing issues (HMSO, 1989). 
"Major savings have come from challenging the customary practices of 
autonomous physicians" (Light, 1998, p 219). 
These new staff reported into Directors of Public Health, who planned the overall health 
needs of the population based upon demographics and local priorities. Pharmaceutical 
advisers were particularly proactive serving on local area prescribing committees and 
assisting GP practices to set up practice formularies and increase generic prescribing. 
"The development of local formularies has been slow. GPs in general have not 
welcomed restrictions on clinical freedom and there have been few specific 
incentives to develop and maintain a formulary" (IMS, 1996, p. 28). 
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In conclusion, the Thatcher reforms injected a greater degree of measurement into the 
NHS, where managers now focused on taking cost out of the system and increasing 
value for money. The links between primary and secondary care were strengthened, 
building towards an integrated service where cost shifting from hospitals to GP practice 
would no longer be tolerated. Fund holders in turn had an incentive to adjust prescribing 
habits, for example to increase prescribing of anti-hypertensive or asthma preparations 
to reduce the cost of hospital admissions, or alternatively to cut prescribing costs 
through wholeheartedly embracing generic prescribing. 
For the first time, active management of prescribing costs had been introduced across 
the NHS with managers specifically assigned to the task. Although the key influences 
upon GP prescribing were indirect factors designed to make practices aware of the cost 
of their prescribing relative to practices with a similar demographic profile, once 
awareness had been achieved, GP's incentives were introduced to encourage a change 
in behaviour. 
"Most of the current influences on GP prescribing patterns are indirect, such as 
the provision of prescription data to each GP and peer review of over and under 
prescribing doctors. Widespread use of PACT data has resulted in an increase in 
rational prescribing practice"(IMS, 1996p 28). 
The structure of the NHS in 1996, the year before John Major's government lost to 
Tony Blair at the May General Election, is shown in figure 3.5 
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Figure 3.5 NHS Structure Circa 1996 
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3.5 The operating environment 1997 to 2002 
Following their May General Election victory, the Labour Government took little time 
in introducing their plans for the NHS, which were announced in the White Paper "A 
New NHS" published in November 1997. 
"By grouping general practitioners and their patients as the basic building blocks 
of a renewed national service, the white paper sets out to provoke new thinking 
and to promote innovation in determining how to make a service suited for 
modern times. This is a fundamental change in which the voice of primary care 
professionals, particularly, general practitioners, has been deliberately 
amplified" (Parston et al., 1998). 
The basic thrust of Labour's proposals agreed with the Conservative approach by 
"committing the government to maintain a health service available to all on the basis of 
need, not ability to pay, and funded through general taxation" (Ham, 1998). A major 
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change, however, was the immediate scrapping of the fund holding scheme that Labour 
considered divisive. Nevertheless the same focus remained on driving out cost and 
pharmaceuticals remained both a politically acceptable and highly visible target. A 
significant part of the white paper addressed the issue of health service structure with 
the removal of the internal market a key part of the reforms: 
"The white paper focuses to a large extent on dismantling the internal market 
and the development of primary care" (Bunch, 1998). 
The key changes were included in chapters 4,5 and 6 of the White Paper, where 
Labour's plans for health authorities, primary care groups and NHS trusts were detailed. 
Health authorities became responsible for assessing local health needs and for drawing 
up a cohesive strategy, a "health improvement plan, " to meet those needs in concert 
with other agencies concerned (Atherton, 1998). An important change was the inclusion 
of the local authority, recognising Labour's view that poor housing and social services 
impacted on a number of clinical conditions such as mental health. The resulting NHS 
structure is illustrated in figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6 The NHS Circa 1998 
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The internal market introduced by the Conservatives in 1991 was thus replaced with a 
new primary-care led integrated system, as illustrated in figure 3.6. Primary Care 
Groups replaced fund holding and were designed eventually to run along the lines of 
Trusts with total responsibility for commissioning healthcare for patient populations 
each in the order of 100,000 (HMSO, 1997). 
"From April 1999,500 new primary care groups, typically serving populations 
of 100,000, will replace nearly 4000 existing commissioning organisations, 
including general practice fund holders" (Butler et al., 1998, p 214). 
A marked change was that, unlike fund holding, membership of primary care groups 
was not optional. Thus GPs that were used to working as independent contractors were 
now, for the first time, forced to work together within large, relatively formal, 
organisations. 
80 
"Primary care groups are not optional: all general practitioners will be required 
to be within a group, and these groups will be answerable to health authorities 
not only for their financial stewardship but also for their standards of clinical 
practice. Closer working relationships between general practitioners are an 
inevitable consequence of this change" (Atherton, 1998, p 379. ). 
The government charged the health authorities to manage the dismantling of the 
purchaser provider split and the eventual development of a primary care driven 
health 
service; in fact "perhaps the most radical aspect of the white paper is its commitment to 
keep primary care in the driving seat shaping local health services " (Boyce et al., 1998, 
p. 215). The changes were not expected to occur overnight but reflected a progressive 
shift over time. Over time, primary care groups were expected to move towards 
independent primary care trust status (HMSO, 1997). Initially four classes of Primary 
Care Group were envisaged: 
"The white paper outlines four progressive forms of primary care group: giving 
advice to health authorities on commissioning; managing devolved budgets; 
independent primary care trusts responsible for some devolved commissioning; 
and primary care trusts responsible for commissioning all primary and 
secondary care services with a fully integrated budget"(Butler et al., 1998, p 
214. ). 
These different forms of Primary Care Group reflected the different starting points of 
different GP practices with some having little experience of commissioning health care 
and others with previous responsibility for running total purchasing pilot schemes. 
"In time primary care groups will be responsible for purchasing almost 90% of 
hospital and community care, so proper accountability is crucial. Health 
Authorities will monitor their performance against targets set in health 
improvement programmes and will exercise some control through allocating 
resources and controlling the progress of groups up (and down) the four steps to 
complete autonomy" . (Boyce et al., 1998, p 215) 
Under this system, healthcare priorities were now driven within a national framework 
but locally adjusted within a three-year health improvement programme. For hospital 
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trusts, a major change was the development of clinical governance that placed a new 
emphasis on the quality of care. Cost containment remained a key element of the 
government's healthcare policy with cash limits being introduced on drug expenditure 
for the first time in the health service. 
"For the first time, primary care budgets will be fully cash limited, but the 
groups will be able to move money between different parts of the service to 
balance their books" (Butler et al., 1998, p 214. ). 
A major problem facing Primary Care Groups, however, was how to discharge them 
from the budget deficit that they inherited from the Health Authorities. Instructions in 
force at that time stipulated that they must balance their budgets within three years. It is 
interesting to note in this context that the US concept of "managed care" requires that 
all elements of the health care system are brought together in one place so that 
budgetary trade offs can be made (Light, 1998): 
"The key to managed care is a single budget so that costs cannot be shifted to 
someone else's budget and savings can be reallocated elsewhere, including 
incentive pay and profits" (Light, 1998, p 217. ). 
Key effects upon the GP population were: 
1. A loss of both individual and practice autonomy as GPs became part of a 
Primary Care Group that could encompass 50 to 100 GPs and more than 20 
practices. 
"Within the PCTs, the main influence on prescribing tends to be the 
prescribing manager or advisor, who is usually a pharmacist. Doctors 
prescribe in accordance with a set formulary or prescribing guide and 
these may be used by a single PCT or a group of PCOs5 in the same 
area... Cost is a major consideration in selection of drugs for a formulary 
as PCTs have capped budgets. There is generally close co-operation 
between PCT and hospital prescribing advisers, with joint prescribing 
5 PCO is an abbreviation for all forms of Primary Care Organization. 
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guides commonly used across the primary care and hospital sectors" 
(IMS, 2003 p 25). 
2. A much more stringent control on both budget and prescribing freedom as 
individual practices were initially brought into line. The old pressures of visits 
by the medical or pharmaceutical adviser from the Health Authority were 
increased through the actions of peer group pressure, the introduction of PCG 
formularies, clinical governance and more acute pressure on budgets. 
"The most recent survey shows that 50% of PCTs operate a prescribing 
formulary. This percentage looks set to rise markedly as a further 28% 
were developing a formulary towards the end of 2001... About three- 
quarters of PCTs use prescribing guidelines, usually linked to specific 
prescribing targets, such as generic prescribing, antibiotic prescribing or 
prescribing of statins " (IMS, 2003 p 25). 
3. The introduction of unified budgets for GPs, who now had responsibility for 
commissioning total healthcare services for their local communities. This shifted 
the emphasis on to total treatment costs, although drug costs remained a highly 
visible and politically acceptable target. 
4. The establishment of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence as the 
government's flagship for evidence based medicine. 
"The stated purpose of clinical guidelines from the United Kingdom's 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is to help healthcare 
professionals and patients make the right decisions about healthcare in 
specific clinical circumstances" (Wailoo et al., 2004, p 536). 
The refusal to grant Relenza, the Glaxo flu drug, a licence, rapidly brought 
NICE into the news. But it was less publicized that NICE also began to review 
the validity of established practice, such as the value of Proton Pump Inhibitors 
in the treatment of GORD (Gastro oesophageal reflux disease). 
"NICE is a national policy making body whose responsibility is clearly 
broader than the individual patient. This wider viewpoint is reflected in 
NICE's technology appraisal by the central role afforded to cost 
effectiveness" (Wailoo et al., 2004, p. 536). 
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5. The government introduced a strategy to promote health and prevent disease 
focused upon cardiovascular disease, cancer and mental illness. "The main 
thrusts of the policy are, by 2010, to reduce mortality rates from heart disease by 
at least 40% and cancer by at least 20% in people under the age of 75" (IMS, 
2003, p. 16, ). 
Central to this strategy of health promotion were a number of major new, 
programmes: 
a) National Service Frameworks (NSFs) set out national standards for 
treating a range of diseases. NSFs were initially developed for cancer, 
cardiovascular disease, mental health, the elderly and diabetes. 
b) Health Improvement Programmes (HImPs) were developed at local level 
reflecting local conditions as well as targets of the NSFs. Asthma and 
obesity frequently featured in HImPs. 
The pressures upon general practice to reduce cost and run more efficiently were now 
more acute than ever with principal measurements being provided by PACT 
(Prescribing Analysis and Cost) data. The introduction of global budgets under the new 
Primary Care Groups was seen by many GPs as an effective method of driving costs 
down and restricting demand. One GP described PCGs6 to me as "a rationing 
mechanism for the government" (Bob Ingles, Chairman of Worcester LMC). 
The 12% of the NHS budget spent on pharmaceuticals therefore remained a highly 
visible target for cost controls (IMS, 2003, p 10). A number of government funded 
6 Primary Care Groups 
84 
organizations were established to provide advice on prescribing and to evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of drugs focused on the drug bill. Among initiatives in place that impacted 
upon prescribing practices were: 
1. Local prescribing committees that influenced which drugs are prescribed at 
community and hospital level. 
2. The National Prescribing Centre, which was set up in 1996 to promote cost- 
effective prescribing. The role of the centre incorporated the earlier initiative of 
MeReC (Medicines Resource Centre) that produced regular bulletins on topical 
prescribing issues from 1991 onwards. The pricing comparison bar charts that 
these included added to the growing awareness of cost. 
3. NICE, sometimes described as "the Fourth Hurdle" after gaining safety, efficacy 
and pricing approval, has demonstrated significant ability to influence the 
prospects of both established and new drugs within the UK. 
"At national level, the specific product recommendations and clinical 
guidelines issued by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence are a 
major influence on prescribing practice, especially now that PCOs 
(Primary Care Organisations) and health authorities have a legal 
obligation to make funding available to ensure that NICE guidance is 
implemented" (IMS, 2003, p 20). 
The impact of such guidance on standardizing the prescribing choices within 
given therapeutic areas should not be under estimated: 
"Prescribing throughout the UK will become increasingly standardized 
as a result of the impact of NICE and other national guidelines and 
protocols, and as the PCTs merge to form larger organisations with 
prescribing policies covering extremely large patient populations" (IMS, 
2003, p 20). 
The establishment of NICE reinforced demand-side regulation of the market, 
where appraisal could significantly delay uptake of new products; for example 
Herceptin was not offered to patients for some time after launch because 
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physicians awaited NICE guidance (IMS, 2003, p. 21). A rejection or restricted 
recommendation from NICE could therefore mean that the potential of some 
new drugs was never realised. In contrast, a positive NICE recommendation 
virtually guaranteed rapid and widespread uptake of the medicine (IMS, 2003, p. 
21). NICE recommendations, in effect, were designed to remove the "postcode 
lottery" that prevailed under the Conservatives, where individual health 
authorities decided whether to fund a particular treatment or not. 
"Recommendations made within a clinical guideline are graded 
according to the strength of the evidence on which they are based. The 
highest grades are afforded to recommendations based on meta-analysis 
of randomised controlled trials and the lowest grade to recommendations 
based on expert opinion, including the view of the development group. 
This classification also has the effect of reducing the impact of cost 
effectiveness considerations: health economic evidence is often sparse in 
established clinical areas and, where it does exist, is of variable quality" 
(Wailoo et al., 2004, p 537). 
Of the 44 appraisals conducted by NICE since it began work in 2000 until mid 
2002,31 were for pharmaceuticals and the remainder for diagnostics, devices 
and procedures (IMS, 2003, p. 21). Initially, critics saw NICE as a rationing 
machine aimed at primarily reducing costs, but the effect of NICE has frequently 
been to promote more widespread use of effective treatments. 
"When NICE was first established, critics considered that the institute 
had been set up to ration treatments in the NHS. However, most of 
NICE's recommendations have suggested partial or full use of 
technologies - 16 have been recommended for routine use (all of their 
licensed indications), 30 for selected use (in groups where evidence 
indicates they are most effective), and four for use in research settings 
only" (Mayor, 2002, p 924). 
4. There is clear evidence that the national service frameworks are having a marked 
impact on prescribing, for example spending on prescribed drugs grew by 10% 
between 2001 and 2002, fuelled by a 25% increase in drugs in a number of 
particular categories (Macdonald, 2003, p 677). 
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"Spending on lipid regulating drugs, including statins, increased by 33%. 
The main reason for this, according to the Audit Commission, was the 
national service framework on coronary heart disease.. . The 18% increase in anti-hypertensives was also a result of the framework. 
Spending on drugs to treat diabetes rose by 23%. The report says this 
was due to the national service framework on diabetes, NICE guidance, 
and an increase in the number of diagnoses" (Macdonald, 2003, p 677). 
"As a result of the NSFs, prescribing volume will increase for drugs to 
treat coronary heart disease, cancer, CNS disease, diabetes, and chronic 
conditions affecting the elderly" (IMS, 2003, p 20). 
The Crown Report, "Review of Prescribing, Supply & Administration of Medicines, " 
was published in March 1999. This recommended that a new group of "dependent 
prescribers" be established. These professionals could then review treatment of those 
patients who were clinically assessed by an independent prescriber. Such dependent 
prescribers could include specialized nurses or pharmacists carrying out reviews of a 
patient's medication (Crown, 1999). They would therefore have the power to limit the 
number of times that a repeatable prescription could be dispensed and would be able 
either to switch the patient to a cheaper alternative, such as a generic drug, or perhaps to 
persuade the patient to try an OTC7 remedy, thus removing the treatment cost from the 
NHS arena. Such activities have some similarities with Pharmacy Benefit Managers, 
which significantly reduced costs to payers under managed care schemes in the USA. 
Although members of the Labour government have mooted the possibility of legislation 
to require generic substitution, the increased level of generic prescribing and dispensing 
since 1997 is considered by some to obviate the need to legislate. However, the 
Department of Health believes that there is room to improve on the number of 
prescriptions written generically - currently around 60% of all GP prescribing. A level 
as high as 70% to 80% is considered achievable (IMS, 2003). Schemes to encourage 
7 OTC refers to an over the counter medicine that may be bought from a pharmacy without prescription 
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more generic prescribing may be expected to continue to be a high priority within the 
Department's pharmacy and prescribing unit. 
Within this scenario, the gatekeeper role of the GP in terms of access to drugs will be 
further enhanced in the Primary Care Group system in the future. With significantly 
increased budgetary responsibility, GPs will have more control over how healthcare 
funding is allocated in their area, including the drug budget. GPs who have not been in 
fund holding practice, which will include a significant number of dispensing doctors, 
will have to adapt to a new style of practice management in which cost control will be a 
key feature. 
Traditional pharmaceutical customers are primarily GPs and hospital doctors, although 
with the emergence of Primary Care Groups the trend has been towards larger buying 
groups and committee decisions rather than individual prescribing choice. Under these 
circumstances, we may expect the number of customers to decrease as the desire to 
leverage administrative savings and achieve economies of scale encourages mergers to 
occur between Health Authorities, Primary Care Groups and Trusts. 
Certainly, while numbers of GPs have increased slightly over the last few years, as 
illustrated in the table below, there has been tremendous concentration in buying and 
decision making power. Prior to the advent of the 1991 "Thatcher reforms" each GP 
acted independently. Effectively, purchasing of primary care pharmaceuticals, the key 
market driver, was in the hands of over 32,000 GPs. In contrast by 1995, as the 
Conservative reforms were in full swing, primary care purchasing came into the hands 
of approximately 4000 individual purchasers, encompassing multi funds, consortia, 
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fund holding and non-fund holding GPs. Under the Labour reforms, there were initially 
500 primary care groups, responsible for primary care purchasing, a number that has 
been declining steadily through merger since. These changes have reinforced the focus 
upon driving out cost in pharmaceutical expenditure, standardizing prescribing habits 
and increasing the usage of generic drugs. However, even though the behaviour of GPs 
has altered in the face of changes in how the health service has been organised and 
attempts to influence prescribing behaviour, the number of actual primary care 
professionals interfacing with patients and the basic factors pertaining to regulation, 
pricing and distribution of pharmaceuticals has changed little during the period covered 
by this study. This is confirmed by the figures below. 
3.6 The structure of the UK pharmaceutical Market, 1993 - 2002 
The number of GPs in the UK has remained relatively stable during the ten year period 
1992 to 2001, as illustrated in table 3.7. Given that patient prescriptions are the building 
blocks of the pharmaceutical market, this illustrates the point that it is changes in 
prescribing behaviour that have the potential to influence the pharmaceutical sales 
environment rather than structural change within the health service per se. Structural 
change acts to facilitate desired changes in physicians prescribing behaviour. 
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Table 3.2 The number of GPs in the UK 1992 - 2001 
Year England & Wales Scotland N Ireland Total UK 
1992 27,644 3,421 937 32,002 
1993 27,991 3,456 950 32,397 
1994 28,277 3,490 979 32,746 
1995 28,421 3,524 994 32,939 
1996 28,591 3,573 1,011 33,175 
1997 28,852 3,625 1,026 33,503 
1998 28,780 3,660 1,033 33,473 
1999 28,471 3,697 1,039 33,207 
2000 29,479 3,707 1,049 34,235 
2001 29,628 3,755 1,054 34,437 
Source: (Yuen, 2002) OHE Compendium of Statistics, 2002 
The number of pharmacies in the UK, as with GPs, shows little difference over a ten 
year period, as illustrated in table 3.8. 
Table 3.3 Number of Retail Chemists in the UK (1992-2001) 
Year England Wales Scotland N. Ireland UK 
1992 9,947 712 1,137 509 12,305 
1993 9,952 714 1,138 504 12,308 
1994 9,954 721 1,136 507 12,318 
1995 9,948 721 1,139 506 12,314 
1996 9,779 715 1,142 504 12,137 
1997 9,773 713 1,143 504 12,132 
1998 9,791 714 1,145 508 12,156 
1999 9,785 712 1,145 502 12,144 
2000 9,775 711 1,144 504 12,134 
2001 9,774 708 1,145 508 12,135 
Source: (Yuen, 2002) OHE Compendium of Statistics, 2002 
The basic unit of the pharmaceutical market remains the prescription. Prescriptions are 
generated by patients consulting a GP or hospital physician. The vast majority of 
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prescriptions are dispensed via the retail pharmacist, although dispensing practices and 
hospital pharmacies still also fill prescriptions. These "dispensers" obtain their supplies 
of drugs primarily via the drug wholesalers, who deliver daily or twice daily to 
pharmacies. Filled prescriptions are then submitted to the Prescription Pricing Authority 
(PPA) that prices the prescription and pays the pharmacist monthly, in arrears. The 
diagram below, Figure 3.7, presents a simplified overview of the supply chain. 
Figure 3.7 Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
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There are 14 full-line wholesalers operating in the UK, supplying drugs and related 
products to dispensing doctors and pharmacies. The three largest Pan European 
wholesalers are Alliance Unichem, AAH (owned by German wholesaler Gehe), and 
Phoenix. Together they account for over 80% of what is usually referred to as the 
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ethical pharmaceuticals supply market (IMS, 2003, p 69. ), reflecting supply through 
GPs. While these three National wholesalers operate on a national basis, the remaining 
full-line wholesalers tend to cover regional territories. In addition, approximately 40 
short-line wholesalers operate in the UK market, supplying limited ranges of cut price 
goods, mainly parallel imports9, primarily to retail pharmacies. Wholesalers receive a 
fixed margin of 12.5% on branded medicines but margins can be 3 to 5% higher on 
generics, athough these products are therefore less profitable (IMS, 2003, p 39). 
All UK pharmacists are remunerated on the basis of a dispensing fee for each script 
dispensed plus a professional allowance. The latter depends on the number of 
prescriptions dispensed. 
"For the medicines they purchase and dispense, they are reimbursed at the Drug 
Tariff Price10 minus a `claw back' which aims to recoup the discounts 
pharmacists receive from manufacturers and wholesalers and the savings they 
make from dispensing parallel imports. Following the October 2000 discount 
enquiry, an 11.28% claw back was agreed but in order to take into account a 
previous shortfall the total claw back was set at 11.48%, effective until 
December 2002"(IMS, 2003, p 39). 
Prior to the introduction of Primary Care Groups it was not unusual for deep price 
discounts, in the order of 100%, to be afforded to hospitals by manufacturers on the 
premise that prescriptions emanating from the hospital would influence the local GPs 
and hence drive prescriptions in the community (IMS, 2003, p 39). 
"Hospital prescribing has a significant influence on the primary care drugs bill. 
Patients prescribed a product by a consultant are likely to continue with that 
product once their care has been passed back to the GP" (IMS, 1996, p 28). 
8 Ethical pharmaceuticals refer to those products which can only be obtained on prescription. 
The term `Parallel imports' refers to supplies of products sourced from other countries in Europe where 
pharmaceuticals are available at lower prices. These parallel imports are typically sourced from Greece, 
Italy, Spain or France. 
10 Drug Tariff Price reflects the market price of a product. For a product which is still protected by patent, 
the drug tariff price is the same as the manufacturer's retail price, but for generic products a market price 
is calculated by averaging the current price across a small group of larger wholesalers and generic 
manufacturers. 
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Available products consist of original brands, parallel imports, branded generics and 
unbranded or "commodity" generics. 
Where: 
1. Original brands are those marketed by an originating company that is the patent 
holder for the active ingredient. 
2. Parallel imports are original brands sourced from other (normally European) 
countries where prices are lower. 
3. Unbranded generics are commodity off-patent copies of drugs available at a 
fraction of the cost of the original brand. In the UK, unlike the US, these 
products are not identifiable back to the manufacturer. 
4. Branded generics are improved generics with patented delivery systems or 
formulations. 
A primary thrust of the NHS reforms has been to reduce the cost of medicines through 
actively encouraging switching from high price, branded products to cheaper generic 
alternatives or parallel imported products. The split between these major groups is 
illustrated in figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8 UK Ethical Retail Market 
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The importance of parallel imports should not be under estimated. Parallel imports 
represent a form of price competition to patent protected products which impacts 
different pharmaceutical companies in different ways. The impact depends upon the mix 
of products which the company markets and management's approach to European 
pricing. 
"The UK is the most popular European destination for parallel trade, followed 
by the Netherlands and Denmark... Leading companies and leading products are 
disproportionately affected by parallel trade. 50% of parallel imports are 
accounted for by 13 products, which include the five market leaders, and just 
four companies experience 57% of PI (Parallel Import) trade" (IMS, 2003, p 64). 
Key factors driving parallel trade in the UK are the high degree of price sensitivity in 
the market. The parallel import trade is now a well established business, conducted by 
all the major wholesalers, and UK pharmacies have systems in place to track and obtain 
the best parallel import deals (IMS, 2003, p. 66). In fact, UK pharmacists have little 
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choice but to use parallel imports because the Department of Health claw back assumes 
that pharmacists will dispense some parallel imports. 
"With the new claw back (11.5%) pharmacists will have to make real efforts just 
to achieve the savings the claw back assumes they are making" (IMS, 2003, p 
66). 
Generics have steadily increased their share in both volume and value in the retail 
market at the expense of branded products. Branded generics have generally returned 
lower growth rates than the unbranded sector. Key factors driving the growth of the 
generics market are: 
1. The focus on cost containment, which favours the cheaper generic alternatives 
as the government tries to curtail NHS expenditure. There is now a real culture 
of generic prescribing within the NHS. 
2. Measures to promote generic prescribing, such as generic target incentives. 
Generic prescribing accounted for 74% of prescriptions in 2001 (IMS, 2003, p 
27). 
3. A number of "blockbuster" drugs came off patent during the study period, 
including omeprazole, enalapril, paroxetine, fluoxetine, and lisinopril. 
4. The introduction of a unified budget managed by the PCOs has focused 
attention on drug prices as a major cost driver. Most PCTs have incentives in 
place actively to boost generic prescribing. 
"There are strong incentives to promote prescribing of generics. PCT 
prescribing software lists drugs by generic name and indicates generic 
alternatives to the GP. Trainee doctors are taught to prescribe 
generically" (IMS, 2003, p 27). 
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3.7 Pricing 
The UK is one of the few major markets in which companies are free to set the launch 
price of new products (IMS, 2003, p 31). The others are the US, Germany and 
Switzerland. The UK government influences prices through control of profits made by 
the pharmaceutical industry on sales to the NHS via the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS). This is one of the chief tools used in the UK to control 
expenditure on medicines. 
"Under the PPRS, companies are free to set launch prices of new products, 
provided that the total rate of return on capital (ROC) on their portfolio of 
products reimbursed by the NHS does not exceed a specified limit. Each 
company negotiates with the government for an allowed ROC, within the range 
of 17-21 per cent.. . Any excess 
is "repaid" either directly or through a price 
reduction "(Danzon, 1997, p 21). 
The scheme, which is a "voluntary", non statutory, agreement between the government 
and the pharmaceutical industry covers all licensed branded prescription drugs sold to 
the NHS. These account for approximately 80% of the NHS drugs bill. Unbranded 
generic products and OTC medicines (other than those prescribed by doctors) are 
excluded from the scheme. 
The PPRS controls the maximum profits a company can achieve on the capital it has 
invested in R&D and manufacturing for sales made to the NHS. For companies that 
undertake little or no manufacturing or research in the UK, profit targets are set in terms 
of return on sales (ROS). In 1999, the PPRS required companies to modulate their 
prices or pay a levy equivalent to a 4.5% reduction in turnover. 
The PPRS also regulates company expenditure on promotional activity and provides 
incentives for R&D in the form of an allowance of 20% of NHS sales, plus an 
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additional 0.25% allowance for each additional in-patent molecule with annual sales in 
excess of £500,000. These incentives may, in part, account for why the UK has 
traditionally been a favoured site for pharmaceutical R&D activity, representing a 10% 
share of world R&D. This is in stark contrast to only 3% of world sales (IMS, 2003, p. 
54). However, despite these incentives, the number of new compounds introduced in the 
UK is falling, only 24 were introduced in 2000 as compared with 34 in 1996. 
Unbranded generics have been excluded from the PPRS since 1986. Prices of all 
medicines are listed by generic name in the Drug Tariff, which is published monthly by 
the Prescription Pricing Authority. Changes to the Drug Tariff, which is negotiated 
between the DOH and the pharmacy body, the Pharmaceutical Services Negotiating 
Committee (PSNC), aim to reflect market changes but rarely keep pace with the high 
level of discounts obtained by pharmacists and dispensing doctors. 
The Drug Tariff dictates the NHS reimbursement price for generics. Pharmacists and 
dispensing doctor reimbursement is based on the Drug Tariff price and additional 
professional fees for dispensing services. Discounts obtained on the Drug Tariff price 
can be retained, but part of this "excess profit" is "clawed back" by the government 
through the discount recovery system. The "claw back" is calculated on the basis of 
annual discount enquiries among a sample of pharmacists and dispensing doctors. 
The system encourages pharmacists to dispense the cheapest available product and to 
retain the discounts that exceed the claw back. It has also stimulated generic price wars, 
which have negatively impacted on the generics sector. 
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In summary, by the end of 2002 a number of factors had come into play within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry that may have applied a differential impact to pharmaceutical 
companies operating within the UK pharmaceutical market. Firstly, the government's 
drive to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure through encouraging switching to cheaper 
alternatives has driven demand for both generic and parallel imported products. 
Companies with ageing product portfolios or whose pricing policies have established 
strong differentials across Europe appear most at risk. Secondly, NICE guidance has the 
potential to deliver market success to favoured new products yet consign others to 
obscurity. Thirdly, national service frameworks have focused the attention of primary 
care professionals on actively diagnosing and treating cardiovascular disease, diabetes 
and chronic conditions of the elderly. Thus companies that had the good fortune, or 
foresight, to research or licence products for these particular categories of illness have 
effectively been handed a financial windfall. 
3.8 How to measure the effect of the NHS changes upon pharmaceutical 
companies 
A key point about strategic groups is that because of the different nature of the mobility 
barriers which surround them, some groups will be more vulnerable to external 
environmental shocks and some more protected than others (Caves et al., 1977); (for a 
full discussion see chapter 2). The issue here is how to measure the effect of such 
profound environmental change? This is not a question of measuring the reorganisation 
of the NHS, per se, or about numbers of types of hospitals, because regardless of how 
such units are organised their base functions and operating principles remain largely 
unchanged. The issue is about measuring changes in behaviour related to the 
procurement, choice and usage of pharmaceuticals. Since the NHS is virtually the sole 
purchaser of pharmaceuticals in the UK, then how NHS changes affect the choice and 
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use of pharmaceuticals should exert significant pressure on the operational strategies of 
pharmaceutical firms. 
This environmental pressure in the study period should be considerable given that the 
Thatcher reforms introduced the most significant change to the NHS since its inception 
in 1948 (Ham, 1994, p. 10). Measuring the effect of change on the relative usage of 
pharmaceuticals becomes the key question. Many of the changes introduced in the NHS 
led to variation in the way in which different parts of the NHS were organised and 
related to one another. Here it is important to separate out the "noise" of reorganisation 
from the relatively few factors that directly impacted on pharmaceutical expenditure and 
the mechanism by which changes in pharmaceutical usage occurred. 
3.9 Conclusions 
In sum, the NHS changes from the late 1980s can in many ways be described in terms 
of efficiency, where the aim was to reduce variation in output and operating cost 
between similar health care providers. The aim was to drive out cost and increase value 
for money. Although pharmaceuticals represented only 12.3% of health care 
expenditure in 2001(IMS, 2003, p 10), it can be argued that pharmaceutical expenditure 
presented a valid target for efficiency gains for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
pharmaceutical expenditures are easily measured and the PACT system provided the 
means to track, compare and contrast pharmaceutical usage and expenditure between 
similar health care providers. Secondly, the pharmaceutical industry has frequently been 
cited as one of the world's most profitable industries (The Boston Consulting Group, 
2000). Hence, it may be argued that reducing pharmaceutical profits, which some may 
regard as excessive, presented a more politically acceptable target than closing hospital 
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wards or postponing non-urgent operations. Thirdly, the availability of cheaper 
alternatives in the form of generic medicines and parallel imports meant that 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals could be significantly reduced without significant risk 
to health care provision. 
Couched in these terms the principal changes to the NHS during the 1990s impacting on 
pharmaceuticals were not changes within the structure or the operating procedures of 
the various organs of the NHS, but rather in terms of those factors that changed the use 
of pharmaceuticals. It makes sense to consider how NHS managers measured the use of 
pharmaceuticals and the precise targets that NHS professionals were driven to achieve 
in terms of drug usage. These are targets can be broadly divided into two groups. 
Firstly, those related to achieving reductions in cost by direct cost shifting from higher 
priced products to lower cost alternatives within defined areas, as measured by PACT 
figures and generic percentages. Secondly, those incentives aimed at shifting focus to 
perceived higher priority health needs of the nation, such as the reduction of the burden 
of cardiovascular medicine through early diagnosis and treatment. The effects on 
pharmaceuticals in the first instance were to differentially penalise the sales of those 
companies operating in areas of high pharmaceutical expenditure and, in the second 
case, to actively grow the market for companies marketing products such as cholesterol 
lowering agents, for example Pfizer, Astra, MSD, Novartis and Bayer. 
The former of these two categories is clearly measurable in terms of the penetration of 
generic products within defined therapeutic categories. The PACT categories effectively 
track the impact, as NHS managers focused on the big six therapeutic categories and the 
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uptake of generics. Figure 3.9 illustrates generic uptake across the seven PACT 
categories. 
Figure 3.9 Generic Penetration by PACT Category 
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Here, the six main therapeutic categories; cardiovascular (CV), gastrointestinal (GI), 
respiratory (R), musculo-skeletal (M), central nervous system (CNS) and infection are 
shown together, with the remaining therapeutic areas summarized into an "all other" 
category. 
Similarly the uptake of parallel imports within these PACT groups is illustrated in 
figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10 Parallel Imports (PI) PACT Categories 
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To measure the effect of windfalls such as NICE guidance and the national service 
frameworks, sales in units of the relevant therapeutic category, for example 
Cardiovascular medicine, should provide a reasonably accurate picture of growth in 
prescriptions without skewing the result due to price differences. For example, note in 
figure 3.11 the tremendous relative growth of the statins (cholesterol lowering agents) 
sub-segment, which stands out from the rest of the therapeutic categories in the figure, 
all of which are indexed on 1993. The key to the right identifies the relevant therapeutic 
area but the key point of the graph is to highlight the huge increase in the use of 
cholesterol lowering drugs C1 OA. 
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Figure 3.11 Therapy Area Index Based on 1993 
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In the next section we shall explore the type of strategies that the pharmaceutical 
industry employed to capitalise upon the emerging opportunities within this turbulent 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE UK PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND STRATEGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the contextual setting of this research and aims to contribute to 
the argument that strategic groups are industry specific because strategic choices are 
industry specific. Firstly, a broad overview of the UK pharmaceutical industry is 
presented, including its structure, principal drivers and trends. This is important because 
within the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain, 1959; Mason, 1949), from 
which strategic group theory first developed, structure is assumed to directly influence 
strategy and hence affect performance (Porter, 1976,1980; Scherer, 1980). It is 
important to note that, as discussed earlier (see chapter 2), both the theory of mobility 
barriers (Caves et al., 1977) and the theory of intra-industry performance (Porter, 1979) 
derive from and build upon this premise. Secondly, strategy formulation within the 
pharmaceutical industry is discussed with particular emphasis on those operational 
aspects that may be considered country specific. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
while the healthcare systems of the developed world face a number of essentially 
common problems, the UK health service differs significantly in a number of ways from 
the operating environments which were the setting for previous pharmaceutical-based 
strategic group studies (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Guedri, 1998; 
Martens, 1988). Thirdly, a brief discussion of what is meant by strategy and alternative 
strategy frameworks is discussed to provide structure to the strategy dimensions 
identified. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the principal strategic 
choices that companies must choose between and a review of the principal mobility 
barriers that differentiate strategies in the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
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4.1 The UK Pharmaceutical Industry - Size, structure and principal drivers 
The UK is generally described as the 6th largest of the world's pharmaceutical markets 
in terms of revenues (IMS, 2001) but it represents only 3% of world sales. The 
pharmaceutical market is dominated by the USA, the European Union and Japanese 
markets, where success in the US market is critical for commercial success (Porter, 
1993, p 27. ). Here, the balance has shifted. In 1995, the US and EU represented roughly 
equal markets at 33% and 32% of world sales respectively, but now the US dominates 
pharmaceutical strategy because it represents over 40% of world sales and 60% of 
pharmaceutical profits (IMS, 2001; Lehman Brothers, 2003; Pilling, 1999). The reasons 
for this shift are twofold. Firstly, as described in the previous chapter, healthcare 
systems across the world's developed countries face the common problems of rising 
demands for healthcare driven by an increasing elderly population and the rising costs 
of medical treatments. Secondly, the response to such pressures differs from country to 
country. Within Europe the approach has been towards control of drug expenditure and 
driving down the cost of pharmaceuticals. For example, in a recent article Sir Tom 
McKillop, Chief Executive of Astra Zeneca, stated that: 
"Europe has become a dog of a market with its downward spiralling of prices" 
(McKillop, 2004, p 50). 
In contrast, within the US an opposite approach appears to dominate: 
"On the demand side, particularly in the US market place, we have seen a 
dramatic rise of managed care. One important effect has been a significant 
increase in the extent of insurance coverage for prescription drugs. This has been 
driven in part by a desire to substitute drugs for more costly medical 
interventions. Increased coverage for pharmaceuticals has been one of the main 
factors linked to the increased per capita expenditures on pharmaceuticals in the 
US in the 1990's" (Grabowski et al., 2000, p 67). 
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The UK is therefore a market which has become progressively more price sensitive over 
the study period, which perhaps explains in part why market consolidation in the UK 
has declined in stark contrast to the trend in the US; see Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Concentration within the world and UK pharmaceutical industries 
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A possible reason for this may be that UK companies experience a sharp decline in sales 
post patent expiry, typically in the order of 50% to 80% of sales in the first year. They 
also face slow market entry during due to the effect of entry barriers such as evaluation 
by bodies such as NICE, ' I which caused problems for Glaxo with Relenza, a treatment 
for flu. In the US higher prices are achievable and consumers may be influenced 
directly via direct to consumer advertising, which is illegal in the UK: 
11 NICE stands for the National Institute of Clinical Excellence a government body which evaluates the 
contribution of medicines to existing treatment. (See Chapter 3) 
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"An ageing population, easy access to medical information, and the current 
scepticism about health care systems have increasingly made consumers - not 
the trusted family physician - the arbiters of what prescription medicine they 
take"(Aitken et al., 2000). (Article discussing direct to consumer advertising in 
the US. ) 
The structure of the pharmaceutical industry has also been radically affected by 
mergers. Note the two merger waves, one in 1996 and a second between 1998 and 2000 
that are prominent in the following figures 4.2 and 4.3. The first compares the 
Herfindahl Index for the 2002 companies over the last decade with and without the 
effect of mergers 12. The figure compares the same companies with the upper line 
demonstrating the position of these companies assuming they had always been a merged 
entity and the lower line illustrates these companies as original un-merged companies. 
12 The standard IMS database automatically incorporates merged companies and recalculates the 
companies' data assuming that a company had always had that asset combination. 
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Figure 4.2 The effect of mergers upon pharmaceutical industry concentration in 
the UK 
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Here, a Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index of around 400 indicates strong rivalry 
(Oster, 1994, p 213. ), while the US competitive authorities tend to view a HHI of under 
1200 as indicating a competitive market structure. The degree of fragmentation in the 
UK pharmaceutical industry is clearly illustrated by figure 4.3, which compares the 
degree of the market held by the top 4,8 and 20 companies respectively. 
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Figure 4.3 Concentration in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
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The importance of merger as a strategy in the pharmaceutical industry is clearly 
illustrated by the above two figures and it is worth noting that previous strategic group 
studies within the pharmaceutical industry do not address this (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et 
al., 1996; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988). According to industry 
sources, merger or acquisition is generally undertaken to gain cost synergies, to improve 
capabilities in research through acquisition of rare assets or critical mass, and to achieve 
marketing strength in critical markets such as the US (McNeil, 1996). These declared 
outcomes are, however, at variance with recent research, which indicates that mergers 
are primarily a response to anticipated patent expiry and weak product pipelines 
(Danzon et al., 2004). This conclusion is supported in my data by the case of 
GlaxoSmithKline. If we compare the company's market position, as a combination of 
Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham and Wellcome, in 1993, the combined market share 
o-- - -q3 C3.. - -o ýý o-- 
"k " .k' .k. " . k. , 
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represented 20.28%. But through patent expiry, notably of Augmentin, Zantac and 
Zovirax, the market share had dwindled to 10.97% by 2002. 
Although the industry structure implies a relatively fragmented industry, competition 
does not occur openly between all firms. The degree of competition occurs at the level 
of substitution in the industry, therefore companies that engage in the marketing of 
alimentary or respiratory products, for example, do not necessarily actively compete. 
The locus of competition lies not at the therapy area level e. g. alimentary products - 
therapy class A- but at the sub-therapy level e. g. anti-ulcerant products - sub-therapy 
class A2B. This point is illustrated figures 4.4 and 4.5. 
Figure 4.4 Competition between the Top 6 companies in the alimentary segment 
200213 
A. Here it can be clearly seen that the most important sub-therapy area is A2B - anti- 
ulcerants - where the market leader Wyeth [WYE]is in cut throat competition with 
In this graph the companies depicted are Wyeth [WYE]. Astra Zeneca [AZ], Glaxo Smith Kline [GSK], 
Novo Nordisk [NOV], Eli Lilly [LIL] and Reckitt Benkisser [RB]. 
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1-figure 4.4 iiiustrates the competition in the anmentary proaucts market - inerapy class 
Astra Zeneca [AZ] each marketing their own brand of a Proton Pump Inhibitor. The 
next most important sub-therapy area is A10C where Novo Nordisk [NOV] and Eli 
Lilly [LIL] are in competition with equivalent products. The key point is that because of 
the nature of disease, the pharmaceutical market is effectively partitioned and 
companies active in one specialist area may not actively compete outside of their chosen 
segments. All companies do, however, compete for selling time in front of doctors, an 
increasingly scarce `commodity', and promoting different but complementary products 
may provide additional strategic options through alliance, for example cross-selling 
arrangements. 
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Figure 4.5 Competition among the top 5 competitors in respiratory medicine 
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Figure 4.5 further illustrates the barriers to competition. Here AstraZeneca [AZ] and 
GlaxoSmithKline [GSK] are clearly direct competitors in R3D and R3F - inhaled 
steroids and beta-agonists, respectively. But Boehringer Ingelheim [BOE] and Schering 
Plough [SPL] can also market their products successfully in the respiratory market by 
concentrating their efforts in less actively contested sub-segments. This observation 
may in part explain why the pharmaceutical industry is able to produce such handsome 
returns. Competition is effectively reduced through companies choosing to compete in 
different market niches. This strategy is effectively negated through merger, where the 
combined company may find difficulty to maintain sufficient industry positions to 
sustain its size let alone allow continued growth. 
" Here the companies depicted are Glaxo Smith Kline [GSK], Astra Zeneca [AZ], lvax Pharmaceuticals 
[IVX], Boehringer Ingelheim [BOE] and Schering Plough [SPI, ]. 
112 
The increasing dominance of the US market, taken together with the risk and cost 
associated with new drug research and development, recently estimated at over $800m 
per new chemical entity, [NCE] (Hawthorne, 2003), act to focus strategy in modern 
pharmaceuticals upon the US market. Here, a key principal driver of management 
actions can be assumed to be investor expectations, as recently demonstrated by the 
ongoing furore over executive pay at Glaxo Smith Kline (Tomlinson, 2004; Yelland, 
2004). This is so for two reasons. Firstly, the management should be there to act for 
investors, who own the company, and secondly, because senior management receive 
strong incentives to maximise shareholder value through share options awarded to them. 
The pharmaceutical industry has long been a favourite with investors (Porter, 1993, p 
158. ) because of its high returns and growth prospects, where: 
"The key aspect of the industry looking forward is the growth of the largest 
pharmaceutical market in the world, the US" (Walton, 2000, p 80). 
It may be assumed that investors buy and hold shares on the assumption that the value 
of the shares will increase in line with previous growth. In general, pharmaceutical 
companies do not offer strong dividend payments, which during the study period 
generally averaged around 1% to 3% of the share price, a point further illustrated in 
figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 Dividend Yield of Selected Pharmaceutical Companies 
Key to figure 4.6 above. 
ABBREV COMPANY ABBREV COMPANY 
AZ Astra Zeneca NOV Novo 
ABB Abbott PFZ Pfizer 
AVE Aventis PG Procter & Gamble 
AKZ Akzo Nobel RB Reckitt Benkisser 
BAX Baxter Healthcare SAG Schering AG 
BAY Bayer SS Sanofi Synthelabo 
GSK Glaxo Smith Kline SPL Schering Plough 
JJ Johnson & Johnson SOL Solvay 
IVX Ivax TAK Takeda 
LIL Lilly WYE Wyeth 
MER E Merck YAM Yamanouchi 
MSD Merck Sharpe & Dohme 
It is because dividends do not represent a strong incentive to hold pharmaceutical 
company shares that sales growth can be taken as a proxy for share price appreciation, a 
point reinforced by Walton: 
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"The correlation between sales growth and the relative performance of quoted 
pharmaceutical companies' price/earnings ratio (PE) compared with the PE of 
all stocks on the market is pretty close" (Walton, 2000, p 82). 
In addition to more traditional measures of valuation, such as PE, investors increasingly 
look at the net present value (NPV) of a company's portfolio (Lehman-Brothers, 2002; 
Walton, 2000). The value of a company can be divided into those parts that are visible 
on the market today in terms of products, both marketed and in the pipeline, and those 
more hidden elements represented, for example, by management expertise (Lehman- 
Brothers, 2002): 
"For a typical large capitalisation pure play drug company we can identify about 
60 percent of the enterprise's value in terms of products that are on the market 
today, or from products that are still in development. This means that 40 percent 
of that enterprise's value must be attributable to products yet to be discovered 
and to other areas of infrastructure such as sales forces" (Walton, 2000, p 101). 
If we assume that the twin goals of maximising share price value and meeting 
shareholders' expectations drive managerial action, then the factors that would appear to 
drive strategic choice are those factors which contribute to sales growth and market 
success. Hence, the prime driver of company strategy may be assumed to be "the 
importance of developing a marketing presence, especially in the US " (Walton, 2000, p 
97). 
In the UK, the elements of success most likely to contribute to these over arching goals 
divide into pre and post market activities, where prior to product launch the factors that 
drive commercial success are about developing a strong cost effectiveness argument to 
submit to NICE. This contributes to the important wider goal of gaining rapid and full 
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marketing approval, especially if the UK has been chosen to act as "rapporteur" as part 
of the European "Mutual Recognition" Procedure. 
Post product launch, the key aim is to maximise sales of the product prior to patent 
expiry. Speed of uptake into the market is important together with life cycle 
management in order to maximise revenues from the company's product portfolio. 
Walton states that "the most important driver of growth has been life cycle 
management" (Walton, 2000, p 86). 
John Kay considers that within the pharmaceutical industry "most capital employed is 
actually uncompleted R&D" (Kay, 2000, p 10) and describes the structure of the 
industry as consisting of two different process parts: 
"There is a creative activity involved in origination. There is a delivery process 
of manufacture and distribution" (Kay, 2000, p 12 ). 
The third factor, distribution, Kay considers important because: 
".. consumers are small; because consumers are ignorant; and because consumers 
are immobile" (Kay, 2000, p 13 ). 
What sets the pharmaceutical industry apart from many other industries is, firstly, that 
the processes of origination, manufacture and delivery are nor clear cut but present 
"fuzzy boundaries", for example research, development, manufacture and marketing 
activities are' strongly intertwined. Secondly, because the retail function is performed 
by three different agents: 
"Governments (or in some countries intermediaries) try to negotiate better prices 
for consumers. Doctors do the product selection. Pharmacists bring the products 
closer to the patient" (Kay, 2000, p 14) 
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In the UK, strategy in the pharmaceutical sector therefore divides into strategic long - 
term activities, aimed at positioning the industry in the most profitable future market 
segments, and maximising long-term shareholder value and short-term operational 
strategy decisions, aimed at maximising UK sales profitability. The broad strategic 
decisions aim to address a changing world market where four key issues are presented 
by Walton (Walton, 2000, p 80 ): 
1. Slowing market growth is driving industry consolidation. This factor is 
perceived as a more important driver than product pipeline gaps and a shortage 
of new chemical entities (NCEs). 
2. Performance is diverging strongly between US and European companies. US 
based companies are showing stronger growth, perhaps due to "home 
advantage", which has long-term implications in terms of companies' ability to 
invest in future research or fund marketing programmes. 
3. Costs are increasing sharply, which limits the amount that companies can afford 
to invest in research and the number of new products which companies' can 
afford to launch. McKinsey estimates that to launch a new product now costs in 
the order of US$400m (Bastianelli et al., 2001); while Grabowski points out 
that R&D expenses have risen six-fold in the last two decades (Grabowski et 
al., 2000, p 75). 
4. A strong correlation exists between success and marketing effort, but beneficial 
scale effects are less evident in research and development activities. 
In conclusion, the strategic factors that appear important in the broader industry setting 
are, firstly, factors related to scale. This is driven, in part, by the belief that research and 
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development is scale dependent (Cookson, 2000) and partly by the size of sales forces 
required to compete effectively in key markets, especially the US. 
Sir Richard Sykes, Glaxo Chairman, spelt out the rationale in characteristic 
language. "You can't discover drugs with a man and a dog. It requires really big 
expenditure to pull together a lot of knowledge coming from different areas. 
There are some things we want to do today but can't, even with a £1.2bn R&D 
budget"(Cookson, 2000). 
A strategic response that has changed the industry has been considerable merger and 
acquisition activity, as commented upon earlier, which has generally been attributed to a 
need to build critical mass in research and marketing (Bastianelli et al., 2001; Pursche, 
1996 {Walton, 2000 #778; Walton, 2000). Spreading of risk is also often cited as one of 
the key arguments in favour of building scale within pharmaceuticals. 
"The dynamics of innovation in pharmaceuticals, an industry in which R&D is 
extremely expensive, introduces substantial risk and takes place over a very long 
period of time. By means of consolidation and the development of oligopolistic 
industrial structures, firms have been able to work with these conditions" 
{Galambos, 2000 #783, p 23. }. 
As explained earlier, merged companies were excluded from previous pharmaceutical 
industry based strategic group studies (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1996; Cool, 1985; 
Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988). This is because earlier research chose to simplify 
the data set thus allowing the comparison of adjacent years to discover stable strategic 
time periods. The research presented in this thesis is unusual because merged companies 
are included. 
In addition, a number of key scope decisions are important, although some decisions 
appear to be forced by the economics of the industry. For example, given that the cost 
of producing each new chemical entity is between US$700 and US$800m (Bastianelli et 
al., 2001; Hawthorne, 2003) companies are forced to address the three major market 
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blocks, the US, the EU and Japan, in order to recoup their investment before patent 
expiry. 
Costs of producing new products and the returns gained appear strongly skewed. 
Grabowski and Vernon, for example, found that the top 10% of products accounted for 
48% of the overall net present value of the 64 products introduced between 1980 and 
1984 (Grabowski et al., 2000, p 63. ). They concluded that, while the returns of 
research-intensive firms were positive, this result was highly dependent on a few new 
"blockbuster" products (Grabowski et al., 2000, p 67). Grabowski and Vernon observed 
that: 
"When returns are highly skewed, considerable volatility in outcomes remains 
even if companies are investing in large numbers of projects as individual 
companies" (Grabowski et al., 2000, p 67 ). 
Earlier strategic group studies (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). described 
an industry where new products were derived largely via the application of organic 
chemistry, in part in the manner described by Kay: 
"Historically my economic model of pharmaceutical research shows skilled and 
lucky people dipping into a very large pot that contained a very large number of 
coloured balls, hoping that one or two will turn out to have winning numbers on 
them" (Kay, 2000, p 14 ). 
Application of knowledge later became the key to success, where biochemistry and 
enzymology began to reshape the industry through changing the innovation process 
(Galambos, 2000, p 21): 
"As enzyme inhibition became central to the process of drug discovery, scale 
and scope efficiencies in pharmaceutical R&D steadily became more important. 
The contest to be first or second to market became more intense, and the 
requirements of successful marketing and sales in now global markets began to 
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drive merger and acquisition activity throughout the industry in the 1980's" 
(Galambos, 2000, p 21 ). 
Despite this aim, however, the period prior to 1990 is marked by the introduction of 
numerous me-too products that frequently failed to recover their research, development 
and marketing costs. This situation Grabowski attributes to a desire to gain incremental 
revenues to set against sunk costs: 
"The R&D process in pharmaceuticals can be viewed as a sequential decision- 
making process under uncertainty. At each stage of the process, companies are 
in effect weighing the extra costs of going to the next stage against the expected 
revenues. The most likely explanation for bringing small revenue products to 
market is that, at the margin, by the time companies realise that these products 
are not going to be large sellers, the costs of carrying on and launching them are 
often relatively low compared to the money that has already been sunk. 
Therefore it is worth getting those incremental revenues since they still make a 
positive contribution to the bottom line" (Galambos, 2000, p 65 ). 
More recently, enabling technologies, such as combinatorial chemistry and genomics, 
have built upon the scientific understanding of pharmaceutical chemistry and 
biochemistry and provided the means to identify larger numbers of potentially active 
compounds and to target sites of action more accurately. Huge chemical libraries have 
been built up, where new techniques such as high throughput screening provide a means 
to rapidly assess many thousands of compounds for chemical activity. 
Despite this intense focus on the productivity of research activities, together with 
increasing resources being applied to research, there is still no evidence, however, that a 
doubling of a research budget produces a concomitant increase in productivity (McNeil, 
1996, p 2. ). In fact, companies that merge together in order to achieve scale [assuming a 
hypothetical doubling of size] need twice the level of sales from the combined R&D 
output simply to maintain the same growth rate. 
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In this context, research by Henderson and Cockburn indicates that far from improving 
research productivity, mergers may actively reduce it (Henderson, 2000; Henderson et 
al., 1994). The argument is that some increase in size may benefit research through 
allowing specialisation, and some scale effects may accrue from the ability to spread 
expensive equipment costs or capabilities over more projects, for example an expensive 
staff of patent lawyers. But most companies have gained sufficient size to access these 
benefits prior to further merger(Henderson et al., 1994). In fact, further size increases 
can produce diseconomies: 
"economies of scope were exhausted once the firm had more than six to seven 
major research programs - that indeed, beyond that level there were 
diseconomies of scope" (Henderson, 2000, p 10). 
Henderson suggests that a far more compelling reason for merger activity could be 
either "the desire to compensate for serious "market failures" in the market for the 
discovery and development of new drugs (Henderson, 2000, p 11 )" or the desire to 
benefit from economies of scale and scope in marketing and distribution. 
"Effective pharmaceutical marketing and distribution requires, in general, 
incurring very substantial fixed costs. These costs must be incurred whether one 
is selling one drug or ten, and are a classic source of scale economies" 
(Henderson, 2000, p 11 ). 
Scale in marketing, aimed at improving sales presence in the critical world markets, 
particularly the US, together with scale in research aimed at seeking potential synergies 
in order to increase research output, therefore appear to be primary strategy drivers in 
the pharmaceutical industry. To achieve this strategy requires either stellar organic 
growth that must be driven by new product introduction (although the source of those 
products may not be in-house company research; witness the success of Wyeth through 
in-licensing successful compounds and marketing them aggressively e. g. lansoprazole)., 
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or, growth can be achieved through merger or acquisition. Both strategies require strong 
sales and marketing capability because to attract licensing opportunities the licensor 
invariably requires strong market reach and a proven sales track record. These 
capabilities are also required for merger or acquisition because to win the battle for 
investors' minds the lead firm must have, first, the paper wealth to afford the 
transaction, which invariably stems from a strong record of previous growth, second, 
the strategy to satisfy investors, analysts and management that the merger will create 
future value over and above the two firms' operating separately. As Henderson 
observes: 
"No one wishes to announce that they are merging with another firm because 
they have a weak pipeline and wish to combine assets; neither analysts nor 
employees are likely to welcome the news. Announcing that one is merging to 
gain economies of scale and scope in R&D has a positive, empowering, 
forward-sounding note to it. Unfortunately, the announcement alone is not 
conclusive proof that such economies exist" (Henderson, 2000, p 11 ). 
Merger or acquisition strategy in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly for serial 
merger candidates, may therefore be interpreted as primarily an attempt to buy time 
with investors. This may be achieved through either the realisation of cost synergies and 
by a move away from weakness through the elimination of a poor performing operation, 
rather than building on strength. 
"Few investors think that Big Pharma can compensate for a deficit of new drugs 
by getting bigger. Some suspect that the converse is true: that size has made it 
sluggish. There is abundant evidence of a pipeline problem" (Gapper, 2004, p 21 
)" 
An alternative view is that building scale in critical markets will enable greater leverage 
to be gained from the existing product portfolio and a more attractive candidate profile 
achieved in the highly competitive market for in-licence product opportunities: 
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"The hiatus has led the industry to try to squeeze more from those drugs that get 
to market. Companies such as Aventis have expanded their US sales forces in 
order to produce more billion-dollar blockbusters" (Gapper, 2004, p 21). 
Mergers, therefore, represent the alternative strategic option for companies that cannot 
achieve their growth expectations organically with their current asset configuration. 
Large size is not, however, equally achievable by all companies. What strategic choices 
are open to the management of the mid-size companies that wish to remain independent 
and yet must achieve the growth expectations inherent in their share price? Alternative 
strategic options for these companies may include alliance or co-marketing, if they 
either cannot or will not merge with others. Here, the aim appears primarily to be 
maximization of the value of the company's product portfolio either through achieving 
some scale, for example marketing reach, via an alliance or alternatively through the use 
of in-licensed products to compensate for a dry pipeline. Mid-size companies by nature 
of their scale can specifically benefit from in-licensed products that would not have 
sufficient market potential to attract the big companies (Bastianelli et al., 2001). 
In conclusion, this section has discussed mergers at length, primarily because the time 
period encompassed by this study has been marked by successive waves of mergers. To 
exclude mergers, a strategy adopted by much previous research (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 
1985; Martens, 1988), would therefore be both impractical and potentially misleading. 
The research reported in later chapters includes merged companies. 
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4.2 Strategy and alternative strategy frameworks 
One of the difficulties apparent from a review of the literature on strategic groups (see 
Chapter 2) is that the number and type of variables used to operationalize strategy in 
previous strategic group studies has varied widely. In fact, one of the criticisms of 
strategic group studies is that they frequently do not attempt to delineate groups a priori 
(Thomas et al., 1988) through the use, for example, of a generic template such as 
Porter's generic strategies (Porter, 1980) or Miles and Snow's strategic typology (Miles 
et al., 1978). 
This potential ambiguity also extends to the definition of strategy which many authors 
describe differently; for a detailed discussion see (Hofer et al., 1978, p 18-19. ) Porter 
defines strategy as; 
"a combination of the ends (goals) for which the firm is striving and the means 
(policies) by which it is seeking to get there" (Porter, 1980, p xvi). 
Porter then links his definition of strategy to 13 dimensions (Porter, 1980, p 127-8. ) (see 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion). This idea of a matching between environment 
and actions by the firm is reinforced by Hofer and Schendel's definition of strategy: 
"The basic characteristics of the match an organisation achieves with its 
environment is called its strategy" (Hofer et al., 1978, p4). 
They go on to further describe this as a: 
"fundamental pattern of present and planned resource deployments and 
environmental interactions that indicates how the organization will achieve its 
objectives" (Hofer et al., 1978, p 25). 
Hofer and Schendel then state that there are four components to any organization's 
strategy. These are: scope, resource deployments, competitive advantages, and synergy 
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(Hofer et al., 1978). This definition of strategy suggests a pattern of scope and resource 
deployment choices from which the firm derives competitive advantage. This in turn fits 
the idea that strategy is invariably not a single decision and therefore is more accurately 
described in multivariate terms. Cool, in his study of the US pharmaceutical industry 
describes strategy first as: 
"a set of actions and the application of resources to this set of actions permitting 
an organisation to achieve its objectives while responding to the perceived 
opportunities and constraints in the environment"(Cool, 1985, p 83 ). 
This definition is then refined by Cool as: 
"A strategy is a set of actions and the application of resources to this set of 
actions enabling an organisation to achieve positions of sustainable competitive 
advantage and permitting it to achieve its objectives" (Cool, 1985, p 85 ). 
Cool then asks the question of what is strategic about strategic groups and suggests that: 
"If observed groupings really stem from differences in strategic management 
decision-making, then the concept of strategy should provide the basis for 
revealing differences in conduct between firms in any given industry" (Cool, 
1985, p 87 ). 
Cool then concludes that "strategy is minimally composed of two facets: actions 
(including scope choices) and resource allocations" (Cool, 1985, p 87- 88 ). These two 
components are derived from Hofer and Schendel's definition and Cool then suggests; 
"Given these two definitional components, it would only be natural to trace 
strategic conduct differences between firms in those terms. One may contend 
that unless both aspects of the strategy concept are included in the empirical 
design of the strategic group concept, no real strategic groups are identified 
within industries" (Cool, 1985, p 88 ). 
This idea that strategy is incomplete without both choices with regard to domain 
(product and geographical market) and resource deployment, in effect challenges the 
traditional 10 view (see Chapter 2) that strategy can be represented purely in univariate 
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terms namely as differences in relative scale. The issue then becomes not whether 
strategy is univariate or multivariate in terms of dimensions, but how many variables 
should be chosen to represent strategy and which dimensions should be chosen. In his 
study of strategic groups in the US pharmaceutical industry, Cool chose seven scope 
variables and seven resource deployment variables, together with a 15th variable 
representing size, to describe strategy within the industry and identify strategic groups 
(Cool, 1985, pp 301-303). Martens in his study of the pharmaceutical industry within 
five E. C. countries chose six variables to describe strategy, including a mix of scale 
(size), scope (in terms of therapeutic and geographical focus) and resource 
commitments (Martens, 1988, p 247 ). 
Previous research within the pharmaceuticals industry therefore confirms the multi- 
dimensional nature of strategic choice within this industry, where the key business 
processes discussed earlier, namely research, sales and marketing, appear to build 
competitive advantage. Those processes which primarily contribute to shareholder 
returns are new product sourcing, either through in-house research or in-licensing 
activities, and the successful marketing and distribution of the company's products. In 
the pharmaceutical industry these two activities are intertwined because the average 
patent life of a product in the UK is probably in the order of 12 years post-launch. 
Prozac, for example, was introduced in 1988 and went off patent in 2000. Losec was 
introduced in 1989 and the UK patent expired in 2002 (IMS, 2002). Post-patent between 
50% to 80% of branded product sales are captured by generic competition in the first 
year (Lehman Brothers, 2003). Therefore, in order to meet investors' growth 
expectations, companies must actively market their products up to patent expiry. The 
year prior to patent expiry typically marks the most important sales year for the product, 
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(Lehman-Brothers, 2002) and at the same time companies must make active provision 
for new products to be available for launch to replace the revenue lost post-patent expiry 
of their key brands. Thus R&D activities together with marketing resource 
commitments represent the key building blocks of sustainable competitive advantage, 
through differentiation, in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Relevant to this discussion, it is important to realise that what we are measuring through 
strategic group analysis using, for example, cluster analysis is primarily the pattern of 
past strategic decisions. Intended strategy is not measured unless interviews are held, or 
other methods used, to canvas the future intentions of managers. This fact, together with 
the nature of the pattern of strategic choices, tends to limit the value of "generic strategy 
templates", such as those of Porter or Miles and Snow, for classifying strategic choice 
within the pharmaceutical industry. 
The generic strategic dimensions offered by Porter are broad market or segment focus, 
versus differentiation or low cost (Porter, 1980). Low cost is not a commonly adopted 
alternative within the "ethical" research based companies, that are the subject of this 
study, although some companies notably Sanofi Synthelabo and Novartis do actively 
trade in commodity generics in addition to their research-based activities. 
The principal business of a pharmaceutical company consists of two productive sets of 
activities, research and development of new drugs, on the one hand, and the active 
marketing of pharmaceuticals, on the other. Previous researchers have pointed out that 
the generics industry operates a different business model to ethical pharmaceutical 
companies (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988). Hence, they 
exclude "pure" generic companies from their strategic group research. The research 
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reported in this study also excludes pure generic companies, such as Generics UK, for 
two reasons. First, the profit model of these companies is not directly comparable with 
that of the research based industry. Second, within the UK generic products are not 
linked within the wholesalers records to the original manufacturer and therefore audits, 
such as those produced by IMS, and used in this study, cannot distinguish between 
companies. In Porter's terms this effectively excludes a low cost strategy, leaving the 
alternative broad strategic options of differentiation and focus, which, although perhaps 
useful as a broad classifier, lack the sensitivity to clearly differentiate patterns of 
strategic choices in UK pharmaceuticals. 
The issue with the Miles and Snow classification is that it requires data of internal 
managers' attitudes and decisions within the firm, which are not represented by the data 
sets available in this study. The nature of strategy in the pharmaceutical industry 
suggests that a number of choices are important to deliver sustainable competitive 
advantage within this industry. These choices are discussed in the following section. 
4.3 Strategic choice within the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
The previous discussion leads to the conclusion that barring low cost as a strategic 
option the various strategic choices within the pharmaceutical industry may be broadly 
nested within two of Porter's strategy choice dimensions i. e. the degree to which firms 
seek to differentiate their products from the competition and the breadth of market 
choices adopted by the firm. This is an observation congruent with that of Cool who 
chose a set of scope variables, that equate to the degree of focus, and resource variables, 
which largely reflect attempts to differentiate the firm's products from those of its 
competitors (Cool, 1985). 
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Previous research suggests that advertising and spending upon R&D, two of Cool's 
chosen variables, are complementary activities with respect to product differentiation 
(Lunn, 1989). Sales force actions are also a primary determinant of differentiation. They 
represent between 30% to 50% of pharmaceutical company operating costs and are 
therefore another important strategic variable. 
The second of Porter's dimensions, the degree of focus, can be interpreted two ways. 
The first is in terms of geographical coverage, the choice between which markets to 
enter or not to participate in. This may have been an important choice variable in the 
1960's and 1970's, when research productivity was higher, research costs were lower, 
and me-too products could still be successfully marketed. Cool, for example, included 
FOREIGN i. e. non-US sales as one of the variables in his study, but he restricted his 
study to US companies (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). The situation in the 1990's was 
very different, research productivity was declining, costs per NCE (New Chemical 
Entity) were spiralling and me-too products no longer recouped their research and 
development costs. (see Chapter 3) In addition, with research increasingly concentrated 
on fewer therapeutic targets, better access to information and use of techniques such as 
combinatorial chemistry, the exclusivity period from pioneer to first follower has 
steadily decreased, from years to months (Boston Consulting Group, 1996, p 42 ). 
Economics now dictate that promising compounds undergo a rapid launch in all of the 
world's key markets in order to recoup crippling research costs before patent expiry. 
Choice of geographies is no longer a valid strategic alternative and, even if it was, the 
quality of reporting and variance in the level of detail in accounts would make this 
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variable difficult to accurately operationalize for research purposes. It will not be 
included here. 
In contrast, as mentioned earlier, choice of market area is critically important. In 1992, 
for example, top companies such as Glaxo, Pfizer, and Merck relied on the sales of only 
three drugs to generate over 50% of their pharmaceutical revenues (Boston Consulting 
Group, 1993, p 95. ). The same situation persists today with a number of companies, 
notably Novo and Lundbeck, focused on a narrow range of therapeutic areas, while 
others like GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Pharmacia and Aventis are now active across a 
spectrum of therapeutic areas. Focus in terms of markets served is, therefore, an 
important variable and one included in the research. 
Given the importance of patent expiry as a key driver of strategic activity, companies 
must seek to build strong product pipelines to incrementally grow future revenue 
streams. Product gaps may not be small, however, with a recent report predicting that 
the average large pharmaceutical company in 1997 should expect to lose 30% of its 
sales to generics within five years (Boston Consulting Group, 1999, p 39). New product 
sales are, therefore, an important strategy variable also included in previous research 
(Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988). They capture the product of both in- 
house research and in-licensing of new products. 
Another important variable, strongly allied to R&D, is risk, where major costs 
representing 60% or more of the total occur at phase 315 in the research and 
development process. This is due primarily to the huge cost associated with recruiting 
IS Phase 3 trials are those where proof of therapeutic activity is established but large numbers of patients 
have now to be tested in trials to understand the side effect profile of the drug and its suitability for a 
broad range of patients. 
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and managing sufficient patients in large-scale clinical trials. The number of phase 3 
projects provides both an opportunity to compare companies' different attitudes to the 
acceptance of risk and the ability of the company's pipeline to develop products to the 
point where they are eligible to seek marketing authorization 
16. 
4.4 Principal strategic choices in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
As discussed earlier, there are really two key productive functions within 
pharmaceuticals. Firstly, to ensure a regular supply of viable products through research, 
development, and in-licensing of identified opportunities. Secondly, to effectively 
market those products in order to maximise returns before patent expiry. It is worth 
noting that patent expiry is not a significant issue in all markets, but it presents a 
problem in certain key markets, notably the US, Germany, Holland and the UK. In 
some European markets patent expiry is not an issue simply because the price attained 
for reimbursement is so low that a viable generic industry cannot develop. In these 
markets, notably France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, the product life cycle can be 
very long, in excess of 20 years, and revenues at a lower price will continue to accrue to 
the original patent holder for a prolonged period. A fuller discussion of this 
phenomenon is provided in chapter 3. It fuels the parallel import trade which effectively 
delivers "early generics" to the high priced European markets, including the UK. 
Unlike consumer markets, price in the pharmaceutical market tends to be determined by 
two key factors, namely order of market entry and "acceptable" reimbursement price. In 
16 Marketing authorization in the UK means obtaining a licence to market the product and agreeing a 
price which the NHS will pay for it. This requires satisfying the Medical Control Agency (MCA) in terms 
of the efficacy, safety and value of the product. 
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the UK, if you are first to market you have the opportunity to "set the standard" and can 
price at what the market will bear. Late-entrants then have two choices, to price at 
parity, e. g. as in the case of the UK anti-depressant market, or to price at a discount, e. g. 
as in the case of the UK proton pump inhibitor market. As discussed in Chapter 3, from 
1991 with the introduction of the Thatcher reforms, the UK pharmaceutical market 
became increasingly price sensitive. The opportunity to premium price late entrant, me- 
too, products on the basis of relatively minor dosage or delivery advantages, which had 
prevailed in the 1980's, effectively eroded away. The second factor, the acceptable 
reimbursement price, was determined by the host government, where in the UK any 
product that represents a significant additional cost to the health service is carefully 
scrutinised by bodies like the MCA and NICE. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
discussion of the effect of NICE on new product entry and market acceptance). The 
company effectively enters into negotiations and trades relative price with the 
government in exchange for breadth of licensed indications and ease of market entry. A 
green light effectively means any GP can prescribe the product without restriction, an 
amber light means that the product is limited to specific therapeutic indications or may 
only be prescribed by a hospital consultant. An amber light has the effect of 
significantly slowing diffusion into the market and reducing product usage thus 
significantly reducing market potential. A red light means that the product must not be 
prescribed or only under very strict circumstances. 
Measuring relative market price is difficult, however, primarily because of a lack of 
transparency regarding discounts given to dispensing doctors or through hospital 
contracts. Another difficulty relates to the problem of determining the equivalent dose 
of competitor products. However, to measure the effect of pricing decisions on branded 
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products, use can be made of parallel import sales, which give an indication of the UK 
price relative to the price of the product in lower-priced European countries. 
The effect of parallel imports can differ significantly between companies. This point is 
illustrated in Figure 4.7 where, for example, Pfizer [PFZ] loses almost 70% of UK pack 
sales' to cheaper European imports. 
Figure 4.7 Parallel Imported Packs as a Percentage of Total Pack 2002 
Parallel Imported Packs as a Percentage of Total Pack 2002 
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" Pack sales refer to the unit sales for the standard pack size for that product. Generally pharmaceuticals 
are packaged in units containing 28 days supply. 
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Key to figure 4.7 above. 
ABBREV COMPANY ABBREV COMPANY 
3M Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing MSD Merck Sharpe & 
Dohme 
AZ Astra Zeneca NOV Novo 
ABB Abbott NVA Novartis 
AVE Aventis PFZ Pfizer 
AKZ Akzo Nobel PG Procter & Gamble 
BAX Baxter Healthcare PHA Pharmacia 
BAY Bayer RB Reckitt Benkisser 
BI Boehringer In elheim ROC Roche 
BMS Bristol Myers Squibb SAG Schering AG 
EIS Eisai SS Sanofi Synthelabo 
GSK Glaxo Smith Kline SPL Schering Plough 
JJ Johnson & Johnson SOL Solvay 
IVX Ivax TAK Takeda 
LIL Lilly WYE Wyeth 
LUN Lundbeck YAM Yamanouchi 
MER E Merck 
Another key decision for a company participating in pharmaceuticals is the extent to 
which pharmaceuticals will dominate the company's business. This decision reflects to 
some extent the level of risk that the company is willing to entertain. A degree of 
diversification enables a company to spread its market exposure across a variety of 
different but, in pharmaceuticals, generally related industries. Looking at the companies 
included within the study in this thesis, there is clearly a spectrum of activities, from a 
quite broad range of different industries within the large industrial chemical or 
manufacturing companies such 3M, Akzo, Bayer, or Solvay, through to a more 
narrowly defined focus within companies such as Pfizer or MSD. A trend is frequently 
identifiable over time with some companies, such as Astra Zeneca, Aventis, Novartis 
and Pharmacia, divesting their lower return businesses, for example agrochemicals, to 
concentrate more upon pharmaceuticals. 
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It is because of the risk and costs of bringing pharmaceuticals to market, recently 
estimated by Bain & Co at US$1.7 billion (Gapper, 2004), and the fact that the most 
important world markets, such as the US, have a limited span of potentially high sales 
years, that the industry must continue to invest heavily in both R&D and marketing. 
Choice of what research areas to invest in is a critical strategic decision and one that has 
become more important over time for three principal reasons. Firstly, the number of 
areas open to research, that satisfy the requirements of both a high unmet medical need 
and a large patient population, are declining with each subsequent key discovery. For 
example, in the five years prior to the period encompassed by this research, Selective 
Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) for depression, Proton Pump Inhibitors for 
gastro-oesophageal reflux, and Statins for the lowering of cholesterol levels were all 
brought to market. Companies are therefore chasing similar markets in crowded 
categories, which makes new discovery all the more hazardous. 
"Bain estimates that overall return in investment in new drugs has fallen to 5 per 
cent. Every drug class has become crowded, and most companies are chasing 
similar diseases" (Gapper, 2004, p 21 ). 
Secondly, many of the areas left for research are either fragmented, e. g. cancers, or 
present problems of accurate measurement, necessitating the development of suitable 
surrogate markers18 and large expensive clinical trials to prove a benefit, for example as 
in the case of Alzheimer's disease. This difficulty has also to some extent been 
compounded by the lack of products emanating from the Human Genome project: 
18 Surrogate markers are measurements taken as a proxy for a response which is difficult or impossible to 
measure directly. These are frequently used in clinical trials involving brain disorders and similar 
conditions where improvement can be difficult to quantify. 
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"To some extent, Big Pharma is suffering from a backlash from the exaggerated 
expectations that followed the mapping of the human genome in 2000. This 
produced a plethora of possible new targets for therapies, which drugs 
companies hoped to be able to crunch through rapidly using new research 
techniques such as high-throughput screening. Turning the new molecules 
produced by these techniques into usable medicines has proved a more difficult 
matter" (Gapper, 2004, p 21 ). 
Thirdly, pharmaceutical companies in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's could rely upon 
the marketing of me-too products, where justification for higher priced new products 
frequently hinged upon minor dosage or delivery improvements. Such me-too's 
provided much needed revenues to contribute towards and ameliorate crippling research 
costs. This opportunity has now all but disappeared. Strongly organised health-care 
buying groups control the choice of pharmaceuticals through formulary management 
and second, or later entrants, are forced to settle for a lower price and frequently an 
insignificant market share. This makes recovery of sunk R&D and marketing costs 
virtually impossible. For example, in 1999 the market shares of the top four Proton 
Pump Inhibitors were Losec 64.4% (Astra), Zoton 30.7% (Wyeth), Protium 3.7% 
(Knoll - later acquired by Abbott), and Pariet 1.5% (Eisai) (IMS, 1999). This illustrates 
a common phenomenon within the UK market, namely that the first entrant sets the 
price and captures the lion's share of prescriptions, the follower product marketed at a 
discount to the market leader - in this case 15 %- achieves a reasonable market share, 
leaving little opportunity for late entrants. Thus, it is not enough to have a good product 
- Protium was market leader in Germany at the time - it is equally or more important to 
be first or second to market. This places further risk and expense upon research, where 
dual tracking of development processes on promising compounds, for example 
ranitidine by Glaxo, is becoming commonplace. This ratchets up cost and risk 
simultaneously. 
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Each research therapy area, e. g. respiratory, represents significant cost to develop and 
staff a facility capable of leading edge research work. The addition of new research 
areas also offers little in the way of synergy (Henderson et al., 1994). Clearly certain 
scale effects exist, for example a staff of patent lawyers can work across therapeutic 
boundaries, but the fact remains that each new active research area adds significantly to 
the cost and risk that the company must manage. 
The problem of research continuity is another, related issue. The decision to stop 
research in an area, both signals a significant failure to the investment community and 
effectively closes a door because the time to assemble the right research team and catch 
up with the competition represents a very significant barrier to future market entry. This 
problem of continuity is increased by the lack of market acceptance of me-too products, 
which places the onus upon the company to deliver a string of breakthrough products or 
so called "blockbusters": 
"A move away from the blockbuster model could help. Instead of placing bets in 
many therapeutic areas in the hope of striking it lucky, companies could focus 
more on particular areas of expertise. That would help them build enough 
knowhow to make better choices among research leads" (Gapper, 2004, p 21). 
Typically, however, even large companies are unlikely to come up with more than one 
or two significant products in a decade of research: 
"To match past levels of productivity, given their huge research and 
development budgets, big companies should be producing three or four new 
drugs a year. Instead, most now struggle to produce one" (Gapper, 2004, p 21 ). 
This dearth of new products from in-house research and declining research productivity 
places further importance on the development of market franchises from a nucleus of 
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product areas. This is because if the company cannot produce the products that it needs 
to refresh its portfolio from in-house research then it must seek licensing opportunities. 
With intense and increasing competition for promising new molecules, the winner in 
negotiation will increasingly need to demonstrate not only complementary research and 
development skills, particularly development, but a proven market presence in the 
therapy area, with superior access to key investigators, opinion leaders, high prescribing 
physicians and a strong marketing presence in all key markets. These capabilities cannot 
be built overnight. A company assumes significant risk both through entering a new 
research area, that may dilute current research and marketing priorities, and by 
abandoning one. 
The increasing importance of certain world markets, notably the US, has also placed a 
premium upon previous launch success and having visible marketing muscle in place to 
compete effectively with the increasing promotional noise in the marketplace. The 
building of scale in marketing in key markets is, therefore, an additional argument put 
forward for mergers and acquisitions to achieve critical mass, enabling the company to 
tackle world markets and leverage full potential from the product portfolio before patent 
expiry cuts in. 
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4.5 Mobility barriers in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
If, as argued earlier, investor expectations are a primary driver of pharmaceutical 
strategy, then a key element of sustaining a superior market position will be the 
presence of one or more strong mobility barriers to protect and sustain superior market 
returns. Porter, for example, argues that the factors that affect a firm's profitability are 
(Porter, 1980, p 142. ): 
1. The height of mobility barriers protecting the firm's strategic group. 
2. The bargaining power of the firm's strategic group with customers and 
suppliers. 
3. The vulnerability of the firm's strategic group to substitute products, e. g. in the 
case of pharmaceuticals this would reflect parallel imports, generics or 
equivalent products. 
4. The exposure of the firm's strategic group to rivalry from other groups. 
To this list Porter adds the firm's implementation ability, recognising that; 
"Not all firms pursuing the same strategy (thus in the same strategic group) will 
necessarily be equally profitable even if the other conditions - as listed above - 
are identical" (Porter, 1980, p 144. ). 
Thus, Porter makes it clear that mobility barriers and strategic groups are intertwined. 
This is discussed in more detail in chapter 2. Strategic groups cannot persist without 
mobility barriers there to protect them. Therefore, he argues that the best strategic 
variables to identify strategic groups are those "that determine the key mobility barriers 
in the industry" (Porter, 1980, p 152. ). 
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In the remainder of this section the mobility barriers that separate strategic groups 
within the UK pharmaceutical industry are discussed. Table 4.1 lists the various 
mobility barriers, the nature of the barrier, source of advantage and relative strength. 
Table 4.1 Mobility barriers in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
Mobility Description Source of Advantage Relative 
Barrier Height 
Research The ability to conduct Proprietary knowledge. Very high 
leading-edge research Tacit research skills. but specific 
and generate Reputation assists in to therapy 
breakthrough molecules. recruitment. Access to area. 
leading edge platform 
technologies e. g. genomics. 
Development Formulation and Proprietary knowledge. High but 
production skills. The Reputation with generally 
ability to recruit and investigators. Process skills. development 
manage clinical trial skills are 
networks. more 
transferable 
between 
companies 
than research 
skills. Some 
clinical trial 
expertise 
available via 
outsourcing 
Sales force Sufficient numbers to hit Superior training. Medium. 
size required call and Displacement skills. Access Numbers can 
frequency targets. to physicians. be raised 
Market knowledge. easily by 
Reputation. outsourcing 
but quality 
relationships 
are difficult 
to replace 
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Sales force Known presence in a Access to the right doctors. Medium to 
reputation given therapy area. Knowledge of how the high 
market network operates Explains why 
and how to influence it. new entrants 
Tacit skills. to an area, 
despite 
success 
elsewhere, 
may fail e. g. 
Ciba-Geigy 
with 
fomoterol. 
Can gain 
access via 
co-marketing 
Advertising Ability to be heard Creative skills reside with Low to 
above the market noise agency but company medium 
strategy, especially Barriers 
positioning, will impact on based on 
results advertising 
can be 
overcome by 
clout i. e. 
outspending 
your rival 
New Product Gaining the right early Effective pre-marketing, High. A good 
Launch trajectory into the especially the recognition of proportion of 
market to maximise the right clinical trials to good 
future sales potential conduct. Access to the right products fail 
products. Tacit launch to achieve 
skills. Access to key their market 
opinion leaders. Clinical potential. 
trials conducted in the right Key 
centres. Hard wired access benchmark 
to the market through for investors 
previous success e. g. Glaxo along with 
respiratory franchise new product 
supply. 
In-licensing Increasingly important Market reputation, High. 
source of pipeline "gap especially a strong existing, Dependent 
filling". The ability to complementary franchise. upon a 
strike successful deals Scale in marketing and combination 
and attract the right skills in development, of tacit skills 
partners particularly formulation and such as 
clinical trial management. networking, 
Active network to ensure negotiation 
access to projects early on and 
relationship 
building 
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Co- The ability to overcome Access to interesting, high Medium to 
marketing market problems by potential, products or the high. 
working proactively with "right partner". Ability to 
a partner. Can be a gap spot synergies and develop 
in product supply, trust. Networking skills. 
seasonal products, 
excess marketing 
capacity. Alternatively 
the ability to recognise 
when in-house skills are 
not sufficient to 
maximise the potential 
of an opportunity 
In summary, strategic choices in the pharmaceutical industry can be measured by a 
number of key dimensions, including the following: 
1. Sales force capability measured by the number of sales calls made within a 
given period. 
2. Media advertising, but excluding direct to consumer advertising which is illegal 
in the UK, as measured in previous research (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). 
3. Research spend - this cannot, however, be taken as a proxy for R&D 
effectiveness only strategic intent. Effective output is really determined not by 
the number of INDs [investigational new drugs] or by the number of candidate 
drugs at a given stage but by the actual sales achieved by new products 
launched. 
4. Research effectiveness, as measured by number of projects entering phase 3 
trials. 
5. Research focus, i. e spend/number of therapy areas 
6. New product sales, where the conventionally reported figures [available from 
IMS] are for sales achieved in the two years post launch. 
7. Therapeutic scope, i. e. the number of product areas actively marketed. Although 
compounds in research could be taken as proxy for therapeutic focus, the 
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number of compounds in a given area gives little indication of sales potential. In 
previous research opinions vary as to what number of therapeutic areas which 
are important. Cool, for example, chose to measure the sales contribution from 
companies' top three therapeutic areas (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b), while 
Martens measured contribution from the top two (Martens, 1988). 
8. Merger status. Whether a company has achieved its current market position 
through organic growth, e. g. Eli Lilly or Merck, or via one merger, e. g. Novartis 
or Astra Zeneca, or serial merger activity, e. g. GlaxoSmithKline or Aventis. 
9. Business focus i. e. the sales contribution that ethical pharmaceutical sales make 
to the total company sales. 
10. Licensing activity. 
11. Co-marketing activity. 
12. Chronic versus acute therapy, where cardiovascular sales have been used in 
previous research as a proxy for chronic vs. acute focus (Bogner et al., 1996). 
The way in which these variables can be effectively sourced and incorporated into the 
experimental design will be addressed in the next chapter, which deals with the choice 
of research method and methodology. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Contrary to the predictions of early 10 researchers, the pharmaceutical industry does not 
offer merely one way to compete, with returns predicated solely by the relative 
application of scale. (see chapter 2 for a fuller discussion). The presence of strategic 
groups in the pharmaceutical industry makes it clear that there are many different kinds 
of potentially profitable strategies. Strategies, which, as Porter points out, can be based 
on a wide variety of mobility barriers or approaches to dealing with competitive forces 
(Porter, 1980, p 144. ). 
Factors shaping these different strategic choices include, the general decline of the 
European market as compared to the US, the effects of shareholder expectation on 
management actions, and the industry's declining research productivity reflected in the 
number of new chemical entities introduced each year. 
This shift hinges on two key changes. The first the differential impact of industry 
regulation. In Europe regulation is concentrated in the hands of, increasingly powerful, 
purchasing authorities, focused on reducing the cost of pharmaceuticals. In contrast, 
within the US greater choice to consumers were reflected in higher prices as "Pharmacy 
benefit", is increasingly seen by employers as an important element in employee 
benefits. 
The impact of regulatory change within the UK was severe; A highly price sensitive 
market ensued with late entrants regularly offered at a discount to market leaders. An 
active generics market for off-patent pharmaceuticals and a strongly increasing parallel 
trade fuelled by government clawbacks forced pharmacists actively to seek cheaper 
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alternatives to fill prescriptions for patent protected products. (see chapter 3 for further 
details). This trade in parallel imports differentially impacted on firms, with some, like 
Pfizer and MSD drastically affected, with up to 70% of their total UK pack sales 
comprised of parallel imports. The concomitant introduction of primary care 
formularies forced GP practices to rationalize prescribing choice, often on cost grounds. 
In addition to increasing relative price sensitivity the adoption of these formularies also 
effectively resulted in a market more hostile to me-too products. This removed the 
option of a strategy of introducing new me-too products, differentiated solely on minor 
improvements, to the market. This strategy had been common in the preceding three 
decades. 
The second major change has been the steady decline in research productivity. Without 
me-too products to support their research activities companies have increasingly been 
forced to fish in the same declining, but increasingly competitive, research areas for 
new products. A new opportunity for research drying up with each new blockbuster 
discovered. Thus research productivity progressively declined despite the building of 
huge chemical libraries, facilitated by the advent of combinatorial chemistry techniques, 
and a sharp increase in the number of compounds tested annually by companies. The 
new product pipelines remain sparse and the much heralded "genomic revolution" has 
failed, to date, to fulfil its promise. 
Faced with declining research productivity and the increasing costs of competing in 
European markets, companies have increasingly concentrated upon the still lucrative, 
US market. Here, building scale is important and this rather than the achievement of 
cost synergies, or the need to build research capability, has driven the waves of 
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consolidation that hit the industry in the 1990s. There were eighteen mergers between 
pharmaceutical companies in the ten years reported in this research. 
Despite this consolidation, competition in the industry remains high but increasingly 
success hinges on two sets of decisions. In the long-term where to compete, in terms of 
markets, and in the short-term how to compete. Market choice is a critical strategic 
decision that determines both the research focus of the firm and the nature of the market 
competition which it faces. In pharmaceuticals, competition is effectively reduced by 
product substitution occurring at the at the sub-therapy level. This creates a myriad of 
market choice opportunities but the larger more lucrative segments, such as statins or 
anti-ulcerants, are strongly contested. In the short-term operational decisions 
increasingly reflect the dearth of new products. Speed to market is key, and life cycle 
management together with achieving scale in key markets are increasingly important 
determinants of success. 
In conclusion, the UK pharmaceutical market is caught between two sets of tensions. 
International factors determine market choices and research priorities, while local 
factors such as the regulatory environment affect pricing and other key marketing 
decisions. To accurately identify firms' strategies, and classify them within strategic 
groups, in this environment, requires a mix of measurement variables reflecting each of 
these key strategic choices. Later in the thesis a number of variables are used to capture 
these choices. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY, METHOD AND DATA 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous three chapters we have reviewed the literature relevant to strategic group 
research and described both the UK operating environment and the strategic options that 
pharmaceutical companies may choose to reach their objectives. This chapter describes 
the epistemological stance of this research before addressing the choice of methods used 
to identify strategic and competitive groups within the UK pharmaceutical industry and 
to statistically test for salient differences between them. 
Choice of method is critical to strategic group research because the nature of the firms 
included in the study and the variables selected to represent strategy will determine to a 
large extent the results of the analysis. These two factors may, as argued in the earlier 
chapters, explain to a large degree the variation between studies even within a common 
industry [see chapter two for further details]. The two preceding chapters are important 
first to determine the environmental factors that may impact upon strategic choice and 
second, to identify the variables that represent the valid strategic choices within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry. 
The benchmark for this study is Cool's study of the US pharmaceutical industry from 
1963 to 1982 (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). This study was selected for two reasons. 
First, because it represents the first comprehensive and detailed longitudinal study of 
strategic groups within the pharmaceutical industry. Second, because Cool's study is the 
main comparator and reference used in more recent strategic group studies of the 
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pharmaceutical industry (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et A, 1996; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 
1988). This thesis aims to utilize Cool's method to identify strategic groups in the UK 
pharmaceutical industry and to attempt to build on Cool's method and subsequent 
research. 
Strategic groups are, as discussed earlier [see chapter 2], a method of classifying firms 
according to their pattern of strategic choices. This chapter therefore begins with a 
discussion of what is meant by classification, the different types of classification system 
and the epistemological framework within which this research fits. Next the choice of 
variables used to describe strategy in the UK pharmaceutical industry are discussed and 
compared to previous research. A discussion of the environmental variables then 
follows, together with a review of the methods used in previous research to identify 
stable strategic time periods (SSTPs). The fourth section of this chapter explores the 
different methods that can be used to identify meaningful strategic and competitive 
groups within our data set, which is followed by a selective review of the statistical 
methods available to measure between, and within, group differences. It is important to 
note that a detailed discussion of each statistical method is beyond the scope of this 
research. The aim here is to acquaint the reader with the salient features of each method, 
a discussion of their relevant strengths and limitations, together with the assumptions 
that underlie each technique. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the method used in this research and the 
salient similarities and differences to previous strategic group studies of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
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5.2 Methodology 
This section aims to place the research reported in this thesis in perspective. Firstly, by 
exploring the extant theory to which this research relates, and upon which it seeks to 
build. Secondly, to explain the choice of methodology and the underlying assumptions 
that underpin it. Thirdly, to describe the paradigm or view of the world within which 
both the theory and the methodology employed here are situated. 
Bryman (2001) distinguishes between two forms of theory. Grand theory that operates 
at any abstract level and which therefore provides little in the way of either direct 
research guidance or clear corroboration. This takes the form of detailed case specific 
accounts, that provide little opportunity for generalisation, and middle range theory that 
lies intermediate between the abstract and the case specific. This research builds upon 
existing strategic group theory, which under Bryman's classification would fall within 
the middle range. 
This choice of middle range theory is itself dictated by three practicalities. First, by the 
need to provide a clear contribution to knowledge, traditionally illustrated by reference 
to extant work. Second, by the requirement to embed research within a conceptual 
framework built within the context of the existing literature. Third by, recognition of 
what is practical and achievable within the permitted time period of the research. 
The origins of strategic group research lie within the realm of economics. A discipline 
that traditionally employs a highly quantitative approach to the pursuit of knowledge. 
This choice of method falls emphatically within the positivist paradigm, which makes a 
number of assumptions about the nature of the world and the valid methods of gathering 
149 
information and carrying out research. An approach which previous research, on which 
this research seeks to build, adopted (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). 
Listed within the positivist paradigm are the following basic beliefs (Bryman, 2001. p 
12). 
1. Only phenomena and hence knowledge confirmed by the senses can genuinely be 
warranted as knowledge. This constitutes the principle of phenomenalism. 
2. That the purpose of theory is to generate hypotheses that can be tested and that 
will thereby allow explanations of laws to be assessed. This constitutes the 
principle of deductivism. 
3. That knowledge itself is derived through the gathering of facts which provide the 
basis for laws and observations. This represents the principle of inductivism. 
4. That scientific enquiry must be free from value judgements and be solely 
objective, i. e. that the observation should be separated from the observer. In effect, 
this means that the researcher can suspend any emotion, preconception or value 
judgement from the observation and record it as an impassionate, objective 
observer. 
5. That scientific statements not normative statements are the domain of the scientist 
because the truth or otherwise of a normative statement cannot be confirmed by 
the senses. 
Concomitant with these basic beliefs is the view that the researcher should focus upon 
facts, where observation represents the only true data. Here, search for causality has led 
to an attempt to construct fundamental laws and reduce phenomena to their simplest 
elements. This is encompassed within the deductive approach to theory construction, 
namely the formulation of hypotheses followed by rigorous testing. This approach 
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requires that concepts under consideration are operationalized so that effective 
measurements can be made. It frequently necessitates the taking of large samples in 
order to achieve statistical significance and hence support claims for generalisability. 
Such generalisations are facilitated through comparing observations from samples taken 
from different populations. 
Positivism, however, does have its critics and this approach to research is made all the 
more difficult because of a lack of unity across the positivist school as to exactly which 
features constitute a positivist viewpoint. 
Relevant issues that relate directly to this research include that it is virtually impossible 
to make any observation without allowing some preconception to influence judgement. 
It is human nature to make comparisons. Comparisons are based upon previous 
experience, the product of environment, education and those who have influenced our 
opinions. 
Also, the benefits of direct observation are skewed because: "facts and data are 
produced and make sense only in the context of a particular framework that allows and 
guides us to see certain things and neglect others"(Alvesson et al., 2000. p63) It is, 
therefore, difficult to accept the positivist claim that research techniques can be purely 
objective. Positivist methodology favours the employment of parametric statistics and 
associated quantitative methods, where subjectivity is clearly illustrated by the decision 
to choose the 1%, 5% or 10% level, of significance to test hypotheses. Why not 2% or 
11 %? It is commonly overlooked that statistical significance is itself largely a function 
of sample size. Finally, in its strictest sense positivism may not attach meaning to social 
151 
observation and hence in some circumstances may not really add to an understanding. 
For example it is possible to observe tangible aspects of human society such as speech 
or specific patterns of behaviour but such observation excludes the intangible aspects - 
the internal interpretation or motivation of those external factors (Fisher, 2004). 
So, when considering a quantitative, positivist stance what other alternatives exist? The 
first serious challenge to the dominance of the positivist paradigm was provided by 
Dilthey (circa 1880), who believed that physical science concerned the study of largely 
inanimate phenomena. These are subjects largely independent from human beings, 
where in contrast social science was a product of human construction. Dilthey proposed 
an opposing interpretative/hermeneutical approach, positing that social studies should 
not use methods designed for the physical scientists due to a fundamental difference in 
subject and form of the matter under investigation. Believing that objective reality was 
unlikely in research, Dilthey reasoned that meaning was context specific, and that 
understanding would depend upon interpretation that varies according to the viewpoint 
or history of the interpreter. Thus, Dilthey put forward an alternative world-view to that 
of the positivists. This approach has attracted the criticism that if there are several 
alternative viewpoints, which is the right one? 
My preference is to view these conflicting paradigms not as two distinct positions but as 
different positions on a research continuum. Indeed, all the various dichotomies used to 
separate the positivist from the non-positivist paradigms may, in some researchers' 
opinion, be viewed as ends of a continuum. For example, quantitative vs. qualitative, 
hard vs. soft, or deductive vs. inductive. It is my contention that the practical choice of 
where on such a continuum to site specific research depends primarily upon its aims, the 
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availability of data and other practical consideration. A view congruent with that of 
Miles and Huberman (2001) who concluded that, "epistemological purity doesn't get 
research done. " 
In conclusion, the subject of the research in this thesis is the UK Pharmaceutical 
Industry. Where pertinent, links are built with previous longitudinal studies on strategic 
groups within the US Pharmaceutical Industry. This research provides both a blueprint 
for methodology and an opportunity to validate these previous findings and explore the 
general application of their research in the UK market. 
This previous research work adopted a primarily positivist methodology, which indeed 
underpins much of the previous strategic group work. Strategic group theory originated 
from disciplines with a strong positivist tradition. The previous studies by Cool (1985), 
Martens (1988) and Bogner (1991) all include the hallmarks normally associated with 
positivism. Clear hypotheses were proposed and research was carried out at an arm's 
length utilising available databases, implying an objective perspective. In other words, 
the methodology of previous studies demonstrates a natural science tradition through 
the adoption of a clear experimental design and the stated aim to prove or disprove a set 
of hypotheses. The choice of a range of quantitative, largely parametric, statistical 
methods, such as analysis of variance, also supports this epistemological position. 
My choice on embarking on this research was whether to endorse this choice or to 
conduct research underpinned by an essentially different methodological assumption. 
From a purely practical viewpoint I was encouraged to pursue this research work in the 
same vein as the previous studies, which places my work strongly within the positivist 
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paradigm. I did not, however, wish to restrict my options and endorsed the concepts of 
triangulation and the idea that methods should not be paradigm specific but chosen to 
advance the research task undertaken. 
In conclusion, research presented in this thesis adopts a positivist approach based upon 
the principles of natural science. The reasons for this epistemological stance are first, 
that it is congruent with previous research approaches with which this study seeks to be 
comparable (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1996; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Guedri, 
1998; Martens, 1988). Second, the nature of this research, based upon numerical 
analysis of primarily secondary data, falls naturally within this epistemological research 
paradigm. 
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5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The rest of this chapter deals with what strategic groups are and how they are 
identified. Strategic groups classify firms according to the strategy which they 
adopt. They are therefore a classification system based primarily upon observed or 
calculated differences in the way such strategic decisions are implemented. As 
discussed in chapter 2 the measures used to separate strategic groups are based 
upon realized not intended strategy. The key decisions at this stage are to identify 
the sample of firms to include within the study and the variables that best 
represent strategic choice in the given industry. 
The second stage of the analysis is then to decide how the data is to be handled 
and the method or methods to be employed in order to reliably and accurately 
identify the strategic groups present within the sample. A criticism of strategic 
group theory is that such groups are an artifact of method (Barney et aL, 1990) 
therefore choice of method and how we may have confidence in the results 
obtained are important issues. These important considerations are addressed 
below. 
5.3.2 What classification means and different approaches to classification. 
Gordon defines classification as "concerned with the investigation of sets of 
objects in order to establish if they can validly be summarized in terms of a small 
number of classes of similar objects"(Gordon, 1999, ix). In this research, strategic 
groups represent the classes identified and firms the set of similar objects included 
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within a common class. Such classes are invariably mutually exclusive and 
hierarchically nested (Gordon, 1999). 
"In classification, in the sense in which the word is used in this [research], the 
classes are not known at the start of the investigation: the number of classes, 
their defining characteristics and their constituent objects [firms] all require to 
be determined" (Gordon, 1999,3). 
The word classification has also been used in a different sense, meaning the assignment 
of objects to one of a set of pre-determined classes (Gordon, 1999). This latter meaning 
does not apply to this research, which is concerned with the identification of strategic 
groups and not the assignment of firms to a pre-determined set of groups. Two main 
aims of classification are identified by Gordon: data simplification and prediction. The 
aim of this research is to classify firms operating within the UK pharmaceutical industry 
according to their strategy, so that meaningful comparisons can be made between them. 
The aim, therefore, is data simplification. 
"The methodology of classification enables such data sets to be summarized and 
can help to determine important relationships and structure within the data set" 
(Gordon, 1999,5) 
Gordon states that the end result of a classification study is (often) a partition of the set 
of objects into a set of disjoint classes, such that objects in the same class are similar to 
one another. An additional requirement for a partition, noted by Gordon, "is that classes 
should be well-separated, i. e. that objects be not only similar to other objects in the 
same class, but also markedly different from objects in other classes" (Gordon, 1999,3) 
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McKelvey is primarily in accord with Gordon and describes classification as; 
"The actual construction of a classification scheme and the identification and 
assignment of organizational forms to formally designated classes" (McKelvey, 
1982, p 13) 
Classification systems are divided by McKelvey into two basic types: special 
classifications and general classifications (McKelvey, 1982). Special classifications use 
only a small, selected number of attributes of particular interest to classify objects and 
have the advantage, according to McKelvey, of high predictive validity. "Such a 
classification is very useful for practical and scientific purposes, but only if one is 
narrowly interested in the one attribute" ( McKelvey, 1982, p 15). The major weakness 
of special classifications that McKelvey identifies are their lack of general 
comparability. The early 10 studies that focus on group identification through relative 
size could perhaps be viewed in this light. 
In contrast, a general classification system attempts to be all encompassing and to 
group objects according to all or at least many of their attributes, but some may be 
weighted more highly than others ( McKelvey, 1982). As a consequence of this, groups 
identified reflect the combined effects of many attributes, not just a very selective few, 
and the members of a group have roughly similar behaviour with regard to many 
different attributes. 
"Since many-usually all-known attributes are taken into consideration, a general 
classification allows scientists to make broad predictions about the total 
behaviour of the members of a given class" (McKelvey, 1982, p 16) 
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McKelvey points out that such a general classification is not as sharply predictive as a 
special classification with regard to any specific attribute, but this compromise is 
necessary if the effects of many attributes are to be included within the classification. 
"Because a general classification is broadly predictive of the total behaviour of 
the members of its classes, it serves as a good method of organizing functional 
studies. And because it reflects total behaviour rather than specific attributes, it 
acts as a broadly inclusive and thus very useful information-retrieval system for 
scientific findings. It often will include many special classifications within it. 
Such a scheme is a way of organizing all findings about organizations on the 
basis of total behaviour rather than only certain attributes" ( McKelvey, 1982, p 
16). 
Chrisman states that a general classification is more important and useful than a special 
classification, largely because of the ability to make broad predictions about behaviour 
of members and because "without a general classification system, researchers are 
forced to pick and choose and/or derive schemes that appear to best fit their data" 
(Chrisman et al., 1988,417). 
A general classification system would play several important roles ( McKelvey, 1982, 
p 17). 
1. Offer a basis for explanation, prediction, and scientific understanding through 
identifying homogeneous populations of organizations allowing the formulation 
and testing of hypotheses. 
2. Provide a conceptual framework that describes the diversity of existing 
organizational populations thus facilitating understanding. 
3. Through parsimonious organization of classes, information from functional 
studies can be collated and organized thus aiding information retrieval. 
4. Allow the substitution of a few broad classification variables for a large number 
of specific attributes. 
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5. Provide a classification system useful to other areas of organization research, 
for example performance studies. 
A number of theories of classification are described by McKelvey. Essentialism is the 
classic classification approach, used for example by Linneaus for the classification of 
flora and fauna (Linnaeus, 1756). This starts with the premise that "every entity has a 
hidden reality which generates observable properties that differentiates it from others 
and can thus be defined" (Sjorstrom, 1994,150). "Essentialist classification 
concentrates on relatively few characters. For example, of all the characters that might 
be chosen to describe a species, essentialists might base the definition on a few" ( 
McKelvey, 1982, p 38). "Classifications are therefore only as good as the homologies of 
the characters on which they are based" (Sokal et al., 1963,23). Sjorstrom suggests that 
some of the early 10 strategic group studies, such as those of Newman and Porter, 
employed an essentialist approach. 
Nominalism is the second central strand of general classification, which argues that 
only individual objects truly exist. There is no difference between classifying living and 
inanimate objects and therefore all groupings of objects represent artifacts of the human 
mind. 
"Nominalists held that the construction of classes was an activity of reason 
which served the purposes of classifiers in particular and of scientists in general" 
(McKelvey, 1982, p 41) 
The strength of this approach is the recognition that researchers carrying out functional 
studies require homogeneous groups upon which to base theory or apply inductive 
reasoning. The principal weakness is that the experience of seeing different types of 
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birds flying overhead or fish swimming in a stream makes it difficult to accept that 
natural groupings or types of organisms do not occur in nature. It was because of this 
weakness that nominalism was never taken too seriously ( McKelvey, 1982). As 
discussed earlier [see chapter 2], one of the key criticisms leveled against strategic 
group research was the assertion that strategic groups did not exist but were merely an 
analytical convenience or artifact of method (Barney et al., 1990; Hatten et al., 1987). 
These researchers may, therefore, be seen to be adopting a nominalist stance. 
McKelvey's third theory of general classification is "empiricism" or numerical 
taxonomy. Here, in contrast to nominalism, the fundamental premise of empiricism is 
that "groupings of plants and animals did occur in nature and that a classification 
should follow as closely as possible the naturally occurring groupings"( McKelvey, 
1982, p 43). Empiricists place their emphasis on observed similarity and attempt to 
keep their observations as free as possible from prior theory about the origin of groups 
or which variables might form the underlying essential pattern. Thus issues of 
classification and origin are kept separate. The aim is to let the facts decide and an 
important consequence of this is the equal emphasis on variables and an attempt to 
include as many characteristics as possible. The following summary of principles 
underpins the empiricist approach (McKelvey, 1982, p 44). 
1. The greater the content of information included in the classification and the 
more variables on which it is based, the better a given classification will be. 
2. A priori, each variable is of equal weight in creating natural groups. 
3. Overall similarity between any two firms is a function of their individual 
similarities in each of the characters by which they are being compared. 
160 
4. Distinct groups may be recognized because the correlations of characters will 
differ between groups. In effect, each natural strategic group should demonstrate 
a different pattern of resource commitments. 
5. Taxonomy is both viewed and practiced empirically. 
6. Classifications are based upon similarity. 
The principal strengths of the empirical approach are that such classifications are 
generally based upon substantial samples thus employing a stronger empirical base. 
Second, empirical taxonomy, although not perfect, offers substantial improvements 
over alternative classification approaches in the objective and replicable treatment of 
data (McKelvey, 1982). Third, empirical classification is more comprehensive, taking 
into account all available characters, therefore the overall similarity of members within 
groups is broadly based. This broad base also means that the resulting classification is 
less subject to bias, including the inadvertent omission of a character or the subsequent 
discovery of a new one. 
The empirical approach is not, however, devoid of weaknesses. Inclusion of many 
characters, usually of equal weighting, means that by indiscriminant measurement of 
all known or available characters some attributes may be inadvertently given more 
weight than others. For example, through the inclusion of eight characters that reflect 
one fundamental attribute but only two characters that describe another. Second, critics 
of numerical taxonomy argue that there is no way to distinguish trivial differences from 
significant ones. Third, empirical methods are not as truly objective as frequently 
claimed. 
"Buried within the multivariate methods are numerous choice points that call 
for decisions by an investigator which are often arbitrary, subjective, and 
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sometimes not widely accepted by knowledgeable colleagues. In factor analysis 
the choice of the number of factors to rotate, which is indeterminate, directly 
affects the number of factors in the solution and thus the number of cells in the 
classification. In cluster analysis the choice of clustering algorithm directly 
affects the final configuration (McKelvey, 1982, p 48). 
Fourth, the quality of outcome achieved depends upon how well the industry is defined 
and the firms chosen to represent it. Finally, taxonomists have questioned whether 
empiricism can in fact be successfully pursued without recourse to prior theory because 
such critical decisions as sector definition, variables chosen to represent firm strategy 
and the choice of firms to include in the sample, all rest to some degree on prior theory. 
The fourth and final theory of general classification discussed by McKelvey is that of 
evolution, and phyletics. Phyletics shares the assumption with essentialism and 
empiricism that natural groupings exist but argues that character similarity alone is not 
enough to prove a relationship. For example, animals within a common genus may 
share a number of superficial similarities but phyletics argues that classification within 
a common grouping implies more than mere similarity. Consider the case of the green 
tree boa of South America and the Asian green tree python, both snakes live in trees 
feeding on birds and essentially exploit the same ecological niche. In superficial 
resemblance, the two species are difficult to distinguish but they each belong to 
different genus. Pythons lay eggs but boas give birth to live young. Phyletics is the only 
theory that attempts to explain how groups arose in addition to attempting to classify 
them. This attempt to explain natural groupings is an attractive idea, particularly 
because such a classification is based upon natural evolutionary links and not 
contrived. The major weakness of the evolutionary approach, which is almost solely 
associated with biology, is that "often poor data are used in making judgments about 
phyletic descent, even where there is a strong fossil record" (McKelvey, 1982, p 51). 
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Other weaknesses cited by McKelvey are the frequent use of small data sets, in stark 
contrast to empiricism, and that the results are susceptible to the personal bias of the 
investigator ( McKelvey, 1982). 
The classification approach taken in this research is that of McKelvey's third grouping - 
empiricism or numerical taxonomy, employing a broad selection of variables to 
describe strategic choice in the UK pharmaceutical industry. This approach has a 
number of distinct advantages over alternative approaches as discussed above, together 
with the benefit of strong antecedent research, notably the studies of Cool (1985), 
Martens (1988) and Bogner (1991). 
McKelvey also notes five main principles of enquiry employed in classification studies. 
First, the idea of a reductive principle, where the researcher seeks to find an explanation 
for the behaviour of an object through studying the behaviour of the object's constituent 
parts. Second, through application of a holistic principle, where the researcher rejects 
the idea that the behaviour of the whole can be explained solely through an analysis of 
an object's constituent parts. The focus is on the pattern of relationships between the 
constituent parts themselves and between the parts and the whole. Third, the use of a 
rational principle, where the researcher seeks to explain the behaviour of an object by 
looking at the environment in which it is embedded. This approach is taken by the 
organizational ecologists in strategic management research, for example Hannan and 
Freeman [see chapter 2 for further detail], which draw on this principle by emphasizing 
an organization's ties with its environment. Fourth, the adoption of an anti-principle, 
where researchers avoid acceptance of any theory or hypothesis but let the facts decide; 
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and finally primitive principle where the researcher lets the existence of a practical 
problem or norm be the guide for scientific enquiry. 
It is clear that the original 10 studies (Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1973) of strategic groups 
adopted a reductionist approach and used size as a proxy to describe firms' behaviour 
and to identify strategic groups across a varieties of industries. In contrast, the 
organizational ecologists explored the perspective that environmental factors affect 
strategic change. (see Chapter 2 and 3 above). "Implicit in this view is the idea that 
environments will support a mosaic of macro-niches, in each of which lives a 
population of organizations of more or less similar characteristics [strategic groups]"( 
McKelvey, 1982, p 100). The research in this thesis adopts the holistic principle and 
argues that strategy cannot be effectively reduced to a single element but consists of a 
number of strategic choices determined in part by the internal resources of the firm and 
in part by the opportunities identified within the firm's environment. Strategic choice 
implies a matching process between each firm and its environment and to be useful a 
strategic group classification should accurately reflect these choices and aid comparison 
between firms. 
5.4 Choice of Variables, Data Sources and Sample 
This section examines the types of variables used to represent strategy in previous 
studies of the pharmaceutical industry. It is important to note that the aim here is not to 
represent strategy for some narrowly defined purpose or to build a special classification 
(for a discussion on the distinction between special and general classifications, see 
previous section of this chapter). The objective of this research is first to provide a 
164 
comprehensive review of the strategy choices in the UK pharmaceutical industry and to 
select the variables most appropriate to represent these choices. Second the aim is to 
build a link to previous research, thus enabling some comparison to be drawn from 
earlier studies of strategic groups in the pharmaceutical industry. Table 5.1 lists the 
variables used in previous strategic group studies that focused solely on the 
pharmaceutical industry. The studies included in this comparison are those that 
measure strategic groups, not cognitive groups, that concentrate solely upon the 
pharmaceutical industry, and which attempt to measure strategic groups over more than 
one year. In sum, these studies are those dedicated to the pharmaceutical industry that 
broadly employ methods comparable to the research in this thesis. Further papers 
reporting the original research are not included to avoid duplication and the studies of 
Osboume (1996), and Voyer (1993) are excluded because they do not meet the above 
criteria. 
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Table 5.1 Variables Used in Previous Pharmaceutical Strategic Group Studies 
Cool (1985) 
Strategy Dimension Measure 
FOCUS Rx sales in 3 largest therapeutic categories/[Total 
Domestic Rx Sales] 
DRUGST [Retail] % Drug store sales in total domestic drug sales 
SIZE [Scale] Ln [Total domestic drug sales] 
BRANGEN Branded drugs % Branded Generic Sales in total domestic Rx 
sales 
PROFPROM Medical Promotion [Total Domestic Professional Promotion]/[Total 
Rx Sales 
RDINTENT Current R&D Spend [Total firm R&D]/[Worldwide Health Sales] 
RDCAP R&D Capital Stock [Cum No of NDAs submitted]/[Cum No of INDs 
submitted 
RDORIENT [Cumulative number of NCEs 
approved]/Cumulative number of NDAs 
submitted 
PRODSTR [Cumulative number of NCEs 
introduced]/[Cumulative number of all products 
introduced 
CONSADV - Advertising to the 
consumer 
[Total domestic PTY drug adv]/Total domestic 
RxSales 
FOREIGN % Total firm sales generated abroad 
COMMGEN % Commodity generic Rx sales in total domestic 
Rx sales 
DISTR Distribution Strategy % of total domestic drug sales shipped directly to 
drug stores and hospitals 
Commitment to the maintenance drug 
market 
% drugs for chronic use vs. those for acute use 
Commitment to the Ethical Drug 
Market Rx 
% Rx sales in total domestic drug sales 
Martens (1988) 
Strategy Dimension Measure 
THERAPEUTIC FOCUS Rx sales in 2 largest therapeutic categories/[Total 
Firm Sales] 
GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS Max of sales of firm in one of the five countries 
studied/ [Total Firm Sales] 
INNOVATIVENESS Firm sales of products less than 2 years old/[Total 
Firm Sales] 
PROMOTION Total promotion/Number of products introduced 
during the last two years 
LOYALTY Ln [Total firm sales] 
MARKET PROXIMITY Rank order of cluster derived from % of sales in 
each of 12 therapy areas 
WEIGHTED MARKET SHARE Sum of [% of firm sales/total firm sales]x [firm 
sales/total market 
NB: All Marten's variables are based on totals for 
the preceding 4 years. 
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Fiegenbaum, Sudharsan & Thomas 1 990 
Strategy Dimension Measure 
ASS [Asset] Gross book value of fixed assets. 
SLS [Sales] Firms total sales. 
ADV [Advertising] Firms total advertising expenditure. 
RD [R&D] Firms total R&D expenditure. 
INV [Inventory] Firms total inventory level. 
CR [Current Ratio] Current assets over current liabilities. 
QR [Quick Ratio] Cash and short term receivables over current 
liability. 
DP [Dividend Payout Ratio] Preferred and common dividends over income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations. 
TIE [Times Interest Earned] Operating income before depreciation over 
interest expense. 
DE [Debt-Equity Ratio] Debt over equity. 
CI [Capital Intensity] Invested capital dollars over sales dollars. 
RDI [R&D Intensity - Production] 20% of R&D dollars over sales dollars. 
INVI [Inventory Intensity] Inventory dollars over sales dollars. 
CE [Cost Efficiency] Cost of goods sold over sales. 
RSI [Receivables Intensity] Receivable dollars over sales dollars. 
ADI [Advertising Intensity] Advertising dollars over sales dollars. 
RDI2 [R&D Intensity - Marketing] 80% of R&D dollars over sales dollars. 
Bogner (1991) 
Strategy Dimension Measure 
ABSOLUTE R&D Number of drug related patents granted in that 
year for particular firm 
RELATIVE R &D No of drug related patents granted in that year for 
that firm/No of new products approved in past 7 
years 
SCOPE of R &D Concentration of R &D by therapy area in each 
year for each firm 
RELPROD Firms new products as a percentage of industry 
total 
HOSP [Hospital Sales] Product codes 04,09,10 & 11 
CHRN [Maintainance Sales] Number of new cardiovascular drugs introduced 
over the past 7 years/total number of new dru s 
HMK Concentration of drugs by therapeutic category in 
each year for each firm 
Guedri 1998 
Strategy Dimension Measure 
AT [Total Assets] Total of current assets, net property, plant, 
equipment and other non-current assets 
TEMP [Total Employees] Number of employees reported by the company at 
fiscal year-end. 
SALE [Total Net Sales] Net sales or revenues during the accounting 
period 
XRD [R&D Expenditures] All direct costs related to the creation and 
development of new rocesses, techniques, 
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applications and products. 
RMKG [Marketing Expenditures] Rank of each firm based on selling & 
administration expenditures 
TFSALEP [Spatial Reach] Proportion of sales generated from operations in 
foreign countries to total firm sales. 
THCLASS [Range of market 
segments] 
Number of therapeutic classes in which the 
corporation is active 
DIVERS [Product/Industry 
Diversification] 
Sales generated from operations within the 
pharmaceutical industry divided by firm total 
sales. 
SEGM [Segmentation] Indicates how many industry segments are 
available for each firm. 
RD1NT [R&D Intensity] R&D expenditures over sales. 
RDOR [R&D Orientation] Number of new drugs approved by the FDA in 
each year. 
CAPINT [Capital Intensity] Capita l expenditures over sales 
Key to abbreviations used in the above table. 
Rx Prescription 
NDA New Drug Application 
IND Investigational New Drug 
NCE New Chemical Entity 
PTY Over the counter medicine 
Ln Natural logarithm 
FDA Federal Drug Administration 
Comparing these five studies, it is important to note that all use a number of variables, 
ranging from 7 to 17, to represent strategic choice in the pharmaceutical industry. All 
encompass scale, scope and resource commitments or scope and resource commitments, 
after Hofer & Schendel (1978). Each, however, measures a different set of strategic 
choices and where choices coincide they are sometimes operationalized differently. 
Cool (1985) for example, chooses to measure market focus as represented by the 
proportion of revenue derived from each firms's top three therapeutic segments, 
whereas Martens (1988) utilizes the top two therapeutic segments. A common theme 
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across these studies is size as measured by firm sales. This features in four out of the 
five studies, although both Cool and Martens convert this measurement to its natural 
logarithm. 
"Size has an important influence on the ability to allocate sizeable amounts of 
resources to R&D and marketing. When R&D to sales ratios and promotion to 
sales ratios are employed without taking the size factor into account, this scale 
element is overlooked. Therefore a final resource deployment variable was 
defined: the natural logarithm of total domestic drug sales (i. e. drug stores and 
hospitals sales combined). The logarithm rather than the absolute amount of 
sales was taken to reflect the differential difficulty of adding equal absolute 
amounts of resources in different size classes" (Cool, 1985,310). 
Other common themes include some measurement of research expenditure, promotional 
choices and the measurement of new product sales, which are generally defined as sales 
from products less than two years old. The study by Bogner places more emphasis on 
research and market focus, each with three out of seven variables respectively. The 
studies by Fiegenbaum (1990) and Guedri (1988) place a greater emphasis on financial 
variables than the other three studies. 
"Some of these Compustat variables which partially reflect elements of realized 
strategy can, however, provide useful proxies for key strategic variables 
associated with scope and resource commitment" (Fiegenbaum et al., 1990, p 
138). 
Thus, some variables chosen reflect a trade-off between precision and availability. 
Differences in data availability provide, in part, an explanation for the use of different 
sets of variables between studies, to describe what appear to be similar choices within a 
common industry. Cool, for example, states that he would have liked to have included a 
more comprehensive data set within his study. 
"In total, 15 variables are used in this study to measure the competitive strategy 
of each firm in the pharmaceutical industry. Although it would be desirable, to 
consider more variables than the ones discussed data availability prevents a 
more detailed analysis" (Cool, 1985,310) 
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Bogner (1991) reiterates this point and refers to the particular difficulty of obtaining a 
comprehensive data set for longitudinal studies. The common data sources used in 
strategic group studies within the pharmaceutical industry are (1) those of IMS 
[Intercontinental Medical Statistics], employed in this research and in the studies by 
Bogner, Cool and Martens, and (2) Compustat19 used by Fiegenbaum, Thomas and 
Sudharshan. A reason for choosing IMS data is that it is the industry standard, available 
in all major countries and widely used by the pharmaceutical industry. 
"Practically, researchers are constrained by data availability when measures of 
managerial decisions and performance are sought. Variable selection is done in 
large part based upon the availability of data from Compustat and other 
packaged data sources. The availability of data from these sources often pre- 
selects out all but a few potential measures. This problem is amplified when 
multiple year studies are used. Even if a good variable is available for one period 
of time, it may be difficult to find that variable for all the years needed" 
(Bogner, 1991,105-106) 
Variable choice is a critical decision that affects the outcome and comparability of the 
study and it is this point, rather than any other, that makes comparisons between 
previous research studies difficult, particularly because those variables which accurately 
reflect strategy in one country may not accurately reflect strategy in another. (see table 
5.4 below for specific detail on this point. ) 
"Whether the objective is exploratory or confirmatory, the researcher has 
effectively constrained the possible results by the variables selected for use" 
(Hair et al., 1998. p 481). 
"The choice of variables to be used with cluster analysis is one of the most 
critical steps in the research process" (Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 19). 
"Variables which are largely the same for all data units have little discriminatory 
power whereas those manifesting consistent differences from one subgroup to 
19 Compustat provides extensive longitudinal information on financial statement variables broken down in 
some instances into line-of-business data (Fiegenbaum et al., 1990,138). 
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another can induce strong distinctions. When a relevant discriminating variable 
is left out of the analysis some clusters may merge into an amorphous and 
confusing mass ... On the other hand, 
inclusion of strong discriminators not 
particularly relevant to the purpose at hand can mask the sought-for clusters and 
give misleading results" (Anderberg, 1973. p 12). 
A further difficulty of making valid comparisons between studies arises because key 
decisions like the geographical focus and the firms included in the research, differ 
between studies. The exclusions made within studies also present a significant difficulty 
when comparing between studies, for example, Cool excluded non-US, merged and 
generic companies from his study. 
"To decide which drug firms would be included in the sample for empirical 
analysis, a number of issues related to sampling methodology and data 
availability were taken into account. First, it was necessary to exclude foreign 
drug firms because of a lack of reliable data on various strategy (geographical 
scope, patent data, R&D outlays) and performance (profitability) dimensions.. A 
second criterion imposed on the sample selection was that firms needed to exist 
as separate legal entities over most of the 1963-1982 period. This criterion was 
adopted to ensure that a changing sample composition would not bias the results. 
Third, all firms participating exclusively in the commodity generic drug 
segments were not included ... The primary reason for their exclusion is ... that a 
comparison of their operations with those of the established ethical drug 
companies is not meaningful because of the totally different bases on which 
each function" (Cool, 1985,337-338) 
These points are illustrated are table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Comparison of Previous Pharmaceutical Strategic Group Studies 
Cool Martens Fiegenbaum Bogner Guedri 
1985 1988 et al 1991 1998 
1990 
Industry US 5 E. C. Global US Global 
Focus Countries 
Time 1963-1982 1978-1985 1974-1981 1969-1988 1995-1997 
Period 
No of 22 42 22 41 42 
Firms 
Major Non US, Some Private None listed Some Non-US Japanese 
Exclusions Merged & Companies excluded from Companies 
Generic performance 
Companies analysis 
Data IMS IMS Compustat IMS Annual 
Source Annual Annual Annual Reports Reports 
Reports Reports 
Data for this research was drawn from a number of sources. The primary data is derived 
from IMS statistics, which are the leading suppliers of quantitative pharmaceutical sales 
and marketing data in the UK and indeed in most, if not all of the world's principal 
pharmaceutical markets. Company annual reports and Datastream20 were used to obtain 
details of companies' geographical focus, R&D expenditure and degree of 
diversification. These data sources were supplemented by access to PharmaPipelines21 
and industry specific publications, for example Pharmaceutical Companies Analysis. 
As in previous research (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 1988), 
some companies were excluded from the research. The reason for exclusion was data 
availability, either because the company did not disclose the required information or 
because the company had not traded publicly for the entire period of analysis. 
20 Datastream is a subscription only service that provides access to on line financial data derived primarily 
from annual reports, together with share price information. 
21 PharmaPipelines is a database produced by Lehman Brothers that provides data on the net present value 
of all major pharmaceutical companies, their research portfolio, licensing arrangements, launch schedule, 
current marketed products and portfolio age profile. 
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Table 5.3 details the companies included in the analysis and abbreviations of their 
names, used for brevity, in some subsequent tables. Company selection included 33 of 
the leading pharmaceutical companies, ranked in terms of UK sales in 2002. At the end 
of 2002 these companies represented 76.6% of the UK pharmaceutical market (IMS BPI 
and HPAI 2002)22. This sample is clearly biased in the sense that it ignores smaller 
companies. That fact cannot be ignored and is considered when interpreting the results. 
"The researcher must realize that cluster analysis is only as good as the 
representativeness of the sample"(Hair et al., 1998. p 490-491). 
The primary reason for restricting the analysis to the larger companies was availability 
of data. In fact, several companies ranked in the top 40 in terms of sales could not be 
included because they are privately owned. Privately-owned companies do not publish 
information such as annual research expenditure, although their market performance is 
captured within the IMS data base. Examples of companies excluded from the research 
include Mundi Pharma, Ferring, Leo Pharmaceuticals, Servier, Elan Pharmaceuticals, 
Gilead and Goldshield. 
Cool's study included 22 companies, limited to US based companies that had not 
participated in any merger activity during the study period and which did not engage in 
significant trading in generic pharmaceuticals (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b). If the 
research reported in this thesis were to have excluded merged companies, eight of the 
top 10 UK companies would have been omitted, i. e. Glaxo Smith Kline, Pfizer, Astra 
Zeneca, Wyeth, Pharmacia, Novartis, Aventis and Sanofi Synthelabo (IMS, 1996). 
Therefore, merged companies are included. This does, however, present a problem, 
because as Cool points out, mergers have the effect of introducing considerable 
u BPI is the British Pharmaceutical Index which measures sales from wholesalers to retail pharmacies 
and dispensing doctors. HPAI is the Hospital Pharmacy Audit Index which measures sales from 
wholesalers and direct from manufacturers into hospitals. 
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disruption to the sample over time. To resolve this problem, two approaches were taken 
here. First, the sample was constructed as though mergers had never happened and each 
company is as it was in 2002 throughout the analysis. This is the normal format in the 
IMS database, which is recalculated for the preceding ten year period whenever mergers 
occur. But this does introduce a problem for certain figures such as research 
expenditure, and geographical and business focus. These figures were gleaned from 
annual reports, Datastream and industry reports, converted to common currency at the 
appropriate date and then combined. Second, the analysis was rerun with the original 
company structures. This provided the opportunity to explore the effect of merger as a 
strategy upon strategic groups and to ascertain if companies generally merged within or 
across strategic groups. 
The study does, however, concur with Cool's in excluding "pure generic" companies, 
such as Ranbaxy or Kent Pharmaceuticals, because they operate in essentially very 
different markets, supplying commodity products primarily to wholesalers and chains of 
retail pharmacies. 
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Table 5.3 List of Companies included in the Analysis and Abbreviations used in 
subsequent tables 
ABBREVIATION COMPANY 
3M Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing 
ABB Abbott Laboratories 
AKZO Akzo Nobel 
AVE Aventis 
AZ Astra Zeneca 
BAX Baxter 
BAY Bayer 
BI Boehringer In elheim 
BMS Bristol Myers Squibb 
CELL Celltech 
EIS Eisai 
GSK Glaxo Smith Kline 
IVX Ivax 
JJ Johnson & Johnson 
LIL Lilly 
LUN Lundbeck 
MER E Merck 
MSD Merck Sharpe and Dohme 
NOV Novo 
NVA Novartis 
PFZ Pfizer 
PG Proctor & Gamble 
PHR Pharmacia 
RB Reckitt Benkisser 
ROC Roche 
SAG Schering AG 
SHI Shire Pharmaceuticals 
SOL Solvay 
SPL Schering Plough 
SS Sanofi S thelabo 
TAX Takeda 
WYE Wyeth 
YAM Yamanouchi 
My research uses Cool's (1985) original study as a benchmark, but aside from the 
problems of company sample outlined earlier, a major difficulty occurs with the 
variables used by Cool to represent strategy. This problem relates to the country specific 
way in which health care in general and pharmaceuticals in particular are administered. 
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A major strategic thrust in the US, for example, is direct to consumer (DTC) 
advertising. 
"Between 1996 and 1999, AstraZeneca, Pfizer, and Schering-Plough increased 
their DTC spending by at least $100 million each, and Merck added $50 million. 
In a few cases, DTC represents the lion's share of the marketing mix. Estimates 
suggest that at least half of the marketing expenditures of three drugs-not only 
Claritin but also Prilosec, which relieves gastrointestinal distress, and the hair 
loss treatment Propecia-are directed at consumers rather than professional 
health care providers. As much as 83 percent of Propecia's budget, and 69 
percent of Claritin's, may be allocated to consumer advertising" (Aitken et al., 
2000,84). 
The UK does not permit direct to consumer advertising of prescription drugs, but this 
does not mean that this channel is unimportant. Access to the internet is now 
commonplace in our society, therefore, for consumers interested in their health, a 
myriad of opportunities to research the relative benefits of products are available. 
Expenditure by pharmaceutical companies on internet promotion may therefore be 
expected to influence a proportion of consumers today, but neither the IMS databases 
nor the other data sources available for this research provide the opportunity to measure 
this phenomenon. Fortunately, this is unlikely to be a significant weakness of the study 
because for much of the time period included, there was little internet use. 
"As online advertising develops, advertisers will discover that the Internet is the 
only medium that can deliver certain types of message, such as multisensory and 
interactive ads. These new forms will allow advertisers to achieve several 
objectives-some of them unattainable via conventional media- 
simultaneously" (Cartellieri et al., 1997, p 51). 
"... many senior pharmaceutical executives believe that drug companies can 
find dramatic new sources of value through DTC marketing, which (in addition 
to TV and radio commercials) includes print advertising, promotional efforts, 
public relations, and Internet communications. There is a powerful logic to this 
optimistic view. An aging population, easy access to medical information, and 
the current skepticism about health care systems have increasingly made 
consumers-not the trusted family physician-the arbiters of what prescription 
medications they take. This trend will probably gain momentum. Drug makers 
are likely to find the consumer increasingly at the center of their strategic 
thinking as they search harder and harder for blockbuster drugs that can generate 
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the revenues needed to sustain their high market multiples" (Aitken et al., 2000, 
p 84). 
Thus direct consumer advertising represents one of a number of significant differences 
between the UK and US operating environments. As a result of these differences not all 
of Cool's original variables are applicable to this research. This point is illustrated in 
table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 Comparison Of Variables Used In This Study With Those Of Cool (1985) 
US Strategic Group Variables UK Strategic Group Variables 
Cool (1985) 
At the company level At the company level 
PHARMA % prescription sales in PHARMA Pharmaceutical sales 
total domestic drug / total world sales 
sales 
DRUGST % drug store sales in DRUGST UK retail chemist 
total domestic drug sales/Total UK sales 
sales of harmaceuticals 
BRANGEN % branded generic BRANGEN This represents the 
Prescription sales in availability of 
total domestic cheaper substitutes 
Prescription sales best represented in 
the UK by parallel 
import sales/total UK 
sales23 
COMMGEN % commodity generic Not used In the UK commodity 
sales in total domestic generics sales are not 
Prescription sales distinguishable by 
manufacturer 
MAINT % maintenance drug MAINT This variable 
sales in total domestic distinguishes chronic 
Prescription sales (long-term) from 
acute (short-term) 
therapy. 
Chronic therapy 
sales/Total UK sales 
FOCUS (Prescription sales in 3 FOCUS (Prescription sales in 
largest therapeutic 3 largest therapeutic 
categories)/(total categories)/(total UK 
domestic Prescription Prescription sales) 
sales) 
FOREIGN % total firm sales FOREIGN A very problematic 
generated abroad variable. Annual 
[Cool's analysis was reports differ 
restricted to US based significantly in terms 
firms which all of how geographical 
complied with the sales are reported 
same accounting which makes 
procedures and accurate comparison 
distinguished home difficult. 
from foreign sales. ] 
RDS (total firm RDI (total firm R&D) 
R&D)/(Worldwide /(worldwide health 
health care sales) care sales 
Z' When total sales is used as a denominator it refers to total UK pharmaceutical sales, unless otherwise 
stated. 
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RDEFFS (No of New drug Not used This data attempts to 
applications measure the 
submitted)/(No of movement of product 
Investigational New submission through 
Drugs) the regulatory body 
and is not available in 
the UK, where 
frequently a 
European wide 
application is often 
sought with a 
different country as 
rapporteur. 
RDORIENT (NCEs approved / Not used As above 
NCEs submitted) 
PRODSTR (No of NCEs) / (Total PRODSTR Sales of products less 
No of New Products) than 2 years old 
PROFPROM (total domestic PROFPROM (Total UK 
professional professional 
promotion) / (total promotion) / (Total 
domestic Prescription UK Prescription 
sales) sales) 
CONSADV (total domestic N/A Direct to consumer 
consumer promotion) / advertising of 
(total domestic prescription products 
Prescription sales) is not allowed in the 
UK 
DISTR % of total domestic N/A In the UK national 
drug sales shipped pharmaceutical 
directly to drug stores wholesalers offer 
and hospitals twice daily delivery 
therefore virtually all 
distribution is via 
wholesaler for retail 
and hospital 
customers 
SIZE LN (Total domestic SIZE LN (Total domestic 
drug sales drug sales 
The above table illustrates that, although Cool employed a relatively comprehensive set 
of variables to represent strategy in the US pharmaceutical industry, some of these 
variables are not easily, nor directly transferable to the UK. This is because first, 
accounting procedures differ between countries and company annual reports vary 
considerably in how they treat sales by geographical area, which makes accurate 
179 
comparisons based on geographical scope extremely difficult. Second, country specific 
differences relating to the legal, regulatory environment and the ways in which health 
care is administered and pharmaceuticals delivered to the end user, differ between 
countries. This may reflect to some extent that with measurement of strategy we are 
attempting to measure two things, first broad strategic choices about where to invest 
time and money, such as research focus, degree of diversification and markets to enter, 
and second local implementation choices reflecting the pattern of local priorities. In 
effect, the difference between strategic and operational decisions reflect choices of 
effectiveness and efficiency respectively (Sjorstrom, 1994). Thus, variables used to 
identify strategic groups in the pharmaceutical industry should reflect local (operational) 
and international (strategic) choices. The variables used to represent strategy in the 
research in this thesis are listed below in table 5.5. They are divided into those 
concerned with strategic and operational decisions, respectively. 
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Table 5.5 Strategy variables used to identify strategic groups 
Strategic Variable Measurement 
Business Focus [DIV] Pharmaceutical sales/Total sales 
Research Intensity [RINT] Research spend/Total Sales 
Research Focus RFOC Research spend/Number of Therapeutic Areas 
Promotional Intensity [PINT] All promotional costs/Total Sales 
Merger Status [MERG] A categorical variable 1 indicates companies that 
have not merged during the period of this study, 2 
indicates that the company by the end of 2002 
was the product of one merger and 3 indicates a 
serial merger strategy where the company has 
engaged in more than one merger during the 
study period. 
Size [SIZE] Natural log of total sales 
Operational Variable 
Market focus MFOC GP (community sales /Total sales 
Therapy focus [TFOC] Top 3 therapy area sales/Total sales 
Maintenance therapy MAINT Chronic therapy sales/Total sales 
New products [NEWPRO] New product sales/Total sales 
Price exposure PIEXP Parallel import sales/Total sales 
Sales force SFORCE Sales force costs/Total sales 
Advertising [ADVERT] Advertising costs/Total sales 
Licensing activity [LIC] Number of in-licensed products 
Co-marketing activity 
COMARK 
Sales of co-marketed products/Total sales 
The six strategic variables included in this research each measure either specific 
resource decisions or access to resources. Business focus measures the degree of 
diversification and measures the strategy dimension between those firms, such as MSD 
(Merck Sharpe & Dohme) or Eli Lilly, that operate solely in pharmaceuticals, and 
industry conglomerates such as 3M or Akzo with a broad portfolio of business interests, 
where pharmaceuticals represent a relatively small element of their turnover. Research 
intensity measures each company's commitment to innovation versus imitation and 
distinguishes firms such as GSK (Glaxo Smith Kline), MSD or Pfizer, that spend a large 
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proportion of income on innovation from those such as Ivax or Solvay which invest 
less. Research focus measures the distinction between firms that invest actively in 
research across a broad spectrum of therapeutic areas in search of the next blockbuster, 
for example Pfizer or GSK, versus firms such as Novo that are specialists in a narrow 
field of research. It is important to note that research is a strategic not operational 
variable because of the huge financial risks incurred (for a fuller discussion on this point 
see chapter 4). Promotional intensity along with research intensity, represent firms' 
ability to differentiate their products. By taking total promotion as the numerator, local 
differences are effectively removed, as whether the focus is on sales force, advertising, 
or direct to consumer, this variable provides a general measure of each firm's position 
with regard to promotion. 
There have been a number of waves of merger activity in the pharmaceutical industry, 
(for further details please see chapter 4) and merger to capture rare assets, gain critical 
mass in specific markets or to meet investor profit expectations, is an important 
strategic option. The categorical variable `merger' distinguishes firms that have chosen 
to grow organically, for example Eli Lilly or MSD, from those that have chosen to grow 
through acquisition or merger. It is important to note that this variable only refers to 
horizontal mergers and specifically excludes the acquisition of pharmacy benefit 
managers24 (PBMs) in the early 1990's, which was a phenomenon solely limited to the 
US market. Size is included because it measures access to resources and ability to 
sustain a strategic position. Larger firms generally have deeper pockets and greater 
market power than smaller ones. 
24 Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBM) are an almost exclusively US phenomenon. In the early 1990's a 
number of pharmaceutical firms purchased PBMs in order to gain greater control over their distribution 
channels in the US market. All of these acquisition decisions were subsequently reversed. 
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The nine operational variables represent specific market decisions that are determined 
locally. Market focus [MFOC] measures the split between general practice (community) 
sales and hospital sales. This distinguishes between firms that concentrate almost solely 
upon GP products, for example Takeda or Wyeth, from those with a strong range of 
hospital products, such as Pharmacia or Roche. Therapy focus [TFOC] measures the 
relative importance of the top three therapy areas to total company sales and 
distinguishes those companies that concentrate upon a narrow section of the market, for 
example Lundbeck or Novo, from those companies with a broad portfolio of products, 
like Novartis. Chronic therapy products are those which the patient has to take regularly 
for a long period of time, as compared to products that are used to treat an illness of 
short duration, for example antibiotic treatment of a respiratory condition. 
"A similar proxy was constructed in order to measure the chronic care/acute care 
split in the product line of each firm. Chronic care drugs hold high potential for 
profits because patients often refill the same prescription, perhaps for life, and 
physicians are reluctant to change a prescription after the patient begins using a 
particular product. Here the proxy attempts to measure the extent to which 
products approved by the FDA are targeted for long-term patient consumption" 
(Bogner et al., 1996) pp. 93-94. 
Cardiovascular products have been taken as a proxy for maintenance therapy (Bogner, 
1991). More recently a broader based alternative using the combined sales of anti- 
arthritics, cardiovascular, sedative and tranquilizer drugs has been suggested (Bogner et 
al., 1996 p. 91), which is employed here for the variable [MAINT]. 
Post-patent erosion may account for significant sales loss (see chapter 4 for further 
details), therefore, the ability to periodically refresh the product portfolio is necessary to 
meet shareholder expectations. This important variable is measured by the proportion of 
sales from products less than two years old [NEWPRO]. 
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In the UK parallel imported products from lower priced countries within the European 
Union (EU) have become increasingly important, but not all companies are affected 
equally (for a detailed discussion of parallel imports please see chapter 4). Parallel 
imports effectively are discounted versions of patent protected products and represent a 
form of price competition measured by [PIEXP]. This variable reflects price decisions 
both locally in the UK and with reference to the EU countries. 
The most widely employed means of product differentiation in UK pharmaceuticals is 
the use of a direct sales force to call on doctors and related professionals in order to 
convince them to use the company's products (see chapters 3 and 4 for further details). 
The cost of UK sales force calls are represented by the variable [SFORCE]. The 
companion variable to [SFORCE] is [ADVERT] which measures media advertising to 
doctors, and related professions, in support of prescription only products. These two 
variables are strongly correlated both to themselves and to promotional intensity 
[PINT], but provide some flexibility to examine companies that appear outliers or to run 
confirmatory analysis. They are included here for reasons of completeness. 
Not all companies are successful in researching their own products and some companies 
rely heavily on marketing other companies' products. This strategic variable is 
measured by [LIC], which represents the sales from in licensed products that the 
company has in their product portfolio. 
Similarly, some companies recognize that they either have a gap in their promotional 
priorities that provides some slack sales force time or alternatively the management 
recognizes that they lack either the experience or the critical mass to succeed in a given 
184 
therapeutic area. The variable [COMARK] measures the proportion of sales due to co- 
marketing activity between firms. 
Use of total sales as a common denominator for many of the above variables has the 
advantage of making the majority of variables directly comparable across firms of 
different sizes. The above division into strategic and operational variables may aid 
comparison with other studies because strategic variables should be generally applicable 
to a number of countries while operational variables reflect adaptation to local operating 
conditions. 
Strategic groups measured by the above set of strategic variables group firms in terms 
of how they compete in the market. The classification of firms into competitive groups 
denotes where firms compete, which market segments they occupy and their relative 
importance. For a fuller discussion of the distinction between strategic groups and 
competitive groups, see chapter 2. The variables used to separate companies into their 
competitive groups in order to identify where firms compete, or the product areas they 
compete in, are the respective company's sales across the 16 IMS therapeutic categories 
listed in table 5.6. Competitive groups are important because as Porter pointed out, 
choice of markets, (represented here by competitive groups) together with the strategy 
chosen to compete, 
( strategic groups) are important determinants of profitability (Porter, 1976; Porter, 
1979). 
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Table 5.6 Variables used to separate companies into competitive groups 
IMS THERAPEUTIC CATEGORY 
A ALIMENTARY TR+METABOLISM 
B BLOOD + B. FORMING ORGANS 
C CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM 
D DERMATOLOGICALS 
G G. U. SYSTEM+ SEX HORMONES 
H SYSTEMIC HORMONES 
J SYSTEMIC ANTI-INFECTIVES 
K HOSPITAL SOLUTIONS 
L ANTINEOPLAST+IMMUNOMODUL 
M MUSCULO-SKELETAL SYSTEM 
N CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM 
P PARASITOLOGY 
R RESPIRATORY SYSTEM 
S SENSORY ORGANS 
T DIAGNOSTIC AGENTS 
V VARIOUS 
The next section starts by isolating the key environmental variables used in the research 
to represent environmental change, before discussing the methods used to isolate `stable 
strategic time periods' (SSTPs) (for a discussion on the use of stable strategic time 
periods in strategic group research, see Chapter 2). 
5.4 Environmental variables and establishment of stable strategic time periods. 
The concept of strategic groups is inextricably linked with the idea of mobility barriers, 
which act as barriers, partly structural or of exogenous origin, and partly endogenous 
between groups (Caves et al., 1977). Thus, for groups to persist and competitive 
advantage to exist between groups it is necessary for strategic actions to be underpinned 
by a unique asset or skill. 
"If the strategy is not supported by a unique asset or skill then it can be easily 
duplicated because mobility barriers and competitive advantage will be lacking" 
(Mascarenhas et al., 1989. p 476). 
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Mobility barriers are necessary for strategic groups to exist and for profitability 
differences to exist between groups (Caves et al., 1977). 
"Group-specific entry barriers not only give differential protection against new 
firms coming into an industry. They also protect the members of one group 
against entry by a member of another group (intergroup mobility).... Indeed 
without intergroup immobility it would be hard to explain persistent differences 
in profit rates among groups within an industry. If the strategy embodied in one 
group's traits is more profitable than any other, why do not all other sellers in 
the industry clamber into that group? " (Caves et al., 1977. p 254). 
Therefore it is argued that strategic groups are a relatively stable and persistent intra- 
industry phenomenon. 
"A natural concern about any grouping is whether substantial mobility is 
observed between groups. If there is substantial mobility one can question 
whether mobility barriers exist between groups, and whether strategic groups 
have in fact been identified" (Mascarenhas et al., 1989. p 476). 
The idea of stable strategic time periods builds on the premise that strategic groups are 
the product of stable sets of strategic investments by firms that do not change 
frequently. Change may be prompted however, either in response to a new opportunity 
that may necessitate moving to another strategic group or to exogenous shocks brought 
about by environmental change. Strategic groups are predicted to be differentially 
affected by such shocks. 
" Because of their structural similarity, group members are likely to respond in 
the same way to disturbances from inside or outside the group, recognizing their 
independence closely and anticipating their reactions to one another's moves 
quite accurately" (Caves et al., 1977. p 251). 
Cool (1985) argued that changes in firms' strategy relative to other industry members 
could be reliably used to determine stable strategic time periods and to identify the 
breaks between such periods. 
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"It is postulated that at any point in time, the covariance structure of a given 
firm's strategic variable set with the sets of the other industry members gives an 
adequate view of the position that firm occupies in its industry. By tracing inter- 
temporal changes in this covariance structure it can be discerned whether and 
when a firm is repositioning itself vis-ä-vis its competitors" (Cool, 1985 p. 121- 
122). 
Cool measured each year's covariance structure consisting of an nxp matrix with n 
companies and p variables. Significant changes between years were identified by use of 
the Box M test of homogeneity of matrices. The precise procedure was as follows. 
First, a covariance matrix for year 1 was compared to year 2. If no significant 
differences were found between these two years, the two years were pooled and 
compared against the third year. The reverse operation was also performed by 
comparing the pooled results for years 2 and 3 with year 1. 
Ho El - 
"z 
H1 ýi ýx 
Where represents the variance/covariance matrix between the strategic variables for 
a specific period. When for a chosen significance level, 25 the null hypothesis is not 
rejected (meaning that no change has occurred between the two periods), the two 
periods are pooled together. Then, the third period is introduced as 
Hý E12= Z3 
HI ý12 # ý3 
and 
Hu 11 _ 
E23 
25 Cool chose 5% and Bogner 10%. Bogner chose a larger significance because of the power available 
from his larger sample. 
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Hl E1 # 
E23 
Where 2: 
12 and 
2: 
23 
denote the variance covariance matrices of the data pooled over 
the first two periods and the last two periods respectively. This dual check between 
years was used because, even if the variance covariance matrix did not differ for the 
first two periods, it is possible that a significant strategic change might occur over the 
last two periods. 
This procedure was repeated until a significant difference was found between years, 
indicating that a strategy discontinuity had been identified. Significant differences 
between years were taken to indicate that the firms within the industry had shifted their 
strategy at the end of a stable strategic time period. 
"When firms alter their strategy vis-a-vis each other, the covariances between 
the strategy variables should change. By determining at what point in time the 
covariance structure for all firms considered simultaneously, has changed from 
previous periods, it is possible to establish breakpoints where significant 
dissimilarities occur. These breakpoints indicate the existence of distinct sub- 
periods with different strategic group structures" (Cool, 1985. p 122). 
The next stage of Cool's method is then to identify the strategic groups present within 
each discrete, stable, strategic time period. A similar method was also employed by two 
subsequent longitudinal strategic group studies of the pharmaceutical industry (Bogner, 
1991; Martens, 1988). It is a requirement of this methodology that the number and 
identity of the firms involved remains constant throughout (Bogner, 1991). Therefore, 
in order to include merged companies in the longitudinal research in this thesis, the 
firms had to be assumed to have always been together. 
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The two statistical tests here are quite specialized tests so a short explanation of them 
both is included, although a full explanation is outside the scope of the research. (for a 
fuller description see Tabachnick & Fidell (2001) or Stevens (2002)) 
Hotelling's T2 test is appropriate when; 
"the independent variable has only two groups and there are several dependent 
variables... It is not legitimate to use separate t tests for each dependent variable 
to look for differences between groups because that inflates Type I error due to 
unnecessary multiple significance tests with (likely) correlated dependent 
variables. Instead Hotellings T2 is used to see if groups differ on the two 
dependent variables combined. The researcher asks if there are reliable 
differences in the centroids (average on the combined dependent variables) for 
the two groups" (Tabachnick et al., 2001.20). 
Box's M test is used to test the assumption that the variance covariance matrices in the 
research are equal. 
"Box (1949) has developed a test, which is a generalization of the Bartlett 
univariate homogeneity of variance test, for determining whether the covariance 
matrices are equal. The test uses the generalized variances, that is, the 
determinants of the within-covariance matrices" (Stevens, 2002.271). 
The Box M test is very sensitive, especially to the presence of non-normal variables. A 
significance test of 0.01 or less is used as an adjustment for the sensitivity of the statistic 
(Hair et al., 1998). 
In concluding this section of the chapter, it is important to isolate stable strategic time 
periods in a longitudinal study as a precursor to identifying the strategic groups 
contained within them. In this research Cool's procedure (1985) was adopted. 
1. Identify stable strategic time periods by comparing the variance covariance 
matrices (n firms xp strategy variables) between adjacent years. 
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Confirmation of stable strategic time periods through comparison of the mean values of 
strategic variables between adjacent years, as used by Fiegenbaum et al (1990), was not 
used. This was because the normality of the data set, although suitable for the Box M 
test which relies upon central tendency was not considered sufficiently robust across all 
variables to use Hotelling's T, which requires accurate determination of confidence 
limits. 
In the next section we shall review the choice of methods to cluster individual firms 
within their strategic groups and how to identify the most appropriate group structure. 
5.5 Clustering methods and identification of group structures. 
The aim of a cluster analysis is to sort the objects of analysis, in this case firms, into 
groups based upon their similarities in terms of the respective variables included within 
the data set. This is done so that the differences within groups are minimized, i. e. firms 
with similar patterns of investment in particular strategies are grouped together, and 
differences between groups are maximized, i. e. firms within groups compete in 
essentially different ways. 
"Cluster analysis techniques are concerned with exploring data sets to assess 
whether or not they can be summarized meaningfully in terms of a relatively 
small number of groups or clusters of objects which resemble each other and 
which are different in some respects from the objects in other clusters" (Brian S. 
Everitt et al., 2001. p 10). 
The approach used by Cool (1985), provides a good general model of the approach used 
in subsequent longitudinal studies investigating strategic groups within the 
pharmaceutical industry (Bogner, 1991; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988). This model 
provides the basis for the approach adopted in this thesis. 
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Figure 5.1 Flow of analysis and overview of methods applied in the study of 
strategic groups 
ANALYSIS METHODS 
Step 1 Identification of stable Box M test of equality 
strategic time periods of variance covariance 
matrices. 
Step 2 Identification of strategic Cluster Analysis 
groups in each SSTP Combination of 
methods 
Step 3 Inter-strategic group performance ANOVA26 
differences MANOVA27 
Kruskal Wallis28 
" Market share 
" Weighted Market Share 
" Market Rank 
Step 4 Intra-strategic group performance ANOVA 
differences MANOVA 
Kruskal Wallis 
" Market share 
" Weighted Market Share 
" Market Rank 
The first step was discussed in the previous section of the chapter. For the identification 
of competitive groups, step 2 is repeated but instead of strategic variables the groups are 
clustered using each company's sales for the 16 IMS therapeutic categories (see table 
5.6). 
The choice of clustering algorithm may have a marked effect upon the results and the 
use of more than one method is recommended to both strengthen and validate the 
results: 
26 ANOVA stands for Analysis of Variance 
27 MANOVA stands for Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
28 The Kruskal Wallis test is the non-parametric equivalent to the Analysis of Variance test. 
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"What is important to remember when faced with the difficult choice of which 
clustering method to use is that the method must be compatible with the desired 
nature of the classification, the variables to be used, and the similarity measure 
used to estimate the resemblance between cases" (Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 
35). 
"The various cluster analysis methods... differ in important respects. It seems 
possible that the unique characteristics of these methods could complement each 
other so that a comprehensive analysis might involve the use of several methods, 
each sensitive to special features of the data set" (Anderberg, 1973. p 188). 
"In many applications it might be reasonable to apply a number of clustering 
methods. If all produce very similar solutions, the investigator might, justifiably 
perhaps, have more confidence that the results are worthy of further 
investigation. Widely different solutions might be taken as evidence against any 
clear-cut cluster structure" (Brian S. Everitt et al., 2001.177). 
Although, as Alderberg remarks 
"If the clusters are well separated then almost any method will succeed in 
finding them" (Anderberg, 1973.210). 
Cool (1985) used two different algorithms, Ward's method and Complete Linkage, to 
separate his data set. Both of these are agglomerative hierarchical algorithms, which 
means that they start with each firm as a separate cluster and then successively combine 
the most similar clusters until all firms are combined within one cluster. It is up to the 
investigator to decide on the right cluster solution, i. e. the number of groups. This is a 
common problem with clustering methods. The second problem with agglomerative 
techniques is that once combined within a group, that position is set in stone even if, 
later in the analysis, moving the firm from say cluster `a' to cluster `b' would make 
more sense. 
"A hierarchical method suffers from the defect that it can never repair what was 
done in previous steps. Indeed, once an agglomerative algorithm has joined two 
objects they cannot be separated any more.. . The rigidity of hierarchical methods 
is both the key to their success (because it leads to small computation times) and 
their main disadvantage (the inability to correct erroneous decisions)" (Kaufman 
et al., 1990.44-45). 
"A partition of data units obtained at a chosen stage in a hierarchical 
classification can be refined using the nearest centroid sorting methods. The 
193 
partitions generated by hierarchical methods are not necessarily optimal with 
regard to the chosen clustering criterion because early merges cannot be undone 
to improve the partition at later stages. However, hierarchical methods usually 
give very good partitions which require only modest modifications to achieve a 
local optimum. Thus, the results from a hierarchical method can provide an 
excellent initial partition from which the nearest centroid methods can converge 
rapidly" (Anderberg, 1973. p 190). 
The use of Ward's method to separate groups is a common denominator between each 
of the previous longitudinal studies of strategic groups in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). Ward's method is also known as the 
minimum sum of squares technique, which assumes points can be represented in 
Euclidean space for geometrical interpretation (Brian S. Everitt et al., 2001). Distance 
between clusters is defined as the increase in sum of squares within clusters, after 
fusion, summed over all variables (Brian S. Everitt et al., 2001). 
". the method of Ward ... is intended for interval scaled measurements and 
makes use of Euclidean distances. The dissimilarity between two clusters is 
again based on the Euclidean distance between their centroids" (Kaufman et al., 
1990. p 230). 
"This method is designed to optimize the minimum variance within clusters. 
This objective function is also known as the within-groups sum of squares or the 
error sum of squares (ESS). The formula for the error sum of squares is 
ESS = xi -1/n(ýxr)z 
where x, is the score of the i`h case. At the first step of the clustering process, 
when each case is in its own cluster, the ESS is 0. The method works by joining 
those groups or cases that result in the minimum increase in the ESS" 
(Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 43). 
Ward's method is widely used in many of the social sciences (Aldenderfer et al., 1984) 
but tends to find same size, spherical clusters and is sensitive to outliers (Brian S. 
Everitt et al., 2001). 
"Outliers are likely to show up as clusters consisting of only one or two 
data units. Such atypical features of the data tend to distort the functioning of 
many clustering algorithms. They should be examined carefully with a view to 
finding a rational explanation for the deviant score profile. Outliers may provide 
a hint of a relevant category in the population which is poorly represented in the 
data set" (Anderberg, 1973. p 183). 
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"More troublesome are single-member clusters, which may be outliers not 
detected in earlier analyses. If a single-member cluster (or one of very small size 
compared with other clusters) appears, the researcher must decide if it represents 
a valid structural component in the sample or if it should be deleted as 
unrepresentative. If any observations are deleted, especially when hierarchical 
solutions are employed, the researcher should rerun the cluster analysis and start 
the process of defining clusters anew" (Hair et al., 1998. p 499). 
Outliers are a feature of Cool's study where Marion, for example, formed a singleton 
group, i. e. a group consisting of only one member, in stable strategic time periods 1 and 
2 and Lederle in period 4. Outliers are potentially important because a significant outlier 
may distort the cluster solution when hierarchical methods like Ward's or the Complete 
Linkage method are used. Despite these limitations, however, Wards method has been 
shown to provide superior recovery of a known cluster structure and to outperform most 
other clustering methods in conditions of cluster overlap (Aldenderfer et al., 1984). 
Ward's method will therefore be used in this research both for its strengths and to aid 
comparison with previous pharmaceutical-based strategic group studies (Bogner, 1991; 
Cool, 1985; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 1988). The strength of the clustering solution found 
by Ward's technique will also be assessed in this research through use of a Banner plot. 
This utilizes the same information depicted in a Dendogram29 but provides a better 
overall insight into cluster structure and data quality (Kaufman et al., 1990). 
"The overall width of the banner is very important because it gives an idea of the 
amount of structure that has been found by the algorithm. Indeed, when the data 
possess a clear cluster solution, the between-cluster dissimilarities (and hence 
the highest level) will become much larger than the within-cluster 
dissimilarities, and as a consequence the black lines in the banner become 
longer" (Kaufman et al., 1990. p 211). 
This measure is provided by means of an agglomerative coefficient 
29 A dendrogram is a tree diagram that provides a visual representation of the sequence of mergers 
between clusters. 
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AC = -l(i) which can be compared with the silhouette coefficient (SC) (see later n ; =1 
in this chapter). The AC simply describes the strength of the clustering structure that has 
been found. 
"When the AC. or SC are very small, the corresponding method has not found a 
natural structure, which can be expressed by saying that no clusters have been 
found, or rather that the data consists of one big cluster. On the other hand, a 
value of AC ... or SC close to 1 means that a very clear clustering structure has 
been identified" (Kaufman et al., 1990 p 213). 
It is important to recognize the property of the algorithms used because each will to a 
certain extent tend to impose their own structure on the data (Kaufman et al., 1990). The 
use of more than one algorithm is therefore recommended to negate the bias of any 
particular method and to confirm results. Anderberg for example recommends an 
iterative process. 
"A distinctive cluster which is well separated from the remainder of the data set 
is likely to be apparent in the first clustering cycle and continue to appear 
regularly in subsequent portions of the analysis. Rather than continuing to 
recover the same information time after time, it is appropriate to extract such 
clear cut features of the data set and focus attention on the more confused 
residue.. . The absence of the removed cluster should have no substantial effect 
on the identifiability of the remaining clusters" (Anderberg, 1973. p 183-184). 
Several authorities recommend a combination of hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
methods to gain the benefits of each, which is the method that is employed in this 
research. 
"First, a hierarchical technique can establish the number of clusters, profile the 
cluster centres, and identify any obvious outliers. After outliers are eliminated, 
the remaining observations can then by clustered by a nonhierarchical method 
with the cluster centres from the hierarchical results as initial seed points. In this 
way, the advantages of the hierarchical methods are complemented by the ability 
of the nonhierarchical methods to "fine-tune" the results by allowing for the 
switching of cluster membership"(Hair et al., 1998. p 498). 
"A solution advocated by many experts is to use a two-stage procedure where a 
hierarchical algorithm is used to define the number of clusters and cluster 
centroids; these results then serve as the starting points for subsequent 
nonhierarchical clustering... Research has shown that this procedure increases 
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validity of solutions... Thus, in summary the best solutions may be those 
obtained by using hierarchical and nonhierarchical methods in tandem" 
(Ketchen et al., 1996. p 446). 
In their review of clustering procedures, Punj and Stewart (1983) recommend the two 
step process suggesting that average linkage or Ward's method should be used first, 
followed by an iterative partitioning (non-hierarchical) algorithm. This step wise 
process is adopted in the research in this thesis. The process is summarized below. 
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Figure 5.2 The two-step procedure for identification of strategic groups. 
Ward's method 
Preliminary Cluster Solution 
1. Select candidate number of 
clusters 
2. Obtain centroids of clusters 
3. Eliminate outliers 
Iterative partitioning algorithm using 
cluster centroids derived from 
preliminary analysis as starting points. 
(run with and without outliers) 
Final Cluster Solution 
The other key decisions, aside from the choice of algorithm, are whether to weight or 
standardize the data, which similarity measure to employ, and how to identify the 
appropriate number of clusters. These points are discussed below. 
Cool (1985) afforded all his variables equal weight in his analysis. This assumes that 
each strategic choice variable is of equal importance. 
The argument with regard to standardization is more subjective. Cool standardized all 
his variables to z scores. 
"Careful use of cluster analysis requires a transformation of all variables to a 
single index at similarity before starting any cluster analysis. To that end scale 
conversion techniques may be applied. A procedure that is often suggested in the 
literature is to transform all variables to their standardized form (zero mean and 
unit variance). In this way a scale-free set of variables, independent of the 
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measurement units used, is obtained. This procedure will be followed in this 
study" (Cool, 1985. p 163-164). 
It is the opinion of Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) that the choice of standardization, 
really comes down to how much weight you wish to apply to a given variable. If the 
measurement scales are meaningful in their own right then it is best not to standardize 
and leave the inherent weights within the variable. But if the variables are assumed to 
have equal importance, then standardization of variables is recommended. 
"by standardizing one attempts to give all variables an equal weight, in the hope 
of achieving objectivity. As such, it may be used by a practitioner who possesses 
no prior knowledge" (Kaufman et al., 1990. p 11). 
This argument stems back to the point made by Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) that if 
the variables are meaningful then standardization may reduce the ability of variables to 
act as effective differentiators. The same basic argument, one of relative weighting, 
applies equally to multicollinearity and standardization, which both have the effect of 
altering the relative weight of the individual variables within the analysis. It is 
recommended by some researchers that analyses be done both with and without 
standardization, for this reason: 
"Because results may differ solely based on standardization, we suggest that 
analyses be done both using and not using standardization" (Ketchen et al., 
1996. p 444). 
This is the approach taken in this research, for two reasons. First, because it is 
recommended but, second because the variables are not equal, although specifically 
assigning weights to them would be subjective. This is because as explained earlier, 
mobility barriers differ (see chapter 4 for a fuller discussion) in their characteristics, i. e. 
relative degree of difficulty of achieving scale, and some strategic choices may be 
expected to accrue together. For example, if a company has an active flow of new 
products it is more likely to put considerable emphasis upon advertising and sales force 
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activity investments, which work in concert, for example to raise awareness. In this 
case, removing one of these variables is contrary to the strategic intent of the company 
which strategic group analysis is seeking to capture. Therefore, relatedness between 
some variables is a natural phenomenon to be expected. 
"Interdependencies among variables may exist by design or, more often, are the 
unexpected result of the research design. Careful selection of variables may 
reduce unwanted interdependencies but the problem is likely to remain even in 
the best of circumstances.... the effect of which is to weight more heavily certain 
dimensions along which clustering will be carried out. When this is desirable for 
some theoretical or practical purpose, correcting for interdependencies is 
inappropriate"(Punj et al., 1983. p 144). 
"When the researcher desires that all dimensions or attributes be given equal 
weight in the clustering process, it is necessary to correct for 
interdependencies ... Correction may 
be achieved by completing a preliminary 
principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation. Component scores may 
then be used as input for the computation of a similarity or distance measure" 
(Punj et al., 1983. p 144). 
Thus a similar problem related to the issue of weight is correlation between variables. If 
multicollinearity3° occurs within the variable set then, in effect, some variables are 
represented more strongly because strongly correlated variables will exert a concerted 
effect: 
"in cluster analysis. those variables that are multicollinear are implicitly 
weighted more heavily... Multicollinearity acts as a weighting process not 
apparent to the observer but affecting the analysis nonetheless"(Hair et al., 1998. 
p 491). 
Approaches suggested to overcome this are either to split the variable set and run two 
separate analyses as a cross check each with one set of uncorrelated variables (Hair et 
al., 1998) or to reduce the variable set to its uncorrelated principle components, using 
principle component analysis, and cluster the factor scores. This latter approach is used 
30 "Extent to which a variable can be explained by the other variables in the analysis. As multicollinearity 
increases , it complicates the interpretation of the variables 
because it is more difficult to ascertain the 
effect of any single variable, owing to the variables' interrelationships"(Hair et al., 1998. p 471). 
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to identify strategic groups in the pharmaceutical industry by Guedri (1998). Criticisms 
have, however, been made about the use of factor score: 
"There is debate over the use of factor scores in cluster analysis, as some 
research has shown that the variables that truly discriminate among the 
underlying groups are not well represented in most factor solutions. Thus, when 
factor scores are used, it is quite possible that a poor representation of the true 
structure of the data will be obtained" (Hair et al., 1998. p 491). 
"However, this technique is controversial because researchers often drop all 
values with low eigenvalues [a statistic representing the amount of variance 
explained by a factor]. The excluded factors may represent unique, important 
information" (Ketchen et al., 1996. p 444), explanation in parenthesis added). 
The principal criticism of factor scores is that by including only the first few factor 
scores in the analysis, a significant proportion of variance may be lost, which may 
include variables that differentiate significantly between groups. The same argument 
can also be extended to the twin group solution. By splitting the data set its full 
explanatory power is also potentially reduced. 
It is recommended by Ketchen and Shook (1996) that because both methods of 
correcting for multicollinearity have drawbacks, an attempt should be made to assess 
the impact of the technique used. 
"We suggest that the ideal approach is to perform a cluster analysis multiple 
times changing only the method of addressing multicollinearity. Consistent 
group assignments despite different methods would be evidence of stability 
whereas inconsistent assignments would suggest a tenuous cluster solution" 
(Ketchen et al., 1996. p 444). 
The approach taken in the research in this thesis is to triangulate results through 
conducting the analysis first without correcting for interrelationships, second by using 
the split sample method, and finally using factor component scores. In this way three 
alternatives methods are used, allowing the resulting solutions to be compared. An 
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advantage of utilizing factor scores is the simplicity that it brings to the analysis through 
reducing the pattern of strategic investments to their core elements. 
"Even though some information will be lost, there is a major advantage in 
reducing the dimensionality through principal components. With two 
dimensions we can plot the data and with three dimensions we could build a 
physical model. This would give managers a much better feel for how objects 
were clustered together" (Morrison, 1967. p 776-7). 
The final critical decision in the cluster analysis process is how to choose the 
appropriate number of groups. Here there are traditionally two methods, the first is to 
examine the Dendrogram, a graph of the order that firms join clusters and the similarity 
between combined clusters. The length of lines along the edge of the Dendrogram 
measure the relative distance between successive fusions and the researcher looks for a 
natural break. 
"Heuristic procedures are by far the most commonly used methods. At the most 
basic level, a hierarchical tree is "cut" by the subjective inspection of the 
different levels of the tree.. . This procedure 
is hardly satisfactory because it is 
generally biased by the needs and opinions of the researcher as to the "correct" 
structure of the data" (Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 54). 
The second commonly used method is to examine the fusion or amalgamation 
coefficient (see glossary), which is the numerical value where each cluster joins 
together, and look for a sharp increase in value that indicates the joining together of two 
dissimilar clusters. 
"A large increase implies that dissimilar clusters have been merged; thus, the 
number of clusters prior to the merger is most appropriate. A major limitation 
with this approach is that there may be no large jumps in the coefficient, 
indicating that there may not be any natural groups in the data. In some cases, 
there may be several large jumps; this would be evidence for more than one 
natural set of clusters" (Ketchen et al., 1996. p 446). 
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Alternatively, a variant of the "scree test" (see glossary) used in factor analysis is 
employed by graphing the fusion coefficient on the y axis against the number of clusters 
on the x axis. 
"A marked flattening of the graph suggests that the clusters being combined are 
very dissimilar, thus the appropriate number of clusters is found at the `elbow' 
of the graph. Interpreting a graph, however, may be difficult; for example, the 
elbow may not be pronounced, indicating that there may not be any natural 
groups in the data. Alternatively, the graph may have more than one elbow, 
indicating that more than one natural set of clusters fit the data" (Ketchen et al., 
1996. p 446). 
Cool utilized the first of these methods as the stopping rule. 
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"A heuristic which is often applied relates to the behaviour of the criterion 
function at any step in the cluster procedure. It is suggested that a "large" 
increase in the criterion value points to a merging of very dissimilar clusters. 
When there is a large increase in the "diameter" or in the within group error sum 
of squares, this heuristic suggests that the existing clusters should not be merged 
and that the "natural groupings" are described by the clusters identified at the 
previous stage. Although this decision criterion is rather subjective, it will be 
applied in this study for lack of a decidedly better criterion" (Cool, 1985. p 169- 
170). 
Despite the above concerns expressed regarding the subjectivity traditionally associated 
with the selection of the "right" group structure, which may have contributed to some of 
the concerns expressed by critiques of strategic group analysis, such Barney and 
Hoskisson (1990) (for further detail see chapter 2), there are a number of mathematical 
methods available to identify the optimum group structure. Two of these are the upper 
tail rule (Everitt et al 2001) and the silhouette plot (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990). 
"The first is based on the relative sizes of the different fusion levels in the 
Dendrogram and is sometimes known as the upper tail rule. In detail the 
proposal is to select the number of groups corresponding to the first stage of the 
Dendrogram satisfying. 
a j+, 
> a+%a 
31 1 'Stopping rule'is the term given to stopping the clustering algorithm at the right point to indicate the 
data partitioning that best describes the natural clusters in the data. 
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where ao, a,, a2, ...., a, _1 
are the fusion levels corresponding to stages 
with n, n-1, ..., 1 clusters. The terms a and S. are respectively the mean and 
unbiased standard deviation of the j previous fusion levels, and k is a constant" 
(Brian S. Everitt et al., 2001. p 77). 
The suite of clustering algorithms presented by Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) 
provide a silhouette plot32 as a means of determining both the quality of clustering and 
the right number of clusters. The equivalent for Ward's method in this same suite is the 
banner plot which is a confirmation method used in this research. 
"A further diagnostic that is helpful for determining the number of groups which 
also operates on the basis of the dissimilarity matrix is the silhouette plot 
suggested by Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990)". (Brian S. Everitt et al., 2001. p 
104). 
The silhouette plot is useful for providing a measurement of the quality of clustering 
solution obtained where both the strength of individual clusters and the overall cluster 
solution can be compared. Table 5.7 illustrates Kaufman and Rousseeuw's (1990) 
quality index. 
Table 5.7 Interpretation of Silhouette Values. 
Silhouette Coefficient: s(i) Interpretation 
0.71-1.00 A strong structure has been found 
0.51-0.70 A reasonable structure has been found 
0.26-0.50 The structure is weak and could be artificial; 
please additional methods on this data set. 
Less than or equal to 0.25 No substantial structure has been found 
Source (Kaufman et al., 1990. p 88) NB: 
These figures are directly equivalent to the 
agglomerative coefficient (AC) used in the 
Banner Plot (Kaufman et al., 1990, p 213). 
32 For a full discussion on silhouette plots see Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990). 
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It is also suggested by Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990) that the silhouette plot provides 
a useful basis to compare not just between groups within a cluster analysis but also 
between algorithms. 
"Silhouette plots for cluster solutions obtained from different choices for the 
number of groups can be compared and the number of groups chosen so that the 
quality of the cluster solution is maximized. In this respect the average 
silhouette width - the average of the s (i) over the entire data set can be 
maximized to provide a more formal criterion for selecting the number of 
groups" (Brian S. Everitt et al., 2001. p 105). 
"When the clustering algorithm does not succeed in finding any "natural" 
clustering, the overall average silhouette width tends to become very low" 
(Kaufiran et al., 1990. p 98). 
It is recommended by Ketchen and Shook (1996) that in order to prevent mistakes and 
to validate cluster solutions, that a number of methods to identify the group structure 
should be used together and the results compared in order to validate and add weight to 
the chosen clustering solution. This opinion is shared by Everitt and is employed in this 
research - examination of the algorithm, graphing of the fusion coefficient, and the 
upper tail rule are all utilized. 
"In conclusion, it is advisable not to depend on a single rule for selecting the 
number of groups, but to synthesize the results of several techniques. (Brian S. 
Everitt et al., 2001. p 105) 
Emphasis has been placed on the topic of the correct number of groups in this chapter 
because the quality clustering of the clustering solution is critical to strategic group 
research. The ad hoc nature of some cluster solutions, lack of comparability, and 
equivocal results have led some researchers to doubt the validity of the approach 
(Barney et al., 1990; Hatten et al., 1987; Thomas et al., 1988). See chapter 2 for a fuller 
discussion of this point. 
205 
In order to establish a reliable and external validity, several ideas are proposed in the 
literature. 
"There are two ways to evaluate reliability. First,. researchers may perform a 
cluster analysis multiple times, changing algorithms and methods for addressing 
multicollinearity. The degree of consistency indicates reliability. Second, 
researchers may split a sample and analyze the two halves independently" 
(Ketchen et al., 1996. p 447). 
Each of the above methods were employed in this research so as to ensure reliability. To 
establish external validity a number of alternative ideas have been suggested. 
"If reliability has been demonstrated, attention can turn to external validity. This 
may be done by cluster analyzing both the sample of interest and a second, 
similar sample and then assessing the similarity of results" 
"Criterion-related validity can be assessed through significance tests with 
external variables. Such variables should be theoretically related to the clusters, 
but not used in defining clusters. Given the field's emphasis on defining the 
strategy-performance relationship, the external variables in strategy research are 
often performance measures. Significance tests with external variables offer a 
powerful tool to establish validity of a cluster solution because the technique 
uses a test statistic thereby avoiding having the researcher provide the meaning 
of results. . . we strongly advocate the use of this technique wherever possible" (Ketchen et al., 1996. p 447). 
Criterion related validity in the research in this thesis is assessed both through 
exploring the relative performance between strategic groups and by comparing other 
relevant variables not included in the cluster analysis. Performance measurement is an 
intrinsic part of this research, where one of the key issues is choice of measures that 
accurately reflect the performance of the UK company. More traditional measures, for 
example, return on sales, reflect the performance of the total company in all markets 
where results may be expected to be strongly skewed by performance in the US (see 
chapter 4 for further details). Accounting measures derived from firms' Annual Reports, 
such as return on sales (ROS) or return on capital employed (ROCE), were not therefore 
considered applicable as performance measures because they may reflect a firm's global 
performance rather than simply its performance in the UK. Therefore, following 
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previous research (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 1988), market share 
(SHARE) and weighted market share (WMS) in the UK were chosen as the most 
appropriate performance variables. 
Market share was measured as total firm sales divided by UK pharmaceutical sales. 
Weighted market share recognises that some companies may choose to dominate a few 
selected market segments and was measured by the sum of a firm's sales in therapy 
class i divided by the firm's total sales and multiplied by its sales of products in therapy 
class i divided by the total market sales of all firms in this segment (Martens, 1988, 
p249). The advantage of the weighted market share measure is that it recognises the use 
of niche strategies (Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988) 
A further performance measure used was DIFF, which reflects changes in companies' 
market positions over a given time period. This metric equates to the relative success of 
the company in improving its market position from a chosen base year versus the 
competition. Market positions were ranked in terms of total market share, retail and 
hospital market share. Differences were measured by a choice of analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and Kruskal Wallis non 
parametric analysis of variance tests as appropriate. These tests are so widely used in 
academic research that a detailed discussion of their respective methodology is not 
included here but the assumptions and limitations of each test will be included within 
the relevant results sections, which are detailed in the following chapters. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this research bears a number of similarities to, and is based upon, the 
earlier work on strategic groups in the US pharmaceuticals market (Cool 1985), but 
differs from this earlier research in a number of ways. The research in common with 
these earlier studies adopts a positivist approach and closely follows earlier work in 
order to aid comparison. This point is important because given the diversity of strategic 
group studies a number of researchers have chosen to use different methods of 
determining groups such as frontier benchmarking (Athanassopoulos, 2003, ), or multi- 
dimensional scaling (Pegels & Sekar, 1989, ) Alternatively, some researchers have used 
different clustering algorithms (Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2004a; Zuniga-Vicente et al., 
2004b, ). These methods were not employed in this research in order to aid direct 
comparison with previous strategic group studies of the pharmaceutical industry. 
The research follows Cool in taking as the unit of analysis each company's prescription 
pharmaceutical based activities. The approach also follows Cool in attempting to 
produce a classification of strategy within the pharmaceutical industry, as delineated by 
companies' strategic group membership. The underlying premise resembles Cool in 
hypothesizing that membership of different strategic groups will exert an effect on firm 
performance, i. e., strategy does matter in the pharmaceutical industry. The general 
methodology follows Cool in first identifying stable strategic time periods across a 
number of years, then using cluster analysis to reveal "natural" strategic groups. These 
strategic groups are then tested for statistical differences in terms of market share and 
weighted market share following Cool. 
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The principal differences between this research and Cool's study are first, location. This 
study is based in the UK, a decision that affects the variables which can be used to 
measure strategy. The nine variables used are effectively equivalent to those chosen by 
Cool, but a number of others were either not relevant, for example direct to consumer 
advertising of prescription medicines is not legal in the UK, or the data are not 
available, for example RDEFFS (see table 5.4). In some cases, for example PIEXP, a 
different form of proxy was chosen as more appropriate. 
The second major difference relates to sample. Cool excluded all but US firms and did 
not include merged firms in his sample. The methodology which Cool, and previous 
research (Bogner, 1991; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; Martens, 1988)adopted, assumes no 
change in sample throughout the time period. To exclude mergers from my research 
would be invalid because merged firms dominate the UK industry. Owing to the 
database used, IMS, it has been possible to construct the ten year trading histories of 
each company as they were at the year end 2002. But the nature of the IMS database, 
which only includes ten years of back data, prevented a longer time period study, which 
is another difference between the research and some earlier work (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 
1985). 
Another and major difference between this study and that of Cool reflects the nature of 
strategic group research today, where more caution is now applied in the use of cluster 
analysis. The paper by Ketchen and Shook (1996) highlights a number of flaws that 
previous research suffered. Hence the importance given in this chapter to addressing the 
key issues of variable selection, dealing with standardization and the inter relatedness of 
variables, and the choice of algorithm. Principal differences from Cool in this regard 
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include the use of both standardized and non standardized variables, the use of split 
samples, component scores, and a full natural variable set to assess the effect of 
multicollinearity. Use is made of different algorithms including Ward's method, as used 
by Cool, and nonhierarchical methods, allowing a reassignment of misplaced groupings 
to occur. 
In this process particular weight is afforded to identification of the natural group 
structure, where use is made not just of the traditional heuristic methods based on visual 
inspection of the Dendrogram and the fusion coefficient, but also the use of the upper 
tail rule to triangulate results. 
The next chapter reports the empirical results of the research, where Cool's method is 
utilized. Essentially three main steps are followed. First the ten year data set is tested to 
identify the presence of stable strategic time periods. Second, three alternative methods 
are used to determine strategic groups and the resulting cluster solutions are compared. 
Finally, the strategic groups are examined and the relationship between group 
membership and performance is tested. Figure 5.3 below summarizes the method 
followed when conducting the research reported below. 
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Figure 5.3 Flowchart of the Research Process 
Choose sample set 
33 Companies Chosen 
Choose Variable Set 
Test each adjacent year's 
nxp matrix [see text] 
Box M Test 
Identify SSTPs 1. Standardized & 
natural variables 
2. natural full set 
3. split set 
4. component 
Cluster firms using scores 
Ward's method Repeat for each and 
compare results. 
Examine 
Outliers & 10 
Remove Cluster firms 
using K Means Identify natural 
rou s usin u er (non p g pp g 
hierchical) tail, banner and 
heuristic methods 
Test for performance differences 
market share, weighted market share 
& differences in rank within and 
between groups 
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CHAPTER 6 
STRATEGIC GROUPS AND STABLE STRATEGIC TIME PERIODS IN THE 
UK PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first set of empirical results and follows the method used by 
Cool in his study of the US pharmaceutical industry (Cool, 1985). There are two 
reasons for adopting this approach. First, previous strategic group research suffers from 
limited similarity between studies. Factors such as the method adopted, and the 
variables chosen to identify groupings differ markedly between studies making reliable 
comparisons between studies difficult. Second, Cool's study stands as the benchmark 
for later strategic group studies and both Martens (1988) and Bogner (1991) base their 
method on that adopted by Cool (1985). Through choosing to adopt Cool's approach 
some comparison is possible between this research and that of earlier these studies. 
Despite the aim to link this research to that of previous studies, there are, however, a 
number of marked differences between the research reported here and the previous work 
of Cool (1985), Martens (1988) and Bogner (1991). This is because research does not 
stand still and with the benefit of more recent research (Ketchen et al., 1996; McGee, 
2003) some of the more obvious criticisms of the method adopted in these earlier 
studies are addressed. These changes relate to the use of more than one type of 
clustering method and addressing the issues of multicollinearity, as recommended by 
several authorities (Aldenderfer et al., 1984; Everitt et al., 2001; Ketchen et al., 1996; 
Punj et al., 1983). This research also differs from previous research (Bogner, 1991; 
Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988) by the inclusion within the sample of merged firms. (see 
chapter 5 for further details). 
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The first section of the empirical results reported in this chapter; addresses the 
identification of stable strategic time periods. Stable strategic time periods (SSTPs) 
denote a period of relative stability in the pattern of strategic choices taken by the firms 
included in the sample. This technique features in a number of previous longitudinal 
strategic group studies (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1988; Cool et al., 1987b; 
Fiegenbaum, 1987; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; Martens, 1988), where breaks between 
time periods have been attributed to the impact of environmental change. 
"Our selection of these strategic issues is supported by work on strategic groups 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Cool and Schendel (1987,1988) examine the 
industry after the enactment of the 1962 Food and Drug Act amendments and 
find four stable strategic time periods: 1963-1969,1970-1974,1975-1979, and 
1980-1982 (when their study ended). The break between 1974 and 1975 roughly 
corresponds with the changes in rules governing price advertising, and the break 
between 1979 and 1980 corresponds both with the emergence of biotechnology 
firms involved in recombinant DNA technology and with the passage of the 
R&D tax credit. Fiegenbaum, Sunharshan, and Thomas (1990), investigating the 
period 1974-1981, found three stable strategic time periods (SSTPs): 1974-1975, 
1976-1980, and 1981. These breaks also correspond with the strategic issues 
affecting the industry, which are presented here and in the work of Cool and 
Schendel (1988; 1987). "(Huff et al., 2000 p. 110) 
The stable strategic time periods found in this research are then compared to the key 
environmental factors such as generic percentages and parallel import penetration 
identified earlier as factors likely to influence firm strategies. (see chapter 3 for further 
details). 
The second section of this chapter describes the identification and validation of strategic 
groups found within each of the stable strategic time periods identified. Here, there are 
important differences between the research presented in this thesis and that of earlier 
studies (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 1988). These include: the 
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use of both divisive and agglomerative cluster analysis techniques to identify strategic 
groups, the use of a bootstrapping technique33 to establish the presence of natural 
clusters within the data, and the use of variables not included in the cluster analysis to 
provide external validity of the strategic groups identified. Tests of performance 
between strategic groups using market share [SHARE], weighted market share {WMS], 
and the difference [DIFF] in sales ranking across the time period enclosed within each 
SSTP are then reported. Two of these performance measures, market share and 
weighted market share, have been used in previous pharmaceutical based strategic 
group studies (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1988; Cool et al., 1987b; Martens, 
1988). The final section of this chapter reports the overall findings of this part of the 
empirical research and presents the conclusions that may be drawn from them. 
6.2 Establishing Stable Strategic Time Periods 
The method used in this research to identify stable strategic time periods (SSTPs) 
closely follows that used in previous research (Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). In 
summary, the technique relies upon comparing nxp matrices for each year, where n= 
the companies included within the data set arranged in rows and p= the variables used 
to represent strategic choices arranged in columns. The statistic used to compare the 
years is called the Box M test, which measures shifts in the variance-covariance 
matrices. 
The data were arranged in year sets. Each year consisted of 29 companies by 10 
variables. The variable set was: PHARMA, DRUGST, BRANGEN, MAINT, FOCUS, 
33 Bootstrapping is a "form of resampling in which the original data are repeatedly sampled with 
replacement for model estimation. Parameter estimates and standard errors are no longer calculated with 
statistical assumptions, but instead are based on empirical observations" (Hair et at, 1998.579), p 579. 
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FOREIGN, RDI, PRODSTR, PROFPROM, and SIZE. These variables were chosen to 
follow as closely as possible the original fifteen variable set used by Cool (1985). See 
table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1 A comparison between the variables used by Cool (1985) to identify 
strategic groups and the variables used to identify strategic groups in this research. 
US Strategic Group Variables UK Strategic Group Variables 
Cool 1985 
At the company At the company level 
PHARMA % prescription sales in PHARMA Pharmaceutical sales 
total domestic drug / total world sales 
sales 
DRUGST % drug store sales in DRUGST UK retail chemist 
total domestic drug sales/total UK sales 
sales of pharmaceuticals 
BRANGEN % branded generic BRANGEN This represents the 
Prescription sales in availability of 
total domestic cheaper substitutes, 
Prescription sales best represented in 
the UK by parallel 
import sales/total UK 
sales34 
COMMGEN % commodity generic Not used In the UK commodity 
sales in total domestic generics sales are not 
Prescription sales distinguishable by 
manufacturer 
MAINT % maintenance drug MAINT This variable 
sales in total domestic distinguishes chronic 
Prescription sales (long-term) from 
acute (short-term) 
therapy. 
Chronic therapy 
sales/total UK sales 
FOCUS (Prescription sales in 3 FOCUS (Prescription sales in 
largest therapeutic 3 largest therapeutic 
categories)/(total categories)/(total UK 
domestic Prescription Prescription sales) 
sales) 
FOREIGN % total firm sales FOREIGN A very problematic 
generated abroad variable. Annual 
[Cool's analysis was reports differ 
restricted to US based significantly in terms 
firms which all of how geographical 
complied with the sales are reported 
same accounting which makes 
procedures and accurate comparison 
distinguished home difficult. 
from foreign sales. 
34 When total sales is used as a denominator it refers to total UK pharmaceutical sales, unless otherwise 
stated. 
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RDS (total firm RDI (total firm R&D) 
R&D)/(Worldwide /(worldwide health 
health care sales) care sales) 
RDEFFS (No of New drug Not used This data attempts to 
applications measure the 
submitted)/(No of movement of product 
Investigational New submission through 
Drugs) the regulatory body 
and is not available in 
the UK, where 
frequently a 
European wide 
application is often 
sought with a 
different country as 
rapporteur. 
RDORIENT (NCEs Not used As above 
approved/NCEs 
submitted) 
PRODSTR (No of NCEs)/(total PRODSTR Sales of products less 
No of New Products) than 2 years old 
PROFPROM (total domestic PROFPROM (total UK 
professional professional 
promotion)/ (total promotion) / (total 
domestic Prescription UK Prescription 
sales) sales) 
CONSADV (total domestic N/A Direct to consumer 
consumer promotion) / advertising of 
(total domestic prescription products 
Prescription sales) is not allowed in the 
UK 
DISTR % of total domestic N/A In the UK national 
drug sales shipped pharmaceutical 
directly to drug stores wholesalers offer 
and hospitals twice daily delivery, 
therefore virtually all 
distribution is via a 
wholesaler for retail 
and hospital 
customers 
SIZE LN (total domestic SIZE LN (total domestic 
drug sales) drug sales 
Five variables used by Cool were not included in the study, either because they were 
inappropriate to the UK e. g. CONSADV and DISTR or because the data were 
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unavailable e. g. RDEFFS, RDORIENT and COMMGEN. (For further details on this 
point see Chapter 5. ) 
Each year's dataset was then compared against the adjacent year using Box's M test of 
equality of covariance matrices. 
"The test uses the generalized variances, that is, the determinants of the within- 
covariance matrices. It is very sensitive to non-normality. Thus, one may reject 
with the Box test because of a lack of multivariate normality, not because the 
covariance matrices are unequal. Therefore before employing the Box test, it is 
important to see whether the multivariate normality assumption is reasonable.... 
a check of marginal normality for the individual variables is probably sufficient" 
(Stevens, 2002. p 271). 
Tests for normality revealed that a number of the variables, principally BRANGEN, 
PHARMA, PROFPROM, DRUGST, FOCUS and FOREIGN, were significantly 
different from normal. This was attributed to two main reasons. First, the variables were 
ratios or percentages and not therefore distributed from minus to plus infinity, as 
assumed by a Normal Distribution (see glossary). Here as appropriate, a log x +1 
transformation was carried out as recommended by Stevens (2002). Second, the small 
sample size of 29 was considered an issue. The variables were, however, expected to 
show a central tendency and given a large sample would be expected to follow a normal 
distribution around the mean. Given that Box M requires reasonable normality and 
measures covariance symmetry, it was assumed that evidence of a central tendency 
should suffice. As Stevens points out, only reasonable normality is required and in the 
event of the normality assumption being violated a highly significant result would 
occur, i. e. two years would be given as significantly different when they were in fact 
homogeneous. In order to assess whether the assumption of an underlying broadly 
normal distribution was correct, each variable was bootstrapped. Figure 6.1, shows one 
218 
of the results, for the bootstrapped variable BRANGEN, which illustrates that the 
assumption of a broadly normal distribution appears justified. 
Figure 6.1 Bootstrap of BRANGEN variable 
BRANGEN 
N 
0 
N 
U, 
O 
U) 
0 
0 
6.4 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.2 
Value 
The full set of bootstrapped variables are shown in appendix A. All of these variables 
follow a broadly normal distribution, and appear to meet the Box M requirement for 
marginal normality, as suggested by Stevens (2002). This level of normality, based 
upon central tendency, is not sufficient, however, to allow the use of parametric 
significance tests, so the non-parametric alternative i. e. Kruskal Wallis was used to test 
for performance differences between the groups. This decision follows the approach 
used in previous research; "Since in about half the tests the assumptions of equal 
variances across the different treatments (i. e. firms) were violated, a parametric 
ANOVA was not performed. Its non-parametric counterpart the Kruskal-Wallis one- 
way analysis of variance, was therefore applied" (Cool & Schendel, 1988 p 216, ) 
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Cluster analysis does not make any assumptions with regard to normality or otherwise 
of the data clustered. 
Box's M tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance matrices of the 
dependent variables are equal across groups. When no difference was found between 
adjacent years the following procedures were carried out. 
1. The statistically similar years were summed and averaged then compared 
against the next year. 
2. This procedure was repeated in both directions e. g. a break was found between 
1997 and 1998 but no significant difference was identified between 1993,1994, 
1995,1996, and 1997. Therefore, to ensure that the period between 1993 and 
1997 was indeed homogeneous, in addition to testing 1993 versus 1994 and so 
on respectively, tests were also carried out between the summed average of 
1993 to 1996 and 1997 and between 1993 and the summed average of 1994 to 
1997. Also, all combinations of adjacent years in between were tested. 
SSTP 1 
This consisted of the period from 1993 to 1997 which differed significantly from 1998, 
as illustrated in table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices 1993 to 1998 
1993 - 94 1994 - 95 1995 - 96 1996 - 97 1997 - 98 
Box's M 52.115 33.770 14.070 29.559 255.900 
F 0.766 0.497 0.207 0.435 3.763 
Dfl 55 55 55 55 55 
Df2 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 
Sig 0.898 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.000 
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SSTP 2 
No significant difference was found between the years 1993 to 1997. A break occurred 
with the single year 1998, marking the start of a second SSTP. From 1998 to 2002 a 
second SSTP was found. The test results are shown in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices 1998 to 2002 
1998 - 99 1999 - 00 2000 - 01 2001 - 02 
Box's M 55.248 51.109 18.039 36.707 
F 0.812 0.751 0.265 0.540 
Dfl 55 55 55 55 
Df2 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 
Sig 0.838 0.913 1.000 0.998 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that no statistically significant differences existed between 
combinations of years within 1993 to 1997, thus confirming the first stable strategic 
time period. 
Table 6.4 Confirmation of First Stable Strategic Time Period [Ascending Years] 
1993/4 - 95 1993/5 - 96 1993/6 - 97 
Box's M 38.843 37.393 34.260 
F 0.571 0.550 0.504 
Dfl 55 55 55 
Df2 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 
Si 0.996 0.997 0.999 
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Table 6.5 Confirmation of First Stable Strategic Time Period [Descending Years] 
1996/7 - 95 1995/7 - 94 1994/7 - 93 
Box's M 26.353 37.253 57.661 
F 0.387 0.548 0.848 
Dfl 55 55 55 
Df2 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 
Sig 1.000 0.997 0.781 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7, show that no statistically significant differences existed between 
combinations of years within the period 1998 to 2002, thus confirming the second stable 
strategic time period. 
Table 6.6 Confirmation of Second Stable Strategic Time Period [Ascending Years] 
1998 - 1999/02 1999 - 2000/02 2000 - 2001/02 
Box's M 95.999 50.922 36.087 
F 1.412 0.749 0.531 
Dfl 55 55 55 
Df2 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 
Sig 0.024 0.916 0.998 
Here it is important to note that the figure of 0.024 is not regarded as significant for the 
Box M test, which means that the year (1998) is not seen to differ significantly from the 
years 1999 to 2002. The Box M test is highly sensitive and a significance level of 0.01 
is recommended. 
"It is very sensitive, especially to the presence of non-normal variables. A 
significance test of . 01 or 
less is used as an adjustment for the sensitivity of the 
statistic" (Hair et al., 1998. p 328). 
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Table 6.7 Confirmation of Second Stable Strategic Time Period [Descending 
Years] 
2002 - 1998/01 2001 - 1998/00 2000 - 1998/99 
Box's M 36.820 53.801 78.782 
F 0.541 0.791 1.158 
Dfl 55 55 55 
Df2 10127.118 10127.118 10127.118 
Si 0.998 0.868 0.198 
In the absence of any statistically significant difference between the years 1998 to 2002 
a second SSTP is confirmed. The above two sets of results indicate the presence of two 
stable strategic time periods within the UK pharmaceutical industry between the years 
1993 to 2002. The first strategic time period spanned from 1993 to 1997 and the second 
from 1998 to 2002. This result also supports the decision to accept the data as 
approximating to a normal distribution because, as Stevens points out, in the event of 
the normality assumption being violated we would expect a number of highly 
significant breaks, not the presence of two five year long stable periods as found here 
(Stevens, 2002). In the next section the environmental factors earlier identified (see 
Chapter 3) will be compared against each of these SSTPs. 
6.3 The Relationship Between Stable Strategic Time Periods and Environmental 
Variables. 
Figure 6.2 below illustrates the penetration of generic pharmaceuticals by PACT 
(chapter 3 for further details on PACT) category into the UK pharmaceutical industry 
from 1993 to 2002. The widespread use of generics is regarded as an important factor 
affecting pharmaceutical company strategy for three principle reasons. First, because 
prescribing habits of GPs in the UK were directly measured against their PACT figures 
and GPs were strongly incentivized to prescribe generically (see chapter 3 for further 
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details). Second, the availability of cheap generics rapidly eroded branded 
pharmaceutical sales leading to a rapid decline of company sales (see chapter 3 for 
further details). Third, health authority pharmaceutical advisers actively encouraged 
practices to regularly review their prescribing habits using PACT and to actively 
manage prescribing costs through the adoption of formularies and generic prescribing 
defaults on the practice computing system. 
The key in the above figure refers to the respective PACT categories: CV = 
cardiovascular products, GI = gastrointestinal products, R= respiratory products, M= 
musculoskeletal products, CNS = central nervous system products, infection products is 
the sixth main PACT category, and products not included in these six categories are 
classified as "all other" products. 
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Figure 6.2 Generic Penetration Across the PACT categories used to measure GP 
prescribing. 
The above figure illustrates a clear change at the end of 1997 with some categories, 
notably infection and CNS products, showing a sharp increase in generic usage. An 
exception to this upward trend is shown by the respiratory products category, which is a 
class of products strongly influenced by patient choice of the delivery device, or inhaler, 
in which they are packaged. These devices are not available as cheap generic 
substitutes. This environmental change therefore appears to agree with the two stable 
strategic time periods identified in the earlier analysis reported above. 
Figure 6.3 below shows the penetration of parallel imported packs (unit sales packs of 
generally 28 days supply) into the UK in the period 1993-2002. Parallel imports 
represent cheaper substitutes for expensive branded, i. e. patent protected products 
sourced from other European countries where prices are cheaper (see chapters 3 and 4 
for further details). 
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Figure 6.3 Parallel Imports Penetration Across the PACT categories used to 
measure GP prescribing. 
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Parallel imports exert an important effect on pharmaceutical strategy because their 
availability, which varies between companies (see Chapter 4) affects the revenues which 
companies obtain in return for their promotional activities. If a company creates demand 
for its product in the UK but the pack used to fill the prescription is sourced from 
another European country, the UK subsidiary loses the revenue. This problem is made 
all the more acute by the Department of Health clawback of excess pharmacy profits, 
which assumes that pharmacies actively source and dispense parallel imports and in 
effect forces pharmacists to do so (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for further details). 
The above figure 6.3 again shows a clear difference between the two stable strategic 
time periods 1993 - 1997 and 1998 - 2002, identified earlier. In particular there is a 
marked difference in the importation of respiratory and cardiovascular products. The 
increased usage of parallel imported respiratory products [R] possibly reflects the 
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demand for cheaper substitutes, in the absence of equivalent generics. The rapid uptake 
of cardiovascular products [CV] marks the effect of the health service frameworks for 
coronary heart disease and active encouragement for doctors to prescribe statins (see 
chapter 3 for a discussion on the windfall provided to selected pharmaceutical 
companies via the health service frameworks). In the next section, the strategic groups 
operating in each of these SSTPs are identified. 
6.4 Identification of strategic groups. 
Each of the variables was standardized to z scores, following Cool (1985), to ensure 
equality of weighting. The variables were then checked for cross correlation using 
Spearman's Rank Correlation35 because if two or more variables are strongly related the 
effect upon the cluster analysis of these variables is strengthened relative to the other 
variables, thus in effect altering the variable's weighting (for further discussion of this 
point see the previous chapter). These results are listed in table 6.8. 
33 Spearnman's Rank is a non parametric statistic and therefore makes no assumption regarding the 
underlying distribution of the data. 
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Table 6.8 Correlation Between Variables SSTP1 
A B C D E F G H I J 
BRANGEN 1.00 0.047 - - 0.411 0.027 0.541 -0.189 0.383 0.792 
-A 0.458 0.041 
DRUGST- - 1.00 0.352 - 0.016 -0.201 - 0.188 - - 
B 0.047 0.235 0.261 0.304 0.096 
FOCUS- - 0.352 1.00 0.071 - 0.157 - 0.363 - 
C 0.458 0.028 0.279 0.125 0.365 
FOREIGN - - 0.071 1.00 -0.043 0.137 -0.149 0.163 0.052 
-D 0.041 0.235 0.113 
MAINT- 0.411 0.016 - - 1.00 0.018 0.042 0.214 0.038 0.227 
E 0.028 0.113 
PHARMA 0.027 - 0.157 - 0.018 1.00 0.130 -0.058 0.513 0.087 
-F 0.201 0.043 
PRODSTR 0.541 - - 0.137 0.042 0.130 1.00 -0.208 0.466 0.788 
-G 0.261 0.279 
PROFPRO - 0.188 0.363 - 0.214 -0.058 - 1.00 - 
M- H 0.189 0.149 0.208 0.008 0.421 
RDI -I 0.383 - - 0.163 0.038 0.513 0.466 -0.008 1.00 0.460 
0.304 0.125 
SIZE -J 0.792 -0.96 - 0.052 0.227 0.087 0.788 -0.421 0.460 1.00 0.365 
The highest correlation between this set of variables was found to be 0.79 between 
BRANGEN and SIZE and 0.79 between PRODSTR and SIZE (Shown in bold). What is 
a significant correlation is a matter of judgement. This value falls below the figure of 
0.9 and above suggested as the point where multicollinearity between variables may 
become an issue, (Tabachnick et al., 2001. p 82). Therefore, all of this variable set may 
be included in each analysis. Nevertheless, two analyses were carried out in order to 
check for the effect of SIZE if included within the variable set. It may also be argued 
that SIZE represents an outcome of strategy rather than a strategic choice variable per 
se. 
The variables were clustered first using Ward's method, following Cool (1985). The 
distance metric employed was squared Euclidean distance (see glossary). A second 
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analysis was then run using ak means method, a nonhierarchical algorithm which takes 
the original data partitions as the starting point. This in effect rechecks the classification 
of cases to groups and has the advantage of being able to reallocate poorly classified 
cases. This approach is recommended to compensate for a weakness of hierarchical 
algorithms, which having combined two cases together cannot later reassign a poorly 
classified case (for further details see chapter 5). The entire clustering analysis was then 
repeated applying no transformation to the data in order to identify the effect of the z 
score transformation. 
The results are shown in table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 Initial Clustering Solution for SSTP1 Employing All Variables 
SSTP1 [Z Score] SSTP1 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 10 10 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Clustering Method Ward's Method Ward's Method 
Cluster 1: 3M AKZO RB BAY 
SOL PG 
3M PG RB AKZO BAY SOL 
Cluster 2: BAX AVE PHR JJ NVA 
Cluster 3: BI SAG MER IVX NOV ABB WYE YAM BMS SPL LIL 
MSD PFZ IVX NOV BAX ROC 
Cluster 4: LUN AZ GSK SS BI SAG MER LUN 
Cluster 5: SPL YAM 
Cluster 6: ABB JJ WYE AVE PHR 
NVA ROC AZ GSK 
Cluster 7: BMS MSD LIL PFZ SS 
The key to company names has been provided earlier in the thesis but is repeated here, 
in table 6.10 for the reader's convenience. 
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Table 6.10 List of companies and their abbreviations included in this analysis 
ABBREVIATION COMPANY 
3M Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing 
ABB Abbott Laboratories 
AKZO Akzo Nobel 
AVE Aventis 
AZ Astra Zeneca 
BAX Baxter 
BAY Bayer 
BI Boehringer In elheim 
BMS Bristol Myers Squibb 
CELL Celltech 
EIS Eisai 
GSK Glaxo Smith Kline 
NX Ivax 
JJ Johnson & Johnson 
LIL Lilly 
LUN Lundbeck 
MER E Merck 
MSD Merck Sharpe and Dohme 
NOV Novo 
NVA Novartis 
PFZ Pfizer 
PG Proctor & Gamble 
PHR Pharmacia 
RB Reckitt Benkisser 
ROC Roche 
SAG Schering AG 
SHI Shire Pharmaceuticals 
SOL Solvay 
SPL Schering lough 
SS Sanofi Synthelabo 
TAK Takeda 
WYE Wyeth 
YAM Yamanouchi 
The Dendrogram illustrating each of these clustering processes is provided in figures 
6.4 and 6.5 respectively. The most closely similar companies are adjacent to each other 
on the Dendrogram and the most typical company within each group or group exemplar 
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is underlined. The distance from left to right represents the value of the fusion 
coefficient36. Shading is used to provide a clearer contrast between clusters. 
Figure 6.4 Ward's Method Dendrogram: SSTP1 Data Set Standardized to Z 
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36 The fusion or amalgamation coefficient is the numerical value at which various cases merge to form a 
cluster (Aldenderfer et al.. 1984. p 54). page 54. 
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Figure 6.5 Ward's Method Dendrogram: SSTP1 Data Set - No Transformation 
An alternative approach to demonstrating the agglomeration process is to use a banner 
plot. This plot for all variables employed in SSTPI using Wards method is shown in the 
below figure 6.6 
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Figure 6.6 Ward's Method Banner Plot: SSTPI Data Set - No Transformation 
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Here, an agglomerative coefficient of 0.92, out of a possible maximum of 1.00 shows 
that a very strong structure is present. 
"The overall width of the banner is very important because it gives an idea of the 
amount of structure that has been found by the algorithm. Indeed, when the data 
possess a clear cluster structure, the between-cluster dissimilarities (and hence 
the highest level) will become much larger than the within-cluster 
dissimilarities, and as a consequence the black lines in the banner become 
longer" (Kaufman et al., 1990). "Thus, an agglomerative coefficient of close to 
1, means that a very clear clustering structure has been identified" (Kaufman et 
al., 1990, p. 213). 
This nested tree structure suggests that several different groups may be present in the 
data. The key question is how to determine the right number of clusters? The 
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appropriate tree partition can be used as the starting point for the k means algorithm. 
The approach used in previous research (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Guedri, 1998; 
Martens, 1988) was to either subjectively examine the tree and to identify a significant 
jump in the agglomeration or fusion coefficient. Alternatively, the approach has been to 
graph the number of clusters implied by a hierarchical tree against the fusion 
coefficient. A marked flattening of the graph suggests that no new information is 
portrayed by the following mergers of clusters, while a sharp increase in the fusion 
coefficient indicates that two sharply dissimilar clusters have been joined. The fusion 
graphs for the cluster analyses based upon the application of Ward's method to the 
transformed and non transformed data are shown in figures 6.6 and 6.7 respectively. 
The fusion values are available in appendix A. 
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Figure 6.6 Plot of Fusion Process for Standardized Data - SSTP1 
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Figure 6.7 Plot of Fusion Process for Non Standardized Data - SSTP1 
This process of "cutting the tree" has been criticized as subjective providing researchers 
with the ability to choose what best suits their purpose. (Note the significant difference, 
in figure 6.7 above between the distance between the 3 and 4 cluster solutions as 
compared to the distance between the 4 and 5 cluster solutions). An alternative approach 
is to use a significance test. The Best cut upper tail method is used here (see glossary). 
The results of this test comparing both standardized and non-standardized data are 
shown in table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 Upper tail test for the right cluster solution 
Data Standardized to Z Scores Non Standardized Data 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.16 16.71 2 clusters 4.78 25.27 
3 clusters 2.53 13.41 3 clusters 1.15 6.07 
4 clusters 1.49 7.89 4 clusters 0.77 4.05 
5 clusters 1.15 6.1 
6 clusters 0.76 4.03 
7 clusters 0.59 3.13 
Best cut applies significance tests to the series of fusion values in the current tree. The 
table shows the proposed cluster partitions in the current tree, which are significant. The 
partition corresponding to the largest number of clusters, which is significant at the 5% 
level, is listed last. (Wishart, 2004 pp. 45-46) 
The upper tail test and the agglomeration values suggest a7 and 4 cluster solution, 
respectively, for the z scored and non standardized data. These tree partitions were then 
used as seed points for the next step in the clustering procedure. This is because the k 
means clustering method requires a starting point from which to optimize the solution. 
These starting points can either be the cluster centroids (see glossary) or the tree 
partitions. 
As previously discussed, a drawback with Ward's method is that once combined within 
a cluster that situation cannot be reversed. In order to correct for this, a second cluster 
analysis was then carried out using a non-hierarchical k means clustering method37. This 
is probably the most widely applied non-hierarchical clustering technique, which has 
the advantage that every time a firm changes between clusters the centroids of both its 
"The k means algorithm attempts to minimise the average squared distance between clusters, yielding so 
called centroids (Kaufman et al., 1990). 
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old and new cluster are recalculated (Kaufman et al., 1990). The use of this second 
clustering method in effect reconfirms the clustering solution ensuring that any 
inappropriately clustered case is reassigned. These results are shown in table 6.12. 
Table 6.12 K Means Clustering Solution for SSTP1 Employing All Variables 
SSTP1 [Z Score] SSTP1 [No Transformation 
Number of Variables 10 10 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Clustering Method K Means K Means 
Cluster 1: 3M AKZO RB SOL 
PG 
3M PG RB AKZO BAY 
SOL 
Cluster 2: BAX AVE PHR JJ NVA 
Cluster 3: BI SAG MER IVX 
NOV 
ABB WYE YAM BMS SPL 
LIL MSD PFZ NOV BAX 
ROC 
Cluster 4: LUN IVX AZ GSK SS BI SAG 
MER LUN 
Cluster 5: SPL YAM 
Cluster 6: AVE PHR NVA ROC 
AZ GSK 
Cluster 7: BAY ABB JJ WYE 
BMS MSD LIL PFZ SS 
The following changes are observed with the clustering solution based upon z scores 
(Comparing tables 6.9 and 6.12 respectively). 
1. Bayer is removed from cluster 1 and reassigned to cluster 7. 
2. Abbott and Johnson & Johnson are moved from cluster 6 to cluster 7. 
Aside from these changes, there are a number of marked similarities between the two 
solutions. 
1. Clusters 2,3,4 and 5 are identical. 
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2. Baxter and Lundbeck are clustered separately. These were not, however, 
regarded as outliers and removed from the analysis because, as will be 
described in more detail later, these companies appear to operate a distinct 
and different strategy within the UK pharmaceutical market. 
Comparing the two cluster solutions based upon non standardized data, the 
following observations can be made. 
1. There is only one change of position - Ivax is moved from cluster 3 
to cluster 4. Aside from this, the two clustering solutions are 
identical. 
2. There are no outliers or single firm groups. 
What is obvious is that relative scale effects do appear to exert a marked effect because 
the cluster analysis based upon transformed data suggests a7 cluster solution as against 
a4 cluster solution without transformation. Before addressing the question of which is 
the most robust solution, the same analysis, excluding the SIZE variable, is compared in 
the following tables 6.13 and 6.14. 
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Table 6.13 Initial Clustering Solution for SSTP1 Excluding SIZE Variable 
SSTP1 [Z Score] SSTP 1 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 10 10 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Clustering Method Ward's Method Ward's Method 
Cluster 1: 3M RB AKZO BAY 
SOL PG 
3M PG RB AKZO BAY SOL 
Cluster 2: BAX AVE PHR JJ NVA 
Cluster 3: BI SAG MER IVX 
NOV 
ABB WYE YAM BMS SPL LIL 
MSD PFZ IVX NOV BAX ROC 
Cluster 4: LUN AZ GSK SS BI SAG MER LUN 
Cluster 5: SPL YAM 
Cluster 6: ABB JJ WYE AVE 
PHR NVA ROC AZ 
GSK 
Cluster 7: BMS MSD LIL PFZ SS 
Table 6.14 K Means Clustering Solution for SSTP1 Excluding SIZE Variable 
SSTP1 [Z Score SSTP1 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 10 10 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Clustering Method K Means K Means 
Cluster 1: 3M RB AKZO SOL 
PG 
3M PG RB AKZO BAY SOL 
Cluster 2: BAX AVE PHR JJ NVA 
Cluster 3: BI SAG MER IVX 
NOV 
ABB WYE YAM BMS SPL LIL 
MSD PFZ NOV BAX ROC 
Cluster 4: LUN NX AZ GSK SS BI SAG MER 
LUN 
Cluster 5: SPL YAM 
Cluster 6: JJ AVE PHR NVA ROC 
AZ GSK 
Cluster 7: BAY ABB WYE BMS 
MSD LIL PFZ SS 
The effect of removing SIZE from the cluster solution appears minimal. Johnson and 
Johnson remains assigned to group 6, rather than moved into group 7 within the 
transformed data set; but aside from this there are no changes. Therefore, in the interests 
of parsimony and to remove any doubt of multicollinearity the second clustering 
solution excluding SIZE was retained. 
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The issue now is which of the two cluster solutions is the most robust? Here the 
methods used to validate cluster solutions are, first, to test for significance on the 
variables used to create the clusters. See table 6.15 for the group means of each of the 
variables. 
Table 6.15 Mean values for each variable by cluster 
Variable Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Clusters Cluster6 Cluster? 
BRANGEN 4.4 0 2.28 5.64 4.65 7.96 8.7 
DRUGST 90.85 28.45 81.99 50.73 83.93 79.77 88.18 
FOCUS 87.51 58.36 89.48 100 75.96 57.68 82.43 
FOREIGN 52.59 48.07 72.55 100 36.51 66.12 43.34 
MAINT 0.33 0.06 0.22 1 0.03 0.36 0.72 
PHARMA 8.77 100 100 100 89.08 61.56 96.27 
PRODSTR 4.81 1.23 6.47 3.99 5.09 8.44 6.49 
PROFPROM 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.04 0.05 
RDI 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.12 
This approach has been widely employed in previous strategic group research, Cool 
(1985) for example, used one way analysis of variance to test between cluster means. 
Here the Kruskal-Wallis test, the non-parametric alternative to a one way between- 
groups analysis of variance is used. The results of this test are shown in table 6.16. 
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Table 6.16 Kruskal-Wallis test on variables between groups - SSTP1 
Clustering Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized variables 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Variable Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square Df Sig 
BRANGEN 20.668 6 0.002 2.484 3 0.478 
DRUGST 12.792 6 0.046 6.803 3 0.078 
FOCUS 16.183 6 0.013 12.346 3 0.006 
FOREIGN 17.875 6 0.007 21.447 3 0.000 
MAINT 15.630 6 0.016 0.155 3 0.985 
PHARMA 20.808 6 0.002 20.444 3 0.000 
PRODSTR 21.282 6 0.002 11.936 3 0.008 
PROFPROM 11.819 6 0.066 0.379 3 0.944 
RDI 15.599 6 0.016 13.518 3 0.004 
Taken on face value both cluster solutions appear valid in terms of sorting clusters into 
significantly different groups. However, as pointed out by Aldenderfer and Blashfield 
(1984), cluster analysis methods, by definition, will separate entities into clusters that 
have virtually no overlap along the variables being used to create the clusters. 
"Significance tests for differences among the clusters along these variables 
should always be positive. Since these tests are positive, regardless of whether 
clusters exist in the data or not, the performance of these tests is useless at best 
and misleading at worst"(Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 65). 
This test, which has frequently been used in previous strategic group research, must 
therefore be disregarded, but it does illustrate that the clustering algorithm has 
performed as expected. 
A second validation technique involves testing whether the same cluster solution can be 
reliably replicated across a series of data sets. Here the aim is to demonstrate the 
validity of the clustering solution. 
"If a cluster solution is repeatedly discovered across different samples from the 
same general population, it is plausible to conclude that this solution has some 
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generality. A cluster solution that is not stable is unlikely to have general utility" 
(Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 65). 
The clustering data were therefore replicated using a bootstrapping tree validation 
technique and the clustering solution compared. This tree validation technique compares 
a tree obtained for a given dataset with the family of trees generated by random 
permutation of the same data or the associated proximity matrix. 
"A distribution is obtained for the set of trees from the randomly permuted data 
and a confidence interval is constructed around the mean. The tree for the given 
data is then compared with this confidence interval and significant departures 
from random are identified. This procedure seeks to reject the underlying 
hypothesis that the data is randomly distributed. It searches for tree sections that 
correspond to the greatest departure from randomness, and in trials when 
random data were evaluated it reassuringly reported no significant clusters". 
(Wishart, 2004 p 46) 
The results of this bootstrap validation technique are shown in figures 6.8 and 6.9 for 
the standardized and non standardized data sets, respectively. The bootstrap results 
figures can be found in appendix A. 
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Figure 6.8 Bootstrap Tree Validation of Standardized Data 
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The solid area at the base of the above figure shows the fusion values that correspond to 
the actual data as presented. Above this solid area, the area encompassed by the next 
two lines show the range of fusion values obtained from 120 trials of randomising the 
data; The central line within this latter area represents the mean of the fusion values for 
each number of clusters, obtained from the random trials. The width encompassed by 
the two lines either side of this central line is 1 standard deviation about the mean. 
Finally looking at the base of the figure directly between the 10 and 7 clusters points on 
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the scale a further area above the first solid area but below the two lines either side of 
the standard deviation line can be seen. This area shows where the fusion values for the 
original data depart significantly from random at the 5% level. (Wishart, 2004). 
Finally the above figure shows that the most significant departure from random occurs 
at 8 clusters, but 4 of the total number of partitions within our data are significant. 
Figure 6.9 Bootstrap Tree Validation of Non Standardized Data 
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In the above figure the 7 cluster solution departs most significantly from random, but 3 
of the total number of partitions differ significantly at the 5% level. 
This replication technique in effect checks the internal consistency of the solution. It 
does not support the validity of the clusters formed but does confirm that a set of natural 
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breaks occur in the data. The clusters that we have discovered in the data appear to be 
natural clusters. But validity of the clusters requires considering whether they mean 
anything in practice when applied to meaningful variables that were not used to 
generate the clustering solution. Here the following variables were used to test the 
validity of the clusters. 
SIZE. This was excluded from the second analysis and is a variable that was 
often used in the original 10 studies as a proxy for strategy. 
2. SHARE. If strategic groups accurately classify strategy and strategy matters in 
the UK pharmaceutical industry then we might expect differences in 
performance between groups. 
3. WMS. Weighted market share takes into account niche strategies. (See Chapter 
5 for further information on this point). 
4. ACUTE. This variable measures the importance of non-chronic therapies such 
as antibiotics and injectables. 
5. LIC. This represents the importance of in-licensed products within the 
company's product portfolio. 
6. OTH. This represents the importance of products marketed by the company 
which are not the product of their original research, nor subject to a licensing 
agreement, for example marketing an off-patent drug in a new delivery system, 
such as the Oxis Turbohaler marketed by Astra Zeneca. 
7. MERGER. This is a categorical variable where 1 indicates a company that has 
taken part in no merger activity during the study period, 2a company that is the 
product of one merger, and 3a serial merger candidate. 
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8. NATION. This is a categorical variable denoting each company's country of 
origin. 
9. ADV. Company spend on advertising. 
10. DET. The number of unit details (sales calls) conducted by the company. 
The Kruskal Wallis test was used to measure the differences between groups and the 
results of this external validation are presented in table 6.17. 
Table 6.17 Kruskal-Wallis test on external variables between groups - SSTP1 
Clustering Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized 
variables 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Variable Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
SIZE 23.917 6 0.001 5.885 3 0.117 
SHARE 23.945 6 0.001 6.191 3 0.103 
WMS 14.670 6 0.023 2.040 3 0.564 
ACUTE 12.376 6 0.054 2.382 3 0.497 
LIC 9.697 6 0.138 4.727 3 0.193 
OTH 6.108 6 0.411 0.498 3 0.919 
MERGER 21.255 6 0.002 10.444 3 0.015 
NATION 7.350 6 0.290 2.970 3 0.406 
ADV 18.632 6 0.005 8.605 3 0.035 
DET 17.885 6 0.007 4.780 3 0.189 
The results of this test are that both cluster solutions achieve external validation. The 4 
cluster solution based upon non standardized data achieved significance on two strategic 
variables, the use of merger and advertising respectively. In contrast, the 7 cluster 
solution appears to provide a clearer insight into strategic choice within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry during the period 1993 to 1997 with six out of the ten variables 
(SIZE, SHARE, WMS, MERGER, ADV and DET) achieving significance and ACUTE 
achieving a significance value of 0.054. 
The benefits of this external validation through the use of relevant variables are; 
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"The power of external validation is that it directly tests the generality of a 
cluster solution against relevant criteria.. . the value of a cluster solution that has 
successfully passed an external validation is much greater than a solution that 
has not"(Aldenderfer et al., 1984, p 66). 
The stronger of these two solutions is therefore selected to classify the pattern of 
strategic choices within the UK pharmaceutical industry for the first stable strategic 
time period. The strategic groupings for SSTP1 are therefore as presented in table 6.18. 
Table 6.18 Strategic groups within the UK pharmaceutical industry 1993-1997 
SSTPI 
Time Period 1993 - 1997 
Number of Strategic 7 
Groups 
SG1: 3M RB AKZO SOL PG 
SG 2: BAX 
SG 3: BI SAG MER IVX 
NOV 
SG 4: LUN 
SG 5: SPL YAM 
SG 6: JJ AVE PHR NVA ROC AZ GSK 
BAY ABB WYE 
SG 7: BMS MSD LIL PFZ 
SS 
We now turn to the second stable strategic time period, 1998 - 2002. 
Here, precisely the same procedure was followed as described above. First, the variables 
were checked for multicollinearity using Spearman's Rank. These results are presented 
in table 6.19. 
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Table 6.19 Correlation Between Variables SSTP2 
A B C E F G I J 
BRANGEN -A 1.000 0.296 -0.029 0.498 0.288 0.549 0.489 0.693 
DRUGST -B 0.296 1.000 0.798 0.236 -0.024 -0.201 0.011 0.078 
FOCUS -C -0.029 0.798 1.000 0.118 -0.001 -0.486 -0.078 -0.245 
MAINT -E 0.498 0.236 0.118 1.000 0.050 0.098 0.148 0.210 
PHARMA -F 0.288 -0.024 -0.001 0.050 1.000 0.439 0.799 0.415 
PRODSTR -G 0.549 -0.201 -0.486 0.098 0.439 1.000 0.437 0.805 
RDI -I 0.489 0.011 -0.078 0.148 0.799 0.437 1.000 0.419 
SIZE -J 0.693 0.078 -0.245 0.210 0.415 0.805 0.419 1.000 
This dataset presents more problems than the SSTP1 data set. The effected variables 
are shown in bold For the purpose of this exercise a figure in excess of 0.75 was 
arbitrarily chosen as a cut off point. This falls well below Tabachnick and Fidells figure 
of 0.90, although opinions do vary on this point; 
"... there is no universally accepted rule of thumb concerning how high is too 
high. Still, most investigators would probably agree that correlations of r> . 80 
between predictors should be considered very problematic" (Licht, 2000. p 45). 
Three interactions therefore present a problem. The first is the 0.798 correlation 
between DRUGST and FOCUS, the second the 0.799 correlation between PHARMA 
and RDI, and finally the 0.805 correlation between SIZE and PRODSTR. The decision 
was therefore made to run two sets of analyses and compare the results. This approach 
is suggested by a number of authorities (Aldenderfer et al., 1984; Ketchen et al., 1996; 
Punj et al., 1983). Each set of analysis was then repeated for non standardized variables. 
The two variable sets are shown in table 6.20. 
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Table 6.20 Variable Set for SSTP2 Analysis 
Full Set Variable set 1 Variable set 2 
BRANGEN BRANGEN BRANGEN 
DRUGST DRUGST - 
FOCUS - FOCUS 
FOREIGN FOREIGN FOREIGN 
MAINT MAINT MAINT 
PHARMA PHARMA - 
PRODSTR - PRODSTR 
PROFPROM PROFPROM PROFPROM 
RDI - RDI 
SIZE SIZE - 
6.5 SSTP2 Variable Set 1 
As before, each set of variables was initially clustered using Ward's method. Two sets 
of analyses were carried out for each of the two variable sets, once with variables 
standardized to unit variance by means of z scores and once with non standardized 
variables. The results of this initial cluster analysis for the first variable set, excluding 
FOCUS, PRODSTR and RDI, are shown in table 6.21. 
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Table 6.21 Initial Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Variable Set 1 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 7 7 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Clustering Method Ward's Method Ward's Method 
3M AKZO RB PG 3M RB PG SOL BAY AKZO 
Cluster 1: SOL ABB JJ MSD 
Cluster 2: LUN SPL YAM 
AVE NVA MER ROC AZ 
LUN BI 
Cluster 3: BAX BAX 
Cluster 4: IVX NOV SAG 
BMS SPL LIL WYE PFZ YAM 
GSK SAG IVX NOV 
Cluster 5: 
ABB BAY JJ AVE PHR SS NVA BI ROC MER 
AZ GSK WYE BMS 
Cluster 6: LIL MSD PFZ 
Cluster 7: PHR SS 
Figure 6.9 shows the Dendrogram for the Z scored data of variable set 1. The 
Dendrogram for the non standardized data is illustrated in Figure 6.10. The cluster 
solutions for the standardized and non standardized data, provided by the best cut test 
are again shown. 
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Figure 6.9 Dendrogram of clustering solution for variable set 1 [standardized data] 
achieved by Ward's Method. 
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Figure 6.10. Dendrogram of clustering solution for variable set 1 [non standard 
data] achieved by Ward's Method 
Figure 6.11 below, shows a banner plot of this same set of data. Here an agglomerative 
coefficient of 0.89 indicates that a very strong structure is again present within the data. 
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Figure 6.11 Banner Plot of clustering solution for variable set 1 [non standard 
data] achieved by Ward's Method 
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As previously, examination of the fusion coefficient together with the best cut upper tail 
significance test was used to determine the correct number of groups. The fusion graphs 
are illustrated in figures 6.11 and 6.12 and the upper tail test results are presented in 
table 6.22. (See appendix A for the agglomeration schedules for each of the fusion 
graphs. ) 
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Figure 6.11 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for 
standardized data, variable set 1 
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Figure 6.12 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for non 
standardized data, variable set 1 
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The disparity between adjacent cluster solutions is particularly striking for the 5 cluster 
solution shown in figure 6.12. 
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Table 6.22 Upper tail test for the right cluster solution applied to variable set 1 
Data Standardized to Z Scores Non Standardized Data 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.45 18.25 2 clusters 3.47 18.37 
3 clusters 2.4 12.68 3 clusters 3.16 16.72 
4 clusters 1.25 6.59 4 clusters 1.08 5.71 
5 clusters 1.16 6.12 5 clusters 0.69 3.64 
6 clusters 0.86 4.53 
7 clusters 0.53 2.81 
These initial tree partitions were then used as the starting point for ak means clustering 
algorithm. The results obtained through this second clustering procedure are presented 
in table 6.23. 
Table 6.23 K Means Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Variable Set 1 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 7 7 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Clustering Method K Means K Means 
3M AKZO RB PG 3M RB PG SOL BAY AKZO 
Cluster 1: SOL ABB JJ MSD 
Cluster 2: LUN SPL YAM 
AVE NVA MER ROC AZ 
LUN BIGSK 
Cluster 3: BAX BAX 
Cluster 4: IVX NOV SAG 
BMS SPL LIL WYE PFZ YAM 
SAG IVX NOV 
ABB BAY JJ AVE 
Cluster 5: BI ROC MER PHR SS 
NVA AZ GSK WYE 
Cluster 6: BMS LIL MSD PFZ 
Cluster 7: PHR SS 
The changes delivered by this second clustering procedure are relatively minor. For the 
standardized data one change in membership is made with Novartis moving from 
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cluster 5 to cluster 6. With the non standardized data there was also one change with 
Glaxo Smith Kline moving from group 4 to group 2. These minor changes suggest that 
a strong cluster membership has been achieved. The same procedure was then repeated 
for Variable set 2. 
6.6 SSTP2 Variable Set 2 
The results of this initial cluster analysis for the first variable set, excluding DRUGST, 
PHARMA and SIZE are shown in table 6.24. 
Table 6.24 Initial Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Variable Set 2 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 7 7 
Number of Clusters 6 3 
Clustering Method Ward's Method Ward's Method 
3M NOV BAX IVX RB BAY 
3M AKZO SOL MSD SAG AVE NVA GSK Cluster 1: YAM ABB BMS LIL PFZ SPL WYE 
JJ SOL PG YAM 
Cluster 2: LUN 
AKZO MER AZ BI ROC 
LUN 
Cluster 3: BAX IVX RB PHR SS 
ABB BAY BMS JJ 
Cluster 4: MER MSD PG LIL 
PFZ 
AVE NVA ROC AZ 
Cluster 5: GSK BI WYE NOV 
SAG SPL 
Cluster 6: PHR SS 
The clustering results for the second set of variables reveal a marked change in 
structure, particularly for the non standardized variables where the number of groups 
found dropped from 5 to 3. As before, the best cut upper tail significance test and 
examination of the change in fusion coefficient were used to determine the correct 
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number of groups. The fusion process is illustrated in figures 6.13 and 6.14 and the 
results of the upper tail significance test are presented in table 6.25. 
Figure 6.13 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for 
standardized data, variable set 2 
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Figure 6.14 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for 
standardized data, variable set 2 
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Table 6.25 Upper tail test for the right cluster solution applied to variable set 2 
Data Standardized to Z Scores Non Standardized Data 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.5 18.53 2 clusters 4.68 24.77 
3 clusters 2.2 11.63 3 clusters 1.76 9.33 
4 clusters 1.42 7.54 
5 clusters 1.12 5.92 
6 clusters 0.71 3.73 
The appropriate tree partitions were then used as the starting point for ak means 
algorithm. These results are presented in table 6.26. 
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Table 6.26 K Means Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Variable Set 2 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 7 7 
Number of Clusters 6 3 
Clustering Method K Means K Means 
3M AKZO SOL 3M NOV BAX IVX RB BAY 
Cluster 1: YAM PG MSD SAG ABB BMS LIL PFZ SPL WYE JJ SOL PG YAM 
Cluster 2: LUN 
AVE NVA GSK AKZO MER 
AZ BI ROC LUN 
Cluster 3: BAX IVX RB NOV PHR SS 
ABB BAY BMS JJ 
Cluster 4: MER MSD LIL PFZ 
AVE NVA ROC AZ 
Cluster 5: GSK BI WYE SAG 
SPL 
Cluster 6: PHR SS 
This second clustering produces a few changes to the initial solution. For the 
standardized data set Proctor and Gamble moves from cluster 4 to cluster 1 and Novo is 
moved from cluster 5 to cluster 3. With the non standardized data set Aventis, Novartis 
and Glaxo are moved from cluster 1 to cluster 2. The greater change observed with this 
clustering process may suggest a less stable clustering solution. 
Given the fact that the two sets of variables do not produce a very close solution, it was 
then decided to repeat the results with the full data set using principal component 
analysis. This approach is recommended as an alternative way to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity (Ketchen et al., 1996; Punj et al., 1983). As before this procedure was 
carried out using both standardized and non standardized data. Five principal 
components were found to represent 89% of the data set. (For the principal component 
scores, see appendix A. ) 
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6.7 SSTP2 Employing a full set of variables 
The principle component scores for the standardized and non standardized data set were 
then first clustered using Ward's method. The results of this procedure are shown in 
table 6.27. 
Table 6.27 Initial Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Full Variable Set and 
Principle Component Analysis 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 5 5 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Clustering Method Ward's Method Ward's Method 
3M AKZO PG SOL 3M RB PG SOL BAY ABB 
Cluster 1: RB JJ MSD AKZO 
Cluster 2: IVX NOV YAM 
AVE NVA GSK SAG AZ BI 
LUN MER ROC BAX 
Cluster 3: LUN BMS 
SPL LIL WYE PFZ 
YAM IVX NOV 
ABB BAY JJ MER 
Cluster 4: AVE NVA ROC BI PHR SS 
SAG SPL 
AZ GSK BMS LIL 
Cluster 5: WYE MSD PFZ 
Cluster 6: PHR SS 
Cluster 7: BAX 
As before, the best cut upper tail significance test and examination of the change in 
fusion coefficient were used to determine the correct number of groups. The fusion 
process is illustrated in figures 6.15 and 6.16 and the results of the upper tail 
significance test are presented in table 6.28. 
262 
Figure 6.15 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for 
standardized data, full variable set SSTP2 based on principal components 
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Figure 6.16 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for non 
standardized data, full variable set SSTP2 based on principal components 
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Table 6.28 Upper tail test for the right cluster solution applied to full variable set 
SSTP2. [Based upon principal components] 
Data Standardized to Z Scores Non Standardized Data 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 4.12 21.8 2 clusters 4.21 22.29 
3 clusters 1.98 10.5 3 clusters 2.11 11.18 
4 clusters 0.88 4.65 4 clusters 1.29 6.81 
5 clusters 0.74 3.93 
6 clusters 0.55 2.91 
7 clusters 0.53 2.82 
The tree partitions identified through this process were then employed as seed points for 
the k means algorithm; these results are shown in table 6.29. 
Table 6.29 K Means Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Full Variable Set 
and Principal Component Analysis. 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 5 5 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Clustering Method K Means K Means 
3M AKZO PG SOL 3M RB PG SOL BAY ABB JJ 
Cluster 1: RB MSD AKZO 
Cluster 2: IVX NOV YAM 
AVE NVA GSK SAG AZ BI 
LUN MER ROC BAX 
Cluster 3: LUN BMS SPL LIL WYE PFZ YAM IVX NOV 
ABB BAY JJ MER 
Cluster 4: AVE NVA ROC BI PHR SS 
SAG SPL BMS 
AZ GSK LIL WYE 
Cluster 5: MSD PFZ 
Cluster 6: PHR SS 
Cluster 7: BAX 
The use of principal components produced a7 cluster solution for the standardized data, 
which agrees with the 7 cluster first variable set in terms of 3 out of the 7 clusters, 
although the membership of the other 4 clusters is not identical; 14 out of the remaining 
21 firms are classified in the same groups. The result for the non standardized data 
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produced a4 cluster solution, which is midway between the 5 and 3 cluster solutions 
achieved with the first and second set of variables respectively. 
It was discussed in the previous chapter that avoiding multicollinearity may in fact act 
against the accurate description of strategic choice, where the example cited referred to 
the synergy achieved between advertising and sales calls. In order to include this 
possibility within the classification of strategy, a final clustering analysis was performed 
for all variables in the SSTP set. As before, this analysis included both standardized and 
non standardized data and the same two step clustering procedure involving Ward's 
method used in conjunction with the K means algorithm. The result of the clustering 
analysis employing Ward's method is shown in table 6.30. 
Table 6.30 Initial Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Full Variable Set and 
Principal Component Analysis. 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 10 10 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Clustering Method Ward's Method Ward's Method 
Cluster 1: 
3M AKZO SOL PG 3M RB PG SOL BAY AKZO 
RB ABB JJ MSD 
Cluster 2: IVX NOV AVE NVA MER ROC AZ BI LUN 
Cluster 3: LUN YAM BAX 
ABB BAY JJ MER 
Cluster 4: AVE NVA ROC BI BMS SPL LIL WYE PFZ YAM 
SAG SPL GSK SAG IVX NOV 
AZ GSK WYE BMS 
Cluster 5: LIL PFZ MSD PHR SS 
Cluster 6: PHR SS 
Cluster 7: BAX 
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As in the previous analyses, the best cut upper tail significance test and examination of 
the change in fusion coefficient were used to determine the correct number of groups. 
The fusion result is illustrated in figures 6.17 and 6.18 and the results of the upper tail 
significance test are presented in table 6.31. 
Figure 6.17 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for 
standardized data, full variable set SSTP2 
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Figure 6.18 Plot of the fusion coefficient against number of clusters for non 
standardized data, full variable set SSTP2 
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Table 6.31 Upper tail test for the right cluster solution applied to full variable set 
SSTP2 
Data Standardized to Z Scores Non Standardized Data 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 4.07 21.52 2 clusters 3.47 18.37 
3 clusters 1.99 10.51 3 clusters 3.16 16.73 
4 clusters 0.91 4.8 4 clusters 1.08 5.71 
5 clusters 0.81 4.29 5 clusters 0.69 3.63 
6 clusters 0.54 2.85 
7 clusters 0.52 2.77 
The identified tree partitions were then used as seed points for ak means algorithm. The 
results of this analysis are presented in table 6.32. 
267 
Table 6.32 K Means Clustering Solution for SSTP2 Employing Full Variable Set 
SSTP2 [Z Score] SSTP2 [No Transformation] 
Number of Variables 10 10 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Clustering Method K Means K Means 
Cluster 1: 
3M AKZO SOL PG 
RB 
3M RB PG SOL BAY AKZO 
ABB JJ MSD 
Cluster 2: IVX NOV 
AVE NVA MER ROC AZ BI 
LUN GSK 
Cluster 3: LUN YAM BAX 
Cluster 4: 
ABB BAY JJ MER 
AVE NVA ROC BI 
SAG SPL 
BMS SPL LIL WYE PFZ YAM 
SAG IVX NOV 
Cluster 5: 
AZ GSK WYE BMS 
LIL PFZ MSD PHR SS 
Cluster 6: PHR SS 
Cluster 7: BAX 
The clustering solution based on standardized data is very similar to the solution 
obtained through principal components analysis. There are however two differences: 
yamanouchi is placed in cluster 2 not 3, and Bristol Myers Squibb is classified in 
cluster 5 not 4. The analysis based upon non standardized data is again similar, but with 
a few differences. Here, Baxter is placed into a group of its own and Schering AG is 
classified in the same group as Schering Plough. 
Which grouping best represents strategy within the UK pharmaceutical industry from 
1998 to 2002? To answer this question the alternative analyses were compared using 
three principal confirmatory procedures. First, they were compared on their ability to 
produce clusters based on differences between group means. As discussed earlier, 
although this does not validate the clusters, it is to be expected that an efficient 
clustering procedure will produce statistically distinct clusters. Second, a bootstrapping 
procedure was used to check that a replication of the data set contains a similar set of 
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"natural clusters". Finally, each of the groups was compared against relevant strategic 
variables that were not used in the clustering procedure to test for external validity. 
The test between group means was carried out using the Kruskal Wallis one way 
analysis of variance test and the results are presented in tables 6.33 and 6.34. 
Table 6.33 Kruskal-Wallis test on split variables between groups - SSTP2 
Clustering Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized variables 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Variable set 1 Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
BRANGEN 24.100 6 0.001 4.634 4 0.327 
DRUGST 14.418 6 0.025 7.172 4 0.127 
FOREIGN 6.782 6 0.341 19.276 4 0.001 
MAINT 10.536 6 0.104 4.851 4 0.303 
PHARMA 21.882 6 0.001 21.124 4 0.0003 
PROFPROM 16.736 6 0.010 6.563 4 0.161 
SIZE 22.102 6 0.001 4.272 4 0.370 
Number of Clusters 6 3 
Variable set 2 Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
BRANGEN 17.371 5 0.004 1.076 2 0.584 
FOCUS 10.800 5 0.055 3.080 2 0.214 
FOREIGN 13.342 5 0.020 20.483 2 0.00004 
MAINT 17.408 5 0.004 1.785 2 0.410 
PRODSTR 23.362 5 0.0003 7.945 2 0.019 
PROFPROM 15.802 5 0.007 1.387 2 0.500 
RDI 14.727 5 0.012 4.931 2 0.085 
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Table 6.34 Kruskal-Wallis test on full variable set between groups - SSTP2 
Clustering Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized variables 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
Principle Components Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
BRANGEN 22.190 6 0.001 0.883 3 0.830 
DRUGST 21.397 6 0.002 8.058 3 0.045 
FOCUS 21.990 6 0.001 7.288 3 0.063 
FOREIGN 8.642 6 0.195 18.895 3 0.0003 
MAINT 10.674 6 0.099 1.655 3 0.647 
PHARMA 18.466 6 0.005 19.431 3 0.0002 
PRODSTR 21.473 6 0.002 9.265 3 0.026 
PROFPROM 10.426 6 0.108 4.777 3 0.189 
RDI 16.152 6 0.013 14.835 3 0.002 
SIZE 20.994 6 0.002 2.473 3 0.480 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Full Set of Variables Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
BRANGEN 23.058 6 0.001 4.634 4 0.327 
FOCUS 21.302 6 0.002 8.034 4 0.090 
FOREIGN 6.936 6 0.327 19.276 4 0.001 
MAINT 7.675 6 0.263 4.851 4 0.303 
PRODSTR 21.145 6 0.002 10.287 4 0.036 
PROFPROM 14.917 6 0.021 6.563 4 0.161 
RDI 14.544 6 0.024 17.413 4 0.002 
DRUGST 19.129 6 0.004 7.172 4 0.127 
PHARMA 19.316 6 0.004 21.124 4 0.0003 
SIZE 21.208 6 0.002 4.272 4 0.370 
It is reassuring that all of the cluster solutions meet some criteria of internal validity, i. e. 
the clusters differ significantly across at least one variable. The clustering procedure 
therefore appears to have been robust. 
Next the bootstrap tree validation method was used to confirm that each of the cluster 
solutions was significantly different from random and therefore that the clusters found 
appear to be a component of a natural structure existing within the data set. The first 
two analyses comprising tests on variable set 1 are shown in figures 6.19 and 6.20 by 
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way of illustration. The remaining tree validation procedures, together with the 
agglomeration procedures which they generate, can be found in Appendix A. 
Figure 6.19 Bootstrap Tree Validation of Variable Set 1 SSTP2 [Z Score] 
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The above figure 6.19 illustrates that there is natural structure in the data and identifies 
that the ten cluster solution differs most significantly from random. But four of the total 
number of partitions present in the data are significantly different at the 5% leve1.38 This 
38 "This tree validation procedure compares a tree obtained for a given dataset with the family of trees 
generated by random permutation of the same data or the associated proximity matrix. A distribution is 
obtained for the set of trees from the randomly permuted data and a confidence interval is constructed 
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procedure seeks to reject the underlying hypothesis that the data are randomly 
distributed (Wishart, 2004). 
Figure 6.20 Bootstrap Tree Validation of Variable Set 1 SSTP2 [Non standardized] 
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Figure 6.20 shows that a natural structure is present within the non-standardized data. 
with the five cluster solution departing most significantly from random and six of the 
total number of partitions significant at the 5% level. In both bootstrap cases illustrated 
around the mean. The tree for the given data is then compared with this confidence interval and 
significant departures from random identified" (Wishart. 2004). 
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above the results indicate that true structure appears to be present in the data i. e. that the 
clusters found are unlikely to be an artifact of the method applied. 
Finally, the clustering solutions were each validated against relevant strategic choice 
and performance variables (for a description of these variables see earlier in this 
chapter) to assess the external validity of the cluster solutions obtained. These results 
are presented in tables 6.35 to 6.38. 
Table 6.35 Kruskal-Wallis test on external variables between groups - SSTP2 
Clusteringased Upon Z Scores Non standardized variables 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
Variable Set 1 Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
FOCUS 17.458 6 0.008 8.034 4 0.090 
PRODSTR 17.810 6 0.007 10.287 4 0.036 
RDI 15.121 6 0.019 17.413 4 0.002 
SHARE 22.102 6 0.001 4.272 4 0.370 
WMS 16.140 6 0.13 3.488 4 0.480 
ACUTE 12.939 6 0.044 4.946 4 0.293 
LIC 9.289 6 0.158 3.841 4 0.428 
MERGER 12.911 6 0.044 9.384 4 0.052 
OTH 10.431 6 0.108 5.903 4 0.207 
NATION 4.287 6 0.638 8.138 4 0.087 
ADV 18.198 6 0.006 7.380 4 0.117 
DET 19.182 6 0.004 5.993 4 0.200 
These results indicate that both the standardized and non standardized variable sets 
produced significant clusters that appear externally valid. The cluster solution based 
upon z scores appears to more precisely represent strategic choices because, out of the 
12 strategic and performance variables compared between groups, 8 are significant at 
the 5% level. This compares to 3 significant results achieved by the clustering solution 
based upon non standardized data. 
The comparisons for variable set 2 are shown in table 6.37. 
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Table 6.36 Kruskal-Wallis test on external variables between groups - SSTP2 
Clustering Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized 
variables 
Number of Clusters 6 3 
Variable Set 2 Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square dL Sig 
DRUGST 8.030 5 0.155 3.234 2 0.199 
PHARMA 9.358 5 0.096 0.585 2 0.746 
SIZE 16.841 5 0.005 2.037 2 0.361 
SHARE 16.841 5 0.005 2.037 2 0.361 
WNIS 7.015 5 0.220 1.074 2 0.584 
ACUTE 9.744 5 0.083 1.857 2 0.395 
LIC 11.033 5 0.051 1.189 2 0.552 
MERGER 12.846 5 0.025 7.779 2 0.020 
OTH 7.054 5 0.217 4.362 2 0.113 
NATION 5.629 5 0.344 6.894 2 0.032 
ADV 17.336 5 0.004 4.789 2 0.091 
DET 15.878 5 0.007 3.043 2 0.218 
Both sets of clusters appear externally valid and once again the clusters based upon z 
scores appear to provide a more precise classification of strategic choice, achieving 5 
significant results compared to 2 for the non-standardized data. 
The comparison between clusters based upon principal component scores is presented in 
table 6.37. 
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Table 6.37 Kruskal-Wallis test on external variables between groups - SSTP2 
Clustering Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized variables 
Number of Clusters 7 4 
PCA Scores Used Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square 
-.! 
If- Sig 
SHARE 20.994 6 0.002 2.473 3 0.480 
WMS 15.325 6 0.018 3.027 3 0.387 
ACUTE 15.414 6 0.017 3.547 3 0.315 
LIC 10.378 6 0.110 1.316 3 0.725 
MERGER 10.966 6 0.89 6.656 3 0.084 
OTH 11.418 6 0.076 3.518 3 0.318 
NATION 6.473 6 0.372 6.538 3 0.088 
ADV 21.750 6 0.001 3.554 3 0.314 
DET 20.706 6 0.002 2.465 3 0.482 
The cluster solution based upon z scores achieved external validation through achieving 
significance, at the 5% level, in 5 out of 9 relevant strategic variables. A further variable 
OTH [products not a result of the company's original research nor subject to a licensing 
agreement] was significant at the 10% level. The clustering solution based on principal 
components of non standardized variables failed to achieve external validation and 
recorded no significant differences based upon the 9 strategic variables tested. 
The clustering solution based upon all ten strategic variables but without allowing for 
multicollinearity is shown in table 6.38. 
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Table 6.38 Kruskal-Wallis test on external variables between groups - SSTP2 
Clusterin Based Upon Z Scores Non standardized variables 
Number of Clusters 7 5 
All variables included Chi-Square df Sig Chi-Square df Sig 
SHARE 21.208 6 0.002 4.272 4 0.370 
WMS 14.440 6 0.025 3.488 4 0.480 
ACUTE 16.898 6 0.10 4.946 4 0.293 
LIC 10.415 6 0.108 3.841 4 0.428 
MERGER 10.518 6 0.104 9.384 4 0.052 
OTH 9.512 6 0.147 5.903 4 0.207 
NATION 8.638 6 0.195 8.138 4 0.087 
ADS/ 18.917 6 0.004 7.380 4 0.117 
DET 18.844 6 0.004 5.993 4 0.200 
Here the full set of standardized variables achieved external validation with 4 out of 9 
significantly different strategic and performance variables. The clustering solution based 
upon non standardized variables failed to achieve significance across a single strategic 
variable. 
In concluding this section, both variable sets 1 and 2 performed well producing 
externally valid groupings for both standardized and non standardized data. The use of 
principal component scores and the full variable set did not appear to significantly 
improve the quality of the clustering solution, but did provide additional verification for 
some of the groupings. The common links across the four clustering solutions based 
upon Z scores are shown in table 6.39. 
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Table 6.39 Common Links Across Strategic Group Clustering Solutions 
Variable Set 1 Variable Set 2 Principal Full Set of 
Components Variables 
Group A 3M AKZO RB 3M AKZO SOL 3M AKZO PG 3M AKZO 
PG SOL YAM PG SOL RB SOL PG RB 
Group B LUN SPL YAM LUN LUN LUN YAM 
Group C IVX NOV SAG BAX IVX RB IVX NOV YAM IVX NOV 
NOV 
Group D BAX - BAX BAX 
Group E ABB BAY JJ ABB BAY BMS ABB BAY JJ ABB BAY 
AVE BI ROC JJ MER MSD MER AVE NVA JJ MER 
MER LIL PFZ ROC BI SAG AVE NVA 
SPL BMS ROC BI 
SAG SPL 
Group F NVA AZ GSK 
WYE BMS LIL 
AVE NVA ROC 
AZ GSK BI WYE 
AZ GSK LIL 
WYE MSD PFZ 
AZ GSK 
WYE BMS 
MSD PFZ SAG SPL LIL PFZ 
MSD 
Group G PHR SS PHR SS PHR SS PHR SS 
Number 
of 7 6 7 7 
Clusters 
Differences compared to variable set 1 are marked in bold. Overall there is strong 
agreement across the board. Group A are the industrial companies, three out of the 4 
solutions are in agreement. Only the cluster solution based upon variable set two places 
Reckitt Benckisser in a different group and transposes Yamanouchi. Group G is 
common across the board. The clustering solution based upon variable set 2 places 
Baxter in the company of Ivax, Novo and Reckitt Benckisser. Group C includes Ivax 
and Novo across the board. 
Groups E and F contain a number of companies common to all clustering solutions but 
the results are particularly close between variable set 1 and the two solutions based 
upon a full variable set. It is clear from table 6.40 that the 7 cluster solution appears the 
stronger, which applies in three out of four cases. An issue with cluster analysis is that 
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different variables may present new perspectives on the data but too many variables 
may obscure relationships. In the interests of parsimony, it makes sense to proceed with 
clusters based upon two approaches. First, on variable set 1 and then, second, to use 
principal components as an alternative view, which offers the chance to include some 
input from the entire variable set. The decision to use principal components recognizes 
the fact that some strategic investment decisions, for example sales force activity and 
advertising spend, will inevitably act in concert. This lessens the criticism that inter 
related variables, by acting in effect as a "block vote", therefore alter the weighting and 
hence skew the analysis. This criticism assumes that variables should be independent. 
This is not necessarily true of investments made in advertising and sales force activity 
toward a common objective. It is however, clear for this data that the solutions based 
upon standardized data appear more useful, which may imply that differences in scale 
do, indeed, exert some kind of skewing effect. 
The result of the analyses based upon the standardized data for variable set 1 and 
principal components was then used to test performance differences across strategic 
groups. This analysis comprises the final section of this chapter. 
6.8 Performance differences across strategic groups. 
During the two stable strategic time periods, 1993 to 1997 and 1998 to 2002, the 
following strategic groups were identified in the discussion above, see table 6.40. 
278 
Table 6.40 Strategic groups across the two stable strategic time periods 
SSTP1 SSTP2 A SSTP 2B 
Time Period 1993 -1997 1998 -2002 1998 -2002 
Number of 7 7 7 
Strategic [VARIABLE SET 1] [PCA] 
Groups 
3M RB AKZO SOL 3M RB AKZO SOL PG 3M RB AKZO 
SG1: PG SOL PG 
SG 2: BAX BAX BAX 
SG 3: BI SAG MER IVX IVX NOV SAG IVX NOV YAM NOV 
SG 4: LUN LUN SPL YAM LUN 
SG 5: SPL YAM PHR SS PHR SS 
JJ AVE PHR NVA ABB BAY JJ AVE BI ABB BAY JJ MER 
SG 6: ROC AZ GSK ROC MER AVE NVA ROC BI SAG SPL BMS 
BAY ABB WYE BMS NVA AZ GSK WYE BMS AZ GSK LIL WYE 
SG 7: MSD LIL PFZ SS LIL MSD PFZ MSD PFZ 
These three strategic group sets were then tested against the following three 
performance measures. First, SHARE which represents market share. Second, WMS 
[Weighted Market Share], which recognizes the value of niche strategies following the 
earlier research of Cool (1985) and Martens (1988). Finally, DIFF which measures the 
companies ranking difference across each of the stable strategic time periods, for 
example, a company moving from 22 °d place in 1993 to 20th place in 1997 will have 
improved its DIFF score by 2. 
These market based measures were chosen rather than profit or cost measures primarily 
for reasons of data availability. The standard profit and cost measures, taken from 
company annual reports, apply to the total company not the UK subsidiary. A second 
reason for utilizing these variables is that previous research has used share and weighted 
market share (Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987a; Martens, 1988). 
279 
Each of these measures was compared across groups using the Kruskal Wallis one way 
analysis of variance test. These results are presented in table 6.41. 
Table 6.41 Performance differences between strategic groups 
SSTP 
1 
SSTP2 
[A] 
SSTP2 
[B] 
Performance 
Variable 
Chi 
Square 
Df Sig Chi 
Square 
Df Sig Chi 
Square 
Df Sig 
SHARE 24.753 6 0.0004 22.102 6 0.001 20.994 6 0.0 
02 
WMS 16.658 6 0.011 16.140 6 0.013 15.325 6 0.0 
18 
DIFF 13.334 6 0.038 7.881 6 0.247 11.509 6 0.0 
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The results are, that for the first stable strategic time period performance differs 
significantly across strategic groups on all three measures. With the second strategic 
time period, both clustering solutions return a similar result with a significant difference 
at the 5% level between groups for both SHARE and WMS, but no significant 
difference found between groups at this level of significance in terms of DIFF. 
However, at the 10% level of significance, a significant result was found for DIFF 
between groups using the principal components method. 
280 
6.9 Conclusions 
The research reported in this chapter found that two stable strategic time periods, 1993- 
1997, and 1998 - 2002, existed within the ten years encompassed by the study. Each 
SSTP was five years in length and the break between the two periods appears to 
coincide with a marked change in a number of key environmental factors. 
Across each time period analyses based on both data standardized to z scores and non- 
standardized data were carried out. Each separate clustering solution was then compared 
using three validation procedures; internal validity, bootstrapping and external validity. 
Consistently, the clustering solutions based upon standardized data were found to 
produce a more detailed and robust solution. External validity, i. e. comparison between 
groups using strategy and performance measures not included in the original analysis, 
was taken as an indication of a stronger solution. For the first stable strategic time 
period analysis of standardized data, using a combination of both Ward's method and 
the K means clustering algorithm, returned a seven cluster solution, which differed 
significantly, at the 5% level, on eight variables, and at the 10% level, on one variable. 
In contrast, the same analysis applied to non-standardized data produced a four cluster 
solution, which achieved significance at the 5% level on five variables and at the 10% 
level on one variable. 
The seven strategic groups identified in the first stable strategic time period consisted 
of; an industrial conglomerate group of highly diversified firms (3M, Reckitt 
Benckisser, Akzo Nobel, Solvay, Procter & Gamble); a group containing one firm 
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(Baxter), which is a firm specializing in hospital solutions; a group of largely medium 
sized, European firms, that each concentrate on a small selection of therapy areas 
(Boehringer Ingelheim, Schering Healthcare, Merck KGAA, Ivax, Novo); a Danish 
company (Lundbeck) which focuses on two therapy areas marketed almost exclusively 
to GPs; a group consisting of two medium sized firms (Schering Plough, Yamanouchi) 
focusing upon largely GP based activities across a selected range of therapy areas; a 
group consisting of heavyweight, largely european based firms which address a broad 
range of therapy areas, invest heavily in research, have participated in significant 
merger activity and generally have a strong hospital presence (Johnson & Johnson, 
Aventis, Pharmacia, Novartis, Roche, Astra Zeneca, Glaxo Smith Kline); a mix of 
firms, which with the exception of Bayer focus almost exclusively on pharmaceutical 
and healthcare based activity, directed strongly at the GP market (Bayer, Abbott, 
Wyeth, Bristol Myers Squibb, Merck Sharpe & Dohme, Lilly, Pfizer, Sanofi 
Synthelabo. ) 
Analysis of the second stable strategic time period was complicated by a greater degree 
of inter-relatedness between variables. A number of strategies can be employed to deal 
with multicollinearity. Several approaches were used: the variable set was divided into 
two groups, each of which was analyzed separately and the results compared; principal 
component analysis scores were used; and a full set of variables was also analysed. In 
each case both standardized and non-standardized data sets were used and the results 
compared using three validation methods. Once again analysis using standardized data 
appeared to outperform non standardized data, which suggests that scale differences are 
a significant factor in the analysis of this type of pharmaceutical data. This finding 
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supports the decision of earlier researchers to utilize standardized data (Bogner, 1991; 
Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). 
Different treatments applied to the SSTP 2 variable sets each produced slightly different 
results, that is to say there were a good deal of similarities. When comparing the 
standardized to non-standardized data treatments both sets of analysis produced 
significant clusters that achieved external validity. The result with standardized data was 
more robust and gave a greater degree of precision. When twelve strategic and 
performance variables were compared across strategic groups, eight out of twelve were 
significant at the 5% level, for the standardized data, as compared to three out of twelve 
utilizing the non-standardized data. 
The analytical method employing either principal components or the full variable set 
performed less well. Neither of these methods achieved an externally valid solution with 
the non-standardized data. This result implies that both interaction between variables 
and scale effects exert a significant effect within this type of data set and that it is right 
to correct for them. Use of principal components or the inclusion of the full variable set 
did not, however, appear to significantly improve the quality of the clustering solution, 
but it did provide additional verification for some of the groupings. A comparison of the 
four different treatments, utilizing standardized data are shown in table 6.40. Overall 
there is strong agreement across these four solutions. Three out of four suggest a very 
similar seven cluster solution (see table 6.40). Of these three out of four, the seven 
cluster solution was chosen as most reliable based on cross-comparison between the 
solutions and performance on external validity tests. 
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The following seven strategic groups were found in the second stable strategic time 
period: 
SG1: The industrial conglomerates. All of these companies have relatively minor 
interests in pharmaceuticals, which represent a fraction of their diversified chemical 
based business interests. Across the three "seven" cluster solutions, the common 
members of this strategic group were 3M, Akzo Nobel, Reckitt Benkisser, Proctor and 
Gamble and Solvay. 
SG2: A singleton strategic group consisting of Baxter, a niche player specializing in 
hospital solutions that spends relatively little on either promotion or R&D. 
SG3: A specialist pharmaceutical group consisting of firms concentrating very strongly 
in one or two selected therapy areas, namely Ivax (respiratory), Novo (anti-diabetic 
drugs) Schering AG (women's health). 
SG4: A group of medium sized pharmaceutical companies with a common member in 
Lundbeck, a specialist across two therapy areas employing strong GP based promotion. 
On two occasions out of three Yamanouchi was placed in this group and once Schering 
Plough was included. These are all mid sized players, employing moderate R&D but 
reasonably strong promotion spend. 
SG5: This group consisted of a common membership of Sanofi Synthelabo and 
Pharmacia. Both are large companies with a very wide portfolio of therapy areas. 
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SG6: This consisted of medium to large sized companies employing average promotion, 
often with strong hospital interests and slightly diversified interests. Roche, for 
example, is strong in diagnostics and consumer health, Abbott in nutrition and J&J in 
consumer products. The core members of this group are Abbott, Bayer, Johnson & 
Johnson, Aventis, Boehringer Ingelheim, Roche and E Merck. 
SG7: The heavyweight pharmaceutical specialists are included within this group. 
Common traits include strong R&D, aggressive promotion, broad range of therapeutic 
areas and strong presence in all major markets. Common members include Astra 
Zeneca, Glaxo Smith Kline, Wyeth, Bristol Myers Squibb, Lilly, Merck Sharpe and 
Dohme, and Pfizer. Additional validation is provided by the recent book. The Merck 
Druggenaut, which in its profile of Merck identifies Pfizer as its "benchmark" 
competitor (Hawthorne, 2003). 
The results of this research show that a relatively stable intra-industry structure 
consisting of seven strategic groups existed in the UK pharmaceutical industry across 
both the two, five year, stable strategic time periods. (see table 6.41). This supports the 
premise that a strong "natural structure" exists. 
Each of these strategic groups were tested for performance differences using three 
market specific variables: SHARE, WMS and DIFF. These performance measures were 
chosen both for reasons of data availability and because this is a UK based study. It is 
because the strategy employed by pharmaceutical companies in the UK may differ from 
strategies employed elsewhere that standard performance measures such as ROCE 
(return on capital employed) or EBIT (earnings before income and tax), readily 
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obtainable from company annual reports, could not be used. Use of SHARE and WMS 
is also in accord with previous research (Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988) and permits 
comparison of the research in this thesis with those studies. 
Comparison across the seven strategic groups for the period 1993 - 1997 found 
significant differences at the 5% level, or better, for all three performance measures. 
The results for the second time period, 1998 - 2002, were less clear cut. Here, both the 
seven variable set and the solution based upon principal components, for standardized 
data, showed a significant difference between groups for SHARE and WMS at the 5% 
level. The solution based on principal components also achieved significance at the 10% 
level for DIFF, but this result was not replicated using the alternative seven variable 
solution. 
The fact that only two stable strategic time periods (SSTPs) were identified in this 
research suggests that the operating environment for pharmaceutical companies in the 
UK was relatively stable throughout this study. The first of these, from 1993 to 1997, 
appears more benign in competitive terms as illustrated by the sharp rise in generic and 
branded substitution which marks the break between these two SSTPs. 
Seven strategic groups were identified in each of these stable strategic time periods. In 
the first period the difference between large and medium firms appeared less distinct 
possibly because pressure upon me-too products was less pronounced at this time. 
Within the second time period, a number of the strategic groups present represent quite 
different market positions. Strategic group one consists of five industrial firms, each 
with broad interests in chemicals where pharmaceuticals represent a minority interest. 
Within this group 3M typifies membership with a modest research and promotional 
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CHAPTER 7 
DYNAMICS BETWEEN STRATEGIC GROUPS AND MERGERS IN THE UK 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 1993-2002 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the structure of the UK pharmaceutical industry 
following a method used in previous research (Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). This 
necessitated taking a simplified view of the industry by excluding companies that were 
not present for the entire duration of this study and by assuming that companies had 
existed in their current form throughout the study period. In this chapter the underlying 
dynamics of the industry are explored with the aim of answering the following two 
research questions: 
1. Do firms that move from one strategic group to another consistently 
move into a higher performing group and are such moves concomitant 
with environmental change? 
2. Do mergers occur more frequently between strategic groups or within 
strategic groups? 
During the period encompassed by this study the pharmaceutical industry experienced 
several waves of consolidation. It is therefore necessary to explore the change in 
industry structure, research that has been largely ignored in previous longitudinal 
strategic group studies on the pharmaceutical industry (Cool, 1985; Fiegenbaum et al., 
1990; Martens, 1988). Reasons for the exclusion of merged firms may include the fact 
that changing sample sizes between years made operationalizing the idea of stable 
strategic time periods more problematic, or that mergers were less of an issue in the 
time periods covered by earlier research. Cool explains his exclusion of merged firms as 
follows; 
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"First, it was necessary to exclude foreign drug firms because of the lack of 
reliable data on various strategy (geographic scope, patent data, R&D outlays) 
and performance (profitability) dimensions.. .A second criteria imposed on the 
sample selection was that firms needed to exist as separate legal entities over 
most of the 1963-1982 period)"(Cool, 1985). 
Three alternatives to dealing with mergers were considered. First, merged companies 
can be excluded from the research. This has the advantage of providing a clean 
uncomplicated solution but as discussed earlier (see chapter 5) to exclude merged 
companies from this research would exclude a number of the most prominent industry 
players and substantially weaken the value of any results because merger is a fact of life 
in this industry. Second, firms can be considered to have always existed in the form that 
existed at the end of 2002. This approach, adopted in the previous chapter, allowed both 
the utilization of Cool's method to this research and permitted the inclusion of merged 
companies. It is also a pragmatic choice because the IMS database, the industry 
standard which is used in this research, automatically recalculates the ten years back 
data when a company merges and thus effectively expunges the earlier separate 
companies from the data. Third, each merged firm can be effectively deconstructed 
using archival data into its original form, which is the approach adopted in this chapter. 
7.2 The Dataset 
The dataset for this research question differs slightly from that employed in the previous 
chapter. This is because it includes those firms swallowed up during the process of 
industry consolidation, which presents significant problems of data availability. The set 
of companies, included in this aspect of the research together with the abbreviations 
used in subsequent sections, are presented in table 7.1 
291 
Table 7.1 Companies included in the following analysis 
ABBREVIATION COMPANY 
3M 3M Corporation 
ABB Abbott 
AKZ Astra Zeneca 
AST Astra 
BAX Baxter International 
BAY Bayer 
BI Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
BM Boehringer 
Mannheim 
BMS Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
BOO Boots 
CEL Celltech 
CGY Ciba-Gei 
DUP Dupont 
FIS Fisons 
GLX Glaxo Labs 
HOE Hoechst 
IVX Ivax 
JJ Johnson & Johnson 
KNO Knoll 
LED Lederle 
Laboratories 
LIL Lilly 
LOR Lorex Synthelabo 
LUN Lundbeck 
MER E Merck 
MMD Marion Merrell 
Dow 
MSD Merck Sharpe & 
Dohme 
NOV Novo 
PFZ Pfizer 
PG Procter & Gamble 
PHA Phannacia 
PU Pharmacia Upjohn 
RB Reckitt Benckisser 
ROC Roche 
RPR Rhone Poulenc 
Rorer 
SAG Schering AG 
SAN Sanofi 
SAND Sandoz 
SEA Searle 
292 
SKB Smith Kline 
Beecham 
SOL Solvay 
SPL Schering Plough 
SS Sanofi Synthelabo 
SYN Syntex 
UPJ Upjohn 
WEL Wellcome 
WL Warner Lambert 
WYE Wyeth 
YAM Yamanouchi 
ZEN Zeneca 
The choice of variables used here are by necessity limited due to the availability of 
data. 39 The variables used to initially separate companies into strategic groups are 
described in table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Variables Used to Separate Companies Into Strategic Groups. 
ABBREVIATION VARIABLE DEFINITION 
3R Proportion of retail sales generated by top 3 therapeutic areas 
FOCUS Proportion of sales derived from pharmaceuticals 
FOREIGN Proportion of sales derived from overseas 
HSAL Proportion of sales derived from hospital segment 
NEWPRO Sales of products <2 years old. 
PINT Total promotional expenditure divided by total UK sales 
RDI Total research expenditure divided by total world sales 
In this chapter, years with differing numbers of firms are taken to stand alone rather 
than being consolidated into stable strategic time periods. The principal reason for this 
is that the number of firms, both due to mergers and to new entrants e. g. Eisai, Shire and 
Takeda, differs between years. For adjacent years where the number of firms' remains 
constant the Box M test will be used to test homogeneity and if found the years will be 
averaged (see chapters 5 and 6 for details) in accord with Cool's method. This method 
39 Some of the companies ceased to exist over ten years ago. In these earlier years the availability of data 
from sources such as Datastream and Annual Reports is patchy and of variable quality. 
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found to be most effective in the previous chapter was used to differentiate strategic 
groups; see figure 7.1. 
Figure 7- 1 Flowchart of data analysis employed in this chapter 
Check variable set for 
correlations > 0.8. Exclude such 
strongly inter-related variables. 
Standardize data using Z scores 
Use Ward's method to produce an 
initial clustering solution. 
Distance measured by Squared 
Euclidean Distance. 
Remove Outliers 
7 
Perform a second cluster analysis 
using the K means method 
"seeded" on the tree partition. 
Check both with and without 
outliers then examine results 
Validate the chosen cluster 
solution using internal and 
external validity 
A check for inter-related variables revealed no strong correlations i. e. > 0.840other than 
SIZE. This variable was therefore removed from the dataset used to cluster firms, 
leaving seven variables 3R, HSAL, NPH, NPR, RDI and PINT. The correlation was 
ao This figure is suggested in the literature as a point where inter-related variables may become 
problematic see chapters 5 and 6 for further details. 
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carried out using Spearman's Rank test and the results of this analysis are shown in 
table 7.3. 
Table. 7.3 Correlations between variables used to differentiate strategic groups 
3R FOCUS FOREIGN HSAL NPRO PINT RDI 
3R 1.000 -0.039 -0.250 -0.672 -0.039 0.137 -0.076 
FOCUS -0.039 1.000 -0.061 0.216 -0.108 -0.242 0.340 
FOREIGN -0.250 -0.061 1.000 0.228 0.003 -0.414 -0.161 
HSAL -0.672 0.216 0.228 1.000 -0.034 -0.252 0.192 
NPRO -0.039 -0.108 0.003 -0.034 1.000 0.027 -0.037 
PINT 0.137 -0.242 -0.414 -0.252 0.027 1.000 0.031 
RDI -0.076 0.340 -0.161 0.192 -0.037 0.031 1.000 
7.3 Strategic group membership 1993 -1994 
The first two years 1993 and 1994 both contain 47 companies so the homogeneity 
between these two years was tested using the Box M test (see chapters 5 and 6 for 
further details). The results of this test are shown in table 7.4 
Table 7.4 Test of homogeneity between 1993 and 1994 
Box's M 47.757 
F 1.203 
dfl 36.000 
d12 27836.864 
Sig. 0.188 
This test confirms that the years 1993 and 1994 do not differ significantly and may 
therefore be treated as part of the same strategic time period. This finding is in 
agreement with the research reported in the previous chapter, which also found no 
difference between 1993 and 1994. The two years were then averaged as per Cool's 
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method (see chapters 5 and 6 for further detail) and the firms clustered into strategic 
groups. 
The results of this cluster analysis are shown in table 7.5. The pharmaceutical industry 
is shown to consist of nine strategic groups, only one of which consists of a sole 
member. This is Baxter which is a specialist in hospital solutions and would therefore 
be expected to be a niche player. 
Table 7.5 Strategic Groups 1993-4 
Strategic Group Ward's Method K Means 
SG1: 3MRBPGBOOAKZBAY 
SOL FIS AST NOV 
3MRBPGAKZBAYSOL 
FIS AST NOV 
SG 2: CGY GLX CGY GLX 
SG 3: IVX SEA BOO IVX SEA 
SG 4: ABB SPL YAM BMS WYE 
PFZ SAN DUP LIL MMD SYN 
MSD UPJ 
ABB SPL YAM BMS WYE 
PFZ DUP LIL MMD SYN 
MSD UPJ 
SG 5: BM LED BM LED 
SG 6: KNO LOR KNO LOR 
SG 7: BAX BAX 
SG 8: BI SAG RPR WEL MER 
SAND PHA ZEN CEL LUN 
BI SAG RPR WEL MER 
SAND PHA ZEN CEL LUN 
SG 9: HOE ROC SKB JJ WL SAN HOE ROC SKB JJ WL 
The two sets of analyses reveal a virtually identical structure of nine strategic groups. 
Strategic groups 2,5,6,7 and 8 are identical. The difference is that the K means analysis 
has reallocated Boots from strategic group 1 to strategic group 3 and Sanofi from group 
4 to 9. Outlier analysis identifies cases that are relatively remote from the clusters. 
These outliers are ordered by their Squared Euclidean Distances and here six companies 
Boots, Astra, Novo, Ivax, Celltech and Lundbeck were further than a value of 0.6 away 
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from the cluster mean41. The presence of firms identified as outliers, i. e. displaying a set 
of strategic investments and decisions not wholly congruent with their group but not 
different enough to justify a singleton position, supports the observation that strategic 
groups may consist of a core central group of members, an inner group which closely 
follows the same pattern of strategic investments, and a number of less centrally aligned 
secondary group members, which represent an outer group less committed to the 
strategy described by their strategic group membership (McNamara et al., 2003). For 
example, the removal of Boots, Astra and Novo from group 1 leaves a tight group of 
companies with strong interests outside pharmaceuticals - 3M, Reckitt, Procter and 
Gamble, Akzo, Solvay and Bayer are all strongly diversified chemical companies. 
Internal group validity for the identified cluster solution was confirmed by the Upper 
tail significance test, which shows that a nine cluster solution corresponds to the largest 
number of clusters, which is significant at the 5% level; see table 7.6. 
" The use of outlier analysis reveals those firms that are peripheral to their assigned cluster which is a 
useful procedure to identify the most tightly defined clusters that describe the densest part of the data. 
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Table 7.6 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
1993-1994 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.65 24.75 
3 clusters 2.91 19.72 
4 clusters 2.29 15.53 
5 clusters 2.01 13.65 
6 clusters 1.73 11.75 
7 clusters 1.66 11.24 
8 clusters 0.58 3.97 
9 clusters 0.39 2.66 
The presence of a natural structure within the data was confirmed by bootstrapping 
validation see figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 Bootstrap Validation of 1993-4 Data 
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Bootstrap Validation WRhout Replacement -120 Trials Completed 
This is not a strong result and indicates that a strong natural structure has not been 
found within the raw z score data. On applying the same technique to the proximities 
used to construct the clusters42 a stronger result was obtained. See Appendix B. 
External validation was tested by using a Kruskal Wallis one way analysis test. The 
results of this validation procedure are listed in table 7.7. 
Table 7.7 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 1993-4 strategic groups 
HSALES TADV TOPRTAS TOTPROM 
Chi Square 21.560 15.319 13.916 16.609 
df 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.006 0.053 0.084 0.034 
TOTSALES UDET SHARE RSAL 
Chi Square 14.509 12.189 14.509 26.045 
df 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.069 0.143 0.069 0.001 
Here retail [RSALES] and hospital sales {HSALES] both achieve significance at the 
1% level, total promotion [TOTPROM] at the 5% level and total sales [TOTSALES], 
total advertising [TADV], top retail therapy area sales [TOPRTAS] and market share 
[SHARE] all achieve significance at the 10% level. Differences between groups in 
terms of thenumber of detailing units [UDET] did not reach statistical significance (at 
the 10% level or better). The external validity of these clusters is therefore confirmed. 
The strategic groupings are shown in a Dendrogram, shaded to show the groupings in 
figure 7.3. 
42 Proximity or closeness between each pair of objects can assess similarity, where measures of distance 
or difference is used, with smaller distances or differences representing greater similarity. Similarity 
matrices constructed from these measures form the basis for clustering where squared Euclidean distance 
is the normal distance measure applied in this thesis. Some clustering algorithms construct the reciprocal 
dissimilarity matrix as a method of determining the relative affinity between objects. 
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Figure 7.3 Dendrogram of Strategic Groups in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
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The most typical member or exemplar of each strategic group is underlined. 
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7.4 Mergers in the1993-1994 period. 
In 1994 two mergers occurred within our data set. Roche acquired Syntex and Wyeth 
(then called American Home) purchased Lederle Laboratories (part of Cyanamid). 
Table 7.8 shows the strategic group membership of these companies. 
Table 7.8 Mergers in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 1994 
Target Company Acquired By 
Merger 1 Syntex Roche 
SG Membership SG 4 SG 9 
Merger 2 Lederle Wyeth 
SG Membership SG 5 SG 4 
In both cases mergers occurred between firms in different strategic groups. 
7.5 Strategic Group Membership in 1995 
The strategic group structure for 1995 is shown in table 7.9. It is of note that as for 1993 
- 1994 nine strategic groups are identified with a very strong agreement between the 
initial clustering solution given by Ward's method and the K means solution. Groups 1, 
5,6,7,8 and 9 are identical with the only differences that Sanofi and Zeneca have both 
been reallocated to group 3. In comparison to the earlier time period, the membership of 
group 1 is a subset of the earlier years, with the exception of Ciba-Geigy. There are 
some significant shifts between the two time periods but a number of common 
combinations remain, for example Abbott, Schering Plough and Yamanouchi are 
classified together, as are Pfizer, MSD, Lilly and Dupont, for example. 
Outlier analysis shows Hoechst, Searle, Novo, Boots, Zeneca, Fisons and Upjohn to be 
at the edge of their clusters. This appears to be an interesting observation for two 
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reasons. First, all of these companies changed groups when compared to the previous 
time period, which supports the idea of outer group members either changing position 
or exhibiting loose affinity to their core group members. Second, during 1995 four of 
these seven companies, Fisons, Boots, Upjohn and Hoechst, were involved in mergers, 
again signaling a significant positional shift. Outlier analysis may therefore prove useful 
to indicate firms about to make strategic shifts. 
Table 7.9 Strategic Groups 1995 
Strategic 
Group 
Ward's Method K Means 
SG 1: 3M PG AKZ CGY SOL FIS 3M PG AKZ CGY SOL FIS 
SG 2: ABB SAN SPL YAM KNO LOR ABB SPL YAM KNO LOR 
SG 3: BM HOE JJ WYE RPR WL SEA SAN BM HOE JJ WYE RPR 
WL SEA ZEN 
SG 4: AST PFZ DUP MMD BAY LIL 
MSD IVX RB NOV BOO ZEN 
AST PFZ DUP MMD BAY LIL 
MSD IVX RB NOV BOO 
SG 5: BAX BAX 
SG 6: BI SAG GLX MER WEL PHA UPJ BI SAG GLX MER WEL PHA 
UPJ 
SG 7: LUN LUN 
SG 8: BMS SAND ROC SKB BMS SAND ROC SKB 
SG 9: CEL CEL 
Internal group validity for this cluster solution was confirmed using the Upper tail 
significance test, which indicated that nine clusters was the largest number of clusters to 
differ significantly at the 5% level; see table 7.10. 
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Table 7.10 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
1995 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 4.1 27.21 
3 clusters 3.01 19.97 
4 clusters 2.25 14.95 
5 clusters 1.36 9.01 
6 clusters 1.13 7.47 
7 clusters 0.91 6.02 
8 clusters 0.75 4.96 
9 clusters 0.45 2.96 
The presence of a natural structure within the data was confirmed by bootstrapping 
validation see figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4 Bootstrap Validation of 1995 Data 
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This figure shows that the data departs most significantly from random at the 4 cluster 
solution and that 3 of the total number of partitions differ significantly at the 5% level. 
External validation of the strategic groups was then tested by the Kruskal Wallis one 
way analysis of variance test. The results of this test are provided in table 7.11. 
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Bootstrap Validation Without Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
Table 7.11 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 1995 strategic groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOPRTAS TOTPROM 
Chi-Square 22.556 16.768 6.657 17.250 7.663 
df 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.004 0.033 0.574 0.028 0.467 
TOTSALES UDET SHARE RSAL 
Chi-Square 17.193 9.421 17.193 23.165 
df 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.028 0.308 0.028 0.003 
Here six of the nine measures achieve significance at the 5% level or better and are 
highlighted in bold. The remaining three measures did not differ significantly between 
groups. These nine measures represent performance as measured by hospital sales, retail 
sales, top retail therapy area sales and market share. Scope decisions are measured by 
RSAL. This measure represents the percentage of business derived from the retail 
sector. Resource decisions include promotional investments, as measured by total 
promotional expenditure, advertising expenditure and the number of detailing units. The 
external validity of these strategic groups is therefore confirmed. The strategic groups 
for 1995 are illustrated in the following Dendrogram, shown in figure 7.5, where groups 
comprising more than one firm are shaded and the exemplar for each group is 
underlined. 
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Figure 7.5 Dendrogram of strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
1995 
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7.6 Mergers in 1995 
In 1995 merger activity reached its highest point with no less than five mergers 
occurring in this year. Table 7.12 shows the mergers which occurred in the 
pharmaceutical industry during 1995. 
Table 7 12 Mergers in the UK pharmaceutical industry 1995 
Target Company Acquired By 
Merger 1 Fisons Rhone Poulenc Rorer 
SG Membership SG 1 SG 3 
Merger 2 Boots Knoll 
SG Membership SG 4 SG 2 
Merger 3 Upjohn Pharmacia 
SG Membership SG 6 SG 6 
Merger 4 Marion Merrell Dow Hoechst 
SG Membership SG 4 SG 3 
Merger 5 Wellcome Glaxo 
SG Membership SG 6 SG 6 
It is interesting to note that three mergers occurred between strategic groups, whilst the 
hostile takeover of Wellcome by Glaxo and the much criticized merger of Pharmacia 
and Upjohn occurred within members of the same strategic group. 
7.7 Strategic Group Membership in 1996 
Following a wave of mergers the structure of the UK industry in 1996 changed slightly 
and only 8 strategic groups were identified in 1996. The groups are shown in table 7.13. 
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Table 7.13 Strategic Groups 1996 
Strategic 
Group 
Ward's Method K Means 
SG 1: 3M RB KNO PG SEA SOL 3M RB KNO PG SEA SOL AKZ 
SG 2: AKZ BAY CGY MER ZEN BAY CGY MER ZEN SAG BMS 
SKB WL RPR 
SG 3: AST DUP BI SAG BM IVX LIL 
PFZ MSD NOV 
AST DUP BI IVX LIL PFZ NOV 
SG 4: CEL CEL 
SG 5: ABB SAN SPL YAM LUN ABB SAN SPL YAM LUN 
SG 6: BAX BAX ROC 
SG 7: BMS SKB WL RPR JJ WYE HMR 
PHU ROC GW LOR 
BM JJ HMR PHU GW LOR 
SG 8: SAND MSD WYE SAND 
A good degree of change is apparent comparing the original hierarchical solution 
provided by Ward's method with the adjustment applied by the K means algorithm. 
Clusters four and five are identical between the two solutions, one of which is a 
singleton group comprising Celltech, which is essentially a niche biotechnology 
company. There is a good deal of agreement between the two cluster solutions with 
cluster one consisting largely of the industrial conglomerates, to which Akzo Nobel is 
added by the K means method. Despite this agreement however, there is a good deal of 
readjustment with nine companies reclassified. This may indicate a general 
readjustment of strategic positions. The movement of Roche into the same group as 
Baxter is surprising, but this analysis precedes Roche's takeover of Boehringer 
Mannheim in 1997, which may in part explain the shift. 
Internal validity of this cluster solution was confirmed using the Upper Tail significance 
test, which indicated that seven clusters was the largest number of clusters to differ 
significantly at the 5% level; see table 7.14. 
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Table 7.14 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
1996 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 2.98 18.61 
3 clusters 2.77 17.33 
4 clusters 2.05 12.81 
5 clusters 1.9 11.88 
6 clusters 1.7 10.62 
7 clusters 1.39 8.67 
8 clusters 0.53 3.32 
The presence of a "natural structure" within the data was confirmed by bootstrap 
validation, see figure 7.6. This is not a strong result. The presence of some structure 
within the data is indicated, but it is not as marked as in some other years. A stronger 
result was obtained when the bootstrap validation was applied to the proximity data 
used to construct the clusters, see Appendix B. 
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Figure 76 Bootstrap Validation of 1996 Data 
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External validity of the strategic groups was then tested by the Kruskal Wallis one way 
analysis of variance test. The variables used were hospital sales [HSALS], retail sales 
[RSALS], total advertising spend [TADV], top retail therapy area sales [TOPRT], total 
promotion [TOTPRO], number of details [UDET], sales of new products into hospital 
[NPH] and sales of new products into the community [NPR]. The results are shown in 
table 7.15. 
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Bootstrap Validation Wkhout Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
Table 7.15 External Validation of 1996 Strategic Groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOPRTAS 
Chi-Square 19.797 17.869 13.171 19.142 
df 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 
As m. Sig. 0.006 0.013 0.068 0.008 
TOTSALES UDET NPH NPR 
Chi-Square 17.490 11.414 10.650 10.472 
df 7.000 7.000 7.000 7.000 
As m. Sig. 0.014 0.122 0.155 0.163 
External validity of the clusters is confirmed with hospital sales, retail sales, total sales, 
market share and top retail therapy area sales differing significantly at the 5% level or 
better. Total advertising differs significantly between groups at the 10% level. The 
structure of the UK pharmaceutical industry is depicted in figure 7.7, group exemplars 
are underlined. 
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Figure 7.7 Dendrogram of strategic groups within the UK pharmaceutical industry 
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7.8 Merger Activity in 1996 
As mentioned earlier, the only merger to occur in 1996 was the merger between two 
Swiss companies, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, to form the new entity, Novartis. The two 
original companies came from two different strategic groups, Ciba-Geigy was classified 
in strategic group 2 and Sandoz in group 8. 
7.9 Strategic Group Membership in 1997 
The strategic group structure for 1997 is shown in table 7.16. Seven strategic groups are 
identified, in contrast to the eight identified in 1996. The firms in the first group, all 
pursue a broadly diversified business portfolio where pharmaceuticals are not the major 
interest of the company. Dupont, Akzo, Bayer and Solvay are all major chemical 
companies. 3M has a wide diversity of manufacturing activities and shares some affinity 
with BASF of whom Knoll is a part. Procter and Gamble and Reckitt Benckisser market 
a variety of household products to consumers. The least diversified of the group 
originally identified is Zeneca which has strong agrochemical interests, a trait shared 
with Searle which is part of the Monsanto Corporation. It is interesting that Zeneca is 
reallocated in the second cluster analysis along with Bayer, which at the time was 
investing heavily in Lipobay their cholesterol lowering agent. 
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Table 7.16 Strategic Group Membership in 1997 
Strategic Ward's Method K Means 
Group 
SG 1: 3M PG RB SEA SOL KNO AKZ 3M PG RB SEA SOL KNO AKZ 
BAY ZEN DUP DUP 
SG 2: ABB EIS MSD YAM BM SAN ABB EIS MSD YAM BM SAN 
WYE SPL AST LOR IVX NOV WYE SPL AST LOR IVX NOV 
PFZ SHI PFZ SHI 
SG 3: TAK TAK 
SG 4: BAX BAX 
SG 5: BI WL BMS JJ SKB GW NVA LIL BI WL BMS JJ SKB GW NVA LIL 
RPR 
SG 6: HMR RPR LUN SAG MER PHU BAY ZEN HMR LUN SAG MER 
ROC PHU ROC 
SG 7: CEL CEL 
The general agreement between these two solutions is excellent with five out of the 
seven strategic groups identical between the two cluster analyses. There are two 
changes, Zeneca and Bayer are moved from strategic group 1, the diversified 
conglomerates, into group six which consists of companies more strongly oriented 
toward pharmaceuticals. Rhone Poulenc Rorer is moved from group six to group five 
which consists of companies with a very strong pharmaceutical focus across a broad 
range of product areas. In 1997 three new companies entered the industry. 'Eisai and 
Takeda are Japanese companies which set up "de novel", largely sales and distribution, 
operations in the UK. Both companies are focused around only two therapy areas. Eisai 
is positioned within group 2, which consists largely of pharmaceutical "specialists". 
Takeda in contrast forms a third singleton group alongside Baxter and Celltech, both of 
which pursue niche strategies. Shire, the third new entrant, also focuses on clearly 
defined pharmaceutical segments and like Eisai is positioned within strategic group 2. 
Outlier analysis indicates that Shire, Lilly and Hoechst Marion Roussell are positioned 
at the outer fringes of strategic groups 2,5 and 6 respectively. The presence of Shire, a 
new entrant, on the fringe supports the presence of inner and outer positions within 
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strategic groups, because new entrants may be expected to enter at the lowest barrier to 
entry. From this point the company may gather information and experience and progress 
(Caves & Porter, 1977). The notion that group 2 is protected by lower entry barriers is 
also supported by the fact that Eisai, another new entrant, is positioned here, although 
perhaps more closely aligned to the core strategy exemplified by Pfizer. 
Internal group validity for this cluster solution was confirmed using an Upper Tail 
significance test, which indicates that a seven cluster solution was the largest number of 
clusters that differed significantly at the 5% significance level. The results of this test 
are illustrated in table 7.17. 
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Table 7.17 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
1997 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.57 22.88 
3 clusters 3.02 19.36 
4 clusters 2.39 15.33 
5 clusters 1.89 12.09 
6 clusters 1.4 8.98 
7 clusters 0.62 3.98 
The presence of a "natural structure" within the data was confirmed by bootstrap 
validation, see figure 7.8. 
Figure 7.8 Validation of a Natural Structure 1997 
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The above figure shows that the 7 cluster solution departs most significantly from 
random but that 3 of the total partitions differ significantly at the 5% level. 
External validation of the strategic groups was then confirmed using the Kruskal Wallis 
One Way Analysis of Variance Test, as before the results of this test are shown in table 
7.18. 
Table 7.18 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 1997 Strategic Groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOPRTAS TOTPROM 
Chi-Square 25.261 14.933 14.973 11.593 15.427 
df 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.0003 0.021 0.020 0.072 0.017 
TOTSALES UDET NPH NPR RSAL 
Chi-S uare 14.922 14.420 13.000 19.268 27.104 
df 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.021 0.025 0.043 0.004 0.0001 
This is a very strong result, with RSAL, which represents retail sales divided by total 
sales, NPR, which measures sales of new products into the retail sector, and hospital 
sales significant at the 0.001 level, or better. Total sales, retail sales, number of detail 
units, total advertising expenditure and total promotion are all significant at the 5% 
significance level, or better. The proportion of retail sales accounted for by the top 
three therapeutic areas achieves significance at the 10% level. The external validity of 
these strategic groups is therefore confirmed. 
The strategic groups for 1997 are illustrated in the following Dendrogram. Here groups 
consisting of more than one member are shaded and each group's exemplar, which most 
closely represents the group's "core strategy", is underlined; see figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9 Dendrogram of 1997 strategic group structure 
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7.10 Mergers in 1997 
During 1997 only one merger took place. This was the acquisition of Boehringer 
Mannheim by Roche. The principal logic appeared to be that both companies were very 
strong in diagnostic products, although Boehringer Mannheim also had significant 
pharmaceutical activities that were subsumed into the Roche portfolio. As in the 
majority of previous mergers, described earlier in this chapter, the merger occurred 
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between strategic groups -Roche the acquiring company was a member of strategic 
group 6, while Boehringer Mannheim, the target, followed a strategy typical of group 2. 
7.11 Strategic Group Membership in 1998 
The strategic group structure for 1998 is shown in table 7.18. Compared to 1997, there 
is a sharp increase in the number of strategic groups, from seven to nine. 
Table 7.18 Strategic Group Membership in 1998 
Strategic 
Group 
Ward's Method K Means 
SG 1: 3M PG RB AKZ KNO SOL DUP 
SEA 
3M PG RB AKZ KNO SOL DUP 
SEA 
SG 2: AST BI LOR CEL LUN SAG AST BI LOR CEL LUN SAG 
SG 3: SHI SHI 
SG 4: EIS LIL PFZ YAM SPL NOV SAN 
WYE IVX MSD 
EIS LIL PFZ YAM SPL NOV 
WYE IVX MSD 
SG 5: TAK TAK 
SG 6: ABB BMS JJ SKB HMR RPR SAN ABB BMS JJ SKB HMR 
RPR MER 
SG 7: BAY ZEN GW NVA MER PHU 
ROC 
BAY ZEN GW NVA PHU ROC 
SG 8: BAX BAX 
SG 9: WL WL 
The agreement between these two cluster analysis solutions is again very good. Clusters 
one, two, three, five, eight and nine are identical. The two differences are the 
reallocation of Sanofi Winthrop from group 4 to 6, and E Merck from group 7 to 6. An 
interesting observation is that Warner Lambert now forms a singleton group. This 
appears to be the result of the launch of Lipitor, a blockbuster product that lowers 
cholesterol. Lipitor went on to become one of the world's biggest selling 
pharmaceutical products; see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion on the effect of 
blockbuster products on pharmaceutical companies. Examination of group outliers 
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indicated that Dupont, Pharmacia Upjohn and Roche were positioned on the periphery 
of their respective strategic groups. The position of Roche may in part be explained by 
the recent acquisition of Boehringer Mannheim, which probably took some time to 
digest and may have led to a slight shift in strategy. 
Internal group validity of a nine cluster solution was confirmed using the upper tail test, 
which indicated that this was the largest number of clusters that differed significantly at 
the 5% level. These results are shown in table 7.19. 
Table 7.19 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
1998 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.54 22.39 
3 clusters 2.9 18.36 
4 clusters 2.43 15.4 
5 clusters 1.44 9.09 
6 clusters 1.22 7.72 
7 clusters 1.11 7.03 
8 clusters 0.53 3.34 
9 clusters 0.42 2.63 
The presence of a natural structure within the data was again confirmed by a 
bootstrapping validation technique, see figure 7.10 
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Figure 7.9 Bootstrap Validation of 1998 Data 
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External validation of the nine strategic groups was then tested using the Kruskal Wallis 
one way analysis of variance test. These results are shown in table 7.20. 
Table 7.20 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 1998 Strategic Groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOPRTAS TOTPROM 
Chi-Square 28.370 16.586 13.961 14.014 13.550 
df 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.0004 0.035 0.083 0.081 0.094 
TOTSALES UDET NPH NPR RSAL 
Chi-S uare 17.577 12.434 11.207 18.265 24.658 
df 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
As m. Sig. 0.025 0.133 0.190 0.019 0.002 
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This result is not as strong as for 1997, but external validity is confirmed by a 
significant result at the 5% level or better for total sales, hospital sales, retail sales, and 
retail new products. A number of other measures, notably advertising spend and total 
promotional spend, achieve significance at the 10% level. The strategic groups for 1998 
are shown in the following Dendogram; see figure 7.11 
Figure 7.10 Dendrogram of 1997 strategic group structure 
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7.12 Mergers in 1998 
Two mergers occurred in 1998. The first between the Swedish company Astra and 
Zeneca a UK company resulted in Astra Zeneca. The second joined two French 
companies, Sanofi Winthrop and Lorex Synthelabo, which together formed Sanofi 
Synthelabo. The strategic group membership relevant to these mergers, is shown in 
table 7.21. 
Table 7.21 Mergers in the UK pharmaceutical industry 1998 
Target Company Acquired By 
Merger 1 Astra Zeneca 
SG Membership SG 2 SG 7 
Merger 2 Lorex Synthelabo Sanofi 
SG Membership SG 2 SG 6 
It is again interesting to note that both mergers occurred between strategic groups and 
not within strategic groups; an observation, which may suggest that resource acquisition 
or diversification, acted here as a primary motive for merger rather than synergy or 
building economies of scale in marketing, research or production. 
7.13 Strategic Groups 1999 
In 1999 eight strategic groups existed in the UK pharmaceutical industry. These groups 
are illustrated in table 7.22. 
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Table 7.22 Strategic Group Membership in 1999 
Strategic 
Group 
Ward's Method K Means 
SG 1: 3M PG RB KNO SOL AKZO BAY 3M PG RB KNO SOL AKZO 
BAY 
SG 2: EIS TAK EIS TAK 
SG 3: ABB JJ SKB BMS MER IVX LIL 
SHI SPL WYE NOV WL YAM 
ABB JJ SKB BMS IVX LIL SHI 
SPL WYE NOV WL YAM 
SG 4: AZ BI SS NVA CELL LUN SAG MER AZ BI NVA CELL LUN 
SAG 
SG 5: DUP SEA HMR RPR DUP SEA HMR RPR 
SG 6: BAX BAX 
SG7: GWROC PU GWROC PU 
SG 8: MSD PFZ SS MSD PFZ 
Once again there is excellent agreement between the two clustering solutions. Groups 
one, two, five, six and seven are identical. Only two companies are reclassified by the k 
means algorithm, E Merck moves from strategic group 3 to 4 and Sanofi Synthelabo 
moves from group 4 to join MSD and Pfizer in strategic group 8. The pairing of MSD 
and Pfizer together is in agreement with a recent review of Merck Sharpe and Dohme, 
which concluded that Pfizer was the benchmark competitor of MSD against whom the 
company measured its research and marketing activities (Hawthorne, 2003). 
Outlier analysis indicated that Abbott, Celltech and Dupont were situated towards the 
periphery of their strategic group. This result is not surprising for Celltech, a niche 
competitor, which frequently features as a singleton group throughout this analysis. 
Internal group validity for this eight cluster solution was confirmed using the upper tail 
significance test; see table 7.23. 
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Table 7.23 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
1999 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.67 22.62 
3 clusters 2.66 16.41 
4 clusters 2.11 13 
5 clusters 1.87 11.54 
6 clusters 1.03 6.35 
7 clusters 0.88 5.4 
8 clusters 0.47 2.9 
As before presence of a natural structure within the data set was confirmed by bootstrap 
validation; see figure 7.12. 
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Bootstrap Validation Without Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
This bootstrap tree validation procedure reveals a strong natural structure within the 
data with the 9 cluster solution departing most significantly from random, two of the 
tree partitions differ significantly at the 5% level from the confidence level constructed 
around the mean of a random sample (Wishart, 2004). 
External validation was then tested using the Kruskal Wallis test; see table 7.24 
Table 7.24 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 1999 Strategic Groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOPRTAS TOTPROM 
Chi-Square 17.822 15.503 13.754 15.622 10.762 
df 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Asymp. Sig. 0.013 0.030 0.056 0.029 0.149 
TOTSALES UDET NPH NPR RSAL 
Chi-Square 14.833 9.708 16.610 18.533 15.650 
df 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Asymp. Sig. 0.038 0.206 0.020 0.010 0.029 
The results confirm the external validity of this strategic group structure, with seven out 
of the ten measures achieving significance at the 5% level or better. Total advertising 
comes close to 5% significance with a value of 0.056, which is significant at the 10% 
level. These strategic groups are illustrated in the following Dendrogram. See figure 
7.13 
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Figure 7.12 Dendrogram of strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
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7.14 Mergers in 1999 
1999 marks the second major upheaval during the ten year time period studied, 1993 - 
2002. The first significant wave of consolidation occurred in 1995 when five companies 
merged. In 1999 four companies merged marking a new level of competition in terms of 
scale. These mergers are shown in table 7.25. 
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Table 7.25 Mergers in the UK pharmaceutical industry 1999 
Target Company Acquired B 
Merger 1 Rhone Poulenc Rorer Hoechst Marion Roussel 
SG Membership SG 5 SG 5 
Merger 2 Searle Pharmacia Upjohn 
SG Membership SG 5 SG 7 
Merger 3 Warner Lambert Pfizer 
SG Membership SG 3 SG 8 
Merger 4 Smith Kline Beecham Glaxo Wellcome 
SG Membership SG 3 SG 7 
It is interesting to note that with the exception of the merger between Rhone Poulenc 
Rorer and Hoechst Marion Roussell, to form Aventis, the three remaining mergers all 
took place between strategic groups. All four of the companies acquired in this 
consolidation were located in strategic groups 3 or 5. The merger between Warner 
Lambert and Pfizer was distinctly hostile, with Warner attempting to hold out for a 
"White Knight". This merger may have been triggered by Wyeth's attempt to acquire 
Warner Lambert. Pfizer, who were co-marketing Lipitor, Warner's blockbuster, at the 
time could ill afford to lose the Lipitor revenues which were a major driver of the 
company's growth and hence share valuation (Butler et al., 2001); see chapter 4 for a 
fuller discussion of this point. The merger between Glaxo Wellcome and Smith Kline 
Beecham to form Glaxo Smith Kline was finally accomplished in 1999, having been 
attempted but not concluded previously. One explanation for these mergers to create a 
number of mega companies is to achieve scale in sales and marketing within the US 
market, which was rapidly emerging as the principal driver of pharmaceutical profits, 
( see chapter 4). 
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7.15 Strategic Groups 2000 
In 2000 there was a sharp decline in the number of strategic groups, from eight in 1999 
down to six in the year 2000. These strategic groups are shown in table 7.26. 
Table 7.26 Strategic Groups 2000 
Strategic 
Group 
Ward's Method K Means 
SG 1: 3M PG AKZO RB KNO SOL 3M PG AKZO RB KNO SOL 
SG 2: EIS IVX MSD LIL SHI SS NOV 
PFZ YAM SPL WYE 
EIS IVX MSD LIL SHI SS NOV 
PFZ YAM SPL WYE ABB JJ 
SG 3: TAK TAK 
SG 4: ABB BMS JJ MER NVA ROC BI 
SAG LUN CEL 
BMS MER NVA ROC BI SAG 
LUN CEL 
SG 5: BAX BAX 
SG 6: AVE PHR AZ BAY DUP GSK AVE PHR AZ BAY DUP GSK 
These two groupings are extremely close. Groups 1,3,5 and 6 are identical and the only 
reallocations that take place are the reassignment of Abbott and Johnson & Johnson 
from strategic group 4 to strategic group 2. Takeda and Baxter are once again 
represented as singletons indicating that these companies pursue distinct niche strategies 
that are deployed very differently from the rest of the industry's pattern of strategic 
choices. 
The presence of six outliers in the year 2000 perhaps indicates a degree of turbulence or 
uncertainty in the market. Abbott, Lundbeck, Celltech, Aventis, Dupont and Glaxo 
Smith Kline are all positioned towards the periphery of their groups. Celltech has been 
discussed previously and this company's strategy appears to vacillate between wholly 
dissimilar to and not entirely congruent with the group to which it is closest. As 
mentioned earlier this company is a niche player with little similarity to the other 
companies included in this analysis. 
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Aventis and Glaxo Smith Kline both merged in the previous period and a degree of 
reorientation is perhaps likely during the integration process. Dupont merged during 
2000, which may explain a shift in strategic position. 
Internal validity of this clustering solution was achieved by utilizing the upper tail test 
which confirmed that the six cluster solution was the largest number of groups 
significant at the 5% level. This result is shown in table 7.27. 
Table 7.27 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
2000 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 4.01 23.4 
3 clusters 1.84 10.76 
4 clusters 1.81 10.56 
5 clusters 1.69 9.86 
6 clusters 1.29 7.52 
The presence of natural structure within the data set was confirmed by means of 
bootstrap validation, see figure 7.14. 
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Figure 7.13 Bootstrap Validation of 2000 Data 
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The bootstrap tree validation procedure reveals a strong natural structure within the data 
consisting with the 6 cluster solution departing most significantly from random, five of 
the tree partitions differ significantly at the 5% level from the confidence level 
constructed around the mean of a random sample. 
External validity of the six strategic groups was confirmed through application of the 
Kruskal Wallis test to a set of strategy and performance measures not included in the 
cluster analysis. These results are shown in table 7.28. 
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Table 7.28 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 2000 Strategic Groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOP3R TOTPROM 
Chi-Square 18.185 10.845 10.380 11.052 ' 8.621 
df 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.003 0.055 0.065 0.050 0.125 
TOTSALES UDET NPH NPR RSAL 
Chi-Square 9.899 7.486 14.957 6.840 19.787 
df 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.078 0.187 0.011 0.233 0.001 
Hospital sales, top three therapy area retail sales, new product sold into hospitals and 
retail sales divided by total sales are all significant at the 5% significance level or better. 
Retail sales, total sales and advertising spend all achieve significance at the 10% level. 
The external validity of these strategic groupings is therefore confirmed. 
The strategic groups for 2000 are illustrated in the following Dendrogram, see figure 
7.15. As previously, the most typical member of a group, or exemplar, is underlined. 
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Figure 7.14 Dendrogram of strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
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7.16 Mergers in 2000 
During 2000 one merger took place. Bristol Myers Squibb acquired the pharmaceutical 
interests of Dupont. This merger took place between strategic groups, with Bristol 
Myers initially located in strategic group 4, and Dupont positioned in strategic group 6. 
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7.17 Strategic group membership 2001 
The strategic group structure for 2001 is shown in table 7.29. 
Table 7.29 Strategic Groups 2001 
Strategic 
Group 
Ward's Method K Means 
SG 1: 3M PG AKZO RB SOL 3M PG AKZO RB SOL 
AVE BAY 
SG 2: KNO KNO 
SG 3: TAK TAK 
SG 4: ABB EIS MSD YAM BI SS SAG BMS JJ 
IVX LIL SHI NOV PFZ SPL WYE 
ABB EIS MSD YAM SS 
BMS JJ IVX LIL SHI 
NOV PFZ SPL WYE 
SG 5: AVE AZ BAY MER NVA ROC CELL 
LUN 
BI SAG MER NVA ROC 
CELL LUN 
SG 6: GSK PHR AZ GSK PHR 
SG 7: BAX BAX 
Seven strategic groups are identified with both Baxter and Takeda again appearing as 
singleton groups pursuing a different pattern of strategic choices than that exhibited by 
the rest of the industry. The two solutions are not as close as previously with a number 
of adjustments made from the original hierarchical solution obtained by Ward's method 
by the k means analysis. Groups two, three and six are identical but all are populated by 
only one member. The movement of Knoll into a singleton group may be due to the 
firm's merger with Abbott, which occurred in 2001. It is interesting to note that Abbott 
was an outlier in the 2000 analysis which may indicate a shift in position prior to the 
merger announcement. Schering AG is moved from strategic group 4 to 5, Aventis and 
Bayer from group 4 to 1, Boehringer Ingelheim from group 4 to 5 and Astra Zeneca 
from group 5 to strategic group 6. 
Outlier analysis indicates that Abbott, Celltech and Aventis are positioned at the edge of 
their cluster. Abbott, as mentioned above, acquired Knoll the pharmaceutical interests of 
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BASF during 2001. Celltech has been discussed earlier in this chapter and the same 
observations apply. The position of Aventis as an outlier may reflect ongoing 
integration. It was not until 2002 that the divestment of agrochemicals and animal 
nutrition, to leave a "pure play" pharmaceutical company, was completed (Aventis, 
2002). 
Internal cluster validity was determined using the upper tail test, which confirmed that a 
seven cluster solution represented the largest number of significantly different clusters 
at the 5% level; see table 7.30. 
Table 7.30 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
2001 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.91 22.46 
3 clusters 1.92 11.04 
4 clusters 1.84 10.57 
5 clusters 1.34 7.68 
6 clusters 1.08 6.21 
7 clusters 0.85 4.88 
The presence of natural structure within the data was confirmed by bootstrap validation; 
see figure 7.16. This result is not particularly strong when compared to some of the 
other years studied but does confirm presence of a degree of natural structure. When 
bootstrapping was applied to the proximities within the similarity matrix rather than to 
the raw z scored data a stronger result was obtained; see appendix B. 
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Figure 7.15 Bootstrap Validation of 2001 Data 
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The bootstrap tree validation procedure reveals a relatively weak natural structure 
within the data with the 4 cluster solution departing most significantly from random. 
External validation of the strategic groups was then tested by application of the Kruskal 
Wallis one way analysis test to a set of strategic and performance variables not included 
in the cluster analysis; see table 7.31. 
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Table 7.31 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 2001 Strategic Groups 
HSALES RSALES TADV TOP3R TOTPROM 
Chi-Square 12.027 12.519 14.467 13.061 10.498 
df 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.061 0.051 0.025 0.042 0.105 
TOTSALES UDET NPH NPR RSAL 
Chi-Square 10.134 10.590 6.601 11.931 13.170 
df 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 
As m. Sig. 0.119 0.102 0.359 0.064 0.040 
This is a weaker result than recorded in some previous years. Nevertheless, external 
validity of these strategic groupings is confirmed with four of the ten variables - 
advertising spend, top three retail therapy area sales, new products sold into hospital and 
retail sales divided by total sales achieving significance at the 5% level. Three other 
variables - hospital sales, retail sales and new products sold into the retail (GP) sector 
are significant at the 10% level. The strategic groups for 2001 are illustrated in the 
following Dendrogram; see figure 7.17 (Exemplars are again underlined). 
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Figure 7.16 Dendrogram of strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
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7.18 Mergers in 2001 
During 2001 one merger occurred within the companies included in this study. This was 
the sale of Knoll to Abbott as BASF divested its pharmaceutical operation. This merger 
occurred between strategic groups, Knoll is classified within strategic group 2 and 
Abbott is a member of group 4. 
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7.19 Strategic Group Membership in 2002 
The strategic group structure for 2002 is shown in table 7.32. Six groups are identified, 
a position very similar to 2000 and 2001 if we exclude Knoll which appeared as a 
singleton group in 2001. 
Table 7.32 Strategic Groups 2002 
Strategic Ward's Method K Means 
Group 
SG 1: 3M PG SOL AKZO RB 3M PG SOL AKZO RB 
BAY 
SG 2: TAK TAK 
SG 3: BMS JJ LIL EIS SHI YAM NOV PFZ BMS JJ LIL EIS SHI 
WYE IVX MSD YAM NOV PFZ WYE 
IVX MSD SS 
SG 4: ABB SPL NVA AVE PHR ABB SPL NVA AVE 
PHR 
SG 5: AZ BI SS GSK LUN CELL BAY MER AZ BI GSK LUN CELL 
ROC SAG MER ROC SAG 
SG 6: BAX BAX 
The two cluster analyses are in strong agreement with only two reallocations taking 
place. Bayer moves from group 5 to group 1 and Sanofi Synthelabo from group 5 to 3. 
Strategic groups 2,4 and 6 are identical between the two solutions. Once again Takeda 
and Baxter represent singleton groups. 
Outlier analysis identifies six companies - Abbott, Novartis, Lundbeck, Celltech, Bayer 
and E Merck - positioned towards the fringe of their respective groups. Celltech has 
been discussed earlier in this chapter. Abbott acquired the Knoll pharmaceutical 
business in the previous year and may therefore have been engaged in integration. Bayer 
suffered a blow in 2001 when Lipobay, the company's leading product, was withdrawn 
from the market due to side effects and this probably explains the company's shift back 
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into strategic group 1 the "diversified conglomerates", during 2001, where it remained 
in 2002. Such a dramatic change of fortunes is likely to herald a shift in strategic 
priorities. 
Internal group validity was confirmed with the upper tail test, which confirmed the 
presence of six discrete strategic groups that differed significantly at the 5% level; see 
table 7.33. 
Table 7.33 Upper Tail Significance Test showing the correct number of clusters 
2002 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.97 22.46 
3 clusters 2.06 11.68 
4 clusters 1.7 9.63 
5 clusters 1.28 7.27 
6 clusters 1.07 6.02 
The presence of a degree of natural structure in the data set was confirmed by a 
bootstrap validation technique; see figure 7.18. 
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Figure 7.17 Bootstrap Validation of 2002 Data 
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This bootstrap tree validation procedure reveals a strong natural structure within the 
data which differs most significantly from random at the 7 cluster solution, four of the 
tree partitions significantly at the 5% level from the confidence level constructed around 
the mean of a random sample. 
External validity of the strategic groups was then tested by applying the Kruskal Wallis 
one way analysis of variance test to twelve strategic and performance variables not 
included in the cluster analysis. The results of this test are shown in table 7.34. 
341 
Bootstrap Validation Without Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
Table 7.34 Kruskal Wallis test of external validity of 2001 Strategic Groups 
RSALES TADV TOP3R TOTPROM TOTSALES UDET 
Chi-Square 10.966 9.513 11.283 11.164 10.797 11.975 
df 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
Asymp. Sig. 0.052 0.090 0.046 0.048 0.056 0.035 
NPH NPR RSAL MERGER SHARE WMS 
Chi-Square 16.637 15.227 16.332 10.907 10.797 8.912 
df 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
As . Sig. 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.053 0.056 0.113 
This is a strong result which confirms the external validity of these strategic groups. Six 
out of the twelve variables achieve significance at the 5% level or better. Four of the 
remaining variables -RSALES, TOTSALES, SHARE and MERGER - narrowly miss 
significance at the 5% level but achieve significance at the 10% level. Two of these - 
MERGER and SHARE - triangulate well with the performance tests applied to the 
second stable strategic time period in the last chapter; see chapter six. Weighted market 
share, which specifically measures the performance of niche strategies, narrowly misses 
significance at the 10% level. See chapter five for a more detailed discussion of 
weighted market share. The strategic groups for 2002 are illustrated in the following 
Dendrogram. 
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Figure 7.18 Dendrogram of strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
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7.20 Mergers in 2002. 
In 2002 one merger occurred within the companies included in this study. Pfizer 
acquired Pharmacia Upjohn. This acquisition followed the same pattern observed for 
Warner Lambert, where having successfully co-marketed the company's leading 
product, in this case Celebrex, Pfizer launched a bid for the company. This acquisition 
occurred between strategic groups, Pfizer is in group 3 while Pharmacia is a member of 
group 4. 
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7.21 Mergers during the period 1993 - 2002. 
Eighteen mergers occurred between pharmaceutical companies during the duration of 
this study; see table 7.35. 
Table 7.35 Pharmaceutical mergers 1993-2002 
MERGER TARGET ACQUIRER SG SAME SG DIFFERENT 
Roche - Syntex 4 9 0 1 
AHP - Lederle 5 4 0 1 
RPR - Fisons 1 3 0 1 
Knoll - Boots 4 2 0 1 
Pharmacia - Upjohn 6 6 1 0 
Hoechst - MMD 4 3 0 1 
Glaxo - Wellcome 6 6 1 0 
Ciba-Geigy Sandoz 2 8 0 1 
Roche - Boe Mann 2 6 0 1 
Astra - Zeneca 2 7 0 1 
Sanofi - Lorex 2 6 0 1 
Hoechst - RPR 5 5 1 0 
Pharmacia - Searle 5 7 0 1 
Pfizer - Warner 3 8 0 1 
GW - SKB 3 7 0 1 
BMS - Dupont 6 4 0 1 
Abbott - Knoll 2 4 0 1 
Pfizer - Pharmacia 4 3 0 1 
It is interesting to note that of these eighteen mergers only three - Glaxo Wellcome, 
Pharmacia Upjohn and Hoechst Rhone Poulenc - occurred between companies within 
the same strategic group. This result is significant at the 0.00 1% level; see table 7.34. 
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Table 7.36 Fisher's Exact Test on Pharmaceutical Mergers Within or Between 
Strategic Groups 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 18 1 0.000 
Continuity Correction 11.52 1 0.001 
Likelihood Ratio 16.2202 1 0.000 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.001 0.001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 17 1 0.000 
N of Valid Cases 18 
Fisher's Exact test was employed due to the small numbers. 
"The Fisher exact probability test is an extremely useful nonparametric 
technique for analyzing discrete data (either nominal or ordinal) when the two 
independent samples are small in size. It is used when ... every subject in both 
groups obtains one of two possible scores"(Siegel, 1956. p96). 
7.22 Dynamics between strategic groups 
Previous research (Caves et al., 1977; Porter, 1979) posits that firms will enter an 
industry via the lowest mobility barrier and seek to improve their market position 
through moving into the next most profitable strategic group. This premise is tested here 
by comparing strategic group membership between adjacent years, or stable time 
periods, and classifying firms into one of the following groups. 
CHANGE; Denotes a single firm moving from one strategic group to 
another. 
SPLIT: Denotes two or more firms moving into another strategic group. 
STAY: Denotes a firm that remains in its original strategic group and 
does not change position. 
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Each firm was also classified as to whether this positional change marked a move into a 
more profitable group or into a strategic group that was either equal to or less profitable 
than the group previously occupied. The mean value of each strategic group in terms of 
total sales was taken as a proxy for profit so if the total sales for all members in the 
group was 500,000 and there were four group members the mean value was 125,000. 
(Market sales are a quite crude proxy for profit but at UK level data the corporate 
annual reports are not applicable and no UK level profit data is in the public domain) 
Therefore a firm moving from a strategic group where the average total sales across all 
group members was 150,000, moving to a group with average sales of 175,000 would 
be classified as a move to a more profitable group. Figure 7.20 shows the number of 
changes by category that occurred throughout the study period. 
Figure 7.20 Dynamics of Firms Between Strategic Groups 1993 - 2002 
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The above figure shows that the industry went through a marked period of change 
during the period 1993 - 2002. Initially this change was marked by a large number of 
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individual firm movements, but from 1996 onwards it was more common for groups of 
firms to break away from their current strategic group and to move in concert. It is 
interesting to note that from 1998 onwards the number of firms changing position 
decreased sharply. This result agrees with the break between stable strategic time 
periods discussed in the previous chapter (see also the discussion on external 
environmental variables in chapter 3). 
Figure 7.21 shows the balance between those firms which moved to a more profitable 
market position, and those that did not. 
Figure 7.21 Do Firms Moving Group Improve Their Market Position? 
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This figure shows that when firms moved position they generally improved their market 
position. Note that the number of firms which moved to a similarly performing or less 
well performing group only exceeded those improving their position in one time period 
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1996 - 1997, although the balance between more and less profitable moves was about 
equal in 1999 - 2000. 
The changes that occurred between strategic groups across all years were tested using 
the Chi Squared statistic and the results are shown in the following tables, 7.24 to 7.29. 
Table 7.37 Analysis of all cases where companies changed and improved 
position 
CHANGE UP - ALL 
CASES 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.900782 1 0.048 
Continuity Correction(a) 3.392033 1 0.066 
Likelihood Ratio 3.830697 1 0.050 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.061639 0.033574 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.888705 1 0.049 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 29.59. 
Note that for a2x2 table the significance figure taken is that of the continuity 
correction statistic, which is marked in this and the following tables in bold. 
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Table 7.38 Analysis of all cases where companies changed and moved to a less 
profitable position. 
CHANGE = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.574905 1 0.209 
Continuity Correction(a) 1.255238 1 0.263 
Likelihood Ratio 1.552239 1 0.213 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.227093 0.131577 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.570029 1 0.210 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 28.34. 
Table 7.39 Analysis of all cases where companies split and improved position 
SPLIT UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.022466 1 0.881 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.000868 1 0.977 
Likelihood Ratio 0.022446 1 0.881 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.904498 0.487035 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.022397 1 0.881 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 42.38. 
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Table 7.40 Analysis of all cases where companies split and moved to a less 
profitable position. 
SPLIT = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.118907 1 0.730 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.049834 1 0.823 
Likelihood Ratio 0.118639 1 0.731 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.807945 0.410439 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.118539 1 0.731 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 40.58. 
Table 7.41 Analysis of all cases where companies remained in the same strategic 
group and improved position 
STAY UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.289642 1 0.130 
Continuity Correction(a) 1.945668 1 0.163 
Likelihood Ratio 2.309789 1 0.129 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.155761 0.081123 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.282553 1 0.131 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 46.40. 
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Table 7.42 Analysis of all cases where companies remained in the same strategic 
group and profits deteriorated. 
STAY = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.054528 1 0.044 
Continuity Correction(a) 3.587845 1 0.058 
Likelihood Ratio 4.111345 1 0.043 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.055784 0.028522 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
4.041975 1 0.044 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 44.43. 
The above tables show that the number of companies changing strategic groups and 
improving their position was significant at the 10% level. The result for the 
combinations - changing to a lower position, split up, split down and stay up - were not 
statistically significant. Those companies that remained in their strategic group and 
during the next year performed in a similar way or whose position deteriorated was 
significant at the 10% level. These results for the entire data set across all years provide 
limited support for the theory proposed by Caves and Porter (1977), namely that firms 
which move from one strategic group to another generally improve their market 
position. 
The changes that occurred between strategic groups during the period 1993 - 1997 were 
tested using the Chi Squared statistic and the results are shown in the following tables, 
7.30 to 7.35. Again the relevant statistic is highlighted in bold. 
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Table 7.43 Analysis of cases between 1993 and 1997 where companies moved 
strategic group and improved position 
CHANGE UP 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.08496 1 0.771 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.010963 1 0.917 
Likelihood Ratio 0.084861 1 0.771 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.457433 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.084316 1 0.772 
N of Valid Cases 132 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 19.22. 
Table 7.44 Analysis of cases between 1993 and 1997 where companies moved 
strategic group and profitability declined. 
CHANGE = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.361132 1 0.548 
Continuity 
Correction(a) 
0.169806 1 0.680 
Likelihood Ratio 0.363162 1 0.547 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.576458 0.341525 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.358396 1 0.549 
N of Valid Cases 132 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 17.59. 
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Table 7.45 Analysis of cases between 1993 and 1997 where companies split 
strategic group and improved position 
SPLIT UP 
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.117982 1 0.731 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.027681 1 0.868 
Likelihood Ratio 0.117926 1 0.731 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.859529 0.433611 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.117089 1 0.732 
N of Valid Cases 132 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 25.03. 
Table 7.46 Analysis of cases between 1993 and 1997 where companies split 
strategic group and either remained the same or their relative profitability 
deteriorated. 
SPLIT = OR DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.560922 1 0.454 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.32473 1 0.569 
Likelihood Ratio 0.560027 1 0.454 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.478385 0.284115 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.556672 1 0.456 
N of Valid Cases 132 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 22.91. 
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Table 7.47 Analysis of cases between 1993 and 1997 where companies remained 
in the same strategic group and improved position 
STAY UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.019941 1 0.888 
Continuity Correction(a) 0 1 1.000 
Likelihood Ratio 0.019924 1 0.888 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.5214 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.01979 1 0.888 
N of Valid Cases 132 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 15.64. 
Table 7.48 Analysis of cases between 1993 and 1997 where companies remained 
in the same strategic group and their relative profitability declined or they 
remained the same as before. 
STAY = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.864348 1 0.353 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.531702 1 0.466 
Likelihood Ratio 0.875951 1 0.349 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.424456 0.233966 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.8578 1 0.354 
N of Valid Cases 132 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 14.32. 
None of the results illustrated in tables 7.30 to 7.35 achieve statistical significance. The 
results for the same analysis for the time period 1998 - 2002 are shown in tables 7.36 to 
7.41. 
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Table 7.49 Analysis of cases between 1998 and 2002 where companies changed 
strategic group and improved position 
CHANGE UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.260539 1 0.039 
Continuity Correction(a) 3.489296 1 0.062 
Likelihood Ratio 4.06792 1 0.044 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.032884 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.238232 1 0.040 
N of Valid Cases 191 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 11.74. 
Table 7.50 Analysis of cases between 1998 and 2002 where companies changed 
strategic group and either remained the same or their relative profitability 
declined 
CHANGE = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.260539 1 0.039 
Continuity Correction(a) 3.489296 1 0.062 
Likelihood Ratio 4.06792 1 0.044 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.049727 0.032884 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.238232 1 0.040 
N of Valid Cases 191 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 11.74. 
I 
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Table 7.51 Analysis of cases between 1998 and 2002 where companies split 
strategic group and improved position 
SPLIT UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.267868 1 0.605 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.121708 1 0.727 
Likelihood Ratio 0.270263 1 0.603 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.736036 0.366399 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.266465 1 0.606 
N of Valid Cases 191 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 18.53. 
Table 7.52 Analysis of cases between 1998 and 2002 where companies split 
strategic group and their relative profitability remained the same or declined. 
SPLIT = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 0.267868 1 0.605 
Continuity Correction(a) 0.121708 1 0.727 
Likelihood Ratio 0.270263 1 0.603 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.736036 0.366399 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.266465 1 0.606 
N of Valid Cases 191 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 18.53. 
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Table 7.53 Analysis of cases between 1998 and 2002 where companies remained 
in their strategic group and improved position 
STAY UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.918091 1 0.166 
Continuity Correction(a) 1.508579 1 0.219 
Likelihood Ratio 1.927526 1 0.165 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.209939 0.109528 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.908049 1 0.167 
N of Valid Cases 191 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 28.42. 
Table 7.54 Analysis of cases between 1998 and 2002 where companies changed 
strategic group and their relative profitability remained the same or declined. 
STAY = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.918091 1 0.166 
Continuity Correction(a) 1.508579 1 0.219 
Likelihood Ratio 1.927526 1 0.165 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.209939 0.109528 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.908049 1 0.167 
N of Valid Cases 191 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
ex ected count is 28.42. 
The results for change in either direction are significant at the 10% level. All the other 
results presented in these six tables fail to achieve statistical significance. The difference 
between this time period, 1998 - 2002, as compared to the previous time period, again 
supports the findings presented earlier, that the operating conditions are different for the 
pharmaceutical industry across these two time periods. 
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Finally, total change was tested by combining the results for split and change. These 
results for the ten year period, 1993 - 2002, are presented in tables 7.42 to 7.45 below. 
Table 7.55 Analysis of all cases (combining change and split) where companies 
remained in the same strategic group and their relative profitability improved 
STAY UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.289642 1 0.130 
Continuity Correction(a) 1.945668 1 0.163 
Likelihood Ratio 2.309789 1 0.129 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.155761 0.081123 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.282553 1 0.131 
N of Valid Cases 323 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 46.40. 
Table 7.56 Analysis of all cases (combining change and split) where companies 
remained in the same strategic group and their relative profitability remained the 
same or declined 
STAY = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.054528 1 0.044 
Continuity Correction(a) 3.587845 1 0.058 
Likelihood Ratio 4.111345 1 0.043 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.055784 0.028522 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.041975 1 0.044 
N of Valid Cases 323 
A Computed only for a 2x2 table 
B 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 44.43. 
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Table 7.57 Analysis of all cases (combining change and split) where companies 
changed strategic group and improved position 
CHANGE UP 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.619677 1 0.057 
Continuity Correction(a) 3.182992 1 0.074 
Likelihood Ratio 3.663218 1 0.056 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.059322 0.036659 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.608471 1 0.057 
N of Valid Cases 323 
A Computed only for a 2x2 table 
B 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 46.03. 
Table 7.58 Analysis of all cases (combining change and split) where companies 
changed strategic group and their relative profitability remained the same or 
declined 
CHANGE = DOWN 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.115198 1 0.146 
Continuity Correction(a) 1.781634 1 0.182 
Likelihood Ratio 2.135461 1 0.144 
Fisher's Exact Test 0.153231 0.090563 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.108649 1 0.146 
N of Valid Cases 323 
A Computed only for a 2x2 table 
B 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 44.08. 
These results show a statistically significant result at the 10% level for firms that hold 
position and either maintain or move down in relative profitability and those which 
change position and improve their market position. The remaining two combinations - 
change and lower or equal profitability and stay and move up in profitability - did not 
show a statistically significant relationship. 
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7.23 Conclusions 
During the ten years included within this study, the pharmaceutical industry was subject 
to a high degree of turbulence as eighteen mergers shaped the new industry structure. It 
was shown in the previous chapter that merger status between strategic groups appears 
to be a significant strategic variable and one which was excluded from previous 
strategic group research. The research presented in this chapter demonstrates that 
mergers represent an important strategic option within the pharmaceutical industry. 
Furthermore, mergers do not appear to occur randomly across strategic groups but occur 
preferentially between, rather than within strategic groups. The eighteen mergers that 
occurred between the firms included in this study occurred within nine of the ten years 
studied. Although merger activity was concentrated within two waves of consolidation, 
centred on 1995 and 1999, only in one year, 1993, were no mergers recorded. This 
degree of turbulence in the industry means that a good deal of the industry dynamics, 
which strategic group analysis can illustrate, may be lost if mergers are excluded from a 
strategic group analysis and years are consolidated within stable strategic time periods. 
This research does, however, support the earlier finding that two distinct stable time 
periods existed within the industry during the ten years studied. The first time period, 
1993 - 1997, was notably more turbulent, in terms of firms moving market position, 
than the second time period from 1998- 2002. An analysis carried out on the 
performance implications of firms' movements between groups, found limited support 
for the theory that firms move from a lower to a higher performing strategic group, at 
least as measured by sales. 
The number of strategic groups declined over the period from nine in 1993-1994 down 
to six in 2002. This result reflects an effect of the mergers, which effectively reduced 
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the number of firms present in the industry and consolidated strategic choices. In 
addition, as the external environmental changes outlined in chapter three progressed, 
companies learned from each other's actions and their own experiences. This led to 
firms gravitating around established ways of competing. 
Examination of the dynamics of the strategic groups and the firms within them support 
the presence of an inner core of members following the typical strategy for that group 
closely and an outer group of fringe members. The latter appear either not wholly 
committed to the group strategy e. g. Celltech, or are in the process of a strategic shift or 
are consolidating their position after a major event such as a merger e. g. Roche, or the 
withdrawal of a major product e. g. Bayer. In either case outlier analysis appears to be a 
useful technique to study these within-group shifts in position. 
When changes between groups occur they can simply involve one firm moving between 
groups e. g. Warner Lambert in 1999, or more frequently a group may cleave into two or 
more distinct splinters of two or more members which follow a similar strategy, but 
different to the earlier strategy adopted by the strategic group. Groups of specific firms 
frequently appear together in the same strategic group and these groupings appear very 
stable over a number of years, for example the grouping of 3M, Procter & Gamble, 
Akzo Nobel, Reckitt Benkisser and Solvay within the diversified conglomerates. Such 
stable groups of strongly linked firms may form "anchor points" around which industry 
structure changes and the industry's competitive dynamics revolve. Firms that are closer 
to the anchor may find it more difficult to shift position and hence it may be expected 
that the closer a firm is to one of these anchor points the slower the change. Industry 
dynamics therefore appear to be fluid, but these changes appear to occur more rapidly 
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away from the strategic positions marked out by stable strategic groups around which 
such dynamics revolve. 
Other strongly associated firms are Yamanouchi, Schering Plough, Abbott or Merck 
Sharpe & Dohme, Pfizer and Glaxo and Pharmacia. These groups act as consolidated 
strategic positions that form the "seed points" around which strategic groupings emerge. 
However, the dynamics of these groupings across the years could not be followed in 
detail without deconstructing merged firms within the industry and reconstructing the 
industry structure that existed during the year in question. 
This study suggests that a number of discrete strategic positions occurred within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry during the period 1993 - 2002. At the stable end of a continuum 
is the diversified conglomerate group typified by 3M, whose members have limited 
exposure to pharmaceuticals. Examination of the Dendrograms indicates that this is 
invariably the strategic group which is identified first by the clustering process. A 
second common group consists of companies like Yamanouchi, Schering Plough and 
Eisai. These companies are focused upon pharmaceuticals, largely within the general 
practitioner segment. A third common group of more focused segment specialists 
appears populated by companies like Lundbeck, Schering AG and Boehringer 
Ingelheim. While at the two extremes of the market there are the niche players, such as 
Celltech or Baxter, and the merging "super heavyweights". Some of these heavyweights 
display a strong hospital presence - typified by Glaxo, Pharmacia, Aventis or Roche - 
others are more GP focused competitors, like MSD, Pfizer and Astra Zeneca. 
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In concluding this chapter, the number of industry positions, as illustrated by strategic 
groups, appears over time to have become consolidated around a smaller number of 
viable positions in UK pharmaceuticals. A major driver of this process appears to have 
been merger and acquisition, a process largely excluded from previous pharmaceutical- 
based strategic group studies. These mergers were largely conducted between 
companies in different strategic groups, an observation that may suggest a motive to 
strengthen their new product pipeline by acquiring the research of another firm e. g. 
Pfizer's acquisition of Warner Lambert, or risk reduction through spreading activities 
across a broader range of products e. g. Pfizer's acquisition of Pharmacia. 
Strategic groups appear commonly to consist of subsets of companies whose moves 
closely mirror each other, as illustrated by smaller groups of associated companies that 
appear to move in concert. Within a strategic group there also appears to be an inner 
group closely following the core strategy and an outer group, which either appears less 
committed to the group's "typical" pattern of strategic choices or is in the process of 
conducting some sort of strategic shift. Here, outlier analysis appears useful to identify 
groups on the fringe of strategic groupings. It may also be that if the distance between 
group members can be taken as a proxy for commitment to the group strategy, some 
strategic groups are denser than others. These reflect a strong common commitment to a 
core strategic position. Other more diffuse positions may be more ephemeral and 
therefore easier to penetrate, i. e. have lower entry and exit barriers than others. This 
point may be illustrated by the observation that both Shire and Eisai joined the same 
strategic group on their entry into the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
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This chapter presents the research based around two main themes, namely industry 
dynamics and mergers within the UK pharmaceutical industry. The results show that 
industry positions may change from year to year. This implies that strategic groups are 
not necessarily an entirely stable element of intra-industry structure within a given time 
period. The inclusion of merged firms within the dataset allowed this dynamic to be 
seen. This observation goes against the idea that all mobility barriers represent relatively 
permanent structures and supports the idea, expressed in chapter 5, that some mobility 
barriers are more difficult to breach than others. Rather company positions, and strategic 
groups change as strategic investments are adjusted in order to capitalize upon emerging 
opportunities. 
Such a degree of industry turbulence is not unknown in earlier strategic group research, 
see for example Fiegenbaum's study of the US insurance industry (Fiegenbaum, 1987) 
or Oster (1982). However, a rather more turbulent picture for the pharmaceutical 
industry has been identified than found in previous strategic group studies - Cool 
(1985) for example identified stable strategic time periods (SSTPs) of 3 to 7 years 
duration, Martens (1988) of 4 years duration and Bogner (1991) from 4 to 7 years. But 
these studies did not include merged firms, a decision which in effect "smoothed" out 
some of the underlying industry dynamics. 
The findings reported in this chapter therefore suggest that the pharmaceutical industry 
may be more turbulent than previously reported in studies of pharmaceuticals in the US. 
A second finding for further strategic group research is that these results do not appear 
to support the model proposed by Mehra & Floyd (1998), that strategic groups tend to 
occur in stable industries with strong product differentiation. In effect the results 
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suggest that industries do change their character and that it is important for the 
researcher to allow such changes to be accommodated within the research design. Aside 
from mergers which are a legitimate and significant strategic option, new entrants (such 
as in UK pharmaceuticals Eisai, Shire and Takeda in 1997), are also important elements 
of industry structure. 
The results also indicate that strategic groups are not equally stable - some are more 
volatile than others. Industry structure therefore may be depicted as a constellation 
where strategic groups represent clusters of stars and where distance from the centre 
implies a greater degree of freedom where movement and group shifts largely occur. All 
strategic groups therefore do not appear equally stable and the research suggests that 
some may change little from year to year - such as SG 1 in UK pharmaceuticals 
consisting of the diversified corporations 3M, Procter & Gamble, Reckitt Benkisser, 
Akzo Nobel, Solvay act as anchor points around which other strategic group positions 
move. Thus, just as strategic groups have an inner and outer group of firms, so the 
industry consists of an inner collection of strategic groups and an outer grouping where 
firms are more liable to shift position more frequently. 
Emerging strategic groups may start from one or two firms, which pursuing a different 
strategy, act as "seed positions", where if the strategy is successful it attracts imitation 
and the group grows in importance and relative strength (Porter, 1976; 1979). 
These positional shifts appeared more common in the first half of the study period, 
where from 1998 onwards the number of firms in UK pharmaceuticals changing 
position decreased rapidly. This may reflect the "damping" effect of mergers or 
alternatively could be due to firms gravitating to and consolidating around successful 
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market positions. The role of mergers and their relationship with strategic groups may 
therefore be a worthwhile area for future study. 
Implications for strategy which emerge from this research are the value of strategic 
groups as a means to map industry dynamics, where outlier analysis may provide a 
useful signal to a change in future strategic intent. As illustrated, for example, by the 
positional shift observed by Roche in 1996 or Abbott in 2000, immediately prior to their 
acquisition of Boehringer Mannheim, and Knoll, respectively. It is also interesting to 
observe that of the eighteen mergers which occurred in the duration of this study, only 
three occurred between members of the same strategic group and that these were 
generally regarded as some of the industries least successful mergers (Lehman 2000). 
The observation that of these eighteen, fifteen mergers were between members of 
different strategic groups also implies that the motive for the mergers was primarily 
acquisition of new products to bolster flagging product pipelines rather than, as often 
reported, to gain synergies in research (Henderson, 2000). 
In the next chapter the relationship between strategic groups - how you compete - and 
competitive groups - where you compete - is explored. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITIVE GROUPS AND 
STRATEGIC GROUPS WITHIN THE UK PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters of this thesis have been concerned with the identification of 
strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry. Strategic groups classify firms 
according to the pattern of investment decisions that each firm makes. (See Chapter 2 
for a fuller discussion on the strategic group concept. ) In contrast, the aim of this 
chapter is to identify competitive groups within the UK pharmaceutical industry. The 
difference between strategic groups and competitive groups is that strategic group 
membership relates to the strategic choices deployed i. e. the how of strategy, while 
competitive groups relates to where the strategy is deployed i. e. the choice of market 
segments in which the firm has chosen to compete. 
In chapter four, reference was made to the fact that while all pharmaceutical firms 
compete for time in front of the doctor, the true locus of competition occurs where one 
remedy directly replaces another. Thus competition within the pharmaceutical industry 
is strongly related to which markets a firm competes within. Managers frequently 
construct mental maps of their industry based upon those firms which they perceive as 
direct competitors. (see chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of cognitive groups. ) 
The therapy areas that a firm chooses to compete in are particularly important in the 
pharmaceutical industry, for a number of reasons. First, to research a new drug is both a 
very costly and time consuming process, where each additional area of therapeutic 
research has both a very significant entry cost, to climb the learning curve and be able to 
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contribute to leading-edge science, and a relatively low spillover to other areas of the 
company's research. As discussed earlier, even the largest firms struggle to compete in 
more than six or seven of the 16 therapy areas and there is evidence to suggest that 
beyond six therapeutic areas the law of diminishing returns sets in (Henderson et al., 
1994). (See chapter 4 for a fuller discussion). 
Second, according to Porter (1979; 1980) it may be expected that firms which compete 
for the same customers, but which deploy different strategies, will be more likely to 
engage in damaging competition because they are less likely to understand the rival 
firm's signals and motives. If, however, competing firms belong to the same strategic 
group they are more likely to understand each others motives and reach an 
accommodation rather than compete on price (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979; Porter, 1980). 
In contrast, firms which compete for different customers are likely to be spared many 
aspects of direct competition because the therapeutic group structure of the 
pharmaceutical market effectively restricts competition. The combination of strategic 
group and competitive group membership, therefore, aids our understanding of industry 
competition. 
Previous strategic group research in the pharmaceutical industry concentrates upon the 
number and relative importance of IMS therapeutic areas as a point of distinction 
between firms (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). These 16 therapeutic areas 
are examined in the next section of this chapter. 
An alternative approach is to examine the relationships between the firm's sub-therapy 
area choices, because these represent the true locus of competition, as explained earlier 
(see chapter 4). This is where one product directly displaces another. To examine this 
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phenomenon requires examination of 277 sub-therapeutic areas so that firms that 
directly compete can be identified. 
To carry out both of these analyses, the source data was the IMS database which, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, groups firms together as they are currently configured 
i. e. as if the mergers (detailed in the previous chapter) had never occurred. 
8.2 Competitive groups based upon IMS therapy areas. 
8.2.1 Stable Strategic Time Periods. 
In order to ascertain if stable strategic time periods relevant to competitive groups were 
present in the data set, the method used to ascertain SSTPs in the two previous chapters 
was adopted. The matrices compared for each year consisted of thirty three firms each 
measured in terms of that year's sales within each of sixteen therapeutic area variables, 
detailed below. The firms' included within this research are shown in table 8.1, and the 
therapeutic area variables in table 8.2. 
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Table 8.1 Companies used to identify competitive groups 
ABBREVIATION COMPANY 
3M 
ABB Abbott Uboratories 
AKZ Akzn Nobel 
AVE Aventis 
AZ Astra Zenecn 
BAX 
BAY 
BI 
BMS 
CEL Celiterb 
EIS 
GSK 
IVX 
JJ 
LIL 
LUN T. undheck 
MER 
MSD 
NOV Novo Phqrmqc! eutic-alq 
NVA 
PFZ Pfi7er 
PG 
PHA Pharmacla 
RB 
ROC Rnc-h 
SAG 
SHI Shirt- Phsrmneentical-s 
SOL Ss'nivav 
SP Schering Ploiifyh 
SS 
TAK Tnkf-da 
WYE 
YAM 
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Table 82 IMS Therapeutic Areas4l 
CODE ANATOMICAL CLASSIFICATION 
A Alimentary tract and metabolism 
B Blood and blood forming organs 
C Cardiovascular system 
D Dermatologicals 
G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones 
H Systemic hormonal preparations 
J Systemic antibiotics 
K Hospital solutions 
L Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents 
M Musculo-skeletal system 
N Central nervous system 
P Parasitology 
R Respiratory system 
S Sensory organs 
T Diagnostic agents 
V Various 
The test for stable strategic time periods involved testing each year's matrices, 
consisting of 33 companies by 16 variables against the next year's matrices, using 
Box's M test. In the event that no change was found, the matrices for the two years were 
averaged and then compared against the next year. The result of this analysis is shown 
in table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Test for stable strategic time periods 
93 vs 94 94 vs 95 95 vs 96 96 vs 97 97 vs 98 98 vs 99 
N 33 " 33 33 33 33 33 
Box's M 34.9 173.466 102.852 51.998 35.494 32.07 
F 0.188 0.934 0.554 0.28 0.191 0.173 
dfl 136 136 136 136 136 136 
df2 12648.85 12648.85 12648.85 12648.845 12648.845 12648.85 
Si Q. 1.000 0.696 1.000 1 1.000 1.000 
_ 99 vs 00 00 vs 01 01 vs 02 93 vs Av 94-02 02 vs Av 93-01 
Box's M 33 33 33 33 33 
N 44.679 63.558 88.489 225.834 192.295 
F 0.241 0.342 0.477 1.201 1.035 
dfl 136 136 136 136 136 
df2 12648.85 12648.85 12648.85 11870.645 12648.845 
-Sig. 
1.000 1.000 1.000 0.056 0.372 
43 Source - (IMS, 1999) pages 1-21 
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No significant breaks were found between years within the dataset. This is perhaps not a 
surprising result given that the decision to research a new therapeutic area is not taken 
lightly and given the dearth of new chemical entities (see chapter 4 for a discussion of 
this point), competitive groups are not expected to change as frequently as strategic 
choices. This is because it takes considerable time to build a position in a new therapy 
area given that new chemical entities take on average some ten to twelve years to reach 
the market, and that licensed products are invariably offered to companies with an 
established track record in that area. 
8.2.2 Identification of competitive groups 
Therapy area sales for each company were used to separate companies into competitive 
groups. The method adopted differed from that used to cluster strategic groups in 
chapters 6 and 7 above, in two main ways. First, the similarity coefficient used to group 
companies into clusters was Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient, not the 
Euclidean distance metric. This is to show patterns based upon similarities in the shape 
of companies' therapeutic profiles rather than pure size differences. This choice was 
made because for competitive groups the point of interest is whether a company is 
active within that therapy area or not. Not the size of their investment in that market per 
se. 
"The correlation coefficient is frequently described as a shape measurement, in 
that it is insensitive to differences in the magnitude of variables used to compute 
the coefficient" (Aldenderfer et at, 1984. p 23). 
The second stage is that this similarity matrix was then clustered using Ward's method 
utilizing Euclidean distance. This approach is outlined by Aldenderfer and Blashfield. 
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"The basic strategy is ... that proposed by Guertin (1966), in which correlation is 
used to create homogeneous groups based on shape, and each shape group is 
then divided with a distance measure into subgroups with similar size and 
dispersion characteristics"(Aldenderfer et al., 1984. p 26). 
Here, the clustering into competitive groups is based upon data for the year 2002 
because, as described in the previous section, no significant differences were found 
between years. The result of clustering into competitive groups is shown in Table 8.4 
Table 8.4 Competitive groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
Competitive Group Constituent Firms 
CG: 1 3M IVX GSK BI SP 
CG: 2 ABB ROC BAX PG 
CG: 3 JJ LUN LIL SS NVA PHA 
CG: 4 AKZ YAM SAG 
CG: 5 AZ EIS SHI WYE SOL NOV RB 
CG: 6 AVE BMS PFZ MSD CEL TAK BAY MER 
The internal validity of this cluster solution was confirmed utilizing the upper tail 
significance test. These results are presented in table 8.5. 
Table 8.5 Upper tail significance test on competitive groups 
Partition Deviate t-Statistic 
2 clusters 3.45 19.49 
3 clusters 2.64 14.91 
4 clusters 2.15 12.19 
5 clusters 1.18 6.7 
6 clusters 0.83 4.71 
The presence of a natural structure within the data was confirmed by bootstrap 
validation, see figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 Validation of Natural Structure 
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This bootstrapping process, provides a test for structure within the data set. It compares 
a tree obtained for a given dataset with the family of trees generated by random 
permutation of the same data or the associated proximity matrix. The solid at the bottom 
of the graph shows the fusion values corresponding to the actual data as presented. The 
band above, encompassed by the next two lines above the first solid line shows the 
fusion values corresponding to the actual data as presented. The most outer line marks 
a band that shows the range of fusion values obtained from 120 trials of randomising 
the data; in this confidence interval, . 
Here, the central line represents the mean of the 
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fusion values for each number of clusters, obtained from the random trials. The width 
of this second band is therefore, I standard deviation about the mean. Between 5 and 4 
clusters, and directly above 8 clusters a fine additional zone can barely be seen This 
additional zone shows where the fusion values for the given data depart significantly 
from random. In this case of the most significant departure from random occurs at 4 
clusters. This is because the fusion value at 4 clusters represents the largest difference 
from the mean for all partitions. However, we note that 5 of the total number of 
partitions present in the data are significant at the 5% level 
Examination of the cluster profiles for the six competitive groups is interesting and 
suggests that competition in the pharmaceutical industry is strongly affected by the 
choice of therapeutic area. The result for competitive group 1 is shown in figure 8.2. 
(For key to this figure see table 8.2 above. ) 
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Figure 8.2 Competitive Group 1 
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This group has a clear therapeutic profile concentrated upon sales of respiratory 
products (R), as shown by the cluster means for competitive group 1. Strong support for 
this position is provided by Glaxo Smith Kline, which has an extremely strong franchise 
in respiratory medicine, worth £ 448.5 million in the UK alone. For this company 
Seretide drove sales in 2002 representing 24.9% of respiratory sales and growing at 
51 % per annum (IMS, 2002). On a smaller scale, 3M won an award for the design of its 
asthma inhaler Qvar, which represented 31.6% of its UK sales, growing at 37% a year. 
Another company Ivax markets branded generic products based upon novel inhaler 
designs where 55.7% of the company's UK sales come from Beclazone, an inhaled 
steroid for Asthma (IMS, 2002). By contrast, Boehringer Ingelheim has a strong 
tradition of respiratory medicines including Duovent, Oxivent and Spiriva. 
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All of these companies are direct competitors, although the Boehringer products also act 
as complements to products of larger competitors. In contrast, Schering Plough has a 
slightly different focus. It focuses not on Asthma but on hay fever with its products 
Clarityn and Neoclarityn. These constituted 43% of the company's UK sales in 2002 
(IMS, 2002). Schering Plough competes directly in the hay fever market against Glaxo 
Smith Kline's Beconase and Flixonase together with Ivax's hay fever range. 
Competitive group 2 exhibits a far more generalist profile which is shown in figure 8.3. 
Figure 8.3 Competitive group 2 
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Here, there is a much broader base of activity with diagnostic agents [therapy area T] 
the largest group, accounting for on average only 18% of sales. This position is 
supported by a strong presence across a large number of therapeutic areas. Roche is a 
strong competitor typical of this group with its broad focus on Diagnostics, which was 
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strengthened by the acquisition of Boehringer Mannheim in 1997, together with Xenical 
its product for obesity, which represented 30% of UK sales in 2002, and its range of 
specialist hospital products. Abbott, on the other hand, is a strong contender in 
Alimentary, Diagnostic and Antibiotic products. 
Competitive group 3 is illustrated in figure 8.4. 
Figure 8.4 Competitive Group 3 
Therapeutic Profile of Competitive Group 3 
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This group consists of firms focused around the provision of CNS (Central Nervous 
System) products, where Lilly was famous for Prozac. In 2002 this still represented 
67.7% of its Dista division's, sales despite losing a large proportion of revenue due to 
patent expiry. 
Competitive group four is shown in Figure 8.4. 
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Figure 8.4 Competitive Group 4 
Here, the dominance of therapy area G [Genito urinary system and sex hormones] is 
striking. The companies in this competitive group include Akzo Nobel, where 
approximately 64% of the company's 2002 pharmaceutical sales are derived from 
women's health, principally contraception and fertility products. The other two 
companies Schering AG and Yamanouchi each derive approximately 80% of their sales 
from this market segment (IMS, 2002). 
Competitive group five is shown in figure Figure 8.5. 
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Figure 8.5 Competitive group 5 
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Here, the dominance of products for alimentary complaints is striking, accounting for 
45% of mean sales. Companies in this group include Wyeth, which derives 50% of its 
sales from Zoton a proton pump inhibitor for ulcers and oesophageal reflux, and Solvay 
where 45% of its sales are derived from products like Colofac for irritable bowel 
syndrome. 
Competitive group six is shown in figure 8.6. 
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Figure 8.6 Competitive Group 6 
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Cardiovascular medicine (C) is the largest single market within the UK pharmaceutical 
industry and competitive group six contains the industry specialists in this area. This is a 
highly competitive market dominated by the large US firms, notably Bristol Myers 
Squibb, Merck Sharpe and Dohme, and Pfizer. These three firms derive in excess of 
70%, 64% and 74% of their revenues, respectively, from sales of cardiovascular 
products (IMS, 2002). 
Competitive group membership seen from the perspective of the therapy classes 
competed within, includes two classes of companies: those that compete directly for the 
same type of customers offering directly substitutable products and those companies 
which compete in the same market addressing the same group of customers but offering 
non-competing products, i. e. a product for ulcers such as Zoton and a product for 
constipation such as Relaxit. The former class of companies' are rival groups, while the 
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second class of companies offer opportunities for direct co-operation and may be 
described as complementary groups. Thus competitive groups described in terms of 
market choice can be further subdivided into rivalry groups - whose members compete 
directly - and complementary groups which compete indirectly, for example for 
available selling time in front of the doctor. 
Therefore, when the competitive group analysis is combined with strategic groups in 
UK pharmaceuticals four market situations exist. These are shown in figure 8.7. 
Figure 8.7 Market options 
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8.2.3 Identification of complementary and rivalry groups 
To distinguish direct rivals from complementary groups, it is necessary to explore 
market choices at the sub-therapy level, e. g. class A2B anti-ulcerants as against class A 
alimentary products. Here, the top 75 sub-therapy areas which account for over 92% of 
UK pharmaceutical sales are clustered. 
Analyzing each competitive group separately across the top 75 sub- therapy areas was 
chosen rather than taking all groups across all sub therapy areas. This was done to avoid 
the impact of confounding variables. With 277 separate sub therapy groups, many of 
which contain extremely sparse data, the chance of skewing the analysis through the 
inclusion of extraneous variables may be high. 
8.2.4 Identification of rivalry groups within each competitive group 
As discussed above, competitive groups based on therapy areas classify firms in terms 
of where they compete but do not allow the division of firms into rivalry groups. 
Rivalry groups are defined here as those companies which offer direct substitutes and 
whose fortunes are directly inter-related, i. e. the market success of one member firm 
impacts upon the market success of another member firm. Firms occupying different 
rivalry groups or competing in sole niches have the potential to complement each 
other's activities through co-marketing or other forms of co-operation, which may be 
expected to reduce promotional costs. 
Porter's theory of intra-industry competition (see chapter 2 for a fuller discussion) 
predicts that firms in the same strategic group and addressing the same customer group 
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should outperform those firms in different strategic groups but the same customer base. 
This is because they will better understand each other's modus operandi and signals 
thus increasing the chance of some degree of co-operative or collusive activity. In 
contrast, firms within the same rivalry group, which compete on different terms, i. e. are 
members of different strategic groups are more likely to engage in strong competitive 
rivalry and compete away margins or undertake damaging price competition (Porter, 
1976; Porter, 1979). Similarly, firms in the same strategic group but different rivalry 
group may be expected to co-operate more freely. This is because each firm will see 
their external environment in similar ways, attempt to compete in similar ways and 
address common customer groups. Mutual understanding of opportunities for low risk 
but high payoff co-operative activities may therefore be more likely to be explored. 
The rivalry groups present within competitive group I are shown in figure 8.8. 
Figure 8.8 Rivalry within competitive group 1 
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It is clear that there is a concentration around inhaler treatments for Asthma marketed 
by Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK), Ivax (IVX) and 3M, which hold shares in R3A the B2 
stimulants market of 67.3%, 10.2% and 3.1% respectively is clear. GSK and Ivax also 
compete in R3D the corticoid market with shares of 54% and 15.3%, respectively (IMS, 
2002). The position of Schering Plough (SPL) is interesting and reflects the importance 
of the Asthma market as compared to the hay fever market, which is where Schering 
directs attention, and where GSK and Ivax also compete. To put this into perspective, 
the UK market value of R3A, B2 stimulants is £230m, R3D the corticoid market is 
worth £289m. This gives a combined value for the Asthma treatment market in excess 
of £500 million per annum, as compared to the UK hay fever market, which is worth 
£47m. Boehringer Ingeiheim (BI) competes with Schering in hay fever preparations 
with shares of 1.8% and 20.1%, respectively but the principal commercial interest of 
Boehringer is in R3G, the anticholinergic and B2 stimulant market, where it holds an 
88.1% market share. This interlinking of respiratory interests does, however, suggest 
that competitive group 1 consists primarily of five companies, all of which compete 
directly to some degree but potentially splitting into primary and secondary competitors. 
The rivalry groups present within competitive group 2 are shown in figure 8.9. 
385 
Figure 8.9 Rivalry within competitive group 2 
Competitive group 2 is interesting because both Abbott (ABB) and Roche (ROC) have 
broad product portfolios, the result to some extent of acquisition of products through 
merger. Abbott purchased the Knoll pharmaceutical interests of BASF, which were the 
product of the earlier acquisition of Boots Pharmaceuticals (see chapter 7 for further 
details). Roche acquired Syntex and Boehringer Mannheim during the time period 
addressed by this research. 
The similarity of these portfolios brings the companies together in several related areas, 
but direct competition between them is limited because they address related but 
different market niches. These companies are, therefore, in several areas not so much as 
direct rivals as complements. Competition will occur more indirectly in terms of time in 
front of the doctor and for cash limited hospital budgets. Abbott has similar interests to 
Roche in several therapeutic areas, principally diagnostic tests, where Abbott specializes 
in pregnancy tests and Roche in diabetes tests. In antibiotics, Abbott specializes in JIF, 
Macrolides, where it had a 58.6% market share at the end of 2002 (IMS, 2002). Roche 
specializes in J5C and HIV Anti-Virals, where it competes directly with Abbott 
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particularly in the hospital market. These two firms are also direct and strong 
competitors in A8A, the anti-obesity market, where Roche holds a 74.1% market share 
as compared to Abbott's 25.9%. The market for obesity products was worth £ 41m in 
2002, but growing much faster than the overall pharmaceutical market at 53% per 
annum. This growth potential when combined with a common customer base - the GP - 
was likely to lead to increased rivalry between these two firms. 
Baxter Healthcare (BAX) specializes in hospital solutions and is, in effect, a niche 
player, although it does operate to a lesser extent in a number of other markets. Procter 
and Gamble (PG) has limited pharmaceutical interests across a number of therapy areas 
but derives almost 60% of its revenues from M5B, Bone Calcium Regulators, where it 
has a 34.4% share. Roche also has a minor interest in this market but the product is not 
actively promoted. 
The groups present in competitive group 3 are illustrated in figure 8.10. 
The six companies included here all have strong interests in the central nervous system 
therapy area. Johnson & Johnson (JJ) competes head to head with Lilly (LIL) in N5A, 
the antipsychotic market, with a 27% and 48.6% share respectively. Lundbeck (LUN), 
Novartis (NVA), Sanofi Synthelabo (SS) and Pharmacia (PHR) all have minor interests 
in this market. In excess of 90% of Lundbeck's revenues stem from N6A, anti- 
depressants, where Sanofi Synthelabo, Novartis and Pharmacia all have a minor 
interest. Pharmacia has strong interests in N7B, anti-smoking products. The general 
picture, therefore, is of a set of interests in related markets with a few points of direct 
competition. 
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Figure 8.10 Rivalry groups in competitive group 3 
Competitive group 4 is shown in figure 8.11. This group consists of only three 
companies, Akzo Nobel (AKZ), Schering AG (SAG) and Yamanouchi (YAM). These 
companies' fortunes are strongly linked to products for women's health. Akzo and 
Schering both compete head to head in G3A, the contraceptive pill market, with shares 
of 12.9% and 46.2%, respectively (IMS, 2002). Akzo also has a strong interest in G3H, 
other sex hormones, where it has a 74.7% market share. Yamanouchi competes mainly 
in G4B, other urological preparations, where it has a 19.8% share. This accounts for 
78.5% of the company's revenue. The impression here is of three companies each 
addressing specific opportunities in women's healthcare but where the main locus of 
competition is the rivalry between Akzo and Schering AG for a share of the 
contraceptive pill market. 
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Figure 8.11 Rivalry groups in competitive group 4 
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Competitive group 5 is shown in figure 8.12. Here, seven companies compete largely 
clustered around the lucrative alimentary market. Astra Zeneca (AZ), Wyeth (WYE) 
and Eisai (EIS) compete in the extremely lucrative but highly competitive A2B, anti- 
ulcerant segment, with shares of 34.1%, 6.9% and 41.2%, respectively. The fortunes of 
Losec, (marketed by Astra Zeneca) formerly the world's biggest selling prescription 
drug, are on the wane; but 34.1 % of a UK market worth £522 million is still worth 
fighting over and despite patent expiry Losec still accounted for 26% of Astra Zeneca's 
revenue at the end of 2002 (IMS, 2002). The Wyeth share of the A2B segment 
represented 50% of the company's 2002 UK sales revenue, while 64% of Eisai's 
revenue came from Pariet a Proton Pump Inhibitor. These three companies were 
therefore locked in internecine warfare with Wyeth having wrestled market leadership 
away from Astra Zeneca through a price cutting strategy, a strategy adopted by Eisai 
when they entered the market. 
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Figure 8.12 Rivalry in competitive group 5 
The remaining four companies Novo (NOV), Shire (SHI), Reckitt Benkisser (RB) and 
Solvay (SOL) address different areas of the alimentary market. Novo is a specialist in 
AI OC, the human insulin analogue market, where in 2002 it held a 64.9% share 
representing two thirds of company revenue in 2002. Shire concentrates on A 12A, 
calcium supplements, and its 74.2% market share equated to almost half company 
revenue. Reckitt held a 71.8% share of A2A, the antacid market, which together with a 
32.9% share in A6A, the laxatives market, accounted for over 90% of company 
revenue. Solvay also competes to a limited degree in A6A, with a 4.4% share, which 
equates to 4.6% of its revenue (IMS, 2002). Solvay's primary interest in the alimentary 
market is, however, in A9A, the digestives including enzymes segment. Here it has a 
dominant 89.7% market share which equated to 26.2% of company revenue (IMS, 
2002). The company's second most important alimentary market in 2002 was A3A, 
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Anti-Spasmodics and Anti-Cholinergics plain, where Solvay was the market leader with 
a 30.8% share, which equated to 13.5% of company revenue. 
The overall picture in competitive group 5 is of two groups. The first consisting of three 
companies vigorously contesting the A2B, Anti-Ulcerant market, which represents 
strong competitive rivalry based on very similar, highly inter-changeable, products. 
This grouping therefore presents an excellent example of a rivalry group where each 
company is engaged in strong competition, promoting directly substitutable products at 
the expense of other members of the same group. 
In contrast, the other grouping consists of four companies, related in terms of exhibiting 
a similar pattern of marketing and research investments focused upon specific 
Alimentary segments. These companies should have potential scope for marketing co- 
operation, as each is a specialist within its chosen segments and there appears to be little 
overlap or direct rivalry. This group of four companies presents a good example of a 
complementary group, where all address a common customer base within related but 
essentially non-competing markets, each offering a range of similar but complementary 
products. 
Figure 8.13 illustrates rivalry groups within competitive group 6. 
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Figure 8.13 Rivalry groups in competitive group six 
In competitive group 6 there are two main groupings. The first is a tight group 
consisting of three companies Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS), Merck Sharpe and Dohme 
(MSD) and Pfizer (PFZ). It is interesting to note again the pairing of MSD and Pfizer, 
who have been referred to as direct rivals and benchmark competitors (Hawthorne, 
2003). These three companies concentrate on the highly competitive and lucrative 
cardiovascular market, where each has an established franchise developed over the 
years based on successive products. Each company actively markets across a range of 
cardiovascular segments. MSD, for example, accounted for 54% of its 2002 UK 
revenues from sales of Zocor in CI OA, and 10.8% from, a second cardiovascular sub- 
segment, C9C. Similarly, Pfizer obtained 35.8% of its sales from Lipitor in CI OA, 
25.6% from Istin in C8A and 12% from Cardura in C2A. Bristol Myers derived the bulk 
of its revenue, 61.5% from CI OA and 8.5% from C9A. This is a complicated market 
where all three companies offer direct substitutes in CI OA, the cholesterol and 
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triglyceride reducers. Here, MSD is the market leader with a 44.4% share of the £677m 
segment, closely followed by Pfizer with a 34.5% share and BMS with a 16% share 
(IMS, 2002). Apart from actively competing as direct rivals in this segment, Pfizer's 
product Istin, a plain Calcium Antagonist, actively competes for hypertension 
prescriptions with Cozaar, MSD's Angiotensin II product, and with Carace, an ace 
inhibitor marketed by Bristol Myers. This first group therefore represents another prime 
example of a rivalry group. 
The second grouping is more diffuse and includes Aventis (AVE), a pharmaceutical 
giant which is the product of numerous acquisitions, and three smaller companies E 
Merck (MER), Takeda (TAK) and Celltech (CEL). Aventis has such a huge product 
portfolio that it would be difficult to find a company which was not in some way a 
competitor. But the company's largest product Tritace, is a cut price ace inhibitor, 
which represents 37.1 % of revenue. Tritace had 30.5% market share of the ace inhibitor 
market in 2002. This puts Aventis in some direct contention with Bristol Myers. The 
other cardiovascular interests of Aventis include Ikorel, a specialist coronary care 
product, which held 99.9% share of the market, and Frumil, a combination diuretic, 
which held a 63.7% segment share, representing 4.6% of company revenue (IMS, 
2002). E Merck is a German company with strong generic interests that is active in a 
range of cardiovascular products. For this company 24.6% of revenues in 2002 
stemmed from Nitrolingual, a nitrate treatment for Angina [CIE], 9.2% of revenue 
from Praxilene, which held a 28.9% share of the cerebral and peripheral vasodilators 
segment [C4A], 6.4% from Slozem, which competed in the C8A Calcium Antagonist 
segment, and 30.3% from Cardicor a Beta Blocking agent, class C7A. None of these is a 
really innovative product but rather a me-too offering. A similar range of competing 
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branded generics is marketed by Celltech, where Coracten, representing 29% of 
company revenue, is a direct competitor to E Merck's Slozem, while Beta-Cardone 
competes directly with Cardicor. The level of promotion which these companies can 
afford to put behind their brands is a fraction of that invested by companies like Pfizer 
or MSD. Therefore, these group two companies represent a distinct second division 
competing across a range of cardiovascular segments promoting largely me too or older 
products. The exception is Takeda. Takeda is a Japanese company active in only two 
therapy areas. Sales of Amias, an Angiotensin II inhibitor, class C9C, represents 79.3% 
of company sales, equating to a 17.0% segment share. Takeda is a smaller company in 
the UK, which although backed by huge resources in Japan represents a step down in 
competitive terms compared to some heavyweight competitors like MSD or Pfizer. 
Despite disadvantages in size and reputation Takeda competes directly against MSD's 
Cozaar, which is market leader of the C9C segment. Similar comments to those 
expressed earlier regarding Aventis apply. Takeda is more of a specialist niche 
competitor with no interest in the huge, highly lucrative, cholesterol lowering segment, 
which at over £677 million and growing at 29% per annum was the primary focus of the 
first grouping within competitive group 6. (IMS, 2002). 
The above analysis represents a useful perspective on a complex and multi faceted 
competitive picture. Competitive groups have been drawn from the pattern of 
therapeutic interests addressed by each firm, where the primary interests of these firms 
are brought to the fore. What this analysis does show, however, is that competitive 
groups can be effectively classified into rivalry groups, consisting of direct rivals, and 
complementary groups pursuing largely non-overlapping but related interests. In the 
next section of this chapter the aim is to explore the performance consequences of the 
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relationship between strategic groups, and competitive groups. In this analysis firms 
may fall into one of four categories (see figure 8.7 entitled market options earlier in this 
chapter). These categories are repeated here for convenience. 
1. Same strategic group and the same competitive group. Here, Porter 
suggests stronger returns due to collusion or co-operation. Markets are 
inter-related but viewed from a similar perspective, and a common 
customer group (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979). 
2. Different strategic group and the same competitive group. The same 
inter-related markets and customer groups are addressed, but each 
company implements a different strategy and views the market from a 
different perspective. Theory predicts strong rivalry with frequent 
recourse to price competition and the erosion of margins (Porter, 1976; 
Porter, 1979). 
3. Same strategic group but a different competitive group. The 
opportunities for co-operation are strong because companies address 
common customers with related but essentially non-competing products. 
Theory would predict co-operation between firms leading to cost savings 
through activities such as cross selling or co-marketing(Porter, 1976; 
Porter, 1979). 
4. Different strategic group and a different competitive group. Here, the 
companies are operating at arm's length in largely unrelated markets. 
Little mutual understanding may exist between companies, but this is not 
a problem as the companies address different niches in a different way. 
They do not compete directly and theory would predict average returns 
(Porter, 1976)(Porter, 1979). 
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In summary, therefore, above average returns are to be expected for categories one and 
three because of savings in marketing and promotion costs. Average returns are 
expected for category four because each company is operating independently and 
interaction between the firms, if it exists, is low. The lowest returns or the highest 
promotional costs are predicted to occur in the case of category two companies, either 
because aggressive pricing reduces margins or because excessive promotional costs are 
associated with heightened non-price competition. 
8.2.5 Analysis of competitive groups 
The performance consequences of strategic groups are discussed in chapter 6. In this 
chapter to test the performance consequences of competitive group membership in UK 
pharmaceuticals, seven variables are compared between groups. These variables are 
described in table 8.6. 
Table 8.6 Variables used to test competitive groups 
Variable Description 
LIC Licensed product UK sales/Total UK sales 
COMARK UK sales from co-marketed products/Total UK sales 
SHARE Share of the UK ethical pharmaceutical market 
WMS Weighted market share (see chapter 5 for further details) 
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax/Total world sales 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation/Total world 
sales 
PRETAX Pre tax profits/Total world sales 
The relevance of these variables is that the first two measure, to some extent, the 
relationship between companies, although licensing arrangements are now less likely to 
be agreed locally (see chapter 4 for a further discussion). The remaining five variables 
all measure some aspect of performance, where share and weighted market share 
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represent UK sales performance measures. Corporate performance is measured by 
pretax profits, earnings before interest and tax [EBIT] and earnings before interest tax 
depreciation and amortization [EBITDA], all of which measure some aspect of raw 
earnings. 
These variables were measured between competitive groups using the Kruskal Wallis 
one way analysis of variance test and the results are shown in table 8.7. 
Table 8.7 Performance tests between competitive groups 
LIC COMARK SHARE WMS 
Chi Square 5.038 2.040 5.161 0.907 
Df 5 5 5 5 
As m sig 0.411 0.844 0.397 0.970 
EBIT EBITDA PRETAX 
Chi Square 9.402 5.918 9.260 
Df 5 5 5 
Asymp sig 0.094 0.314 0.099 
The results in general are quite weak. No significant relationship was found between 
UK performance, licensing and co-marketing activities. Nor was EBITDA found to 
differ significantly between groups. A difference was found to exist between groups in 
terms of the proportion of pre tax profit and EBIT. This difference was significant at the 
10% level. 
In order to test the validity of Porter's theory on intra-industry competition (Porter, 
1979) applied to competitive group and strategic group membership the following 
hypotheses were tested. 
Ho The performance of firms within a competitive group will differ 
according to whether the firms are members of the same or different 
strategic group. 
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Hi Performance will not differ between firms whether they are in the same 
or different strategic group. 
The above, seven variables were compared between two groups of firms based upon the 
following simple classification. 
1. Same strategic group and same competitive group. 
2. Different strategic group and same competitive group. 
The result of this analysis is shown in table 8.8. 
Table 8.8 Performance consequences of strategic and competitive group 
membership 
LIC COMARK SHARE WMS 
Chi Square 0.252 3.205 6.189 2.333 
Df 1 1 1 1 
Asymp si 0.616 0.073 0.013 0.127 
EBIT EBITDA PRETAX 
Chi Square 6.438 2.438 5.554 
Df 1 1 1 
As m si 0.011 0.118 0.018 
These results indicate a performance relationship between strategic group and 
competitive group membership in terms of how you compete and where you compete. 
Three performance measures SHARE, EBIT and PRETAX are significant at the 5% 
significance level. EBITDA and WMS were found not to differ significantly between 
the two groups. The two variables measuring co-operation were also found not to differ 
significantly at the 5% level, but COMARK was found to be significant at the 10% 
level. 
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These results support the null hypothesis that strategic group membership when 
combined with competitive group membership has performance consequences. This in 
turn broadly supports Porter's theory of intra-industry competition. This posits that 
firms in different strategic groups competing in inter-related markets will perform less 
well than firms who are members of the same strategic group. The argument is that such 
firms are likely to read each other's signals more accurately and co-operate or collude 
rather than engage in destructive price competition (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979). 
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8.2.6 Conclusions 
If competitive groups delineate where firms compete, which in effect provides a more 
detailed calibration for the scope decision in Porter's generic strategies, described by the 
dimension `broad' or `narrow' market focus, then strategic groups, in turn provide 
further detail on Porter's second axis, described by the dimension `differentiation' or 
`low cost' strategies. 
The analysis reported in this chapter set out, first, to show that scope choices of where 
firms compete, in terms of market choices, can be used to develop a meaningful 
classification of competitive groups. These competitive groups can then be combined 
with a strategic group classification to produce a more detailed analysis of competition 
within the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
The first approach adopted was to classify firms according to their therapy choices 
using the 16 class anatomical classification in the IMS data base and adopted in 
previous strategic group studies of the pharmaceutical industry (Bogner, 1991; Bogner 
et al., 1996; Cool, 1985; Cool et al., 1987a; Martens, 1988). 
Six different competitive groups were identified, most of which concentrated around a 
dominant market opportunity, for example, almost a half of the sales of competitive 
group 1's sales are derived from respiratory products. Competitive group 3 is clustered 
around central nervous system products, group 4 around female health, group 5 around 
alimentary products and group 6 around cardiovascular offerings. The exception to this 
pattern was found to be group 2. The member firms of this group appeared to adopt a 
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more generalist profile and are active across a broad range of markets. The main 
conclusion from this analysis is that the presence of these six different competitive 
profiles effectively segments competition within the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
Direct competition is dependent upon which therapy area is addressed i. e. to which 
competitor group you belong. 
This analysis was useful in classifying firms broadly in terms of where they compete. 
But it lacked the detail necessary to distinguish between firms that compete directly 
from those that offer unrelated or complementary products. These firms still will 
compete indirectly, however, for example for the limited time available to see a doctor 
or for access to limited funds such as hospital budgets. To classify firms that offer direct 
substitutes it was necessary to identify these rivalry groups. 
In order to classify firms into rivalry groups, i. e. firms which compete directly in such a 
way that the relative success of one means the relative failure of another, and 
complementary groups, which are firms that operate in the same market and address the 
same customers but do not directly compete, it was necessary to group firms within 
competitive groups according to the IMS sub therapy class. There are 277 sub therapy 
classes but in order to avoid confounding the cluster analysis by the introduction of 
many extraneous variables, each firm's sales within the top 75 sub therapy classes, 
which represents over 91% of total sales, was used. 
The results indicated that generally each competitive group could be divided into two or 
sometimes three groupings of firms each clustered around a specific market 
opportunity. The UK pharmaceutical market is composed of a myriad of such clusters 
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and therefore a firm may engage simultaneously in a number of very different markets, 
acting as a rival to another specific firm in one market situation and yet provide 
complement products in another. To draw any detailed performance consequences from 
this classification would, therefore, by necessity, have to be based upon much more 
detailed market specific data, for example including marketing costs, manpower costs 
and profits by therapeutic segment, This data was not available for this research. The 
distinction between rivalry and complementary groups does, however, support the idea 
of cognitive groups, where researchers indicated that managers actively segment their 
market according to whom they perceive to be their firm's direct competitors (Porac et 
al., 1989; Porac et al., 1994). 
The link between competitive groups and performance was not found to be strong, but 
two corporate performance variables, EBIT and PRETAX, achieved statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Clearly, the choice of market segments should affect 
market potential as some market segments in pharmaceuticals are larger and more 
lucrative than others: for example CI OA, the cholesterol and triglyceride reducers 
segment, was worth a massive £ 677 million in 2002, growing at 56% per annum. Based 
upon the results reported in this thesis, market potential alone does not appear sufficient 
to explain differences in firm performance. 
Through looking in turn at each competitive group and then dividing firms into two 
categories - those within the same strategic group as other firms and those that belong to 
different strategic groups - an attempt is made here to link the two dimensions originally 
posed in Porter's generic strategies, namely where you compete (competitive group) as 
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against how you compete (strategic group) (Porter, 1980). The results reported in this 
chapter indicate a link between these two combined choices and performance. Three of 
the five performance variables, SHARE, EBIT and PRETAX differed significantly at 
the 5% level or better. This is a result that broadly supports both the null hypothesis - 
that the performance of firms within a competitive group will differ according to 
whether the firms are members of the same or a different strategic group - and the 
outcome suggested by Porter's theory of intra-industry competition (Porter, 1976; 
Porter, 1979). The suggestion of co-operation, as proposed by Porter, is also but more 
weakly supported by the finding that the co-marketing variable differed significantly at 
the 10% level of significance (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979). Some anecdotal evidence is 
also provided by the observation that Astra Zeneca, Wyeth and Eisai compete strongly 
on price within the A2B segment and belong to different strategic groups. A price 
cutting strategy appears, however, to be absent from the CI OA segment, where Pfizer, 
Merck Sharpe & Dohme and Bristol Myers Squibb are engaged in competition and 
where all three companies are members of the same strategic group. 
In conclusion, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the competitive group 
classification provides a useful and potentially informative dimension to understanding 
competition in the UK pharmaceutical industry. There is some evidence that 
competitive group choices have performance consequences. However, at the same time 
the UK pharmaceutical industry is a complex web of market relationships, and the 
situation would have been made more complex by the introduction of the plethora of 
mergers described in the previous chapter. Importantly, when competitive groups are 
combined with strategic group membership a clearer relationship between combined 
group membership and performance is discernable. Three of the five performance 
403 
measures were significantly different at the 5% level or better. These findings support 
both the null hypothesis - that the performance of firms within a competitive group will 
differ according to whether the firms are members of the same or a different strategic 
group - and the predictions posited by Porter (Porter, 1976; Porter, 1979). 
The results present a new classification framework for firms which, allows both market 
and strategic priorities to be pinpointed. The use of Porter's generic strategies is now 
virtually universal within the strategy literature, but for firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry the division between low cost and differentiation is too blunt because the 
industry is primarily concerned with product differentiation. As Cool (1985) points out 
the "generic drugs" industry operates by very different rules to the research based 
industry and should therefore be viewed separately. Strategic groups describe how firms 
compete and arguably therefore provide a more calibrated alternative to Porter's low 
cost - differentiation axis. 
Similarly to describe firms as to whether they compete on a broad industry basis or 
more selectively does not precisely reflect market choice in the pharmaceutical industry. 
This is an industry where competition is separated by therapeutic choice and where the 
locus of competition resides at the sub-therapy level, where one product directly 
substitutes for another. This is an industry where firms frequently compete in a variety 
of sub-segments and several therapeutic areas. Here, the competitive group dimension, 
where firms compete, allows a more detailed positioning of firms within the generic 
strategies template. 
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For example, through the use of this distinction it is possible to separate out in UK 
pharmaceuticals Astra Zeneca, Wyeth and Eisai as direct competitors within the 
alimentary market and distinct from the numerous other companies which potentially 
compete within this segment. Similarly a more detailed picture of complements and 
direct substitutes can be drawn from the competitive/strategic group matrix when 
applied to the more complex cardiovascular or respiratory markets. 
The research reported in this chapter therefore contributes to theory by providing a more 
precise calibration of an established and valued strategy template. In addition, the theory 
which Porter originally proposed on intra-industry competition (Porter 1976; Porter 
1979) has been empirically tested. In addition it is important to realize what is meant by 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Competition occurs at two levels. At a more 
general level through calling upon a largely common customer base, the general 
practitioner, firms compete for time in front of the doctor. The heavy organs of 
promotion employed via the major sales battalions of the heavyweight pharmaceutical 
companies effectively mop up available appointments. This deprives competitors of 
selling opportunities - the marketing "oxygen" necessary for growth. Also, at this more 
general level firms compete for available share of resources because if more is spent on 
cardiovascular medicine, for example, this impinges upon the remainder of the 
healthcare budget which has to be cut so many ways. 
At a more precise level, direct competition occurs at the point of substitution where the 
doctor, having made a diagnosis, is then faced with a number of choices of remedies 
from which to choose. This is the true locus of competition within pharmaceuticals, 
where one remedy, substitutes directly for another. Here, the concept of rivalry groups 
captures this dimension, as distinct from the competitive grouping which may include 
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direct competitors alongside those firms which offer complements or unrelated 
products. 
For those engaged in strategy formulation within the pharmaceutical industry, the 
strategic group/competitive group matrix provides the opportunity to simplify a 
complex and multi-faceted competitive picture, allowing a clearer view of the 
competitive dynamics. Where firms compete appears in performance terms to be highly 
correlated to how firms compete. The combination of strategic and competitive group 
analyses allows the strategist to more accurately predict the nature of competition within 
a given segment of the market. In UK pharmaceuticals an excellent example is provided 
by the internecine "price competition" present in the A2B segment between Astra and 
Wyeth, who each belong to different strategic groups and employ different strategies, as 
compared to the more benign competition between Pfizer and MSD, who are members 
of the same strategic group competing within the cholesterol lowering segment. 
Therefore, through such analysis a clearer view of both current and future market 
competition may be gleaned. 
It is also possible through examining the strategic group/competitive group matrix to 
identify those companies that share a congruent view of the market but which offer 
either complements or unrelated products. These companies may offer excellent 
opportunities to exploit synergies, by reducing promotional costs and increasing market 
presence through co-operative activities such as cross-selling. 
The next chapter considers further the results reported in this and the preceding two 
chapters. It discusses the findings of the research as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together the empirical research presented in the preceding 3 
chapters. 
The formal assumption that underlies strategic group theory is that these groups 
accurately represent choice of strategy within a given industry and that group 
membership has performance implications. The research presented in this thesis follows 
three separate but interconnected themes within the context of the UK pharmaceutical 
industry during the ten years 1993 to 2002. 
The first of these themes, reported earlier in chapter 6, follows the approach established 
by Cool's benchmark study of the US pharmaceutical industry (Cool, 1985) and 
attempts to confirm Cool's findings that strategic groups are present within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry and that these groups differ with regard to performance. 
The second theme explores the dynamics between firms and strategic groups, where the 
principle aim is to empirically test the theory proposed by Caves and Porter (1977), 
which states that firms moving between strategic groups move to a higher performing 
group. An additional aim of this part of the research was to explore the relationship 
between mergers and strategic groups. This research theme is reported in chapter 7. 
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The third and final research theme investigates the relationship between how firms 
compete, i. e. the strategic group to which they belong, and where firms compete i. e. 
their choice of markets. Therefore a more detailed exploration of Porter's "generic 
strategies" is undertaken, where the strategy dimension equates to low cost versus 
differentiation, and the market choice dimension to broad versus narrow market focus 
(Porter, 1980). A principal aim of this research is to empirically test Porter's theory of 
intra-industry performance (Porter, 1979). This third and final research theme is 
reported in chapter 8. 
9.2 Research Theme 1 Strategic Groups in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
The premise here is that if strategic groups accurately classify firms according to their 
strategy, then we may expect performance differences between strategic groups 
because, as shown in Chapter 4, the ethical pharmaceutical industry is high risk and 
high reward. Therefore the ability of companies to manage the risk effectively and profit 
from their operations, (in effect to formulate and implement effective strategies, ) should 
have marked performance consequences. To date however, previous research has 
produced mixed results with regard to performance (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Cool et 
al., 1988; Cool et al., 1987b; Guedri, 1998; Martens, 1988; Voyer, 1993). Cool and 
Voyer reported significant performance differences but Bogner, Guedri and Martens 
failed to corroborate these findings. As discussed previously, (see Chapter 2 for a fuller 
discussion) comparison between these studies is difficult because of different samples, 
methods, choice of variables and performance measures employed. 
The empirical results presented in chapter 6 aimed in part to redress this lack of 
comparators by employing and building upon a common approach used by a number of 
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previous researchers (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988). The key elements of 
this common approach are firstly, the establishment of stable strategic time periods. 
Secondly the use of a number of variables to represent strategy. These variables were 
then used to identify strategic groups present using Ward's method. Thirdly, 
performance was tested between groups using a number of measures. A key limitation 
of these earlier related approaches, adopted by (Cool, 1985; Martens, 1988; Fiegenbaum 
& Thomas, 1990; Bogner, 1991, ) is that the method used to identify stable strategic time 
periods - Box's M test - requires that the firm sample remains constant throughout the 
duration of the study. This by necessity rules out merged firms and new entrants, such 
as the Japanese firms Eisai and Takeda. 
Although these three previous researchers all followed a broadly similar approach there 
were however marked differences in both the number and choice of variables chosen to 
represent strategy. For the purpose of this research it was decided to most closely follow 
Cool (1985). This was for two main reasons. Firstly, because Cool's study is the most 
frequently cited in the literature and secondly because Cool chose a more 
comprehensive set of variables that represented scale, scope and resource decisions. 
Despite this aim however, in practice, five of the fifteen variables chosen by Cool could 
not be included within this research. This was either because the variable was not 
applicable in the UK, (e. g. direct to consumer advertising and distribution strategy, ) or 
because the relevant data was not available, which was the case for commodity generics 
and two of the research variables chosen by Cool. (See Chapter 5 for further details). 
This discrepancy clearly illustrates the market specific nature of some strategy variables 
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and explains one of the reasons why strategic group studies may have yielded equivocal 
results. 
Two stable strategic time periods (SSTP) were identified in this study. Each was five 
years in duration. The first ran from 1993 until 1997, and the second from 1998 to 2002. 
Here it is interesting to note that a number of the environmental variables identified as 
important in chapter 3, were markedly different between the two time periods. Firstly, 
the generic penetration of all six PACT therapy areas, except respiratory products, rose 
sharply post 1997, although generic usage of CNS and infection products rose more 
sharply than the other therapeutic categories. Secondly, post 1997 there was also a sharp 
increase in the market penetration of parallel imported products, particularly 
cardiovascular drugs. The rise of this specific category may well have been fuelled by 
the introduction of the National Service Framework for cardiovascular health. (See 
Chapter 3 for further details). 
The duration of the stable strategic time periods identified are not dissimilar to those 
reported in previous research. See table 9.1 for further details. 
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Table 9.1 Duration of Stable Strategic Time Periods 
Cool 1985 Martens 1988 Bogner 1991 
Time 
Period 
Duration Time 
Period 
Duration Time Period Duration 
SSTPI 1963 - 69 7 years 1981 - 84 4 years Pre 1972 
SSTP2 1970 - 74 5 years 1985 - 88 4 years 1972 - 1975 4 years 
SSTP3 1975 - 79 5 years 1975-1981 7 years 
SSTP4 1980 - 82 3 years 1981 - 1984 4 ears 
SSTP5 1984 - 1988 5 ears 
The two stable strategic time periods each of five years duration identified in this 
research, agree closely to the length of SSTPs found in the previous research detailed in 
the above table. The implication of this finding is that strategic choices do not change 
rapidly which would be the predicted outcome from mobility barrier theory (Caves et 
al., 1977) 
Within these two stable time periods this research found that seven strategic groups 
were present within each time period. The number of strategic groups found in previous 
research, employing a similar method, is shown in table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 Number of Strategic Groups in Stable Strategic Time Periods 
Cool 1985 Martens 1988 Bogner 1991 
Number of Strategic 
Groups 
Number of Strategic 
Groups 
Number of Strategic 
Groups 
SSTP1 6 9 4 
SSTP2 5 10 4 
SSTP3 4 6 
SSTP4 6 7 
SSTP5 6 
411 
In this research a relatively stable structure of seven strategic groups within each SSTP 
were found, see table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 Strategic Groups in the UK Pharmaceutical Industry 
SSTPI SSTP2 
Time Period 1993 -1997 1998 - 2002 
Number of strategic groups 7 7 
SG1: 3M RB AKZO SOL 
PG 
3M RB AKZO SOL 
PG 
SG2: BAX BAX 
SG3: BI SAG MER IVX 
NOV 
IVX NOV SAG 
SG4: LUN LUN SPL YAM 
SG5: SPL YAM PHR SS 
SG6: JJ AVE PHR NVA 
ROC AZ GSK 
ABB BAY JJ AVE BI 
ROC MER 
SG7: BAY ABB WYE BMS 
MSD LIL PFZ SS 
NVA AZ GSK WYE 
BMS LIL MSD PFZ 
The above table compares the strategic group structure for the first SSTP with the 
second SSTP. (The set of results chosen to represent SSTP2 are those of standardized 
variable set one which performed best in terms of the external validity test, although the 
other clustering results did not differ a great deal from this one. See Chapter 6 for 
further details). Companies shown in bold are classified in the same group as for the 
previous time period. These represent 18 out of the 29 firms therefore 62% of firms 
remained in the same group during the entire ten year period. Some groups seem 
particularly stable notably the group of diversified conglomerates comprising 3M, 
Reckitt Benkisser, Akzo Nobel, Solvay and Procter and Gamble. 
On examination this group structure suggests a consolidation of strategic positions in 
the second stable strategic time period where firms within individual groups appear 
more closely aligned. 
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Strategic group 1 is common across both time periods. The members of this group are 
3M, Reckitt Benkisser, Akzo Nobel, Solvay and Procter and Gamble. The common 
factor with these firms are that they are all broadly diversified conglomerates, each with 
a number of operating divisions and a relatively small commitment to pharmaceuticals. 
The technological platform of these companies is industrial chemicals where spend on 
research and promotion for example are generally much lower than for a typical 
pharmaceutical company. 
Strategic group 2 consists solely of Baxter which is a specialist supplier of hospital 
solutions. 
Strategic group 3 changed significantly over the two time periods. Initially the group 
included Boehringer Ingelheim and E Merck which are both medium sized European 
companies whose core business is pharmaceuticals. Both of these companies have a 
broad product portfolio particularly E Merck which has a strong presence in generic 
pharmaceuticals. The other three members which remained in this group across both 
SSTPs are Ivax, Novo and Schering AG. Ivax is the exception here because it is an 
American company but these three companies are all mid sized with a relatively limited 
promotional spend. All derive the majority of their revenues from one therapy area. Ivax 
specializes in branded generic respiratory medicines, Novo in hormones, particularly 
growth hormone, and Schering AG is very strong in women's health products. 
Strategic group 4 comprises of Lundbeck a small Danish company in period 1 but this 
company was joined by Schering Plough and Yamanouchi in period 2. These three 
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companies have in common their size and limited market scope, but they are more 
aggressive in their marketing than the companies in group 3. Lundbeck for example 
spent very heavily to promote its CNS product and Schering Plough are known for their 
active marketing of hay fever products. It is interesting to note how commonly certain 
groups of companies are paired together in strategic group analysis. Schering Plough 
and Yamanouchi represent this trait which may suggest a common perspective on the 
market. 
Strategic group 5 changed its group membership in SSTP2. In the first time period this 
group consisted of Schering Plough and Yamanouchi, but these companies then formed 
a single group with Lundbeck. In the second time period Pharmacia and Sanofi 
Synthelabo are classified together. These companies are both "heavyweight" with 
strong but broad healthcare interests. Both have a strong consumer presence. Pharmacia 
marketed Nicorette and Sanofi Solpadol for example. Spending on research and 
promotion is about average for the industry. 
Strategic group 6 changed markedly over the two time periods. In SSTPI the 
membership consisted of Johnson & Johnson, Roche, Aventis, Pharmacia and Novartis 
which were all large relatively diversified pharmaceutical companies each with other 
healthcare and in the case of J&J non-healthcare interests. Also included within this 
group were Glaxo Smith Kline and Astra Zeneca which were dedicated research led 
pharmaceutical companies that deployed large field forces and spent heavily on 
research. During the second time period, this group splits and its remaining members 
J&J, Aventis and Roche are joined by Abbott, Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim, Roche and 
E Merck. Five of these companies are of European origin. All have strong interests in 
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pharmaceuticals, although Bayer suffered a setback with the withdrawal of Lipobay. 
The strategy followed appears middle of the road, broad therapeutic focus, average to 
high research spend and average to high promotional spend. These companies represent 
the pharmaceutical industries emerging second division. 
Strategic group 7 changed markedly in membership across the two time periods. In 
SSTPI this group presents a mix of companies. MSD and Pfizer present a common dual 
pairing and are quoted as "benchmark competitors" with strong research interests 
(Hawthorne, 2003). Bayer, Abbott, Wyeth, Sanofi and Lilly all market primarily GP 
products, as do MSD and Pfizer. BMS also has a strong GP presence but has a strong 
franchise in Cancer products. In contrast, by SSTP2 a strong research led heavyweight 
pharmaceutical group is emerging. By 2002 both Novartis and Astra Zeneca had 
divested their agrochemical interests and all of the companies in this group - Novartis, 
Astra Zeneca, Glaxo Smith Kline, Wyeth, BMS, Lilly, MSD and Pfizer - are research 
led pharmaceutical companies with a broad range of therapeutic interests. These 
companies represent the first division of the pharmaceutical industry in terms of size, 
scope and spend. 
Previous research also identified a relatively common structure with the number of 
groups found between SSTPs appearing broadly in agreement. The largest shift reported 
was by Bogner (1991) who found that the number of strategic groups between SSTP2 
and SSTP3 increased from four to six. The difference was accounted for by one 
strategic group of three firms and one singleton group. The presence of a relatively 
stable strategic group structure in the UK pharmaceutical industry is therefore generally 
congruent with the findings of previous research. 
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It is worth noting here the importance of the method used to differentiate strategic 
groups. A clear improvement in precision was shown in this research, firstly by the use 
of an objective statistical test to establish the right number of groups and secondly by 
the use of variables not included in the initial analysis to provide external validity. Other 
relevant variables which are not in some way correlated to those used in the analysis 
were difficult to include, however, given the limited nature of some data sets. The 
chance of doing so was however improved by excluding size from the analysis because 
this variable correlates frequently with both marketing decisions and performance 
measures. Size is an outcome of strategy not a strategic variable despite much previous 
IO research relying upon this variable as a proxy for strategy. Thirdly, the quality of the 
analysis is improved through the use of a second clustering algorithm in order to 
counteract occasional misclassification of firms by the one direction approach used by 
"hierarchical methods". Fourthly, the discrepancy shown in this research between non- 
standardized and standardized variables, shows that relative scale differences can affect 
results. 
The performance measures employed in this study were market share (SHARE), 
weighted market share (WMS) and difference in market rank compared to the beginning 
of the period (DIFF). These results shown in table 9.4 demonstrate a strong statistically 
significant difference between strategic groups in terms of performance. 
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Table 9.4 Performance differences between strategic groups 
SSTP I SSTP 2 
SHARE 0.0004 0.001 
WMS 0.011 0.013 
DIFF 0.038 NS at 5% level 
These results are in agreement with Cool who found significant performance differences 
in terms of market share across all time periods and for weighted market share across all 
but one time period (Cool, 1985). In contrast, neither Martens (1988), or Bogner (1991), 
found significant performance differences between strategic groups. A possible 
explanation may be the different performance measures employed. Martens for example 
measured percentage increase in weighted market share. Alternatively the smaller 
number of variables used to identify groups in these two studies may have reduced the 
precision of group identification. The presence of significant performance differences 
between strategic groups is therefore confirmed in this study. 
9.3 Research Theme 2 The Dynamics of Strategic Groups in the UK 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
The ten years included within this study marked a turbulent time for the pharmaceutical 
industry. Initially change was marked by a large number of individual firm movements 
but from 1996 onwards it was more common for groups of firms to move in concert. 
The number of strategic groups, identified in this study, are shown in table 9.4 below. It 
should be noted here that these findings include all the firms that were swallowed up by 
mergers and that because of the nature of the resulting dataset, a different set of 
variables was available to identify groups. This dataset was difficult to construct 
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because it necessitated deconstructing each merged company back into its original form 
and finding archive data for key elements of strategy such as research spend. For these 
reasons comparisons between this theme of the research and the other two themes are by 
necessity limited. 
Table 9.5 Number of Strategic Groups Across Each Year. 
Year Number of 
Strategic Groups 
Total Number of 
Firms 
1993 -1994 9 47 
1995 9 45 
1996 8 40 
1997 7 42 
1998 9 41 
1999 8 39 
2000 6 35 
2001 7 34 
2002 6 33 
The above table again demonstrates the relative stability of the strategic group structure. 
It also shows a major limitation of the practice of dividing industries into stable 
strategic time periods for strategic group research. Through ignoring mergers and new 
entrants, two potential major drivers of industry dynamics are specifically excluded. 
The number of firms moving in a given time period did not appear to be related to any 
of the external environmental factors measured in this research. This finding agrees with 
that of Bogner who found no link between movements of firms between strategic 
groups and external disturbances (Bogner, 1991; Bogner et al., 1994). 
Eighteen mergers occurred within this period, but although there were two major waves 
of consolidation, in 1995 and 1999 respectively, only in one year 1993, did no mergers 
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take place. In addition two new entrants, Eisai and Takeda entered the UK 
pharmaceutical industry in 1997. 
On examining movement of firms a common pattern frequently emerges whereby firms 
more closely aligned to a group appear to form an inner core group, while companies 
positioned in an outer ring at the edge of the group appear less committed to the group 
strategy. This finding of intra-strategic group shifts agrees with the findings of earlier 
research (Cool & Dierickx, 1993; McNamara et al., 2003, ). Movement by a company 
to the fringe of the group either precedes or immediately follows a strategic change. 
This observation suggests that analysis of outliers may prove useful to anticipate 
strategic shifts. 
It also appears true that not all firms are equally mobile and certainly some strategic 
groups, for example the diversified conglomerates comprising 3M, Solvay etc, seem 
more stable than others. This implies that industry structure may evolve around "anchor 
points" which consist of these stable groups. A strategic web of strategy interactions 
may therefore represent the industry where some groups and firms are more fluid and 
willing to adapt than others. The tightness of the "core" of a group may serve as a proxy 
for commitment to the current strategy with distance between firms providing a measure 
of willingness to change. 
The premise that firms move from one strategic group to another in order to capitalize 
upon more profitable market positions was first proposed by Caves and Porter (1977). 
In order to empirically test this theory firms were classified into those companies which 
changed strategic group or those which remained within their original group. 
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Companies that changed position were divided into those which moved group on their 
own and those which formed part of a faction that split away from the original group 
and moved to another group in the company of other firms. These results are 
summarized in table 9.6. The figures show the probability recorded using a Chi Squared 
Test. Probabilities significant at the 10% level are marked in bold. The figures for total 
change include both the change and split categories. 
Table 9.6 Do firms that move between strategic groups improve their position? 
Movement Recorded All Cases 
Chan ge - UP 0.066 
Chan ge - DOWN 0.263 
Split - UP 0.977 
Split - DOWN 0.823 
Stay - UP 0.163 
Stay - DOWN 0.058 
Total Change - UP 0.074 
These results provide weak support for the proposition that firms improve their position 
by moving between strategic groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry has undergone at least three successive waves of 
consolidation during its recent history. Reasons for mergers have included the need to 
achieve critical mass in research and development or marketing. The alternative 
explanation is that as competition becomes more intense, firms seek mergers as a source 
of cost synergies. Therefore a merger is adopted in order to meet the need for increased 
efficiency of operation and the investors demand for profitable growth. (This point is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). 
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Examination of the eighteen mergers which occurred during the study period revealed 
that of these eighteen, only three - Glaxo Wellcome, Pharmacia Upjohn and Hoechst 
Rhone Poulence - occurred between companies belonging to the same strategic group. 
This result is highly significant achieving a statistical significance of 0.001. 
It may be expected that companies pursuing broadly the same strategies would be able 
to more easily realize synergies, which suggests that the main driver for these mergers 
could be to obtain new products to bolster the pipeline and thus compensate for flagging 
research productivity. This motive was certainly displayed after the acquisition by 
Pfizer of Warner Lambert and Pharmacia Upjohn which secured the revenues from two 
"blockbusters" Lipitor and Celebrex together with bolstering a dry mid to near term 
pipeline(Lehman Brothers, 2003; Lehman-Brothers, 2002). 
9.3 Research Theme 3 The relationship between strategic groups and competitive 
groups in the UK pharmaceutical industry 
The market choices that firms make may be expected to exert some effect upon 
profitability as clearly some markets are larger, more accessible and less competitive 
than others. Therefore competitive groups where firms compete may have performance 
implications. Porter in his 1979 article argued that the interaction between where firms 
compete in terms of common customers and how firms compete (i. e. strategic groups), 
should have performance consequences. This is because firms competing for common 
customers and employing similar strategies would be more likely to reach an 
accommodation and thus avoid damaging price competition. 
The term competitive group has been given various meanings by previous researchers. 
Porac et al defined a primary competitive group as "a collection of firms who define 
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each other as rivals"(Porac et al., 1994, p. 135. ). In contrast Bogner defines a 
competitive group as: 
"an intra-industry combination of firms which are following similar strategies. 
Firms are following similar strategies because they have different historical 
backgrounds which have provided them with different stocks of competencies 
and assets and because different managers have identified different ways in 
which they can compete in the industry"(Bogner, 1991 p 496). 
The definition proposed by Bogner suggests a more inclusive term for a strategic group 
by adding a number of elements generally associated with the resource based view 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). In contrast, the competitive group proposed by Porac 
et al (1994) assumes direct rivalry. This research starts from the Porac definition but 
with several notable differences. Firstly, definition of rivalry depends upon your 
perspective. A small firm may view a larger one as a rival but not visa versa, for 
example Glaxo may view Astra very differently as a competitor than it views Ivax or 
Boehringer. Secondly, if a firm has several products then the rivalry pecking order may 
reflect their relative importance. Thirdly, through use of cluster analysis, competitive 
groups can be formed based upon the pattern of markets addressed not viewed 
individually in isolation. 
This research found that the following six distinct competitive groups occurred in the 
UK pharmaceutical industry. 
CGI 3M, Ivax, Glaxo Smith Kline, Boehringer Ingelheim, Schering Plough. 
CG2 Abbott, Roche, Baxter, Procter & Gamble. 
CG3 Johnson & Johnson, Lundbeck, Lilly, Sanofi Synthelabo, Novartis, 
Pharmacia. 
CG4 Akzo Nobel, Yamanouchi, Schering AG. 
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CG5 Astra Zeneca, Eisai, Shire, Wyeth, Solvay, Novo, Reckitt Benkisser. 
CG6 Aventis, Bristol Myers Squibb, Pfizer, Merck Sharpe & Dohme, 
Celltech, Takeda, Bayer, E Merck. 
Of these six all but one competitive group was concentrated around a dominant therapy 
area. The exception, group 2, comprised companies like Roche and Abbott who adopted 
a more generalist pattern active across a number of different market segments. 
Therefore competitive groups in effect limit primary competition i. e. product 
displacement between firms, but most firms will compete to some extent, for example 
for time in front of the doctor. 
The relationship between competitive groups and performance was tested using seven 
performance measures LIC (licensed products), COMARK (co-marketing), SHARE 
(market share), WMS (weighted market share), EBIT (earnings before interest and tax), 
EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) and PRETAX 
(profit before tax). The first two of these measure co-operative activities. LIC represents 
products licensed from other companies where it may be expected that strength in a 
given area, for example an established franchise in cardiovascular medicine, would 
make the company a more attractive licensing partner. COMARK measures the degree 
of co-operative selling of a common brand. SHARE and WMS directly measure UK 
market performance. The last three measures EBIT, EBITDA and PRETAX are 
corporate financial measures and do not relate specifically to UK performance. These 
measures can be used here because competitive groups represent the pattern of market 
choices which a firm makes which for a pharmaceutical company are often common 
across markets. This is because having invested US$ 700 million to produce a new 
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chemical entity, it simply does not make economic sense to restrict the product to a few 
chosen markets. These results are shown in table 9.7. 
Table 9.7 Performance measurement between competitive groups 
Performance Measure Significance 
LIC 0.411 
COMARK 0.844 
SHARE 0.397 
WMS 0.970 
EBIT 0.094 
EBITDA 0.314 
PRETAX 0.099 
These results are weak and do not confirm a strong relationship between competitive 
groups and performance. No significant relationship was found between UK 
performance, licensing and co-marketing activities. Nor was EBITDA found to differ 
significantly between groups. A weak significant difference at the 10% level was found 
between groups in terms of pre tax profit and EBIT. 
The relationship between strategic group and competitive group membership was then 
tested using the same set of variables. These results are shown in table 9.8. 
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Table 9.8. The performance relationship between strategic and competitive groups. 
Performance Measure Significance 
LIC 0.616 
COMARK 0.073 
SHARE 0.013 
WMS 0.127 
EBIT 0.011 
EBITDA 0.118 
PRETAX 0.018 
These results indicate a strong performance relationship between strategic choice and 
market choice. Three performance measures SHARE, EBIT and PRETAX were 
significant at the 5% level or better. Two measures of performance WMS and EBITDA 
did not differ significantly. The two variables measuring co-operation did not differ at 
the 5% level, but COMARK was significant at the 10% level. 
These findings provide some support for Porter's theory that market choice inter- 
twinned with mode of competition has performance consequences (Porter, 1979). The 
null hypothesis, presented in Chapter 8, that - the performance of firms within a 
competitive group will differ according to whether the firms are members of the same or 
different strategic group - is therefore supported. The implications of this result are that 
companies which compete in similar ways and who can therefore read each others 
market signals and understand their motives are likely to avoid damaging price 
competition and hence reap higher profits. In contrast if firms which compete in 
different ways address a common market then competition is likely to intensify and the 
costs of competing for each firm will increase leading to reduced profits. 
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In the above discussion three research themes have been considered. The first 
established that the ten years addressed by this study could be reliably divided into two 
stable strategic time periods each of five years duration. Within each of these five years 
seven clear and distinct strategic groups could be identified. These groups were 
relatively stable across the two SSTPs and group membership was found to have 
significant performance consequences. 
The second research theme explored the dynamics of individual firms and their 
relationship to strategic groups. Weak support was found for the theory, proposed by 
Caves and Porter (1977), that firms moving between groups invariably move to a more 
advantageous market position. It was found that there was greater turbulence in the first 
SSTP, and that successive waves of mergers throughout the ten years reduced the 
number of firms and led to the market structure we see today. These mergers were 
found to occur preferentially between strategic groups rather than within strategic 
groups. 
The third and final research theme addressed the relationship between strategic group 
membership how firms compete and competitive group membership where firms 
compete. The expectation was that the interaction of these two choices should have 
performance consequences as suggested by Porter (1979). The research presented here 
found strong support for this contention. 
In the final chapter the conclusions of this research are presented together with the 
contribution to theory and suggestions as to how this research may be extended. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Summary of findings 
The research reported in this thesis found that two stable strategic time periods (SSTP) 
existed between the years 1993 to 2002. The first SSTP ran from 1993 to 1997, and the 
second from 1998 to 2002. The duration of these stable strategic time periods was 
congruent with the range reported in previous research (Bogner, 1991; Cool, 1985; 
Martens, 1988). The break between these two years coincided with a marked change in 
both the penetration of parallel imports in the UK and the rise in generic usage. These 
factors it is argued, provide a good proxy for environmental change because they are 
closely linked to the PACT figures by which doctors prescribing behaviour are 
monitored and measured. Three main drivers within the healthcare environment make 
these factors particularly relevant in the measurement of change. Firstly the stated desire 
by healthcare managers to reduce costs through the increased use of generic drugs and 
the incentives and penalties applied to doctors in order to enact this change. Secondly, 
the government clawback applied to all retail pharmacists which assumes that cheaper 
parallel imports have been used to fill prescriptions when appropriate. Thirdly, the 
National Service Framework's recommendations for specific conditions, notably 
cardiovascular products, effectively handed a windfall to some manufacturers (see 
chapter 3 for a full discussion on this point). 
Seven strategic groups were identified in each stable strategic time period. This group 
structure was relatively stable over time and 62% of firms classified in the first period 
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were reclassified into the same groups in the second period. The finding of a relatively 
stable strategic group structure agrees with previous research on the US pharmaceutical 
industry (Bogner, 1991; Cool et al., 1994). 
Strategic groups were identified using a two step clustering procedure in order to 
improve the quality of the classification because with the sole use of hierarchical 
procedures, such as Ward's method, "undesirable early combinations may persist 
through the analysis and lead to artificial results" (Hair et al., 1998 p 498). The choice 
of variables in clustering is a critical decision and probably accounts for the lack of 
consistency between studies, even those conducted within the same industry. It is 
important to use a set of variables which reliably represent strategic choice for the given 
industry. The aim should be to be both comprehensive and parsimonious. The use of 
related dependent variables for the analysis should be avoided. In this study SIZE was 
found to correlate strongly with both a number of operational variables and the 
performance measures used. Variables representative of strategy were found to be both 
industry and country specific. This observation explains in part both why it is difficult 
to draw valid comparisons across previous studies and the considerable variation in 
results achieved. The use of a significance test to identify the correct number of groups 
removes a great deal of subjectivity associated with graphing the agglomeration 
coefficient in order to identify "natural clusters". 
Performance between the strategic groups identified was found to differ significantly at 
the 5% level or better. For SSTP 1 performance differed between groups on all three 
measures SHARE (p =<0.0004), WMS (p =<0.011) and DIFF (p =<0.03 8). The 
results for SSTP2 was that performance differed between groups in terms of SHARE 
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(p =<0.001) and WMS (p =<0.0 13) but the third performance variable DIFF was not 
significant at the 5% level. These results agree with earlier research by Cool (1985) who 
found significant performance differences between strategic groups. 
In conclusion, the first theme of this research addressed the question as to whether 
strategic groups that differ significantly in terms of performance occur within the UK 
pharmaceutical industry. This research confirms the presence of seven strategic groups 
within the UK pharmaceutical industry which do differ significantly on up to three 
performance measures. 
The second research theme examined the relationship between firms and strategic 
groups and first attempted to empirically test the theory that firms moving between 
groups improve their market position (Caves et al., 1977). This research found greater 
movement between strategic groups pre 1997, and that by the end of the study firms 
appeared to have gravitated around a number of markedly different strategic positions. 
Firms within groups frequently consisted of an inner group of core members following 
the typical strategy more closely and an outer group of fringe members. Movement to a 
fringe position frequently either preceded or immediately followed a change in strategy. 
Some groups, notably the "diversified conglomerates" appeared very stable over time. 
Weak support was found for the proposition that firms moving from one strategic group 
to another invariably moved to a higher performing group although the industry 
dynamics were punctuated by a series of mergers which increased industry 
consolidation. An interesting finding was that mergers did not appear to occur at 
random but occurred preferentially between strategic groups. Of the eighteen separate 
mergers that occurred during the study period only three - Glaxo Wellcome, Pharmacia 
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Upjohn and Hoechst Rhone Poulenc - were between firms belonging to the same 
strategic group. This difference was highly significant (p =<0.001). 
In conclusion, the second theme of this research addressed two separate research 
questions: whether firms that move between strategic groups invariably move to a 
higher performing group, and whether mergers occur more frequently within or between 
strategic groups. This research finds weak support for the proposition that firms which 
change groups move to higher performing groups, p=<0.074, but found strong 
evidence that mergers occur more frequently between groups than within groups, p=< 
0.001. 
The third part of this research explored the relationship between strategic groups how 
firms compete and competitive groups where firms compete. Six different competitive 
groups were found. Of these, the pattern of market choices for group 2 comprising 
Roche, Abbott, Baxter and Procter and Gamble, showed active involvement in a number 
of different therapeutic areas. All of the other 
five competitive groups showed a pattern 
of market choices dominated by one specific therapeutic area. Competition within the 
pharmaceutical industry is therefore limited according to the therapeutic area in which 
the firm is involved. Competitive group membership on its own, however, did not 
appear to have strong performance consequences. A test of seven performance measures 
between competitive groups found a marginal relationship at the 10% level, EBIT p= 
<0.094 and PRETAX p= <0.099, but no significant differences at the 5% level. 
The relationship between strategic group and competitive group membership was then 
tested using the same set of variables. The results indicate a strong performance 
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relationship between choice of strategy and market choice. Three performance measures 
SHARE (p =<0.0 13), EBIT (p =<0.011) and PRETAX (p =<0.018) were 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better. These findings support Porter's theory 
that market choice when combined with mode of competition has performance 
consequences (Porter, 1979). 
The third research theme explored the relationship between competitive groups and 
strategic groups. The results indicate a weak relationship between competitive groups 
and performance, p=<0.099 but a strong relationship when choice of strategy 
(strategic group) is combined with market choice (competitive group), p=<0.02. 
10.2 Contributions to theory 
The research reported in this thesis contributes to existing knowledge in four main 
areas. Firstly the research presented is the first strategic group study dedicated solely to 
the UK Pharmaceutical Industry, prior to which the only strategic group research which 
addressed the issue of UK pharmaceuticals was Martens (1988) study, which included 
the UK only as part of a study of five E. C. countries. The UK is an important 
pharmaceutical market and a dedicated study is both useful to bring out the individual 
characteristics of the UK market and to provide a comparison with previous strategic 
group studies centred on the pharmaceutical industry internationally. 
Previous strategic group studies have generally suffered from a lack of comparability 
even when such studies address the same industry and investigate overalapping time 
periods. For example both Cool (1985) and Bogner (1991) researched strategic groups 
within the US pharmaceutical industry. Cool's study encompassed the years 1963 to 
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1982 and Bogner from 1969 to 1988. Yet both studies differed significantly in the 
sample of firms included and in the choice of variables chosen to distinguish strategic 
groupings. In contrast this research was specifically designed to be comparable with 
earlier research, notably the work of Cool (1985). 
A significant contribution of the research reported in this thesis relates to the linkage 
with previous work. Importantly the research confirms that strategic group research is 
both industry and market specific because the variables used to accurately depict 
strategy in one market, i. e. the US, were found to be inappropriate in terms of 
describing the UK situation. This finding offers some explanation as to why previous 
strategic group studies have frequently reported equivocal results. Multi-industry 
comparisons based upon common variables would appear to lack the precision 
necessary to adequately depict strategy in a variety of situations. 
Secondly this research contributes to the debate on the link between strategic groups 
and performance. This research broadly supports Cool's original findings (Cool, 1985; 
Cool, 1988). In contributing to this debate, the idea of competitive groups, where firms 
compete, has been linked specifically to strategic groups, how firms compete, and the 
performance implications of the interaction between these two classifications have been 
compared. 
Nesting strategic groups and competitive groups within Porters "generic strategy" 
framework has allowed for more precision in the strategic positioning of firms. These 
positions were then used to empirically test Porter's theory of intra-industry competition 
using data from the UK pharmaceutical industry. The findings showed that although 
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competitive groups appeared to exert a relatively weak influence upon performance, 
when combined with strategic groups a strong relationship with performance was 
revealed. In addition the idea of "rivalry groups" was discussed which offers a further 
line of enquiry to explore Porter's theory in more detail. 
Thirdly, this research contributes to the industry dynamics literature. Specifically, an 
aspect of Cave's and Porter's (1977) theory has been tested. This theory predicts, that 
firms moving between groups will invariably move to a more profitable group. The 
research in this thesis finds some limited support for this proposition. In addition, the 
idea that environmental shocks will precipitate group changes has been explored and the 
findings support the earlier results of Bogner (1991) that firm changes appear largely 
unrelated to environmental turbulence, suggesting some endogenous motive. 
The inclusion of merged firms within this research is novel and contributes both to the 
strategic group and industry dynamics literature. Firstly, the research found that through 
including merged firms within the analysis a greater richness of detail was included, 
allowing the important finding that mergers occurred preferentially between rather than 
within strategic groups in UK pharmaceuticals. Secondly, the inclusion of mergers 
revealed that in only one year, 1993, did no mergers take place and yet despite this 
turbulence a clear strategic group structure occurred throughout the period studied. This 
finding agrees with earlier reports (Fiegenbaum, 1987; Oster, 1982) that strategic 
groupings may persist under turbulence. It also questions the model proposed by Mehra 
and Floyd (1998) that in differentiated industries a stable environment predicates the 
presence of strategic groups. 
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Finally the research has specifically explored how the methods employed to identify 
strategic groups can be improved and contributes to the discussion on why performance 
consequences between strategic groups have frequently proved equivocal. The use of a 
significance test to identify the number of groups present, the use of two algorithms in 
combination, and applying tests of external validity, were aimed specifically at 
contributing to the quality of strategic group research and to answering the criticism that 
strategic groups are simply an artifact of method. The combination of these three 
methods has suggested a means both to remove the subjectivity that some associate with 
determining the "right" number of clusters and to ensure that the resulting clusters are 
both valid and meaningful in future strategic group studies. 
The principal implications for theory revealed by this research also fall into four areas. 
First, strategic groups are industry and market specific therefore it is important to 
choose a set of industry specific variables which accurately reflect strategic choice in 
the given market. This recommendation clearly has implications for drawing 
comparisons with previous research and provides some explanation as to why links 
between strategic groups and performance have often proved equivocal. 
Second, the challenge that strategic groups are an artifact of method has previously been 
made (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990). It is therefore incumbent upon strategic group 
researchers to follow the advice provided in the literature (Ketchen & Shook, 1996; 
Punj & Stewart, 1983) and ensure that the procedures used to derive strategic groupings 
are robust and reliable. In particular the use of relevant variables not included in the 
original analysis to test the external validity of the strategic groupings identified is 
recommended (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). 
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Third, care should be taken in the selection of a sample which is truly representative of 
the population. The inclusion of merged firms within the research introduced a greater 
degree of detail and sensitivity into the study. 
Fourth, the use of strategic groups and competitive groups as dimensions within the 
template of Porter's "generic strategies" permitted greater precision in the strategic 
positioning of firms. This may prove useful in studying industry dynamics and drawing 
performance implications in other industrial settings. This modification allows a more 
fine-grained approach to studying competitive interactions without compromising the 
value of Porter's template as a strategy tool. 
10.3 The Wider Application of Strategic Group Theory 
Strategists in all industries are frequently faced with the problem of how to make sense 
of complex patterns. These patterns may relate to the shape of competition within the 
industry or simply relate to industry dynamics such as signals between firms or simply 
firms shifting position over time. Here, strategic group theory offers the manager the 
opportunity to group firms according to the type of strategy which they are deploying 
and hence to better understand the competitive dynamics of their industry and to track 
relevant changes over time. 
The implications for strategy provided by the research in this thesis are that the strategic 
group/competitive group matrix should prove extremely useful for strategists to 
simplify the complex markets in which they operate and to draw inferences on potential 
competitive moves and viable market positions. The 
idea of outlier analysis may prove 
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particularly beneficial because, as shown by the research, relative position within a 
strategic group may be indicative of a level of commitment to the "group strategy" 
while positional changes within a group may signal a shift in intentions before a more 
fundamental strategic move. 
A particular benefit of strategic group theory in this application is that the methods 
employed to distinguish strategic groups are flexible and offer a set of tools from simple 
mapping to the use of more complex multivariate techniques. These techniques in turn 
can accommodate both qualitative and quantitative data therefore managers can utilize 
readily available industry data. This benefit allows the use of industry standard 
databases such as those provided by IMS or Nielsen to be effectively incorporated into 
industry planning unlike the Miles and Snow framework for example which requires 
some knowledge of internal drivers such as managerial attitudes to be taken into 
account. 
The idea of Porter's generic strategies appears now to be commonly applied within 
industry planning. This allows some initial analysis but in practice of en lacks the 
flexibility and precision to allow much industry data to be included. In an industry 
where differentiation is an important determinant of sustainable competitive advantage 
for example it becomes difficult and often rather subjective to distinguish between firms 
which are competing broadly along the same lines. 
The research presented in this thesis adds to the manager's armoury by providing a fins 
grained framework which fits within Porter's framework allowing the strategic position 
of firms to be pinpointed with more precision. The use of the strategic 
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group/competitive group framework allows the use of a wide range of industry data to 
be employed thus both increasing data utility by firms and allowing more precise and 
detailed analysis of competitive dynamics to be carried out. 
A further advantage of the application of strategic group and competitive group theory 
is that it encourages managers to identify the bases on which industry competition is 
fought and the dimensions which are important to their firm's sources of competitive 
advantage. The competitive group dimension also provides the facility to explore 
industry segmentation in greater detail and to explore opportunities for alliances or 
other forms of co-operative venture. 
The findings presented earlier in this thesis may also assist managers to better 
understand competitive dynamics and to predict firm moves. The use of reference firms 
within a group and the idea of an inner and outer strategic grouping may be applied 
within industry analysis to both understand the degree of commitment which firms have 
to the "core group strategy" and the degree to which they mimic industry leaders which 
may serve as reference points within the group. In contrast, firms positioned at the edge 
of a strategic group may be more likely to modify their strategy or niove to another 
strategic position and hence maybe worthy of considerable attention if the competitive 
dynamics of the industry are to be understood and anticipated. 
In conclusion, strategic group theory provides a useful and practical means to classify 
firm strategies and make sense of industry dynamics and competitive exchanges over 
time. The research presented in this thesis, although centred on the UK pharmaceutical 
industry may therefore be usefully and profitably applied in other industry settings. A 
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task facing every management is how to align firm strategies with the opportunities 
presenting themselves in the marketplace, whilst skilfully anticipating and wrong 
footing competitors. The application of strategic group theory may be usefully applied 
in this process. 
10.4 Study Limitations 
The research in this thesis is naturally limited by the sample of firms included within it. 
Ideally it would have been preferable to include more firms but the further down the 
league table you move in general, the sparser is the data. This problem is made more 
acute when you consider the secretive nature of some pharmaceutical firms and reliable 
information on research spending, for example, for some of the privately owned firms 
was difficult to obtain. Significant companies included in this privately owned group 
include Mundi Pharma, Servier, Ferring and Leo Laboratories. 
A second significant problem with a longitudinal study is to obtain a 'valid' and 
`reliable' data set for all firms and all variables across all years. A number of specific 
problems arise. Firstly, the industry has undergone a series of mergers and acquisitions 
where companies disappear and finding archival data for firms which went out of 
business ten years ago presents a problem. Secondly, reporting standards differ between 
firms and here the Japanese companies can present a particular problem. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most problematic, how firms classify the world in terms of geographical 
segments differs between firms. Clearly for a quantitative study which is reliant upon 
data analysis, such as this one, these problems impose limitations on the scope of the 
study. 
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In Chapter 2 the importance of making valid comparisons between studies was 
discussed and here data availability between countries, together with the country 
specific nature of some strategy variables can present a problem. One of the aims of this 
study was to link to previous empirical strategic group research on pharmaceuticals. 
Such comparisons are however limited by the different variables employed and the lack 
of agreement between marketing channels in the US as compared to the UK. 
Finally it is important to realize the preconceptions and unconscious bias which any 
researcher could bring to a study of this kind. Throughout this study care has been taken 
to use more objective statistical tests to identify group structures for example through 
the use of the upper tail significance test. Future research could usefully duplicate the 
method to further test the robustness of the results. 
10.5 Suggestions for further research 
Strategic group research offers opportunity to compare and make sense of firms and the 
strategies employed by firms. The key to any useful classification however is its 
practicality. Previous strategic group research suffers from the lack of comparability 
between studies. The research presented in this thesis illustrates that strategy is both 
market and country specific. The strategic choices which are important in the 
pharmaceutical industry are not precisely the same as those in another unrelated 
industry. Similarly marketing channels, customs and laws differ between companies and 
strategy seeks to match environmental threats and opportunities. This means that future 
strategic group studies should seek to identify and utilize a comprehensive set of the 
relevant industry strategic choice variables. 
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A further criticism of strategic group research is the lack of common methods employed 
to identify groups. There are a number of choices which need to be carefully considered. 
First among these is the choice of variables where care should be taken to accurately 
and comprehensively represent strategic choice within the given industry. Variables 
should be checked for cross correlation and care should be taken to avoid the use of 
dependent variables such as firm size within the data set because such variables are 
likely to correlate strongly with measures used to test performance such as market share. 
Clustering algorithms in turn place their own structural assumptions upon the data and 
the use of two different but complementary methods has been recommended (Ketchen 
et al., 1996; Punj et al., 1983) but often ignored. Similarly the use of objective means to 
determine the right number of clusters is recommended. If future research gravitates 
towards industry specific, multivariate studies employing common methods, then the 
opportunity for valid comparison and building on previous research should be 
enhanced. 
Finally strategic groups offer the opportunity to compare strategies within a common 
industry across different countries allowing the opportunity to enhance our knowledge 
of strategy choices and the degree to which global strategy affects results. Clearly such 
comparisons are themselves limited by data availability, but the common use of such 
global data providers as IMS should assist this process. To date Marten's study (1988) 
stands as the only cross country comparison of strategic groups in the pharmaceutical 
industry and it would be interesting to see detailed industry studies between countries. 
In conclusion, to be useful any classification scheme has to be practical in nature and 
based upon clearly understood principles. The concept of strategic groups offers an 
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opportunity to compare and contrast the pattern of strategic choices between firms and 
to better understand competitive dynamics. The strategic group/competitive group 
framework and the further sub-division into rivalry groups should provide the 
opportunity to measure the performance implications of strategic moves at a more 
detailed level. In the UK pharmaceutical industry, for example, the true locus of 
competition is at the sub-therapy level not at the broad therapeutic level. The issue of 
the locus of competition is, however, industry specific and future research should 
ideally be based upon developing common methods in order to aid comparison between 
studies. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 1 Tests of Normality 
Kolmogorov- Shapiro-Wilk 
Smirnov 
YEAR Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
BRANGEN 1993 0.137 29 0.178 0.940 29 0.098 
1994 0.117 29 0.200 0.947 29 0.151 
1995 0.125 29 0.200 0.925 29 0.040 
1996 0.180 29 0.017 0.870 29 0.002 
1997 0.188 29 0.010 0.890 29 0.006 
1998 0.179 29 0.018 0.882 29 0.004 
1999 0.164 29 0.044 0.896 29 0.008 
2000 0.187 29 0.011 0.852 29 0.001 
2001 0.197 29 0.006 0.815 29 0.000 
2002 0.193 29 0.007 0.839 29 0.000 
DRUGST 1993 0.138 29 0.170 0.828 29 0.000 
1994 0.222 29 0.001 0.697 29 0.000 
1995 0.163 29 0.048 0.807 29 0.000 
1996 0.188 29 0.011 0.727 29 0.000 
1997 0.185 29 0.013 0.734 29 0.000 
1998 0.188 29 0.010 0.724 29 0.000 
1999 0.182 29 0.015 0.735 29 0.000 
2000 0.197 29 0.006 0.747 29 0.000 
2001 0.197 29 0.006 0.747 29 0.000 
2002 0.164 29 0.044 0.787 29 0.000 
FOCUS 1993 0.178 29 0.020 0.894 29 0.007 
1994 0.170 29 0.032 0.915 29 0.022 
1995 0.154 29 0.075 0.924 29 0.039 
1996 0.120 29 0.200 0.930 29 0.055 
1997 0.126 29 0.200 0.896 29 0.008 
1998 0.179 29 0.018 0.896 29 0.008 
1999 0.136 29 0.182 0.922 29 0.034 
2000 0.123 29 0.200 0.920 29 0.030 
2001 0.123 29 0.200 0.920 29 0.030 
2002 0.103 29 0.200 0.917 29 0.025 
FOREIGN 1993 0.116 29 0.200 0.943 29 0.118 
1994 0.116 29 0.200 0.943 29 0.118 
1995 0.116 29 0.200 0.943 29 0.118 
1996 0.116 29 0.200 0.943 29 0.118 
1997 0.116 29 0.200 0.943 29 0.118 
1998 0.116 29 0.200 0.943 29 0.118 
1999 0.181 29 0.016 0.897 29 0.008 
2000 0.384 29 0.000 0.523 29 0.000 
2001 0.353 29 0.000 0.537 29 0.000 
2002 0.207 29 0.003 0.802 29 0.000 
MAINT 1993 0.145 29 0.124 0.943 29 0.121 
1994 0.103 29 0.200 0.948 29 0.166 
1995 0.104 29 0.200 0.955 29 0.244 
1996 0.102 29 0.200 0.946 29 0.146 
1997 0.105 29 0.200 0.942 29 0.111 
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1998 0.124 29 0.200 0.937 29 0.085 
1999 0.118 29 0.200 0.942 29 0.115 
2000 0.115 29 0.200 0.945 29 0.133 
2001 0.118 29 0.200 0.940 29 0.102 
2002 0.097 29 0.200 0.940 29 0.102 
PHARMA 1993 0.195 29 0.006 0.814 29 0.000 
1994 0.195 29 0.006 0.814 29 0.000 
1995 0.195 29 0.006 0.814 29 0.000 
1996 0.195 29 0.006 0.814 29 0.000 
1997 0.195 29 0.006 0.814 29 0.000 
1998 0.195 29 0.006 0.814 29 0.000 
1999 0.128 29 0.200 0.893 29 0.007 
2000 0.164 29 0.044 0.866 29 0.002 
2001 0.198 29 0.005 0.853 29 0.001 
2002 0.211 29 0.002 0.831 29 0.000 
PRODSTR 1993 0.150 29 0.096 0.918 29 0.027 
1994 0.186 29 0.012 0.861 29 0.001 
1995 0.225 29 0.001 0.839 29 0.000 
1996 0.190 29 0.009 0.857 29 0.001 
1997 0.196 29 0.006 0.788 29 0.000 
1998 0.202 29 0.004 0.863 29 0.001 
1999 0.235 29 0.000 0.832 29 0.000 
2000 0.227 29 0.001 0.826 29 0.000 
2001 0.148 29 0.105 0.906 29 0.014 
2002 0.176 29 0.023 0.862 29 0.001 
PROFPROM 1993 0.143 29 0.137 0.959 29 0.307 
1994 0.162 29 0.049 0.933 29 0.066 
1995 0.166 29 0.040 0.893 29 0.007 
1996 0.188 29 0.010 0.829 29 0.000 
1997 0.137 29 0.172 0.954 29 0.238 
1998 0.126 29 0.200 0.945 29 0.133 
1999 0.140 29 0.153 0.947 29 0.149 
2000 0.171 29 0.029 0.881 29 0.003 
2001 0.171 29 0.029 0.881 29 0.003 
2002 0.166 29 0.039 0.935 29 0.073 
RDI 1993 0.140 29 0.150 0.949 29 0.175 
1994 0.164 29 0.046 0.947 29 0.152 
1995 0.109 29 0.200 0.964 29 0.416 
1996 0.136 29 0.182 0.953 29 0.221 
1997 0.126 29 0.200 0.958 29 0.294 
1998 0.169 29 0.034 0.929 29 0.052 
1999 0.116 29 0.200 0.971 29 0.594 
2000 0.104 29 0.200 0.977 29 0.767 
2001 0.123 29 0.200 0.972 29 0.603 
2002 0.166 29 0.040 0.930 29 0.055 
SIZE 1993 0.086 29 0.200 0.984 29 0.929 
1994 0.088 29 0.200 0.982 29 0.888 
1995 0.097 29 0.200 0.979 29 0.822 
1996 0.101 29 0.200 0.977 29 0.757 
1997 0.097 29 0.200 0.972 29 0.614 
1998 0.121 29 0.200 0.959 29 0.317 
1999 0.122 29 0.200 0.957 29 0.285 
2000 0.114 29 0.200 0.961 29 0.348 
2001 0.114 29 0.200 0.961 29 0.348 
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2002 0.090 29 0.200 0.959 29 0.316 
Result of Bootstrapping of Variables 
Each of the distributions for the bootstrapped variables are shown below in figures 
to 10. 
Figure APPI Bootstrap of BRANGEN variable 
BRANGEN 
N 
O 
N 
U, 
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6.4 6.6 6.8 7.0 72 
Value 
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Figure APP2 Bootstrap of DRUGST variable 
DRUGST 
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Figure APP3 Bootstrap of FOCUS variable 
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Figure APP4 Bootstrap of FOREIGN variable 
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Figure APPS Bootstrap of MAINT variable 
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Figure APP6 Bootstrap of PHARMA variable 
PHARMA 
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Figure APP7 Bootstrap of PROFPROM variable 
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Figure APP8 Bootstrap of PRODSTR (Log) variable 
PRODSTR Log Transformation 
`° i 
N 
O 
2.4 2.5 2.6 27 
Value 
Figure APP9 Bootstrap of RDI variable 
RDI 
O O 
N 
T 
yO 
CO 
0.104 0.106 0.108 0.110 0.112 0114 0116 0118 
Value 
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Figure APP 10 Bootstrap of SIZE variable 
SIZE 
CID 
T 
In 
4) 
11.4000006 11.4500004 11.5000003 11.5500002 11.6000001 11.6499999 11.6999998 
Value 
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Table 2 Data standardized to Z scores agglomeration schedule Ward's Method - 
SSTP1 
Agglomeration Schedule -Z Score Data 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First Appears Next Stage 
Stage Cluster I Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 4 21 0.639917 0 0 15 
2 9 16 1.3513 0 0 12 
3 5 10 2.174387 0 0 22 
4 13 19 3.01918 0 0 12 
5 8 24 4.137776 0 0 17 
6 12 28 5.575746 0 0 13 
7 3 22 7.24312 0 0 8 
8 1 3 9.163154 0 7 21 
9 18 23 11.17539 0 0 15 
10 26 29 13.77636 0 0 24 
11 7 25 16.50024 0 0 18 
12 9 13 19.44928 2 4 16 
13 2 12 22.48455 0 6 19 
14 11 17 25.81828 0 0 20 
15 4 18 29.49296 1 9 19 
16 9 27 33.98438 12 0 25 
17 8 15 39.92477 5 0 20 
18 7 20 46.27595 11 0 21 
19 2 4 55.24881 13 15 22 
20 8 11 64.39042 17 14 23 
21 1 7 74.94379 8 18 27 
22 2 5 91.27495 19 3 25 
23 8 14 108.7647 20 0 24 
24 8 26 127.5321 23 10 26 
25 2 9 150.5763 22 16 28 
26 6 8 177.4683 0 24 27 
27 1 6 216.5975 21 26 28 
28 1 2 280 27 25 0 
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Table 3 Non standardized data agglomeration schedule - Ward's Method - SSTP1 
Agglomeration Schedule for non standardized data set - SSTP1 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 1 20 18.32599 0 0 
2 5 10 46.13995 0 0 
3 13 16 76.85682 0 0 
4 8 24 117.0984 0 0 
5 9 26 196.6839 0 0 
6 13 19 314.5887 3 0 
7 4 21 452.6501 0 0 
8 28 29 594.2335 0 0 
9 11 17 740.0052 0 0 
10 1 22 889.4544 1 0 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
9 
8 
7 
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12 
1 
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9 
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1 
2 
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13 
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3 
28 
14 
12 
23 
11 
7 
8 
9 
6 
4 
5 
2 
1104.788 
1333.37 
1615.854 
1959.478 
2338.542 
2789.93 
3521.118 
4311.759 
5189.184 
6168.893 
7164.011 
8251.434 
9859.919 
12359 
16500.98 
23842.99 
33657.88 
66956.63 
5 6 
4 0 
0 0 
2 0 
0 0 
10 0 
0 8 
12 0 
7 15 
0 0 
11 9 
16 13 
14 18 
17 21 
24 20 
22 19 
25 23 
26 27 
Next 
Stage 
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12 
11 
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17 
21 
16 
21 
18 
22 
23 
19 
22 
24 
23 
26 
25 
24 
26 
27 
25 
27 
28 
28 
0 
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Table 4 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Standardized Data - SSTP1 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.128 0 0 0 0 
27 0.142 0.27 0.146 0.274 0.004 0 0 0 
26 0.165 0.435 0.173 0.446 0.008 0 0 0 
25 0.169 0.604 0.218 0.665 0.049 0.049 1.003 10.936 
24 0.224 0.827 0.285 0.95 0.061 0.04 1.525 16.634 
23 0.288 1.115 0.326 1.276 0.039 0.032 1.219 13.301 
22 0.334 1.449 0.371 1.647 0.037 0.048 0.765 8.34 
21 0.384 1.833 0.42 2.067 0.036 0.058 0.619 6.756 
20 0.403 2.236 0.486 2.554 0.084 0.074 1.128 12.306 
19 0.52 2.756 0.562 3.115 0.042 0.093 0.448 4.887 
18 0.545 3.301 0.656 3.772 0.112 0.103 1.08 11.786 
17 0.59 3.891 0.757 4.528 0.167 0.112 1.483 16.178 
16 0.606 4.497 0.864 5.393 0.258 0.113 2.289 24.972 
15 0.667 5.164 1.018 6.41 0.351 0.127 2.755 30.055 
14 0.735 5.899 1.177 7.587 0.442 0.153 2.879 31.401 
13 0.898 6.798 1.361 8.949 0.463 0.196 2.363 25.78 
12 1.188 7.985 1.607 10.556 0.42 0.232 1.81 19.741 
11 1.27 9.255 1.883 12.439 0.613 0.248 2.473 26.975 
10 1.794 11.05 2.143 14.582 0.349 0.253 1.379 15.045 
9 1.828 12.878 2.476 17.058 0.648 0.272 2.38 25.964 
8 2.112 14.989 2.801 19.859 0.689 0.276 2.496 27.233 
7 3.266 18.255 3.177 23.036 -0.088 0.289 -0.305 -3.332 
6 3.497 21.752 3.529 26.566 0.032 0.272 0.119 1.299 
5 3.755 25.507 4.136 30.702 0.382 0.372 1.025 11.182 
4 4.609 30.116 4.753 35.455 0.144 0.428 0.336 3.668 
3 5.378 35.494 5.578 41.033 0.2 0.437 0.458 4.991 
2 7.827 43.32 6.751 47.784 -1.076 0.475 -2.264 -24.694 
1 12.68 56 8.217 56 -4.463 0.691 -6.457 -70.434 
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Table 5 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Non Standardized Data - SSTP1 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. StDevs. Errors Statistics 
28 1.833 1.833 3.784 3.784 1.951 2.117 0.922 10.053 
27 2.781 4.614 6.201 9.985 3.42 2.551 1.341 14.624 
26 3.072 7.686 8.145 18.13 5.073 2.893 1.754 19.13 
25 4.024 11.71 10.588 28.717 6.564 3.222 2.037 22.219 
24 7.959 19.668 12.731 41.448 4.772 3.678 1.297 14.153 
23 11.79 31.459 14.938 56.386 3.148 4.148 0.759 8.277 
22 13.806 45.265 17.404 73.79 3.598 4.519 0.796 8.685 
21 14.158 59.423 19.959 93.749 5.801 4.826 1.202 13.11 
20 14.577 74 22.951 116.7 8.374 5.235 1.599 17.448 
19 14.945 88.945 25.841 142.541 10.896 5.467 1.993 21.742 
18 21.533 110.479 29.044 171.585 7.511 6.338 1.185 12.927 
17 22.858 133.337 32.597 204.182 9.738 6.625 1.47 16.035 
16 28.248 161.585 37.096 241.279 8.848 7.298 1.212 13.226 
15 34.362 195.948 42.693 283.972 8.331 8.656 0.962 10.499 
14 37.907 233.854 49.868 333.84 11.961 10.688 1.119 12.208 
13 45.139 278.993 56.859 390.699 11.72 12.584 0.931 10.16 
12 73.119 352.112 65.596 456.295 -7.523 14.347 -0.524 -5.72 
11 79.064 431.176 77.882 534.177 -1.182 17.03 -0.069 -0.757 
10 87.742 518.918 91.977 626.154 4.235 21.985 0.193 2.101 
9 97.971 616.889 115.316 741.47 17.345 27.605 0.628 6.854 
8 99.512 716.402 141.76 883.23 42.247 28.994 1.457 15.895 
7 108.742 825.144 173.145 1056.375 64.403 40.231 1.601 17.463 
6 160.849 985.992 218.466 1274.841 57.618 50.488 1.141 12.449 
5 249.908 1235.901 287.962 1562.803 38.054 61.732 0.616 6.725 
4 414.198 1650.099 384.206 1947.009 -29.993 74.801 -0.401 -4.374 
3 734.201 2384.3 522.351 2469.36 -211.85 129.565 -1.635 -17.837 
2 981.49 3365.789 823.528 3292.888 -157.961 187.179 -0.844 -9.206 
1 3329.875 6695.665 3224.558 6517.446 -105.318 677.332 -0.155 -1.698 
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Table 6 Agglomeration Schedule for SSTP2. Ward's Method Variable Set 11Z 
Scores] 
Agglomeration Schedule 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Next Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 9 13 0.354033 0 0 18 28 
2 4 18 0.728843 0 0 11 27 
3 5 10 1.15501 0 0 12 26 
4 7 12 1.903146 0 0 8 25 
5 16 19 3.0663 0 0 18 24 
6 26 29 4.31097 0 0 22 23 
7 8 23 5.606776 0 0 11 22 
8 2 7 7.003912 0 4 16 21 
9 17 24 8.487198 0 0 15 20 
10 1 3 9.98831 0 0 13 19 
11 4 8 11.71594 2 7 16 18 
12 5 28 13.52133 3 0 21 17 
13 1 22 16.27709 10 0 20 16 
14 21 27 19.1509 0 0 26 15 
15 11 17 22.30582 0 9 25 14 
16 2 4 25.94047 8 11 19 13 
17 20 25 29.64466 0 0 20 12 
18 9 16 33.4216 1 5 21 11 
19 2 15 38.14762 16 0 23 10 
20 1 20 43.90533 13 17 24 9 
21 5 9 51.12767 12 18 23 8 
22 14 26 60.6686 0 6 24 7 
23 2 5 72.81949 19 21 26 6 
24 1 14 88.11934 20 22 27 5 
25 6 11 106.3193 0 15 27 4 
26 2 21 125.3923 23 14 28 3 
27 1 6 155.5978 24 25 28 2 
28 1 2 196 27 26 0 1 
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Table 7 Agglomeration Schedule for SSTP2. Ward's Method Variable Set 1. Non 
Standardised Data 1 
Agglomeration Schedule 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Next 
Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 11 17 17.42901 0 0 18 
2 20 25 36.17928 0 0 13 
3 9 26 58.08275 0 0 11 
4 1 22 80.77591 0 0 13 
5 13 28 103.9203 0 0 11 
6 19 29 201.2875 0 0 17 
7 5 14 301.6809 0 0 12 
8 15 23 422.8496 0 0 19 
9 4 18 557.939 0 0 19 
10 2 12 701.5133 0 0 15' 
11 9 13 886.782 3 5 17 
12 5 8 1080.899 7 0 22 
13 1 20 1289.97 4 2 16 
14 10 24 1569.236 0 0 18 
15 2 16 2020.486 10 0 24 
16 1 7 2511.207 13 0 20 
17 9 19 3049.628 11 6 21 
18 10 11 3592.312 14 1 21 
19 4 15 4229.925 9 8 22 
20 1 3 5680.361 16 0 24 
21 9 10 7140.244 17 18 26 
22 4 5 8845.09 19 12 25 
23 21 27 10594.39 0 0 28 
24 1 2 13154.64 20 15 27 
25 4 6 19351.87 22 0 26 
26 4 9 27685.45 25 21 27 
27 1 4 47343.99 24 26 28 
28 1 21 68700.05 27 23 0 
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Table 8 Agglomeration Schedule for SSTP2. Ward's Method Variable Set 2. Z 
Scores] 
Agglomeration Schedule 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Next 
Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster I Cluster 2 
1 5 10 0.330388 0 0 7 
2 4 18 0.763389 0 0 5 
3 9 12 1.235105 0 0 4 
4 7 9 2.18045 0 3 12 
5 4 23 3.224799 2 0 18 
6 13 19 4.444912 0 0 21 
7 5 8 5.771645 1 0 10 
8 17 24 7.118582 0 0 19 
9 1 3 8.623614 0 0 14 
10 5 28 10.14535 7 0 18 
11 11 22 11.87672 0 0 23 
12 2 7 13.86105 0 4 13 
13 2 15 16.40973 12 0 20 
14 1 25 19.50904 9 0 17 
15 21 27 22.81156 0 0 26 
16 16 20 26.40284 0 0 20 
17 1 29 31.1348 14 0 24 
18 4 5 35.95097 5 10 22 
19 17 26 41.6436 8 0 22 
20 2 16 49.08753 13 16 21 
21 2 13 57.09576 20 6 25 
22 4 17 67.57965 18 19 25 
23 6 11 78.8459 0 11 27 
24 1 14 92.32614 17 0 27 
25 2 4 109.5962 21 22 26 
26 2 21 129.6803 25 15 28 
27 1 6 156.841 24 23 28 
28 1 2 196 27 26 0 
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Table 9 Agglomeration Schedule for SSTP2. Ward's Method Variable Set 2 [Non 
Standardized Data I 
Agglomeration Schedule 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Next 
Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 8 23 0.657508 0 0 13 
2 2 9 1.553867 0 0 14 
3 26 28 2.976481 0 0 10 
4 3 15 5.005052 0 0 18 
5 4 18 7.461259 0 0 19 
6 1 17 10.67147 0 0 15 
7 13 19 14.31111 0 0 10 
8 12 25 19.81561 0 0 20 
9 6 11 26.02678 0 0 15 
10 13 26 34.30064 7 3 14 
11 7 16 42.62393 0 0 17 
12 20 29 53.05598 0 0 20 
13 5 8 65.33655 0 1 18 
14 2 13 83.1874 2 10 22 
15 1 6 105.1418 6 9 16 
16 1 22 130.3196 15 0 23 
17 7 24 157.3075 11 0 23 
18 3 5 188.6585 4 13 21 
19 4 10 229.4661 5 0 24 
20 12 20 273.2148 8 12 22 
21 3 14 337.867 18 0 27 
22 2 12 431.4446 14 20 26 
23 1 7 560.95 16 17 24 
24 1 4 1126.676 23 19 26 
25 21 27 2551.288 0 0 28 
26 1 2 4782.821 24 22 27 
27 1 3 13306.14 26 21 28 
28 1 21 33925.26 27 25 0 
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Table 10 Principle Component Scores SSTP2. Full Variable Set [Non Standardized 
Data ] 
3M 5.1355 51.9375 7.8266 58.8885 -25.339 
ABB 24.9269 40.9556 25.0011 40.9862 
17.5779 
AKZO 7.1953 41.9453 9.8689 90.5029 -5.9062 
AVE 27.8245 39.178 33.0906 71.5999 -5.6218 
AZ 35.3885 52.8764 47.553 98.3596 -4.9981 
BAX 23.0477 0.2555 29.4549 49.4599 16.1128 
BAY 13.3646 42.8912 11.4918 59.8458 
15.3284 
BI 31.6898 44.902 44.744 93.297 -0.5907 
BMS 39.6609 45.3596 48.3832 43.5693 
15.4892 
GSK 40.7886 51.2251 51.4131 80.4932 -9.0149 
IVX 34.9931 54.078 58.8704 62.4587 
18.5845 
JJ 23.1576 48.7403 24.5247 50.2815 
20.9611 
LIL 42.894 52.6998 53.9971 47.1988 -19.296 
LUN 34.6887 50.6133 56.836 101.3293 1.2738 
MER 27.9629 33.5749 42.4228 89.036 6.4447 
MSD 24.6464 56.0955 25.3711 62.0683 
22.8681 
NOV 37.2598 56.0424 56.0317 60.4737 -19.897 
NVA 32.7576 46.3825 39.8801 71.5321 -9.8815 
PFZ 40.454 60.9215 47.2573 47.5851 
26.7149 
PG 6.3655 53.8582 5.5415 46.6007 
30.0057 
PHR 43.3732 55.6721 36.1466 -53.5831 - 
58.6992 
RB 1.6185 52.1308 6.6012 62.8023 
25.6055 
ROC 25.532 35.1018 32.1963 91.4164 4.0169 
SAG 39.1786 40.9918 54.3754 65.467 -5.2304 
SOL 7.9759 55.0177 7.1438 51.0446 -28.99 
SPL 38.506 47.1692 47.6472 46.5741 
17.1332 
SS 46.1131 60.9948 50.838 -3.8189 
43.9072 
WYE 41.5688 53.6754 50.3265 48.5913 -21.217 
YAM 28.6018 59.048 43.123 46.6243 -26.137 
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Table 11 Principle Component Scores SSTP2. Full Variable Set [Standardized 
Data 
Principal Component Scores 
3M -3.1334 0.6102 -0.2286 -0.1325 -0.3681 
ABB 0.0485 -0.7116 -0.9973 -0.893 0.5721 
AKZO -2.0214 0.0035 -0.7984 0.8659 0.1526 
AVE 1.4112 -1.0118 -0.4886 0.3803 0.4149 
AZ 2.031 0.3687 -0.0618 1.6622 -0.5846 
BAX -1.3421 -5.8006 0.0495 -0.7383 0.9893 
BAY -0.6107 -0.308 -1.3399 0.1527 -0.0057 
BI 0.7875 0.1006 0.6142 0.8886 0.7621 
BMS 1.0251 -0.1354 -0.3216 -0.0675 0.0316 
GSK 2.5546 -0.0443 0.0223 1.2658 -1.0883 
IVX -1.9276 -0.6964 1.9693 0.5001 -1.4902 
JJ 0.3071 -0.4742 -0.9411 0.0746 -0.5173 
LIL 1.813 0.7636 0.6712 0.0172 0.0451 
LUN -0.2376 2.7753 1.0929 0.6439 2.9848 
MER -0.809 -1.3225 -0.0422 0.6219 1.2955 
MSD 0.6258 1.4834 -2.0557 0.5874 -0.573 
NOV -0.2581 0.134 2.3357 0.4164 -1.1911 
NVA 1.887 -0.9111 -0.8711 0.361 0.302 
PFZ 2.151 1.9505 -0.5696 0.2692 -0.3839 
PG -2.7261 1.4404 -1.5934 -0.2622 0.0676 
PHR 2.0759 -0.2972 -0.0948 -3.5421 -0.9166 
RB -3.9497 -0.2477 -0.0968 0.5779 -1.8997 
ROC 1.2049 -1.8864 -0.3621 0.8536 0.5262 
SAG 0.5651 -0.7946 1.9559 0.0465 0.3239 
SOL -2.7067 1.3535 -1.109 -0.8647 0.4719 
SPL 0.2356 0.4229 1.0203 -1.0308 0.6448 
SS 1.5835 1.4399 0.1995 -1.9646 -0.1237 
WYE 1.7096 0.0399 0.3367 0.0118 -0.8634 
YAM -2.294 1.7553 1.7043 -0.7013 0.4213 
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Table 12 Agglomeration Schedule Based upon Principle Component Scores SSTP2 
Full Variable Set [Standardized Data J 
Agglomeration Schedule 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Next 
Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 4 18 0.197976 0 0 6 
2 20 25 0.582494 0 0 14 
3 5 10 1.013816 0 0 17 
4 7 12 1.662244 0 0 8 
5 13 28 2.398106 0 0 7 
6 4 23 3.341568 1 0 19 
7 9 13 4.483593 0 5 17 
8 2 7 5.731313 0 4 16 
9 1 3 7.329929 0 0 14 
10 8 24 9.106006 0 0 12 
11 11 17 10.95976 0 0 21 
12 8 26 13.03474 10 0 22 
13 16 19 15.4797 0 0 20 
14 1 20 18.39677 9 2 18 
15 21 27 21.62866 0 0 24 
16 2 15 25.12059 8 0 19 
17 5 9 28.9363 3 7 20 
18 1 22 35.32436 14 0 26 
19 2 4 41.85347 16 6 22 
20 5 16 48.4245 17 13 24 
21 11 29 55.25116 11 0 23 
22 2 8 64.73694 19 12 25 
23 11 14 81.50648 21 0 26 
24 5 21 98.53624 20 15 25 
25 2 5 118.4212 22 24 27 
26 1 11 140.3094 18 23 28 
27 2 6 178.5874 25 0 28 
28 1 2 248.525 26 27 0 
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Table 13 Agglomeration Schedule Based upon Principle Component Scores 
SSTP2. Full Variable Set [Non Standardized Data ] 
Agglomeration Schedule 
Cluster Combined Coefficients Stage Cluster First 
Appears 
Next 
Stage 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 9 26 8.440851 0 0 11 
2 13 28 19.34613 0 0 11 
3 11 17 30.70507 0 0 19 
4 20 25 44.34762 0 0 14 
5 1 22 58.99617 0 0 14 
6 15 23 121.1874 0 0 20 
7 5 8 186.2959 0 0 12 
8 4 18 256.5396 0 0 18 
9 2 12 337.4434 0 0 15 
10 19 29 418.6104 0 0 17 
11 9 13 517.1817 1 2 17 
12 5 14 627.4003 7 0 20 
13 10 24 805.4988 0 0 18 
14 1 20 987.1802 5 4 16 
15 2 16 1260.702 9 0 21 
16 1 7 1554.779 14- 0 21 
17 9 19 1866.094 11 10 19 
18 4 10 2242.764 8 13 22 
19 9 11 2711.035 17 3 26 
20 5 15 3351.625 12 6 22 
21 1 2 4567.377 16 15 24 
22 4 5 5890.21 18 20 25 
23 21 27 7363.687 0 0 28 
24 1 3 8925.302 21 0 27 
25 4 6 12369.26 22 0 26 
26 4 9 19635.17 25 19 27 
27 1 4 30419.87 24 26 28 
28 1 21 50135.44 27 23 0 
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Figure 11 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Diagram- Standardized Data - SSTP2 
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Table 14 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Standardized Data - SSTP2 
Variable Set 2 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0 0 0 0 
27 0.124 0.218 0.127 0.221 0.003 0 0 0 
26 0.135 0.353 0.151 0.373 0.016 0 0 0 
25 0.27 0.623 0.197 0.569 -0.073 0 0 0 
24 0.298 0.921 0.241 0.81 -0.058 0.036 -1.601 -17.465 
23 0.348 1.269 0.288 1.098 -0.06 0.047 -1.263 -13.774 
22 0.378 1.648 0.341 1.44 -0.037 0.043 -0.853 -9.301 
21 0.384 2.032 0.383 1.822 -0.002 0.036 -0.051 -0.556 
20 0.43 2.462 0.421 2.244 -0.009 0.052 -0.162 -1.769 
19 0.435 2.897 0.466 2.71 0.031 0.065 0.48 5.241 
18 0.495 3.392 0.536 3.245 0.04 0.074 0.548 5.979 
17 0.566 3.958 0.611 3.856 0.045 0.094 0.477 5.207 
16 0.728 4.686 0.711 4.568 -0.017 0.104 -0.162 -1.768 
15 0.887 5.573 0.83 5.398 -0.057 0.118 -0.479 -5.223 
14 0.944 6.517 0.968 6.365 0.024 0.146 0.165 1.796 
13 1.026 7.543 1.161 7.526 0.135 0.202 0.669 7.302 
12 1.353 8.895 1.416 8.942 0.064 0.236 0.27 2.943 
11 1.375 10.271 1.743 10.686 0.368 0.268 1.372 14.972 
10 1.625 11.895 1.992 12.677 0.367 0.264 1.389 15.152 
9 2.126 14.021 2.287 14.965 0.161 0.268 0.6 6.548 
8 2.29 16.311 2.643 17.607 0.353 0.296 1.193 13.012 
7 2.995 19.306 3.176 20.783 0.18 0.347 0.52 5.668 
6 3.218 22.525 3.656 24.439 0.438 0.395 1.108 12.087 
5 3.851 26.376 4.292 28.731 0.441 0.447 0.987 10.768 
4 4.934 31.31 5.043 33.774 0.109 0.487 0.223 2.434 
3 5.738 37.047 5.983 39.757 0.246 0.551 0.446 4.867 
2 7.764 44.811 7.305 47.062 -0.459 0.564 -0.815 -8.891 
1 11.189 56 8.938 56 -2.251 0.922 -2.44 -26.62 
463 
Figure 12 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Diagram- Non Standardized Data 
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Table 14 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Non Standardized Data - SSTP2 
Variable Set 2 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 0.188 0.188 0.188 0.188 0 0 0 0 
27 0.256 0.444 0.273 0.46 0.016 0.052 0.317 3.462 
26 0.406 0.85 0.476 0.937 0.07 0.112 0.623 6.801 
25 0.58 1.43 0.692 1.629 0.113 0.128 0.883 9.638 
24 0.702 2.132 0.876 2.505 0.175 0.135 1.289 14.06 
23 0.917 3.049 1.067 3.573 0.15 0.298 0.504 5.493 
22 1.04 4.089 1.395 4.968 0.355 0.466 0.761 8.302 
21 1.573 5.662 1.814 6.781 0.241 0.561 0.43 4.686 
20 1.775 7.436 2.279 9.061 0.505 0.552 0.915 9.986 
19 2.364 9.8 2.926 11.987 0.562 0.791 0.711 7.757 
18 2.378 12.178 3.866 15.853 1.488 1.37 1.087 11.856 
17 2.981 15.159 5.28 21.134 2.3 2.016 1.141 12.442 
16 3.509 18.667 7.84 28.974 4.331 3.254 1.331 14.52 
15 5.1 23.768 12.163 41.137 7.063 5.877 1.202 13.11 
14 6.273 30.04 19.05 60.187 12.778 8.428 1.516 16.539 
13 7.194 37.234 30.023 90.21 22.83 10.914 2.092 22.82 
12 7.711 44.945 43.637 133.847 35.926 16.688 2.153 23.484 
11 8.957 53.902 67.49 201.337 58.533 22.835 2.563 27.962 
10 11.659 65.561 99.955 301.292 88.296 34.347 2.571 28.043 
9 12.5 78.061 152.643 453.935 140.143 42.338 3.31 36.109 
8 18.472 96.533 211.955 665.89 193.483 54.822 3.529 38.5 
7 26.736 123.269 300.614 966.504 273.877 71.52 3.829 41.773 
6 37.002 160.271 423.888 1390.392 386.886 110.019 3.517 38.361 
5 161.636 321.906 621.941 2012.333 460.306 168.308 2.735 29.834 
4 407.032 728.939 962.435 2974.768 555.403 227.947 2.437 26.58 
3 637.582 1366.521 1476.058 4450.826 838.476 267.942 3.129 34.137 
2 2435.237 3801.758 2080.97 6531.795 - 
354.267 
305.363 -1.16 -12.656 
11- 5891.177 9692.935 3161.14 9692.935 - 
2730.04 
461.136 -5.92 -64.582 
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Figure 13 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Diagram- Standardized Data - SSTP2 Principle Components 
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Bootstrap Validation Wtthout Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
Table 15 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Standardized Data - SSTP2 
Principle Components 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 0.018 0.018 0.063 0.063 0.046 0 0 0 
27 0.049 0.067 0.096 0.16 0.047 0 0 0 
26 0.091 0.158 0.119 0.278 0.028 0 0 0 
25 0.124 0.282 0.138 0.416 0.014 0 0 0 
24 0.177 0.459 0.16 0.577 -0.016 0 0 0 
23 0.218 0.677 0.183 0.759 -0.036 0 0 0 
22 0.23 0.907 0.204 0.963 -0.026 0 0 0 
21 0.231 1.137 0.228 1.192 -0.002 0.032 -0.071 -0.775 
20 0.257 1.394 0.255 1.447 -0.002 0.034 -0.051 -0.553 
19 0.26 1.654 0.281 1.728 0.021 0.036 0.586 6.394 
18 0.265 1.919 0.315 2.043 0.05 0.04 1.255 13.692 
17 0.4 2.318 0.353 2.396 -0.046 0.045 -1.029 -11.23 
16 0.444 2.762 0.397 2.794 -0.046 0.051 -0.91 -9.931 
15 0.479 3.241 0.447 3.241 -0.032 0.055 -0.582 -6.344 
14 0.48 3.721 0.507 3.748 0.027 0.057 0.468 5.11 
13 0.518 4.24 0.568 4.316 0.05 0.062 0.801 8.742 
12 0.682 4.922 0.647 4.963 -0.036 0.08 -0.445 -4.849 
11 0.808 5.73 0.727 5.689 -0.081 0.097 -0.834 -9.098 
10 0.861 6.591 0.847 6.536 -0.014 0.117 -0.121 -1.316 
9 1.134 7.725 0.995 7.531 -0.139 0.13 -1.07 -11.67 
8 1.326 9.05 1.164 8.695 -0.162 0.146 -1.11 -12.113 
7 1.462 10.513 1.398 10.093 -0.064 0.172 -0.374 -4.075 
6 1.95 12.463 1.668 11.761 -0.283 0.195 -1.451 -15.83 
5 2.767 15.23 2.037 13.798 -0.73 0.246 -2.973 -32.43 
4 2.884 18.114 2.494 16.292 -0.39 0.252 -1.544 -16.844 
3 3.138 21.252 3.016 19.308 -0.123 0.306 -0.401 -4.372 
2 3.245 24.498 3.703 23.01 0.457 0.41 1.114 12.157 
1 3.502 28 4.99 28 1.488 0.617 2.41 26.293 
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Figure 14 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Diagram - Non Standardized Data - SSTP2 Principle Components 
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Table 16 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Non Standardized Data - 
SSTP2 Principle Components 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 3.376 3.376 3.376 3.376 0 0 0 0 
27 4.362 7.738 4.395 7.772 0.033 0.116 0.288 3.143 
26 4.544 12.282 5.34 13.112 0.796 2.386 0.334 3.641 
25 5.457 17.739 9.221 22.333 3.764 5.603 0.672 7.329 
24 5.859 23.598 15.959 38.292 10.099 6.213 1.626 17.733 
23 24.876 48.475 21.552 59.844 -3.325 4.142 -0.803 -8.756 
22 26.043 74.518 25.971 85.814 -0.073 5.09 -0.014 -0.156 
21 28.097 102.616 32.075 117.89 3.978 7.893 0.504 5.498 
20 32.362 134.977 39.951 157.841 7.59 10.217 0.743 8.103 
19 32.467 167.444 50.985 208.826 18.518 13.292 1.393 15.197 
18 - 39.428 206.873 65.657 274.483 26.229 16.184 1.621 17.68 
17 44.087 250.96 84.247 358.73 40.16 20.319 1.976 21.56 
16 71.239 322.199 108.482 467.212 37.242 29.605 1.258 13.723 
15 72.673 394.872 136.237 603.449 63.565 33.053 1.923 20.979 
14 109.409 504.281 181.706 785.155 72.297 46.89 1.542 16.819 
13 117.631 621.911 248.472 1033.627 130.842 65.92 1.985 21.652 
12 124.526 746.438 332.834 1366.461 208.308 86.054 2.421 26.406 
11 150.668 897.106 432.382 1798.844 281.714 93.484 3.013 32.873 
10 187.308 1084.414 536.83 2335.674 349.522 90.493 3.862 42.134 
9 256.236 1340.65 650.588 2986.262 394.352 95.155 4.144 45.209 
8 486.301 1826.951 786.118 3772.38 299.818 118.495 2.53 27.601 
7 529.133 2356.084 940.864 4713.245 411.731 132.058 3.118 34.011 
6 589.391 2945.475 1191.454 5904.699 602.063 156.421 3.849 411.988- 
5 624.646 3570.121 1477.906 7382.605 853.26 219.219 3.892 42.46 
4 1377.584 4947.705 1951.824 9334.429 574.24 270.913 2.12 23.123 
3 2906.364 7854.069 2568.606 11903.04 - 
337.758 
361.58 -0.934 -10.19 
2 4313.879 12167.95 3419.129 15322.17 -894.75 409.498 -2.185 -23.835 
1 7886.229 20054.18 4732.008 20054.17 - 
3154.22 
636.411 -4.956 -54.066 
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Figure 15 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Diagram - Standardized Data - SSTP2 
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Bootstrap Validation With Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
Table 17 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Standardized Data - SSTP2 
Full Set of Variables 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 0.051 0.051 0.131 0.131 0.08 0.04 2.016 21.993 
27 0.069 0.12 0.171 0.303 0.102 0.034 2.975 32.448 
26 0.095 0.214 0.199 0.502 0.105 0.037 2.846 31.046 
25 0.144 0.359 0.229 0.731 0.085 0.04 2.143 23.383 
24 0.166 0.525 0.259 0.99 0.093 0.043 2.181 23.792 
23 0.187 0.712 0.282 1.271 0.095 0.047 2.022 22.063 
22 0.187 0.899 0.306 1.578 0.119 0.048 2.458 26.819 
21 0.19 1.089 0.332 1.91 0.143 0.047 3.037 33.126 
20 0.197 1.286 0.365 2.275 0.167 0.052 3.208 34.997 
19 0.282 1.568 0.394 2.669 0.112 0.056 2.001 21.823 
18 0.323 1.891 0.427 3.095 0.104 0.063 1.656 18.063 
17 0.328 2.219 0.463 3.558 0.134 0.071 1.899 20.719 
16 0.394 2.614 0.506 4.064 0.112 0.069 1.611 17.578 
15 0.4 3.013 0.555 4.619 0.156 0.074 2.088 22.773 
14 0.436 3.449 0.603 5.223 0.168 0.083 2.031 22.151 
13 0.521 3.97 0.651 5.874 0.13 0.087 1.497 16.326 
12 0.569 4.539 0.721 6.595 0.152 0.095 1.593 17.373 
11 0.683 5.222 0.792 7.387 0.109 0.11 0.986 10.758- 
10 0.743 5.966 0.874 8.261 0.13 0.127 1.022 11.144 
9 0.844 6.809 0.998 9.259 0.154 0.152 1.015 11.067 
8 0.914 7.724 1.13 10.389 0.216 0.175 1.237 13.495 
7 1.222 8.946 1.267 11.656 0.045 0.188 0.237 2.588 
6 1.773 10.719 1.487 13.142 -0.286 0.226 -1.27 -13.851 
5 1.795 12.514 1.755 14.897 -0.041 0.249 -0.163 -1.78 
4 2.199 14.712 2.112 17.009 -0.087 0.336 -0.259 -2.825 
3 2.34 17.052 2.585 19.593 0.245 0.452 0.543 5.922 
2 3.935 20.987 3.217 22.81 -0.718 0.531 -1.353 -14.755 
1 7.013 28 4.323 27.133 -2.69 0.908 -2.964 -32.333 
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Figure 16 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Diagram - Non Standardized Data - 
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Table 18 Tree Validation Bootstrapping Results - Non Standardized Data - 
SSTP2 Full Set of Variables 
Fusion Cumul. Random Cumul. Absolute Random Standard t 
Clusters Values ESS Means ESS Diff. St. Devs. Errors Statistics 
28 1.817 1.817 2.193 2.193 0.376 1.191 0.315 3.439 
27 1.882 3.699 3.551 5.744 1.67 1.396 1.196 13.043 
26 2.43 6.129 4.652 10.396 2.222 1.651 1.346 14.679 
25 2.434 8.563 5.769 16.164 3.335 1.685 1.979 21.586 
24 2.525 11.088 6.974 23.138 4.449 1.905 2.335 25.476 
23 11.549 22.636 8.177 31.315 -3.372 2.101 -1.605 -17.51 
22 12.478 35.115 9.536 40.851 -2.943 2.305 -1.277 -13.926 
21 13.045 48.16 11.145 51.995 -1.901 2.603 -0.73 -7.966 
20 13.52 61.68 13.055 65.051 -0.464 3.025 -0.154 -1.675 
19 14.373 76.053 15.326 80.377 0.953 3.453 0.276 3.011 
18 18.535 94.589 17.697 98.074 -0.838 3.792 -0.221 -2.412 
17 20.123 114.712 20.501 118.575 0.378 4.247 0.089 0.97 
16 20.989 135.701 24.169 142.743 3.179 5.241 0.607 6.618 
15 28.356 164.057 28.784 171.527 0.428 6.126 0.07 0.762 
14 45.38 209.437 34.225 205.752 -11.155 6.87 -1.624 -17.711 
13 49.438 258.875 41.486 247.238 -7.952 8.091 -0.983 -10.722 
12 55.625 314.5 49.552 296.79 -6.073 9.197 -0.66 -7.203 
11 55.679 370.179 60.113 356.903 4.434 12.646 0.351 3.825 
10 63.9 434.079 77.807 434.71 13.907 16.028 0.868 9.465 
9 145.503 579.581 103.955 538.666 -41.548 22.988 -1.807 -19.716 
8 146.008 725.59 139.924 678.59 -6.084 27.411 -0.222 -2.421 
7 170.921 896.51 185.722 864.312 14.802 37.673 0.393 4.286 
6 174.948 1071.458 260.156 1124.468 85.208 64.117 1.329 14.497 
258.458 1329.917 389.651 1514.119 131.192 68.861 1.905 20.783 
4 619.993 1949.91 577.419 2091.538 -42.574 70.95 -0.6 -6.546 
3 833.54 2783.45 784.672 2876.21 -48.869 135.015 -0.362 -3.948 
2 1968.141 4751.591 1750.243 4626.453 - 
217.898 
189.275 -1.151 -12.558 
1 2137.34 6888.931 2262.479 6888.932 125.139 170.153 0.735 8.023 
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APPENDIX B 
Bootstrap Validation Applied to Proximity Data. 
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Bootstrap Validation V4tthout Replacement - 120 Trials Completed 
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1997 Proximity Data 
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Bootstrap Validation Without Replacement -120 Trials Completed 
APPENDIX C STATISTICAL GLOSSARY 
Agglomerative Method 
A hierarchical clustering procedure that starts with each object 
represented as a single cluster. The two most similar objects or clusters 
are then progressively combined until all of the objects are contained 
within one cluster. (Hair et al 1998) 
Banner Plot The name of this plot stems from the fact that for many examples 
it looks like a waving flag. This display is a variant of the icicle plot. 
The banner allows us to investigate easily the structure of the data set at 
a given level. The overall width of the banner is very important because 
it gives an idea of the amount of structure that has been found by the 
algorithm. This width is presented as an agglomerative coefficient (AC) 
a quantity between 0 and 1. Generally the AC describes the strength of 
the clustering structure that has been obtained. When the AC is very 
small, the corresponding method has not found a natural structure, which 
can be expressed by saying that no clusters have been found, or rather 
that the data consists of one big cluster (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990). 
Best Cut The "best cut" upper tail rule provides a test for the correct number of 
clusters that are present within the data. This test takes the fusion values, 
during the agglomeration process, as a series the computes the mean and 
standard deviation from this series. A t-statistic is produced based upon 
the standardized deviation from the mean. The test then computes the 
standard deviate for each fusion value on this distribution (which is 
assumed to be normal), and selects the first one (i. e. lowest number of 
clusters) as "significant" if its t-value exceeds the 5% level. Thus the null 
hypothesis is that the kth fusion value comes from the normal 
distribution of fusion values (Wishart, 2004). 
Bootstrap Validation 
It is often argued that cluster analysis always finds clusters even where 
there is no true structure present within the data. The bootstrap tree 
validation method starts with the assumption that we expect to find 
structure within the data and to search for partitions that mark the 
greatest departure from random. In statistical terms, we therefore test the 
null hypothesis that the structure displayed by a partition of a given tree 
is random, and seek to reject the hypothesis. 
For a proximity matrix this is accomplished by destroying any structure 
that it contains by randomizing the proximities. Alternatively, we can 
randomize the input data, construct a proximity matrix from it and hence 
obtain a tree. Having obtained a randomised variant of either our original 
477 
data or our proximity matrix, this process is repeated for a series of 
random trials. Each trial generates a different tree for the given data, in 
random order, and the series of trials provide both a mean tree and a 
confidence interval. We then compare the given tree with the randomised 
trees, looking for a significant departure from random. In this way we 
test the null hypothesis that the given data are random, and hence contain 
no structure (Wishart 2004). 
Box's M Test Statistical test for the equality of the covariance matrices of the 
independent variables across the groups of the independent variable. The 
test uses the generalized variances, that is, the determinants of the 
within-covariance matrices. If the statistical significance is greater than 
the critical level (e. g. 0.01), then the equality of the covariance matrices 
is supported. If the test shows statistical significance, then the groups are 
deemed to be different and the assumption of equality is violated. (Hair 
et al 1998) 
Centroid Average or mean value of the objects contained in the cluster on each 
variable, whether used in the cluster variate or in the validation process. 
A cluster centroid therefore is the average value of the objects contained 
in the cluster on all the variables in the cluster variate. (Hair et al 1998) 
Cluster Variate 
Set of variables or characteristics representing the objects to be clustered 
and used to calculate the similarity between objects. (Hair et al 1998) 
Dendrogram A graphical representation or "tree graph" used to display the results of a 
hierarchical clustering procedure. Starting with each object shown as a 
separate cluster, the dendrogram shows graphically how clusters are 
progressively combined until all are contained in a single cluster. (Hair et 
al 1998) 
Divisive method 
A clustering procedure that starts with all of the data combined within 
one cluster. This is then progressively divided into two clusters that 
contain the most dissimilar objects. (Hair et al 1998) 
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Euclidean distance 
The distance between two objects defined as the hypotenuse of a right 
angled triangle drawn between two points. 
Kruskal-Wallis One Way Analysis of Variance 
The Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks is the non- 
parametric alternative to one way analysis of variance. This technique 
tests the null hypothesis that the k samples come from the same 
population. (Siegel 1956). 
Non-hierarchical procedure 
Clustering procedure that produces only one cluster solution. This 
procedure starts with a set of cluster seeds, for example the cluster 
centroids or the tree partitions of a previous clustering procedure, these 
seeds are then used to group objects within a pre specified distance of the 
seeds. Non-hierarchical procedures, unlike hierarchical methods, do not 
produce all possible solutions, only the one requested solution. (Hair et al 
1998) 
Normal Distribution 
Bell shaped symmetrical distribution grouped around the mean where I 
standard deviation either side of the mean includes 68% of the data and 
1.96 standard deviations either side of the mean encompass 95%. It is an 
assumption of all parametric statistical methods that the data tested is 
drawn from a normal distribution. Also referred to as a Gaussian 
distribution. 
Multicollinearity 
The extent to which a variable may be explained by the other variables in 
the analysis. As multicollinearity increases this clouds interpretation 
because it is difficult to discern the effect of any single variable due to 
the inter-relationships between the variables. (Hair et al 1998) 
Scree Test A graphical method where the magnitude of the eigenvalues (vertical 
axis) are plotted against their ordinal numbers (whether it was the first 
eigenvalue, the second, etc). Generally what happens is that the 
magnitude of successive eigenvalues drops off sharply (steep descent) 
and then tends to level off. The recommendation is to retain all 
eigenvalues (and hence components) in the sharp descent before the first 
one on the line where they start to level off. (Stevens 2002 p 389) 
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Ward's Method 
A hierarchical clustering procedure where the similarity used to combine 
objects is represented by the sum of squares of the distance between the 
two objects summed over all variables. The result tends to be spherical 
clusters of a similar size. This is due to the minimization of within-group 
variation. Also called the increase in sum of squares method. (Hair et al 
1998) 
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